What do Sacred Texts teach?
Mīmāṃsā views on Exhortation, Duty, Language, Exegesis and Sacrifice,

including a critical edition and translation of Rāmānujācārya's Tantrarahasya, Śāstraprameyapariccheda

Elisa Freschi

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Preface

I started working on the following text during my PhD, under the tuition of Prof. Raffaele Torella, to whom goes my deepest gratitude, most of all for the freedom he granted me, his confident support, his invaluable insights. Prof. Arindam Chakrabarti strongly encouraged me to translate Rāmānujācārya's Śāstraprameyapariccheda, at a point when I was mainly busy translating the (other) linguistic parts of the Tantrarahasya. I also had the privilege of reading the text in July 2007 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, by Prof. John Taber, who greatly contributed to my understanding of the text. I owe many insightful remarks to Dr. Alessandro Graheli, who also frequently took part in our reading sessions. Finally, throughout these years Prof. Kei Kataoka patiently solved many doubts through longs and –I am afraid– tiring email exchanges.

0.1 How to use this book

TR IV debates many, at first sight disparate, issues. This does not mean that it lacks any inner consistency. The text is indeed weel-organized (as described below, §1.5, but it is targeted for readers quite different from todays' ones. Hence, I chose not to comment the text following its own sequence, as done by John Taber in his exemplary *Kumārila On Perception* (**Taber2005**), because a Western reader would have hardly been able to follow the sense of the paragraphs' sequence. On the other hand, I extensively discussed the themes of TR IV in an introductory study, which is often only a gloss making the text more easily understandable to today's readers. In order to do that, I had to comment in the same chapter paragraphs which are not necessarily close to each other in the text. Whoever wants to better understand the translation is, hence, kindly invited to refer to the pages in the introductory study referring to each paragraph (for a list of paragraphs and pages dealing with them, see Index, p.317).
I could not deal explicitly with all the subjects which constitute a Mīmāṃsaka's background. A brief clarification on each Sanskrit term will be found in the glossary. Further explanation on specific terms can be found in the study and located through the summary and/or the index. I did not list in

the Index the terms for which a separate entry in the Glossary or a distinct § is available.

Part I

Rāmānujācārya and the Tantrarahasya

Chapter 1

Author and text

1.1 Rāmānujācārya

Of Indian authors, Rāmānujācārya offers to modern readers the rather uncommon advantage of being reliable and proficient in both the rival schools of Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā.
Two works by this author are extant: the Nāyakaratna (henceforth NR, a commentary on a Bhāṭṭa work, Pārthasārathi Miśra's Nyāyaratnamālā) and the Tantrarahasya (henceforth TR, where the Prābhākara views are ultimately preferred). That the TR was composed after the NR can be inferred by the fact that the NR is mentioned therein:

> This has been fully explained by us in the commentary, called Nāyakaratna , of the Nyāyaratnamālā[1].

As for the personality of Rāmānujācārya, some interesting information has been collected in the Introduction to the second edition of TR. Most of them have been driven out of his maṅgalas. The following is the one placed at the beginning of TR (I emphasised geographic references):

> Viṣṇu, in the shape of Narasiṃha, shone dwelling *in the town of Dharmapura*. He sits in padmaka position, looking eastwards in front of him towards the *Godāvarī river* || 1 ||
> The broad Dharmapura shines well-situated on the board of the Godāvarī; there descended Viṣṇu in the shape of Narasiṃha. I remember in my heart his [holy] place || 2 ||
> I bow in front of the ascete Jaimini, who composed in sūtras the twelve-chapters Mīmāṃsāsūtra, for the sake of establishing the aim of the Vedic Texts (śruti) || 3 ||
> Victory to the master Śabara, versed in several Veda-branches,

[1] nyāyaratnamālāyā vyākhyāne nāyakaratne prapañcitam asmābhiḥ (TR V, p. 69). A similar expression is also to be found in TR IV, p. 53. All page numbers refer to the 1956 edition.

> who composed a commentary for the sake of clarifying the meaning of the [Mīmāṃsā]-sūtra || 4 ||
> Having considered the force of words and that of meaning in the Vedic Texts, Prabhākara composed two sub-commentaries, the Long and the Short one bearing in mind the deep and synthetic Commentary by Śabara: that Teacher named Prabhākara shall win in the three worlds || 5 ||
> Bearing in mind the Long and the Short Sub-commentaries, Śālikanātha composed, for the sake of clarifying them, respectively the elaborate explanations named the Right and Clear and the Flame of Light || 6 ||
> Similarly, Śālikanātha composed with effort an elaborate explanation (pañcikā) aiming at the understanding of means of knowledge and objects of knowledge, and consisting of several chapters (prakaraṇa) [the verse focuses on the title of the work, i.e. prakaraṇapañcikā] || 7 ||
> Bhavanātha, instead, summarising the two Sub-commentaries and the [three] Elaborate Explanations composed a treatise called Nayaviveka[2], upon which all agree || 8 ||
> And also the two schools (namely the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara) –which sometimes diverge and sometimes not, and which are on an aspect contradictory, but also convergent– are composed [by me] in a teaching called Tantrarahasya according to the utterances of the Teacher Prabhākara || 9 ||
> Here I summarise according to the modalities of the Teacher's school, for the satisfaction of wise people, and in a synthetical way the ascertainment regarding the real means of knowledge, objects of knowledge, and knowledge expounded in the various previous works || 10 ||[3]

Further information on our author may be found in the shorter maṅgalas

[2]See **Bhavanatha**

[3]paśyan godāvarīm agre prāṅmukhaḥ padmakāsanaḥ | narasiṃhavapur viṣṇur avyād dharmapure vasan || 1 || godāvarīrodhasi saṃniviṣṭā garīyasī dharmapurī cakāsti | tatrāvatīrṇasya nṛsiṃhamūrtter viṣṇoḥ padaṃ cetasi saṃsmarāmi || 2 || namāmi jaiminimuniṃ yena dvādaśalakṣaṇī | mīmāṃsā nirmitā sūtraiḥ śrutitātparyasiddhaye || 3 || sa jīyāc chabarasvāmī nānāśākhāsu viśrutaḥ | sūtrārthaṃ viśadīkartuṃ yena bhāṣyam abhaṣyata || 4 || ālocya śabdabalam arthabalaṃ śrutīnāṃ ṭīkādvayaṃ vyaracayad bṛhatīṃ ca laghvīṃ | bhāṣyaṃ gabhīram adhikṛtya mitākṣaraṃ yaḥ so 'yaṃ prabhākaragurur jayati trilokyām || 5 || bṛhatīṃ tathaiva laghvīṃ ṭīkām adhikṛtya śālikānāthaḥ | ṛjuvimalāṃ dīpaśīkhāṃ viśadārthām akṛta pāñcikāṃ kramaśaḥ || 6 || tathānyāṃ śālikānātho nānāprakaraṇātmikām | mānameyavivekārthaṃ cakre yatnena pañcikām || 7 || ṭīkādvayaṃ pañcikāś ca bhavanāthas tu saṃkṣipan | cakre nayavivekākhyaṃ prabandhaṃ sarvasaṃmatam || 8 || bhinnaṃ kvacit kutracid apy abhinnaṃ viruddham ekatra tathāviruddham | tantradvayaṃ cāpi gurūktarītyā vitanyate tantrarahasyaśikṣā || 9 || pūrvapūrvakṛtiṣu prapañcitaṃ mānameyamitititattvanirṇayam | saṃksipāmi gurutantranītibhiḥ prītaye 'tra viduṣāṃ mitākṣaram || 10 ||

placed before TR IV and V:

> Instructed by the Guru Śrī Veṅkaṭādri, because of his mercy, in the Vedāntabhāṣya composed by the noble Rāmānuja, and aiming at [showing] the different nature of God and individual soul (jīva), Rāmānuja composed the teaching called Tantrarahasya[4].

On the identity of this Veṅkaṭādri, see infra, 1.1.3.
And:

> Hail all over earth to the teacher Jātavedas, the sacrificer, who reached the supreme level as regards means of knowledge, sentence and words!
> Rāmāṇuja made the Tantrarahasya for the sake of others, having repeatedly seen the connaturated feebleness of mind, body and sense organs[5].

Of Jātavedas, as well as of the other preceptors mentioned in his other work, the Nāyakaratna , there are only tentative identifications made by Ramaswami Śāstrī in his Introduction to the TR edition (**TR1956**).
Lastly, at the very end of TR, our author adds a conclusion on the aim of his work and in praise of Viṣṇu. The second verse is a *śliṣṭa*, a verse bearing two possible meanings at the same time. It suits well Rāmānujācārya's Mīmāṃsaka-Śrīvaiṣṇava nature.

> This Tantrarahasya has been well composed with suitable words and according to a fit order [of arguments] for the sake of those whose minds desire to enter into the deep beginning of the ocean of the Guru's school and hence go until the other bank. It is formed of groups of syllogisms going along the paths of every inferior [opposite] school || 1 ||
> That (prescription) which shines in the last boundary of the Veda, having as sphere of application a real performative capacity, which orders to human beings the ritual they have to perform according to their responsibility, which receives a manifold auxiliary with all the subsidiaries of all principal [rituals], this prescription increases visibly like Viṣṇu, and it resides in many descents.

Or:

[4] rāmānujāryaracite nigamāntabhāṣye jīveśvaraprakṛtibhedapare vinītaḥ | śrīveṅkaṭādriguruṇā karuṇāvaśena rāmānujo vyadhita tantrarahasyaśikṣām || (TR V, p. 65).

[5] padavākyapramāṇeṣu parāṃ kāṣṭām upāgataḥ | jātavedogurur yajvā jayati kṣitimaṇḍale || karaṇakalebaramanasāṃ śaithilyaṃ sahajam asakṛd ālocya |tantrarahasyaṃ kṛtavān rāmāvarajaḥ paropakārārtham || For further notes on the text, see the translation of TR IV below

> That (God) who shines in the last boundary of the Veda, having the power to create the existent, who rules over human beings according to their respective karmaṇ and following an order suitable to their responsibilities, who receives through all the bodies of all people a manifold ornament, this creator, having as support many descents on earth, prospers in his bodily form as Viṣṇu[6].

Before writing his introduction to the second printed edition of TR (1956), Ramaswami Śāstri published a study on Rāmānujācārya in 1938-9 (**RamaswamiSastri1938** Although no essay has been devoted to him after those ones and apart from the present author's ones (**Freschi2007 Freschi2008a Freschi2008b**), Rāmānujācārya has been read and used by many scholars[7], because of its references to former authors, because of its clarity and because of the objective approach of its author, but also due to the scarsity of available primers on Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā.

1.1.1 A Theist Mīmāṃsaka

A few words are worthy to be added on the apparent paradox of a Mīmāṃsaka being at the same time a Śrīvaiṣṇava. Śrī Vaiṣṇavism underlines pleasing and serving God as the first and foremost duty for all human beings. Although such a worldview could seem to contrast the one held by Mīmāṃsakas, as a matter of fact contacts between the two schools of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and (in particular) Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā have always been intense. Śrī Vaiṣṇavas borrowed from Mīmāṃsakas, and from Prābhākaras in particular, many tenets (such as the svataḥprāmāṇyavāda, the kind of validity attributed to the Veda –deemed to be apauruṣeya, although the school is stricly theistic–, and the anvitābhidhānavāda). Moreover, Śrī Vaiṣṇavas used Mīmāṃsaka texts and rules for the sake of accomplishing rituals agreeable to God in the best way, and Prabhākara's point of view on the precedence of the dutiness in regard to any desired goal to be achieved through its accomplishment could well fit the ideal of a gratuitous service to God.

Furthermore, although I cannot now approach the issue of how should Mīmāṃsaka atheism be interpreted, it is sure that later Mīmāṃsakas understood it as a rather methodological devise. They denied, e.g., the Naiyāyika God, employed in order to provide an external foundation to the world and

[6] gambhīraṃ gurutantrasāgaramukhaṃ ye 'ntaḥ praveṣṭuṃ tataḥ tatpāraṃ prati yātum utsukadhiyas teṣāṃ kṛte nirmitam | samyak tantrarahasyam etad ucitaiḥ śabdaiś ca yogyakramaṃ nyagbhūtapratitantramārgagatibhir nyāyavrajair yojitam || 1 || āmnāyāntimasīmani sphurati yas sadbhāvanāgocaraḥ sve sve karmaṇi yaḥ praśāsti puruṣaṃ yogyādhikārakramāt | ādatte vividhopakāram akhilair aṅgair aśeṣāṅgināṃ sākṣād viṣṇur ivaidhate vidhir asau nānāvatārāśrayaḥ || 2 || Translation of the second verse is still tentative.

[7] Among others, **Halbfass1980**280; **Sarma1987**xi, **Mohanty1966**6, **Siderits1986**CHECK, **Schmithausen1991**83, **Yoshimizu1994**

the Veda. But, as can be seen in various works (such as Āpadeva's MNP and Nārāyaṇa's Mānameyodaya), and in the TR itself, they did not feel at odds in praising God in a devotional way. Hence, I may suggest that, though denying to deities any philosophical role, from a religious point of view they honoured their iṣṭadevatā.

An interesting example of the contrast between the two points of view is TR IV §C.9.4.5, where the author says that "Dharmamīmāṃsakas" cannot accept that it is God who bestows the desired result to the sacrificers, thus leaving the question open as if he would subscribe to this view.

Another example of the contacts between Vaiṣṇavism and Mīmāṃsā in South India is Veṅkaṭādhvarin (or Vedānta Deśika, ca 1590-1660 according to V.A. Rāmasvāmī Śāstrī in his Introduction to **Tattvabindu1936**), a great poet and a Mīmāṃsaka, who could possibly be identified with the preceptor mentioned by Rāmānujācārya in his maṅgala at the beginning of TR V (see above)[8].

1.1.2 Rāmānujācārya's dates: internal evidences

Rāmānujācārya's dates are far from certain. He quotes extensively from works by Pārthasārathi and –less extensively– by Bhavanātha, proving that he was not active before the twelfth century, but he does not quote from any later authors. Unfortunately, I do not know of any quotations from his works in other texts, which would also enable us to date him more precisely. Rāmānujācārya must also have lived after Śrī Rāmānuja (possibly 1170-1280), the founder of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism, whose name he bears and whose tradition he follows, as shown by the maṅgala found at the beginning of TR V (see above)[9].

Further, the arguments Rāmānujācārya deals with closely resemble those treated by Āpadeva (XVII century) (see also infra, 1.4). Although no direct quotation has so far been found by me, this general similarity could suggest that their cultural habitat was similar (see infra). However, a similarity limited to just some of the themes shared by Āpadeva and Rāmānujācārya (such as the four types of prescriptions, see infra) can be found even in earlier Mīmāṃsaka or Mīmāṃsā-indebted texts. An interesting example in this regard is Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, which also deals with some Prābhākara issues and is somehow a "cousin" of the TR as it is indebted to Śālikanātha Miśra's Vākyārthamātṛkā. Moreover, our author displays a keen interest in the MS's tarkapāda, an interest which usually weakens in later authors. Unfortunately, this last argument (which I borrow from Lawrence

[8](rāmānujāryaracite nigamāntabhāṣye jīveśvaraprakṛtibhedapare vinītaḥ | śrīveṅkaṭādriguruṇā karuṇāvaśena rāmānujo vyadhita tantrarahasyaśikṣām ||). TR V, p. 65

[9](rāmānujāryaracite nigamāntabhāṣye jīveśvaraprakṛtibhedapare vinītaḥ | śrīveṅkaṭādriguruṇā karuṇāvaśena rāmānujo vyadhita tantrarahasyaśikṣām ||). TR V, p. 65

McCrea[10]) cannot be conclusive as Rāmānujācārya is often more interested in the tarkapāda than Śālikanātha himself, as can be seen, e.g., from the way his TR IV opens.
Lastly, some passages in TR I are identical to the ones found in the Bhāṭṭa primer Mānameyodaya, written probably in the first half of the xvi century. As the Prābhākara view is presented there as a pūrvapakṣa, and as the TR often develops longer the Prābhākara theses, the Mānameyodaya cannot be thought as a direct source of Rāmānujācārya. It is more likely that both share a common language, possibly due to some (maybe remote) common source. Some passages of TR I, moreover, reveal some similarities with the style commonly used in primers influenced by the Nāvya Nyāya (such as the xvi century Tarkasaṅgraha of Annambhaṭṭa, who wrote also Mīmāṃsaka works[11]).

1.1.3 Rāmānujācārya's dates: scholars' opinions

One of the rare excursuses on post-classic Mīmāṃsā (Rāmaswāmi's learned introduction to the Tattvabindu) collocates Rāmānujācārya «C. A.D. 1750», but does not explain the grounds for this late date[12]. This is probably driven out of the Introduction to the first edition of the TR, by R. Shamashastry:

> Little or nothing is known about the date of the author. [...] Judging by the style of his work, it may be presumed that he was not older that the 18th century A.D. and later than Khaṇḍadeva and Anantadeva, who all lived at the close of the 17th century A.D.[13].

The learned author of the second printed edition of the TR, Pt. K.S. Ramaswami Sastri Śiromaṇi, in his introduction, has carefully analysed any available evidence for the author's dates. On the strength of "the genealogical details of the author, available from an existing member of this ancient family, at Tirupati", of a NR manuscript which can be dated to A.D. 1595, and of tentative identifications of the teachers Rāmānujācārya mentions, he he concludes:

> Under these circumstances, it seems reasonable to identify our author's preceptor Veṅkaṭādri with Veṅkaṭanātha Deśika and place him a little later than the middle of the 14th century A.D. In any case, he cannot, as already made out, be placed later than 1595 A.D., the date of the Poona MS, already referred to.

[10]Personal Communication in Paris, July 2004. See also **McCrea2000**

[11]I.e. the Subodhinī on the TV and the Rāṇakaphakkikavyākhyā on the Nyāyasudhā of Someśvara.

[12]**Tattvabindu1936**

[13]**TR1923**

> This date cannot be doubted as a copyist's error because the entry of a date is a simple matter and also because there is no indication anywhere that the author should be brought down to a period later than the 16th century. Regarding the simplicity of his style, on which Dr. Śāma Śāstri placed great reliance, it may be remarked that this style is a common feature almost of every age. The author cannot be brought down to a period so late as the 18th century, because he does not quote any author who lived later than Pārthasārathi . Also, because he is not quoted by any other writer, he cannot be taken to a very early period. Under these circumstances, [...] it would be reasonable to place him in a period ranging between 1350-1575 A.D[14].

More precisely,

> In case, we approve of this identification of Jātavedaguru, the Mīmāṃsā teacher of our author Rāmānuja, with this Jātavedaguru, the father of Nīlakaṇṭhasomasutvan of Kerala, the date of Rāmānuja who learnt from him may also be safely fixed at 1500 A.D. The MS of the Nāyakaratna copied in 1595 A.D. and now preserved in the B.O.R.I. also would then corroborate with this date of our author Rāmānujācārya. In this case it will not be possible to identify his other preceptor Veṅkaṭādri as Vedānta Deśika who flourished between 1269-1369 A.D[15].

If, on the other hand, one identifies Veṅkaṭādri with Veṅkaṭanātha Miśra, Rāmānujācārya would have lived "a little later than the middle of the 14th century A.D" (**TR1956** lxxv).

1.1.4 Rāmānujācārya's dates: concluding remarks

Until the present time, I could not see the manuscript here referred to by Ramaswami Śāstri. I started checking whether Veṅkaṭanātha's Seśvaramīmāṃsā ('Mīmāṃsā with a Lord') is directly or indirectly quoted in the TR or in the NR but, until now, found no positive evidence of that (the choice of the Seśvaramīmāṃsā among the many works of Veṅkaṭanātha is due to its closer link to the themes dealt with in the TR).
For further material evidences, see infra, Introduction to the critical edition,B.2.

1.2 The Tantrarahasya

The TR consists of five chapters, each of very different length. The first chapter (16pp.) deals with the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) (with the

[14] **TR1956**lxxv-lxxvi.
[15] **TR1956**lxxvii.

exception of verbal knowledge, which is dealt with in the third chapter);the second chapter (5 pp.) treats the contents of knowledge (prameya), focusing on whether a form (ākṛti) or an individual is known through a cognitive act. The third (20 pp.) and the fourth (23 pp.) chapters somehow constitute a unit that deals with verbal knowledge and the Veda from two point of views: verbal knowledge and the Veda as a means of knowledge (śāstra) is dealt with in the third chapter, whilst the fourth chapter focuses on the kinds of contents that can be known thereby (śāstraprameya). Finally, the fifth chapter ($8\frac{1}{2}$ pp.) discusses the first sūtra of the MS and the necessity of studying Mīmāṃsā.

As testified both by their size (two thirds of the whole TR, whereas the second chapter covers less then one twelfth) and by their elaboration, chapters III and IV of the TR constitute the bulk of the treatise, both from a quantitative and a qualitative point of view. Their composition is modelled on the two chapters of Śālikanātha's Vākyārthamātṛkā (henceforth VM), which also deal with vākya (sentence) and vidhi (prescription), respectively. The essential connection of the two subjects is explained by Śālikanātha at the beginning of VM I:

> In this regard, those who maintain that the sentence means something which has to be done (kārya) recognise verbal action, effort (bhāvanā) and duty non-preceded (apūrva) [by any other means of knowledge] as the sentence-meanings. Of these, it must be established that only the apūrva is the sentence-meaning. This is based on the fact that words express [the sentence-meaning] once related, hence the author firstly clears this up[16].

In short, the main purpose of the VM and of TR III-IV is to explain the function of prescriptions, but in order to do this, a previous understanding of the way language expresses its meaning is necessary.

A brief note should perhaps be made that the third and fourth chapters each have a maṅgala. Hence, they may originally have been composed independently of the other chapters and then inserted into a larger structure at a later date. The other chapters might have been composed in order to place the actual intention of the author, namely an enquiry into vedaprāmāṇya and its contents, into a wider epistemological context.

The following extracts point at the interconnection of chapters i, ii and iii, and at their common purpose:

> Since our motive is just the inquiry into the meaning of the Veda, we shall not devote too much application on this subject [written

[16]tatra kāryavākyārthavādina eva bhāvam, bhāvanām, apūrvañ ca vākyārthān pratijānate. tatrāpūrvam eva vākyārtha iti sādhanīyam. tasya mūlaṃ padānām anvitābhidhāyiteti, tām eva tāvad ādau pariśodhayati.

> at the end of the general discussion on the means of knowledge][17].
> Among those (inferential cognitions), whilst dealing with Verbal Communication as instrument of knowledge we will say that the validity of worldly utterances is inferentially derived[18].
> At its own place, we shall extensively deal with Verbal Communication as instrument of knowledge [written after having explained the other four means of knowledge][19].
> We shall not insist too much on this subject as it is of no use in the inquiry into the meaning of the Veda [written after having explained the other four means of knowledge][20].
> At its own place, we will speak of Verbal Communication [written at the end of the chapter on means of knowledge][21].
> As it is of no use for the enquiry into the meaning of the Veda we shall not persevere on this subject [written after enunciating the qualities' modalities and before discussing karman, action/ritual action][22].
> Means of knowledge, objects of knowledge and knowledge have been explained in this way. Now will be explained the instrument of knowledge called Verbal Communication [written at the beginning of TR III][23].

1.3 Quotations in the Tantrarahasya

Quotations, both direct and indirect are frequent in the TR. However, Rāmānujācārya almost never quotes a passage exactly as it is to be found in its source text. From this point of view, he follows Śabara Svāmin's footsteps, as can be inferred from Damodar Vishnu Garge's words:

> Most of the passages cited in the Bhāṣya, again do not correspond precisely in language to their source-texts. [...] While citing passages from older literature, Vedic or post-Vedic, the Bhāṣyakāra, more often than not, resorts to devices such as adapting and summarising the original passage in order to suit the trend of the Mīmāṃsā discussion. The number of inexact citations in the Bhāṣya is far larger than that of the exact ones –so much so that one is tempted to advance the view that Śabara

[17] nāsmākaṃ tatrātyantābhiyogaḥ vedārthavicāramātrapravṛttatvāt (TR I, p.8).

[18] tatra laukikavacasām anumānaveṣeṇa prāmāṇyaṃ śabdapramāṇāvasare vakṣyāmaḥ (TR I, p. 12).

[19] śabdaṃ tu pramāṇaṃ svāvasare nirāpayiṣyāmaḥ (TR I, p.14).

[20] vedārthavicārānupayogān nāsmākaṃ tatrātinirbandhaḥ (TR I, p.14).

[21] śābdaṃ svāvasare vakṣyāmaḥ (TR I, p.16).

[22] vedārthavicārānupayogān nāsmākaṃ tatrābhiniveśaḥ (TR II, p. 18).

[23] itthaṃmānameyamitayo nirūpitāḥ. atha śābdaṃ pramāṇaṃ nirūpyate (TR III, p. 22).

quotes from memory many, if not a majority, of them[24].

1.4 Sources

Rāmānujācārya excerpts from Śālikanātha's VM many passages, which he nevertheless rarely reproduces literally. Instead, he enlarges obscure passages and shortens too long excursuses. Hence, although the source can be easily identified, one has to compare the sense rather than the linguistic material. Moreover, Rāmānujācārya does not follow Śālikanātha's order whilst dealing with his subject matter. He also neglects many of the issues touched by Śālikanātha. On the other hand, he himself introduces long sections on crucial points absolutely absent in the VM. These insertions are easily understandable, as Rāmānuja has the advantage/disadvantage of dealing with language and prescriptions from a Prābhākara point of view after Pārthasārathi Miśra's major works, deemed at defending the Bhāṭṭa views against Śālikanātha's ones. Accordingly, Pārthasārathi is the second main source of TR III-IV. In this connection, it is worth remembering that Rāmānujācārya himself commented upon Pārthasārathi's Nyāyaratnamālā. Therefore, the passages of Pārthasārathi are mostly driven out of that work, especially out of § VN. Among Śālikanātha's writings, Rāmānujācārya does not quote only passages of his VM, although those are in overwhelming number. Other chapters of the PrP are also present (viṣayakaraṇiyaprakaraṇa, aṅgaprakaraṇa, etc.). As for other possible sources, only parallel passages (but no direct quotation) have been found in Vācaspati's commentary to the Vidhiviveka, the Nyāyakaṇikā. However, since Vācaspati has been one of the most important sources of Pārthasārathi Miśra, the similarities between Vācaspati and Rāmāṇujācārya may be only indirect ones. Unfortunately, I could not find any evidence of a direct source chronologically posterior to Pārthasārathi Miśra and Bhāvanātha. Of particular interest is the relationship between our text and Āpadeva's. Parallel passages are many and frequent. In general, MNP and TR share most terms and problems. In one case (TR IV §C.4.2.4, about puroḍāśāvaruddhe yāge), the TR text is hardly understandable at all if one does not refer to the larger context, explained in MNP. However, I could not find any direct quotation either of MNP in TR or of TR in MNP. Moreover, MNP disregards some of the solutions offered by TR (see for instance MNP §§390-1 which do not deal with the proposal that the verbal ending aims at expressing the agent's number) and, vice versa, TR does not answer to some of the objections raised in MNP and it does not follow its systematic sequence in dealing with Mīmāṃsā matters. This latter fact is probably more significant than the former, as Rāmānujācārya's TR (possibly because it was a Prābhākara work) does not seem to have been widely reknown. On the other hand, MNP seems to have been commonly

[24]**Garge1952**

used by Bhāṭṭa scholars. If we assume Rāmānujācārya to be younger than Āpadeva, it is hence odd to explain why he did not drive passages from the MNP, which defends Pārthasārathi Miśra's siddhāntas.
In sum, I can only say that both works seem to have been inspired by similar concerns and hence could belong to a similar cultural age/situation (Āpadeva having lived in the xvii century Maratha).

1.4.1 Śālikanātha and Rāmānujācārya

In many cases, Rāmānujācārya's text is easier than Śālikanātha's one, and this is not surprising, since the former was overtly trying to write an accessible introduction to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā (see his maṅgala to TR IV). However, in a few cases, a passage in TR IV is hardly understandable but for its VM II model. Does Rāmānujācārya avoid spelling too much out because it was obvious for his readers or does he presuppose that they already knew the VM? Some instances: tatkaraṇasya meaning itikartavyatākaraṇasya in TR IV §C.3.7.2 (could be understood also out of context, if one is at home with the matter), an ambiguous *te* in §C.3.13.2 referring not to the immediately preceding *jñānājñāne*, but to *praśnaḥ prativacanaṃ ca* mentioned before (could be understood out of context, but the editorial work is here not so smooth). More evident examples: in TR IV §C.3.15, a *tasyāḥ* refers to an unuttered *pravṛtteḥ*, as can be understood from the VM parallel only.

1.4.2 Pārthasārathi and Rāmānujācārya

Most of what has been said in regard to and Rāmānujācārya also applies to the author's relation to Pārthasārathi . TR IV §C.9.5.1 (about the closeness to a well-known word –prasiddhapadasamabhivyāhāra– as a way to settle the meaning of an unknown word) is rather unconnected with the argumentation's structure. In fact, the *prasiddhapadasamabhivyāhāra* in the context of the ascertainment of the meaning of liṅ assumes the following significance. Through connection with a *niyojya*, one understands that the liṅ do not indicate a kriyā as kārya (kriyākārya) but rather a kārya distinct from the kriyā, an apūrva kārya. Rāmānujācārya may have felt the specification needless because he knew (and assumed, his readers also knew?) the corresponding NRM passage: yadā hi phalakāminiyojyasamabhivyāhārāt kriyātiriktam apūrvaṃ liṅādyabhidheyam āsthitaṃ tadā na kriyāyā api tadabhidheyatvaṃ sukalpam (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 10, p. 305).

1.5 Structure of TR IV

TR IV is composed of four symmetrical parts. The first part (up to §C.4, according to my partition of the work) deals with the Bhāṭṭa discussion concerning the contents of the Veda, that is, the linguistic bhāvanā and

the purpose[-oriented] bhāvanā. The second part (§C.4.1-§C.7) applies this theory to Vedic passages. The third part (§C.8.1-§C.10.11) deals with the Prābhākara understanding of what the Veda's contents are, that is, "what must be done" which is conveyed by Vedic injunctions and which cannot be known through any other instrument of knowledge (hence, it is 'unprecedented' by all of them, apūrva). Finally, the fourth part (§C.11 to the end) applies the Prābhākara theory to Vedic passages.

Part II

Analysis of the content of TR IV

Chapter 2

Exhortation

2.1 Bhāvanā and Vidhi according to the Bhāṭṭas

2.1.1 State of the research

The two topics of action and inducement to action are closely connected in Mīmāṃsā, but not always in the rest of Indian philosophy. Hence, I will focus mainly on studies taking into account their nexus.
A short –and very correct– account of bhāvanā in English is **Edgerton1929** Franklyn Edgerton's translation of Āpadeva's MNP also makes the Mīmāṃsā text approachable and enjoyable.
Frauwallner1938 is –as usual with Erich Frauwallner's works– surprisingly clear and accurate and it should be recommended as still the best discussion of the Mīmāṃsā theory of bhāvanā. Of particular relevance is the detailed discussion of the opposition between Kumārila and Maṇḍana, and, later Pārthasārathi and Someśvara. However, unfortunately Frauwallner never wrote the announced second part of the essay, namely, the one on vidhi.
V.A. Rāmasvāmī Śāstrī, the learned editor of the Tattvabindu and of the excellent excursus on Mīmāṃsā authors preceding it, published two studies on bhāvanā and, although more laterally, vidhi in 1951 and 1952 (the former dealing closer with Mīmāṃsā). The studies are correct and informative about the inner-Indian debate on the import of verbal endings.
The number of studies about bhāvanā is much higher than that of the ones about vidhi. Moreover, the last ones are often more concerned with the Nāvya-Nyāya theory of vidhi than with the Mīmāṃsā one (although the former is surely indebted to the latter).
To the problem of what signifies a prescription[1] and to how this, in turn, prompts people, Hiroshi Marui dedicated his 1989 essay *What Prompts Peo-*

[1]As with the English terms "prescription", "instigation", "exhortation", etc., vidhi indicates both a prescriptive sentence and its exhortative core (more precisely called vidhitattva in TR). I distinguished the two aspects by calling the former "prescription" and the latter "prescriptive force".

ple to Follow injunctions?: An Elucidation of the Correlative Structure of Interpretations of vidhi and Theories of Action, which is insightful and accurate at the same time. Marui adopts the standpoint of Udayana –who seems to have been deeply influenced by the Mīmāṃsā theories– and does not discuss at length Mīmāṃsā theories. The essay proposes the foundation of a new field of investigation, entirely dedicated to vidhi, both from the linguistic point of view (which linguistic element expresses the prescriptive force?) and from the pragramatic point of view (how does the prescriptive force prompt a person to commence an action?). Unfortunately, Marui's call has not been largely echoed, at least in Europe.

Further studies on vidhi and bhāvanā have been published in India. In particular, Rajendra Nāth Śarma dedicated several books to the translation and comment of Śālikanātha Miśra's Vākyārthamātṛkā (**Sarma1987 Sarma1988 Sarma1990** XXX); Brahmamitra Avasthi translated it into Hindī and Kanchana Natarajan translated and commented Maṇḍana Miśra's Vidhiviveka (**Natarajan1995**). V.P. Bhatta's translation and study of Maṇḍana's BhV deserves a special mention, because of its accuracy (**Bhatta1994**). Within the Proceedings of the Winter Institute on Ancient Indian Theories on Sentence-Meaning (1980) K.N. Chatterjee, Jayashree Gune and Vachaspati Upadhyaya wrote on vidhi-related subjects(**Chatterjee1980 Gune1980 Upadhyaya1980**). In the same volume, D.V. Garge dedicates a short article to prescriptions, especially to what conveys a prescriptive force, according to Maṇḍana Miśra (**Garge1980**). The article is not innovative, but it clearly summarises the debate about the linguistic aspect of prescriptions in the Vidhiviveka. This discusses three alternatives: the optative and the other exhortative endings constitute themselves the prescriptive force; the optative's function (vyāpāra) constitute the prescriptive force; the prescriptive force is the meaning of the optative and the other exhortative endings. The latter is the option favoured by Maṇḍana Miśra. All of them are examined also by Rāmānujācārya (see below, §§C.3.4, C.3.5, C.3.13, C.3.17). However, unfortunately one can profit from all these studies only side-by-side with the Sanskrit texts which inspired them, due to their close reliance on Sanskrit patterns[2] (for further details, see bibliography). V.P. Bhatta's work may be a partial exception, since it can be understood –by scholars who know the specific terminology involved– even without the Sanskrit original. Still, it follows closely Maṇḍana's argumentative structure and does not, therefore, aim at offering a general introduction to the linguistic expression of exhortation and action in Mīmāṃsā.

Lastly, Irene Wicher has unfortunately not published yet her German translation and study of the Vākyārthamātṛkā, which greatly improves on her

[2]Cf. the following sentence: "According to Āpadeva, a Vedic word of injunction denotes instrumentality of the desired end, based on the act of prescription, and qualified by the state of being the impellent force" (**Chatterjee1980**).

PhD thesis on the same subject (**Wicher1987**

2.1.2 Mīmāṃsā linguistic investigations

The Mīmāṃsā inquiry on the way sacrificial prescriptions work starts with a survey on what linguistic element expresses a prescriptive (i.e., exhortative) meaning. As most other Indian authors, Mīmāṃsā thinkers assume that every morpheme has a distinct meaning which is made explicit by means of a paraphrase (vivaraṇa[3]). In case of prescriptions, the linguistic elements most likely to express an exhortative meaning are the verbal endings commonly associated with prescriptions, namely the endings denoting the optative (called liṅ by Indian Grammars and also in Mīmāṃsā), the imperative (loṭ), the Vedic subjunctive (leṭ) and the gerundive (tavya); moreover, due to the Mīmāṃsā stress on the point of view of the listener, also present indicative forms may convey an exhortative meaning, if the semantics of the passage requires an exhortative meaning. From now onwards I will refer to all these cases, for brevity's sake, just as "exhortative" verbal endings in this introduction and as "optative and other suffixes" (from the Sanskrit liṅādi, lit. 'the [group] beginning with optative', in the following translation).
Due to their chronological priority and to their link with the influential theory of ritual elaborated by the Mīmāṃsā authors, Mīmāṃsā linguistic theories extensively influenced all other philosophical schools. More in detail, the Mīmāṃsā approach predominates even over the Vyākaraṇa 's one whenever accounts of the agentive component of verbs or of exhortative sentences are at stake. Notwithstanding the peculiarity of the Mīmāṃsā point of view sketched above, and since Western theories of language consider exhortative expressions as less prototypical and regard instead affirmative sentences as the standard, Mīmāṃsā theories may have some significance in proposing new fields of investigation for today's analyses, too.

2.1.3 Bhāvanā and vidhi

The causative verbal noun bhāvanā ('causing to be') is a recurrent term in Sanskrit philosophy. It designates, for instance, an impression as cause of memory and intuition, a peculiar meditation in Buddhism and in Kashmir Śivaism, a linguistic function in Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka's aesthetic theory, etc. It is also used in various sense by Bhartṛhari (see, for instance, Vākyapādīya II.27, II.116, II.146, II.151) and by other Vyākaraṇa authors.
It was probably introduced into Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics by Śabara (see, e.g., his commentary ad MS 2.1.1) in order to denote the undertaking of an activity by a person, designated by the verbal endings (ākhyāta) and directed to an object. This undertaking is, however, not identical to the action itself,

[3]For this technical term, see **Cardona1975**

and, hence, the term can also be translated as 'effort' or 'initiation of the action'. Such an undertaking (and the ensuing activity) is further specified by its requirement (ākāṅkṣā) of an object, an instrument and a procedure (respectively answering the questions "What [does one do]?", "Through what?" and "How?").

object to be brought about, e.g., heaven
↗
bhāvanā → instrument, e.g., sacrifice
↘
procedure, e.g., rites composing the sacrifice

Conforming to the Pan-Indian style of making the meaning of a linguistic element explicit through a paraphrase, Śabara paraphrases the standard Mīmāṃsā example of prescription, svargakāmo yajeta ("One who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice"), as yāgena svargo bhavati ("Through sacrifice, heaven occurs"):
svargakāmaḥ ('one who is desirous of heaven') → svargaḥ ('heaven')
yaj- (verbal root 'to sacrifice') → yāgena ('through sacrifice')
-ta (optative suffix) → bhavati ('occurs')

In the words of the much later Āpadeva, author of a well-known Bhāṭṭa primer,

> And this word-efficient-force (like any activity) requires (presupposes) three elements: the end (or aim), the means (or instrument, by which it operates to reach its end), and the manner (method, way in which the operation is performed)[4].

Here an object/aim (svargaḥ, 'heaven'), according to the polysemy of the Sanskrit term artha, of particular relevance within Mīmāṃsā, see MS 1.1.5 et passim, is pointed out; the root of the verb is read as an instrument (yāgena, 'through sacrifice'), and the verbal action is designated by the verbal ending alone (bhavati, 'occurs', lit. 'is'). Noticeably, yajeta ('[One] should sacrifice') is rendered with a substantive in the instrumental case ("through sacrifice"), paraphrasing the verbal root, and with the verb "occurs", which is used to express the mere "verbal", "active" component of the verb. In fact, the present indicative of the verb "to be" is used to paraphrase the active component of the verb and is assumed to be not in need of further analysis. Mīmāṃsā authors identify this active component as the peculiarity of inflected verbal endings (unlike nouns, verbal roots, etc.) and label it bhāvanā ("force", lit. 'causing to be'). Hence, an inflected verbal ending is characterised by its capacity to cause a certain aim to occur by means of what is

[4] **Edgerton1929** sā ca śabdī bhāvanāṃśatrayam apekṣate: sādhyaṃ sādhanam itikartavyatāṃ ceti (MNP, 7, p. 194).

expressed by the verbal root. As described long ago by Erich Frauwallner, the above said paraphrase

> [...] is only possible because the word yajeta [‘[One] should sacrifice’] is split into two, because one believed to recognise in it, besides the concept of sacrifice, that of effecting (Bewirken), and this effecting is what is called bhāvanā by the Mīmāṃsā. We can also for the time being say that according to the Mīmāṃsā view the bhāvanā is the activity expressed by a verb besides the object of the verbal root[5].

Later on, Kumārila noticed that such an explanation does not account for the exhortative character of forms such as yajeta (‘[One] should sacrifice’), lacking in others such as yajati (‘[One] sacrifices’). Therefore, he introduced a further force, called śabdabhāvanā (‘linguistic force’), peculiar to exhortative forms and explaining their faculty to compel whoever listens to them to perform the action indicated by the verbal root. The śabdabhāvanā is constructed symmetrically to Śabara’s bhāvanā and bears, hence, the same expectations for an object, an instrument and a procedure.
Hence, he analysed the two forms as follows:

yajati: yaj- (yāgena, ‘through sacrifice’) + -ti (bhavati, ‘occurs’)
yajeta: yaj- (yāgena, ‘through sacrifice’) + -ta (bhāvayet, ‘should cause to occur’)

An exhortative verbal ending and its paraphrase (bhāvayet, being itself an optative) express both the general active component (called bhāvanā), common to every inflected verbal ending, and the exhortative component (śabdabhāvanā), peculiar of exhortative endings.

active component (bhāvanā)
↗
-ta
↘
exhortative component (śabdabhāvanā)

This is possible because according to the formal depiction of language typical of both Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa , a finite verbal ending can be further

[5]«[...] Das ist aber nur dadurch möglich, daß das Wort yajeta in zwei Teile zerlegt wurde, daß man in ihm neben dem Begriff des Opfers den Begriff des Bewirkens erkennen zu können glaubte, und dieses Bewirken ist es, was die Mīmāṃsā als bhāvanā bezeichnet. Wir können also vorläufig sagen, daß nach der Auffassung der Mīmāṃsā die bhāvanā die Tätigkeit ist, welche vom Verbum neben dem Gegenstand des Stammes zum Ausdruck gebracht wird» (**Frauwallner1938**

analysed as containing a finite verbal component (ākhyātatva), which is common to all finite verbal endings, as well as a specific modal component. This modal component is briefly called liṅtva (lit. 'optativeness') in the case of exhortative verbal endings (that is, the verbal endings of optative, imperative and subjunctive). In a single ending these two components are both present and cannot be distinguished morphologically:

ākhyātatva
↗
-ta
↘
liṅtva

This linguistic force has nothing to do with the actual performance of the action, for it operates purely on a linguistic level; and Kumārila in fact named it "linguistic". At that point, he had to qualify also the other bhāvanā, the one theorised by Śabara. In opposition to śabdabhāvanā (or śābdībhāvanā, as it is labelled by later commentators), he called it arthabhāvanā (or ārthībhāvanā), that is 'actual bhāvanā', 'objective bhāvanā', or 'purpose[-oriented] bhāvanā'[6]. In the words of Āpadeva,

> in the word yajeta, '[One] shall sacrifice,' there are two elements, the root yaj-, 'to sacrifice', and the ending -ta (third singular optative, with the meaning of an imperative). Of these (two elements), in the ending also there are two elements, verbality and optativeness (general verbal force, and injunctive force). And verbality is found in all the ten sets of mode and tense formations (finite verb-forms); but optativeness only in the optative forms, nowhere else. In this (ending, tho it has this two-fold function), both verbality and optativeness express merely efficient-force. [...]. And this (efficient force) is of two kinds: word-efficient-force and end-efficient-force. Of these (two), word-efficient-force is a particular kind of operation in an efficient-agent which is conducive to man's action (i.e., to the particular action denoted by

[6]'Objective bhāvanā' would indicate its being more closely related to an object than the linguistic bhāvanā. The translation 'purpose[-oriented] bhāvanā' accords to the way Rāmānujācārya interprets it in TR IV §C.3.16 (1956: 75), where the term is glossed as puruṣārthabhāvanā. However, other interpretations are also possible and to the exact import of the two definitions in Kumārila and later Mīmāṃsakas will be dedicated a separate study. In the following, I will translate arthabhāvanā as 'objective bhāvanā', but the reader should be aware that this is not the only possibility and that both Mīmāṃsakas and modern scholars diverge about it. Although Bhāṭṭa writers usually adhere strictly to this terminology, they sometimes conform to the older usage and call the arthabhāvanā just "bhāvanā".

> the verb). And it is exprest by that element (in the ending, as -ta) which denotes optativeness (injunctiveness)[7].

Kumārila's analysis of the linguistic bhāvanā hints at the characteristic of exhortative language of having a sort of second-order object. An arthabhāvanā causes an objective result to occur (such as the cooking of rice or the performance of a sacrifice), whereas the linguistic bhāvanā causes the purpose[-oriented] bhāvanā to be. In other words, whereas the so-called objective bhāvanā aims at an external object, the linguistic bhāvanā aims at the undertaking of an activity towards that external object. In this way, "The one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice" (svargakāmo yajeta) becomes "Through sacrifice an activity leading to heaven occurs" (*yāgena svargabhāvanā bhavati), through the intermediate step of "Through sacrifice one should cause to occur heaven" (*yāgena svargo bhāvayet)

svargakāmo → svargaḥ
yaj- → yāgena
-ta → bhāvayet (=śabdabhāvanā+arthabhāvanā)

In fact,

bhāvanā (arthabhāvanā)
↗
bhāvayet
↘
bhavati (śabdabhāvanā)

One would be tempted to say that the linguistic bhāvanā is an "illocutionary force", like the one present in commands, but Mīmāṃsā authors do not attribute a role to the speaker, thus making the distinction between illocutionary speech acts (intended by a speaker to produce a certain effect) and perlocutionary ones (producing effects on the hearer) hardly possible (see infra, § 2.2.11).

[7] yajetety atrāsty aṃśadvayam, yajidhātuḥ pratyayaś ca. tatra pratyaye 'py asty aṃśadvayam, ākhyātatvaṃ liṅtvaṃ ca. ākhyātatvaṃ ca daśasu lakāreṣu vidyate; liṅtvaṃ punaḥ kevalaṃ liṅy eva. tatrākhyātatvaliṅtvābhyāṃ bhāvanaivocyate. bhāvanā [...] dvividhā, śābdī bhāvanā, ārthī bhāvanā ceti. tatra puruṣapravṛttyanukūlabhāvakavyāpāraviśeṣaḥ śābdī bhāvanā. sā ca liṅtvāṃśenocyate (MNP, 3-4, p.193). Translation by F. Edgerton (**Edgerton1929**).

2.2 Bhāṭṭa theories on exhortative expressions in TR IV

At the very outset, Rāmānujācārya spells his final position (siddhānta), and then dedicates approximately half of TR IV to the presentation of the Bhāṭṭa view, or rather the Bhāṭṭa views, insofar as TR IV offers an interesting survey of various theories about action and exhortation elaborated by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors. Rāmānujācārya begins this survey with a verse of Kumārila presenting action (arthabhāvanā), exhortation (śabdabhāvanā) and the linguistic elements meaning them. All the following views are thoroughly discussed on the basis of their internal consistency, of their concordance with Kumārila's verse and of more general problems. Accordingly, the objector is either another Bhāṭṭa, upholding Pārthasārathi Miśra's positions, or the very Prābhākara siddhāntin, who reflects Śālikanātha Miśra's conviction.
As for the sequence of the elucidated views, the first one is Maṇḍana's, the second one is an emended version of his theory, and the three last ones are found in Pārthasārathi 's Vidhinirṇaya. Here, Rāmānujācārya conforms to the Indian pattern recurrent in many works such as Mādhava's Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, of starting from the position more distant to the truth and gradually ascending to the best one. Maṇḍana's is at the same time the most distant and the most threatening position, due to its appeal to the commonly acknowledged notion that in order to initiate an action one has to know that it will lead to some benefit. It is hence not surprising that this notion is later subsumed in Pārthasārathi's definitive position. The role played by Maṇḍana's theory is an evidence for the ambivalent nature of this debate, with theses oscillating between pure linguistic theory and its pragmatic results, and using the effects of language on human beings as a test for the validity of the theories proposed. Incidentally, this is the only case I know, of Maṇḍana's theory being included within the interpretations of Kumārila's second (linguistic) bhāvanā. In fact, Rāmānujācārya clearly understands Maṇḍana as a Bhāṭṭa and sometimes even interprets Kumārila through Maṇḍana. For instance, §3.8 reproduces Kumārila's view and even includes quotes from the ŚV, but it neglects Kumārila's ambivalence towards the meaning of the verbal root and rather favours Maṇḍana's understanding of it (see **BhV** v.27).

2.2.1 Kumārila's departure point (§C.3)

Rāmānujācārya starts his overview of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theories of action with a verse found in TV ad 2.1.1. A somehow provisional translation of it is:

> The optative and the other [suffixes] express one bhāvanā, the

> designation (abhidhā) [one], |
> whereas there is another bhāvanā, that has an object (artha) as its core (ātman), [and] is in every case the sphere of application of [all] verbal endings (ākhyāta) ||

Therefore, Kumārila's verse states, in Rāmānujācārya's interpretation[8], that the prescriptive force (vidhi) is tantamount to the linguistic bhāvanā (śabdabhāvanā). It is conveyed by the exhortative suffixes and it has as its object the arthabhāvanā. The latter is conveyed by all verbal suffixes (including the optative and the other similar ones, which hence convey two bhāvanās). The paragraph does not go into further detail, since it is meant to offer just the common frame for all following views.

2.2.2 Maṇḍana (§C.3.1-C.3.1.1)

In the following paragraph, a Maṇḍana-like objector (in Sanskrit, pūrvapakṣin, henceforth PP) states that a prescriptive force (vidhi) is tantamount to the knowledge that the action to be undertaken is the means to a desired aim (iṣṭasādhanatva). As with Kumārila, such prescriptive force is conveyed by the exhortative suffixes. Evidence for that is provided by the fact that people undertake an action once they have listened to a sentence entailing one of such verbal forms. Hence, since one only undertakes an action because one knows that it is the instrument to realise a desired aim, such verbal forms must necessarily convey the notion that the action to be undertaken is the instrument to realise a desired aim. Maṇḍana calls this action just bhāvanā, since he does not admit a śabdabhāvanā and hence does not need to further qualify what Kumārila calls arthabhāvanā.
As with Śabara (see above, §2.1.3), the bhāvanā is said to require three arguments, an object to be brought about by it, an instrument and a procedure. While looking for the object, which is the most important complement, one would be tented to take into account first what is conveyed by the verbal root. In fact, this is delivered by the same word as the bhāvanā and appears hence to be the element more closely connected to it. However, the verbal root only conveys an action, which is not in itself desirable. In this connection it is worth remembering that, though this PP has referred above to the process of language acquisition, Mīmāṃsakas consider the Veda as the main linguistic instance and hence derive their examples from it. And, within Vedic prescriptions, another word conveys a desired aim, for instance, "heaven" in "The one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice". Here, "heaven" is the desired aim, to be connected as what has to be brought about by the bhāvanā. The verbal root conveys instead the

[8]In the following I will omit this clause, but it should be thought of as implied in all cases, so that "Maṇḍana" actually means "Maṇḍana, in Rāmānujācārya's interpretation" and so on.

instrument through which heaven can be brought about, e.g., “through sacrifice”. The other sentences read in Vedic texts close to the prescription and detailing the sacrifice, convey the procedure to be followed.

2.2.3 Bhāṭṭa objections against Maṇḍana (§C.3.2)

In §C.3.2 Rāmānujācārya reproduces the objections against Maṇḍana’s thesis raised by Pārthasārathi Miśra:

1. If the prescriptive force would convey the knowledge that the action to be undertaken is a means to a desired aim, then there would not be any difference in what is understood through a sentence prescribing a sacrifice and through a sentence stating that such a sacrifice is the means to realise a desired aim. But it is not so, since one can clearly differentiate them.

2. If the prescriptive force would convey the knowledge that the action to be undertaken is a means to realise a desired aim, it would be meaningless to explicit the purpose of the action prescribed right after a prescription. According to Indian theories of meaning, in fact, redundancy simply does not exist. If two things are stated together, this means that they are not synonyms.

3. This view does not tally with Kumārila’s verse. In fact, according to Pārthasārathi Miśra (through Rāmānujācārya), Kumārila meant that the verbal endings such as liṅ and similar suffixes designate the linguistic bhāvanā and not the iṣṭasādhanatva, as in Maṇḍana’s understanding.

2.2.4 Alternative interpretation of Maṇḍana’s theory, and its refutation (§C.3.3)

In order to avoid the above mentioned flaws, one could suggest that the notion that the action to be undertaken is the instrument to realise a desired aim is not directly conveyed by exhortative verbal forms, but rather that it is implicitly deduced because otherwise the prescription would be incomplete. In fact, a prescriptive force conveys the idea that something has to be done (kārya). What has to be done is either pleasure, or avoidance of pain or the means thereto. Since sacrifice is in itself neither pleasure nor avoidance of pain, it is necessarily a means towards something desirable. So, just by enjoining it, a prescription implicitly declares it to be a means to realise a desired aim.
A Western reader would immediately say that a prescription might enjoin also something unpleasant. That no Indian objector raised this question is due to the very term kārya, which (because of the polysemy of Indian

optative –liṅ– and gerundive –tavya–) means at the same time 'what has to be done' and 'what can be done,' so that the second aspect cannot be separated from the first one. More in general, Indian ethics seem not to consider the possibility of a command to do something ultimately unpleasant. Mīmāṃsakas explicitly face the issue while explaining prescriptions to sacrifice though sacrificing is known to be in itself a tiring activity. This means, they maintain, that it is the means to realise a desired aim, since otherwise none would undertake it. In this way, whatever is enjoined either partakes of the nature of a desired aim (including "avoidance of pain") or of that of the means thereto. Unpleasant things can only be enjoined insofar as they eventually lead to a desired end.

Rāmānujācārya deals with this version of Maṇḍana's theory from two different points of view. On the one hand, a Pārthasārathi -like objector repeats that it does not tally with Kumārila's verse. On the other, a Śālikanātha-like one states that there is a difference between being a means to something desired and being to be done. A thorough explanation of their distinction, however, will be found only much later in TR IV.

2.2.5 Is the prescriptive force just a linguistic fact? (§C.3.4-§C.3.5)

Next, a different interpretation of the prescriptive force is proposed: the prescriptive force is tantamount to the exhortative suffixes themselves. A similar view is hinted at by Maṇḍana and dismissed through several other arguments beside the one employed by Rāmānujācārya[9]. I could not find any text actually upholding this view, but it possibly represents the common sense view of the yajñikas, the performers of sacrifices. These Brahmins might have believed in a sort of magical power inhering in language itself, independent of its meaning. At least, these scholars attribute to the Veda a specific potency, so that the Vedic words by themselves give raise in the hearer to an inclination to undertake an action. This position can be associated to the one of the branch of Vedic scholarship maintaining that Vedic mantras do not, properly speaking, have a meaning (better: that their sacrificial function does not depend on their meaning, which is hence not really signified, see Taber 1989). Such view is attributed to an otherwise unknown Kautsa in Nirukta 1.15.

Philosophically speaking, however, this position is easily defeated insofar as, as the Bhāṭṭa PP explains, if it were so, then everyone would undertake an action just by hearing an exhortative verbal form, even children or strangers who do not understand Sanskrit. The present objector (I will call these re-

[9]See the first option among the following alternatives: sa (=vidhiḥ) śabdabhedo vā, tadvyāpārātiśayo vā, arthabhedo vā, yadabhidhānāc chabdo 'pi vyapadeśyaḥ (Vidhiviveka, ad 1 quoted in Garge 1980:150). For an outlines of Maṇḍana's arguments against this view, see Garge 1980:150-1.

spondents uttarapakṣin, henceforth UP) might claim that only people who are linguistically competent are incited to act by optative and similar verbal forms. But, insists the Bhāṭṭa, which kind of meaning should they be competent about? In this way, the problem is reduced to that of the meaning of optative and similar verbal forms, discussed above (if the meaning is considered to be the fact that the action to be undertaken is the means to a desired aim) and below.

2.2.6 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on the prescriptive force as linguistic bhāvanā (§C.3.6-§C.3.7.2)

Paragraphs C.3.6 to C.3.17.1 discuss the prescriptive force from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's perspective and only differ as far as a different balance of its elements.

First, the TV stance is discussed (TV ad 1.2.7). According to it, the prescriptive force is a linguistic bhāvanā. It incites people to undertake actions and is expressed by optative and similar suffixes. Kumārila builds for the linguistic bhāvanā the same structure as that of the objective bhāvanā. The latter is paraphrased as, e.g., "Through sacrifice heaven is brought about" (yāgena svargo bhavati, see above, §2.1.3), and requires something to be brought about (e.g., heaven), an instrument (e.g., the sacrifice) and a procedure (e.g., the rites composing the sacrifice). Similarly, the linguistic bhāvanā requires something to be brought about, an instrument and a procedure. The role of what has to be brought about is easily fulfilled by the objective bhāvanā, insofar as the purpose of a prescriptive force is exactly to cause someone to undertake an action. Moreover, the objective bhāvanā is the closest element to the linguistic bhāvanā, since it is conveyed by the same verbal suffix (which has two semantic parts: activeness, conveying the objective bhāvanā; and exhortativeness, conveying the linguistic one, see §2.1.3). Hence, out of suitability and proximity the objective bhāvanā is identified as what has to be brought about by the linguistic bhāvanā.

As for the instrument, it is –explains Rāmānujācārya– the signifier-signified relation between exhortative suffixes and prescriptive force. Here Rāmānujācārya partly goes back to Kumārila, though still strictly following Śālikanātha's presentation of the Bhāṭṭa view. In fact Śālikanātha, while retelling Kumārila's position, only speaks of the knowledge of the prescriptive force as the instrument. This sounds as hinting at the fact that one needs to know about a prescriptive force in order to obey it. Rāmānujācārya, instead, specifies that the signifier-signified relation is the instrument for the arousal of the prescriptive force. The idea of the signifier-signified relation playing an instrumental role remounts to a statement of Kumārila:

> «There being the requirement [of an answer for the question "Through what should one cause to be the action]?," one

> connects "Through the knowledge of the prescriptive [force], which requires the experience of a previous connection [between the exhortative endings and the prescriptive force signified by them]"» (kenety apekṣite pūrvasambandhānubhavāpekṣeṇa vidhivijñāneneti sambadhyate, cf. TR §C.3.6).

In sum, in Rāmānujācārya's explanation, the signifier-signified relation between exhortative endings and prescriptive force is instrumental to the prescriptive force, because only once expressed can a prescriptive force incite someone to act. As for the procedure, this role is played by the praiseworthiness of the action to be undertaken, which is eulogised by commendatory statements (arthavāda) found close to the prescription within Vedic texts.

object to be brough about: objective bhāvanā
$\nearrow$
linguistic bhāvanā $\rightarrow$ instrument: signifier-signified relation
$\searrow$
procedure: praiseworthiness

But, as pointed out by the Prābhākara respondent of §§C.3.7.2-C.3.7.2, this way to fulfil the requirement for an instrument and a procedure is highly questionable.

2.2.6.1 Śālikanātha's and Rāmānujācārya's objections to that (§C.3.6-§C.3.7.2)

To begin with, the role of the procedure is said to be fulfilled by the praiseworthiness conveyed by commendatory statements, in order to make sense of the commendatory statements. But commendatory statements are not transmitted together with every prescription. Confronted with this objection, the Bhāṭṭa PP proposes that praiseworthiness could be implicitly understood even when no commendatory statement is present, through an analogical extension of a praising commendatory statement. But this also does not fit the case, since analogical extension can only apply to something which is absolutely needed, like an assisting ritual element (upakāra), and a commendatory statement is not needed in this way (TR IV §C.3.7.2). Moreover, the possibility of an extended application of just the commendatory statements (*arthavādātideśa*) is advanced and denied in MS 7.1.16-8 and in the ŚBh thereon. In fact, commendatory statements are part of a prescription and cannot be extended independently of it (see also **Clooney1990**).
In sum, from the point of view of the S, the very notion of linguistic *bhāvanā* is overloaded with postulations. The Bhāṭṭa is postulating 1) that there is a linguistic *bhāvanā* which has the same requirements as the objective *bhāvanā*.

Therefore, he postulates that 2) the linguistic *bhāvanā* requires a procedure, and 3) that this procedure must be identified with the praiseworthiness expressed by commendatory statements. Finally, 4) he postulates that such praiseworthiness can be obtained through analogical extension since commendatory statements are not always available. The whole theory seems more an *ad hoc* device than a useful explanatory tool.
Second, the Bhāṭṭa theory ignores the role of the cognition that the action to be undertaken is the means to something desired. This role is also differently evaluated by Śālikanātha Miśra and Rāmānujācārya. In the corresponding VM text this part of the argumentation is elaborated in a different way. The opponent says:

> [PP:] Then, let it be that a sentence just brings forth the incitement, still the initiation of an action does not depend on that alone. Rather, an action is initiated only when there is the awareness of that (of the praiseworthiness of the action to be initiated). [...]
>
> [S:] If it were so, then the initiation of the action would be a result of the awareness, not of the incitement[10].

So, the whole idea of a linguistic *bhāvanā* would collapse. Rāmānujācārya (better, his Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin, who mostly coincides with Pārthasārathi Miśra), unlike Śālikanātha , explicitly admits that knowledge does have a role in regard to the initiation of an action. The knowledge involved, however, is the awareness that the action to be undertaken is a means towards something desired, and not the awareness that such action has been praised. Still, Rāmānujācārya must skip the last part of Śālikanātha's argument ("If knowledge has a role, than initiation of the action is the result of knowledge, and not of incitement"), as this would have been possibly applied to his conclusion, too. This is one of the few divergences between Rāmānujācārya. and Śālikanātha, and it can be explained as resulting from the influence of Pārthasārathi Miśra's way of accommodating iṣṭasādhanatājñāna within his depiction of the linguistic *bhāvanā*.
Another weak point of this theory, according to Rāmānujācārya, is the vague link between exhortative suffixes and prescriptive force. As early as in §C.3.6, a cursory reference to the prescription about the study in fact anticipates a possible objection, which is fully developed in the VM II ad 4, Śā p. 420-1. In fact, the Prābhākara respondent (in VM and in TR §C.3.7.1) will in fact object that prescriptions are insentient and hence cannot by themselves incite anyone to undertake an action whatsoever. The objector, on the other hand, mentions the case of the prescription about the study, which is believed

[10] atha śabdaḥ preraṇāṃ karoty eva, pravṛttis tu na tāvanmātreṇa, kintu tajjñāne sati. evaṃ tarhi jñānaphalam eva pravṛttir astu, na preraṇāphalaṃ (VM II, ad 4, pp. 422-3).

by Bhāṭṭas to promote its own implementation along with that of all other prescriptions (see **Kataoka2001b**).
Coherently with the broader space left to this argument, Śālikanātha withdraws the Bhāṭṭa views as follows:

> I disagree, because an undertaking of an action depending on that (functioning of the optative and other suffixes) has not been seen anywhere else. And seeing an undertaking of an action one can infer only that, upon which one has seen the undertaking to depend, not a sort of linguistic functioning which is a cause never apprehended before[11]

In this sense –and the following is just the present authors' opinion– this theory runs the risk to become too similar to the one evoking a sort of magical power of language and already refuted (§§C.3.4-C.3.5). More in general, the Bhāṭṭa standpoint that exhortative suffixes only express the incitement as their meaning is hard to be maintained because of the absence of a necessary speaker in the Bhāṭṭa account of language. Due to this absence, the burden of the illocutionary power of exhortative endings lies all on those endings themselves.
Rāmānujācārya's argument, however, displays a more pragmatic concern. The real cause of an action, he says, is not the exhortative suffix which preceded it, but rather the fact that one knows the action to be a means to realise something desired (TR IV §C.3.7).

2.2.7 The Bhāṭṭa-Prābhākāra debate about the meaning of verbal endings (§C.3.8-C.3.10)

While dealing with the signification of verbal endings, Rāmānujācārya quotes a verse of the ŚV, but the Bhāṭṭa thesis then depicted rather resembles the one advanced by Maṇḍana in his Bhāvanāviveka (vv.27-28 and commentary thereon). This is not surprising insofar as in the centuries immediately following his death Maṇḍana has often been cited as the main upholder of the Bhāṭṭa theses, even more than Kumārila himself.
According to this view, the verbal root expresses the action's content and the verbal ending the objective bhāvanā (Kumārila instead does not deny the possibility that the objective bhāvanā is conveyed by the verbal ending and by the verbal root, see TV ad 2.1.1, pp.378-380, although he rather implements the thesis according to which the verbal ending expresses it). On top of that, exhortative verbal endings also express the linguistic bhāvanā. This way of signification is exemplified by the paraphrase of

[11] na. tannibandhanatvena pravṛtter anyatrādṛṣṭatvāt. ayannibandhanā hi pravṛttir dṛṣṭā, tad eva tāṃ dṛṣṭvā śakyam anumātum, na punar apratipannapūrvakāraṇabhāvaś śabdavyāpāraviśeṣaḥ (VM II, ad 4, A p. 69, Śā p. 420).

"[(S)he] cooks" (pacati), which is "[(S)he] does cooking". Here, the verbal root is paraphrased by a substantive ("cooking") whereas the verbal ending is paraphrased by "[(S)he] does," which points out the fact that the verbal ending expresses the third person singular and also the person's effort (as, again, with Maṇḍana; Kumārila speaks instead just of "activity"). More in detail, the verbal ending expresses the active component of the verb and the verbal root specifies the kind of activity meant:

pac- (verbal root) → pākam ('cooking')
-ti (verbal ending) → karoti ('[(S)he] does')

This paraphrase is proposed as valid for all verbs, as with Maṇḍana (whereas Kumārila distinguishes between verbs paraphrased with "[(S)he] does" and verbs such as "[It] is" (asti, bhavati, vidyati, TV ad 2.1.1, p.377, l.6 and p.379, l.27).
Śabara (see above, §2.1.3) would have probably rather used the following paraphrase: "Through cooking X (the kind of food one desires to prepare) occurs" (pākena X bhavati).
A Prābhākara siddhāntin (§C.3.9-C.3.10) replies to the above description by saying that verbal endings are used even in case of activities which do not imply any effort (and, hence, any objective bhāvanā), such as, "S/he sleeps". Instead, he advances the thesis that also the activity in general is expressed by the verbal root and that the verbal ending only expresses the person and number (vacana) of the subject. The paraphrase "[S/he] does cooking" remains congruous, according to this view, insofar as "cooking" points out the specific activity, expressed by the root, and "[S/he] does" points out the effort, which characterises the agent implied by the verbal root:

pac- (verbal root) → pākam ('cooking')
[agent characterised by effort, implied through the verbal root] → karoti
-ti (verbal ending) → third person singular

On the other hand, exhortative verbal endings express that an action has to be done and, hence, signify at the same time (1) the idea that something has to be done (kārya), and (2) the action (also called bhāvanā) so characterised.

kārya
↗
-ta (exhortative verbal ending)
↘

bhāvanā

If one consistently implements this theory –but the following is the present writer's opinion only– one is lead to admit that only exhortative endings directly convey an (objective) bhāvanā.

2.2.8 Further Bhāṭṭas on linguistic bhāvanā as the function of cognitions and mnestic traces (§§C.3.13-C.3.14)

After an excursus on kārya, in the rest of the chapter Bhāṭṭa views which have also been depicted (and not explicitly refuted) in Pārthasārathi Miśra's Vidhinirṇaya are examined. Rāmānujācārya, following the Vidhinirṇaya's order, starts with the thesis according to which the linguistic bhāvanā, called "designation bhāvanā", is the function of exhortative suffixes. The function (vyāpāra) is generally defined as the additional quality, having achieved which, a linguistic element becomes fit for the accomplishment of its purpose (i.e., the conveyance of a meaning). Here, it is said to be "designation" itself (1). It is further qualified as consisting in a cognition or in the mnestic traces of the preceding phonemes (2). In fact, a linguistic element can express a meaning exactly because of the mnestic traces of the previous phonemes or because of having been known. Moreover, the Bhāṭṭa PP may quote Śabara saying that a meaning is expressed by the last phoneme together with the mnestic traces of the previous ones, and that the awareness of a meaning occurs from the knowledge of the words.
However, the two analyses ((1) and (2)) seem to presuppose a different discernment of "function", since a mnestic trace or a cognition can aptly fulfil the role of what makes a linguistic element fit for the conveyance of a meaning, but it is difficult to see how they can be tantamount to a designation. One would rather expect them to be additional qualities of the linguistic elements, activating their designative function. In fact, in his commentary on the source text of this passage, Rāmānujācārya states that mnestic traces and cognition are 'intermediate functions' (avāntaravyāpāra) possibly implying that they are intermediate steps for the accomplishment of the designation's function (vyāpāra) (see NR ad VN ad 2, p.79).
Else, the oddity may be solved if one considers "designation" to be just the function's name. This function would then be said to be tantamount to cognition and mnestic traces. In fact, in order to understand the meaning of a (prescriptive) sentence, one needs both the mnestic traces of all the words one has heard, and the cognition of the signifier-signified relation between them and their meanings (see above, §2.2.6). Since the two together express the meaning of the sentence, they can be labelled "designation". However, this solution is not adopted by Rāmānujācārya in his commentary on VN ad 2, p. 79, mentioned a few lines above.
From a different point of view, TR IV §C.3.13.2 explains how a cognition

can perform a designative function (e.g., “One knows a meaning”). But how can possibly a mnestic trace do that? In fact, the mnestic trace seems to cause a process different from the one described in case of “S/he knows the meaning,” since the action of the mnestic trace is rather mechanic. One might presuppose something like *saṃskāraiḥ* (or better *saṃskāravyāpāreṇa*) *artho jñāpyate* or *saṃskārā arthañ jñāpayanti.*.
Further, one might object that the equation mnestic traces/function is in itself questionable, since the former are left-overs of something else and, by themselves, inert. However, according to all Indian conception of memory I am aware of, also mnestic traces are operative, insofar as, once mature, they bring about a result by themselves. On this possibility, Pārthasārathi ’s VN (which Rāmānujācārya is at this point following) states:

> How can there be a collection of [phonemes], [although they only] exist in sequence? We answer: through an intermediate activity. In fact, as soon as a subsequent phoneme is seized after the preceding one, it produces an intermediate activity, whose other name is ‘mnestic trace’ (saṃskāra)[12].

So, also Pārthasārathi specifies that it is the operative aspect of the saṃskāra, the intermediate activity it brings forth, which is properly called its function. Pārthasārathi seems to presuppose that this theory is Kumārila’s.
A further flaw has been pointed out by Maṇḍana Miśra in the PP of his Vidhiviveka (p.21): it has been said that all words have a designative function, but this does not agree with the idea that such designative function is tantamount to the śabdabhāvanā, which is typical of exhortative verbal endings only. Rāmānujācārya sketches an answer insofar as he has the PP specify that all words have a designative function, but that only in case of exhortative suffixes this amounts to the prescriptive force (§C.3.14).

2.2.9 Subsumption of Maṇḍana’s view (§§C.3.15-C.3.16.2)

After an excursus on the structure of sentences and their correspondence to actual states of affairs, a discussant objects that in real life one initiates an action just because one knows that it will lead to a desired result. Hence, this part of Maṇḍana’s theory has to find a place within the definitive view. The Bhāṭṭa PP, whose view is gradually becoming more similar to Pārthasārathi ’s final one, replies that exhortative endings designate just a prescriptive force. However, since a prescriptive force is not conceivable unless the action enjoined is an instrument to something desired, the latter fact is indirectly implied by the former.

[12] kathaṃ punaḥ kramavartināṃ [varṇanāṃ] sāhityam? avāntaravyāpāravaśād iti brūmaḥ. pūrvapūrvo hi varṇa upalabhyamānaḥ saṃskārāparanāmadheyam avāntaravyāpāraṃ janayati (VN ad 2, 1937: 90).

More in detail, §C.3.16 repeats part of the argument found in §C.3.1 but improves it insofar as it takes into account the objection raised in §C.3.2. Hence, in §C.3.16, the fact that the bhāvanā, which is conveyed by the same suffix together with the incitement, is the means to realise something desired is not explicitly expressed (*vācya*) by the optative and similar suffixes, but rather *kḷpta*, so that the difficulty due to the fact that the incitement and the statement that the action to be undertaken is a means towards something desired would be synonyms though they are used together does not arise. Possibly, in §C.3.2 the UP denied the possibility that an action is 'directly designated' (*abhidheya*) as the means to realise the desired result in order to leave room for a 'postulated' (*kḷpta*) cognition of the action as the means to realise something desired. Such postulation is, explains §C.3.16, caused by the optative and similar suffixes, though not as their direct denotation. In respect to the §C.3.6 position, on the other hand, the present one adds as an explicit intermediate postulation the cognition that the action to be undertaken is an instrument for the accomplishment of something desired. This position seems in essence quite close to the one outlined above, §C.3.3. However, the fact that exhortative suffixes are said to *designate* a prescriptive force (and not the fact that the action to be undertaken is a means to something desired –which is rather indirectly postulated) makes it tally with the TV verse cited at the outset.

2.2.10 Pārthasārathi against the idea of a prescriptive force as the exhortative suffixes' function (§§C.3.17-C.3.17.1)

A further Bhāṭṭa UP objects against the idea brought forth since §C.3.13, and summarised in §C.3.16.2, that the exhortative suffixes' function (called designation) designates a content which is, again, an exhortation. In fact, the UP claims, exhortation cannot be at the same time the function of the exhortative suffixes and its content. However, this loop can be avoided if the function of exhortative suffixes (that is, exhortativeness) is not assumed to designate itself. Rather, it designates the fact of causing to act, which, unlike exhortation, seems to be conceived by the UP as a pragmatic reality and not as a linguistic category. This causing to act can be of four types, according to the speaker-hearer relation, the first three being impulsion (if the speaker is of a higher rank), request (if the hearer is of a higher rank), consent (if both are on the same level). If, as in the case of the Veda, there is no speaker whatsoever, the causing to act is necessarily of the fourth type, i.e. the notion that the action prescribed is the means to something desired. According to this theory, a prescriptive force (i.e., a linguistic bhāvanā) has the objective bhāvanā as what it has to bring about, and the cognition of the praiseworthiness raised by commendatory statements as its procedure. The prescriptive force's instrument is no longer the awareness of the prescriptive

force itself (as with Kumārila, see §C.3.8), but rather the cognition that the action to be undertaken is the means to achieve something desired.

object to be brough about: objective bhāvanā
↗
linguistic bhāvanā → instrument: cognition that the objective bhāvanā ...
↘
procedure: praiseworthiness

In this way, the main insight of Maṇḍana's theory can be embedded in Pārhasārathi's one.
The cognition that the action to be undertaken is the means to realise a desired result can be the instrument of the linguistic bhāvanā because, writes Rāmānujācārya, it is the side product of the activity of the optative suffixes, which primarily aims at making someone undertake an action. In a similar way, raising and lowering the axe are side products of the activity undertaken for the purpose of felling the tree and are at the same time instrumental to it (see §C.3.13.2). This parallel is explicit in Rāmānujācārya's commentary on the parallel VN passage:

> yāgādivad iti. yathārthabhāvanāyāḥ svargārthaṃ pravṛttāyā madhye yāgādikam aniṣpādya tanniṣpādanāyogāt parārthapravṛttasya vyāpārasya vyāpyatvarūpakaraṇalakṣaṇasaṃbhavena yāgādiḥ karaṇaṃ tadvat pravṛttyarthaṃ pravṛttāyāḥ śabdabhāvanāyā bhāvyarūpapravṛtteḥ samīhitasādhanatvam anavagamayya taddhetutvāyogāt tajjñānaṃ tasyāḥ karaṇam ity arthaḥ (NR ad VN ad 2–1937: 87).

2.2.10.1 Kinds of incitement (§C.3.17, §C.9.15)

As for the types of incitement (pravartanā), two different lists can be found in §C.3.17 (preṣaṇa, adhyeṣaṇa, abhyanujñāna and iṣṭasādhanatva) and in §C.9.15 (praiṣa, āmantraṇa, adhyeṣaṇa, iṣṭasādhanatva). The latter is inspired by a VM passage, where Śālikanātha speaks of four kinds of pravartanā and nicely explains the first three (the fourth is iṣṭasādhanatva) as related to the speaker's status: "If the speaker is superior than the person who must be incited to undertake an action, the duty he conveys is called an impulsion (praiṣa), if he is on the same level, an invitation (āmantraṇa), if he is inferior, a request (adhyeṣaṇa)" (VM II, ad 11, Śā pp. 430-1). Now, apart from the different order of the §C.3.17 list, which follows Pārthasārathi (VN ad 2, p. 53), praiṣa should be the same as preṣaṇa. The terms have been chosen probably because praiṣa is also a significant term in Vedic ritual, since it designates the «Aufforderung, Einladung; speziell die Aufforderung des maitrāvaruṇa an den hotṛ zur Rezitation der yājyā» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

Turning back to the two lists, the two adhyeṣaṇas are surely equivalent, whereas abhyanujñāna is not an obvious synonym of āmantraṇa. In fact, abhyanujñāna is rather a "permission" allowed by an elder person, whereas āmantraṇa can be translated (according to Āpte's Sanskrit Dictionary) as "permission", but it is understood by Śālikanātha within an inter pares relationship. Maybe Pārthasarathi lists abhyanujñāna as different from preṣaṇa because in the latter the elder person incites someone to undertake an action, whereas with abhyanujñāna he rather allows one to undertake an action? Or maybe abhyanujñāna means, as in "śāstric" Sanskrit, "agreement, acknowledgment" (see, for instance, Vācaspati's definition of tarka in his commentary on NS 1.1.1: ayuktapratiṣedhena yuktābhyanujñānaṃ tarkaḥ). Then, both abhyanujñāna and āmantraṇa could mean "To agree that someone acts in a certain way" (said from an equal speaker). Pārthasārathi 's list and argumentation is probably derived from Maṇḍana Miśra's Vidhiviveka:

> na hi preraṇādhyeṣaṇābhyanujñālakṣaṇaḥ śabdasya vyāpāro nirūpyate. tasya puruṣadharmatvāt. See also ibidem, p. 319: tatreṣṭatacchaktyanapekṣāṇām abhiprāyamātrānuvidhāyināṃ tadapekṣāṇāṃ ca tadānukūlyam apekṣamāṇāṃ pravṛttihetavaḥ preṣaṇādhyeṣaṇābhyanujñā apuruṣabuddhiprabhavāyā na pratipādyāḥ[13].

In a similar context, Udayana proposes a different list: ājñā (presumably =preṣaṇa), adhyeṣaṇā, anujñā (presumably =abhyanujñāna), sampraśna, prārthanā, āśaṃsā (=āśī, benediction) and vaktur icchā (author's intention) which is what is left when the others do not apply (fulfilling the role of iṣṭasādhanatā and harmonising with Udayana's theistic agenda). NKus V, ad 14 (1957, p. 564). Thereafter Udayana even states that vaktur icchā is the general meaning of exhortative suffixes (!, NKus V, v.15). On this subject, see Marui 1989, p.20.

2.2.11 Conclusions

The problem on which the text focuses is that of the referent of exhortative expressions. Bhāṭṭas believe that exhortations are expressed by exhortative verbal endings. But what is exactly the link between these verbal endings and their alleged meaning? Within affirmative expressions, it is easy to say that a certain sentence designates a certain state of affairs and one could even postulate that a noun expresses a substance, a verb an action, etc. However, as for exhortative expressions, an exhortation is hardly just a meant entity and closely resembles a characteristic of language itself. No wonder, it has been called 'linguistic force' (śabdabhāvanā) by Kumārila. However,

[13] VV ad 3, pūrvapakṣa, Gosvāmī ed. pp. 12-3. Many thanks are due to Prof. Kei Kataoka who pointed out the VV passages.

Kumārila does not specify the link between this force and the endings connected to it (in TV ad 2.1.1 he just claims that they 'say' [āhuḥ] it).
Some Bhāṭṭas maintain that the prescriptive (or "linguistic") force is a function (vyāpāra) of exhortative verbal endings. The proposal of a "function" as the characteristic of linguistic elements might be useful in order to avoid the problem of their "meaning", and to identify exhortative expressions through an inner characteristic rather than through an external meaning. The concept of a meaning is not completely avoided, insofar as the exhortative suffixes' function is a designation (and hence designates a meaning), but the distinctive mark of exhortative suffixes is not their meaning (rather, their function is). However, Bhāṭṭa opponents maintain that in this way the meaning of exhortative verbal endings ends up to be identified with their specificity, that is, the prescriptive force itself, and that this leads to a vicious circle. Moreover, I could not solve some ambiguities in the account of the function of exhortative verbal endings (see §2.2.8).
Eventually, Pārthasārathi Miśra proposes a synthesis, claiming that exhortative verbal endings express an incitement, which is further defined, in the case of Vedic sentences, as the cognition that the action to be undertaken is a means to something desired. So, this last proposal favours a pragmatic identification of exhortative verbal endings through their effect on the listener (incitement).
In Western terms and leaving aside the major point of the lack of a speaker in the Mīmāṃsā account, one could say that in one case the linguistic force is identified as an illocutionary force, in the other through its perlocutionary effects.

Chapter 3

Exhortation and Duty

Symmetrical to chapter 4, on the Bhāṭṭa view of exhortation, chapters 8 and 9 elaborate on the Prābhākara view. The main disagreement lies in what both sub-schools understand as the core content of the Veda, namely a bhāvanā promoted by a prescriptive force (vidhitattva) according to the Bhāṭṭas and (an action) to be done (kārya) according to the Prābhākaras (§C.8.1).

3.1 Prābhākara theories on exhortative expressions in TR IV

Both Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras acknowledge that the Veda promotes the undertaking of actions. But why are these actions undertaken? Because a prescriptive force promotes them (Kumārila), or because one knows that they will lead to a desired result (Maṇḍana), or because one knows that they have to be done (Prabhākara).
According to the Bhāṭṭas, the prescription directly expresses the bhāvanā. According to the Prābhākaras, instead, the bhāvanā is not the meaning of the exhortative suffixes. On the other hand, these denote something to be done (kārya) and, only insofar as this 'to be done' cannot but inhere in an action do they also denote –as subordinate to it– an action. Hence, the action is not their meaning (§C.3.10, §C.8.2). Maṇḍana's proposal (endorsed by Pārthasārathi Miśra, §C.3.17) that the action is signified insofar as the exhortative suffixes convey the idea that it is the instrument to realise a desired result, is also refuted as too cumbersome (§C.8.2).
In fact, according to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas the Veda (and the language in general) conveys only prescriptive (that is, exhortative) meanings. It does not describe reality, but rather prescribes what has to be done. The latter cannot be understood, in turn, from the other means of knowledge, as they can only reflect reality (and in reality there is nothing bridging the link between what exists and what must be done, *is* and *ought*). Hence, what

has to be done, the *ought*, can only be grasped through the Sacred Texts. It is therefore called apūrva, that is, un-preceded (a-pūrva) by any other instrument of knowledge (TR IV §C.8.3).

3.2 The Sacred Texts' loop (§C.9.1)

But how can such an understanding take place? The possibility of understanding Sacred Texts is established within Theistic traditions by the will of God who reveals them. In the atheistic Mīmāṃsā, on the other hand, it is based on our linguistic expertise: we have to rely on worldly meanings of words even while reading Sacred Texts since, else, we would not have any key as to how to interpret them. Hence, the mastery of worldly meanings is a pre-condition for the understanding of a Sacred Text. But what if that texts prescribes a kind of duty which is fully new (apūrva), un-preceded, that is, non-attainable through any other (worldly) kind of knowledge? Should not it remain beyond any possible grasp?

More in general, the issue here sketched raises thought-provoking questions for all theological discourse. How can, in fact, the non-human be expressed in terms accessible to human beings?

Rāmānujācārya lets a Prābhākara propose the option that even in worldly sentences prescribing something to be done what one grasps is the pure "ought", so that one can grasp the ought in itself even in mundane commands (TR IV §C.9.6). Rāmānujācārya dissents. According to him, it is only through its link to action, which can be experienced even in this-world, that we can understand what a ought means, and, hence, understand it even in its apūrva-garb in Sacred Texts. Thus, Rāmānujācārya confirms the Mīmāṃsā commitment to our common experience even as regards the Veda (TR IV §C.9.7).

This final position of Rāmānujācārya has linguistic roots. According to both the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, the relation betweeen a word and the entity it means is perpetual (nitya). Nonetheless, this does not amount to say that everyone, upon hearing for the first time a word, automatically understands its meaning. Rather, one needs first to acquire proficiency in language use through the usage of elder people and through the ensuing activities (both these aspects may be referred to as *vyavahāra*). E.g., after having heard one's grandfather ordering:"Bring [the] cow!," one sees one's father bringing a cow. Through many similar instances, one eventually learns the meaning of the words "Bring!" and "cow" (this process is briefly sketched in §C.3.1).

But, according to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, the meaning conveyed by the Veda is a duty (*kārya*) which is *apūrva*. Hence, how could it be possible to learn the relation between a word and a meaning such as the *apūrva kārya* through the usage of the seniors? And if this is not possible, how could

one understand the meaning of the Vedic words referring to it? In fact, though the relation between Vedic words and the apūrva kārya is fixed, a meaning can be grasped only by people who have previously understood, by means of the linguistic usage of senior speakers, its relation with the word signifiying it. Nor can it be said that one can learn the meaning of Vedic words referring to an apūrva kārya through the Veda itself, as in this case there would be a vicious circle (the elders' usage would depend on the Veda, whose understanding depends on the elders' usage). Summing up,

senior speakers linguistic usages
↓
ensuing activities
↓
comprehension of worldly meanings (vyutpatti) by younger people

And:

comprehended worldly meanings
↓
comprehension of Vedic meanings

However, if the Vedic meaning to be comprehended has no antecedent in the world, this process cannot occur. Or, a vicious circles takes place, since the practical activity cannot but be based on the Veda, when a meaning that is accessible only through the Veda is at stake:

apūrva-content imparted from the Veda
↓
one looks at practical activity to comprehend it
↓
practical activity cannot but be based on the Veda
↓
one looks at the Veda to understand the apūrva
↪

3.3 A possible way-out: the apūrva is only a characteristic of an action (§C.9.2)

An objector proposes the following solution:
Prescriptive sentences in the Veda point to an *action* to be done.
With this (at first sight, minor) change, the stress is shifted from what has to be done to the action. And an action can easily be comprehended through the linguistic usage and the ensuing activities of this-world.

This solution has the further advantage of economy (lāghava). In fact, prescriptive sentences in the world cannot impart an apūrva, since this can only be known through the Veda. Hence, they must convey an action to be done. To postulate that they convey the same meaning even within the Veda, hence, entails that no extra potential meaning (śakti) has to be admitted.
But what exactly conveys the meaning of an action to be done, within a prescriptive sentence? The same objector proposes the verbal root, and a later one the optative suffix (or other suffixes bearing the same exhortative meaning).

3.3.1 The verbal root conveys the action to be done (§C.9.2)

As with the enunciation of the problem of apūrva, its possible solutions are also discussed from a linguistic point of view.
The idea that a verbal root conveys the action had already been discussed in §C.3.9. There, the Prābhākara siddhāntin maintained –against the Bhāṭṭa PP– that verbal endings just denote the number of the agent, whereas verbal roots convey the action. He also added that exhortative endings alone can, on top of that, also convey the incitement (*preraṇā*). The present objector leaves aside this last part and claims instead that in all cases it is just the verbal root that conveys the action. The fact that only if followed by exhortative suffixes, the verbal root conveys an action to be done is explained in this way: when a root expresses an action to be done, then it is followed by optative or similar suffixes. Just like a root expressing the present tense, which has to be followed by present-tense-ending. The latter, however, do not express the present tense, since this has already been expressed by the root (and classical Indian Linguistics is quite cautious in admitting repetitions). What do, hence, exhortative suffixes convey? The opponent does not express it, but his analogy with suffixes of the present tense may intend that exhortative suffixes also just refer to the number of the subject. If this interpretation is correct, all verbal endings would convey just the number of the subject and the difference among an optative and a present indicative verbal ending would just be due to the fact that the former is required in case of a verbal root conveying an exhortative meaning and the latter in case of a verbal root conveying the present tense, although this accord would not yield any additional information (just like the accord between adjective and noun does not yield any additional information on top of the ones already conveyed by the noun's termination).
The PP here wishes to prove how his description is more economical than the S's one (to be found in §§C.3.9-C.10). In fact, according to the PP, in a prescriptive sentence the optative and the other similar endings refer to the agent's number (1st potency) and the verbal root refers to the action as something to be done (2nd potency). The S agrees that the optative and the other similar endings refer to the agent's number (1st potency) and

the verbal root refers to the action (2nd potency), but in addition to that, the optative and the other endings also refer to what must be done (3rd potency).

3.3.2 The verbal suffix conveys the apūrva (§C.9.3, §C.3.9-C.3.10, §C.9.9)

The siddhāntin's reply is quite dismissive, insofar as for him it is obvious that exhortative suffixes convey something to be done and nothing is said in §C.9.3 to prove this assumption.
It is possible that in his reply the S does not focus on contesting the idea that the verbal root may express an action to be done, as this hypothesis is only suggested by the PP in order to show how something to be done could be more easily understood as an *action* to be done, rather than as something having the nature of apūrva. Hence, since the verbal root expresses the action, it has been natural for the PP to suggest that, within a prescriptive sentence, it may express the action which must be done.
If one goes back to the discussion on the meaning of suffixes (§C.3.9-C.3.10), however, one notices that both discussants share the idea that, within an exhortative suffix, two elements coalesce:

ākhyātatva
↗
yaj-eta
↘
liṅtva

The first one may be said to convey only the number of the agent, whereas the latter must convey an additional meaning (there are no meaningless morphemes according to classical Indian Linguistics). Hence, the point is just whether this additional meaning is an action (to be done) or the fact that something has to be done. The siddhāntin argues in favour of the latter option by resorting to the evidence of its meaning in texts. In fact, Prābhākaras maintain that words convey their meaning only once connected in a textual unity and that the text meaning is, hence, more than the mere sum of the words' meanings. Therefore, knowing the meaning of a text throws light also on that of the single words composing it. And exhortative suffixes are found together with words such as *svargakāmaḥ*, 'the one who is desirous of heaven'. Such words, according to the Prābhākaras, identify a prompted person. In fact, when one hears that one's desire has been pointed out, one grasps that the following sentence refers to oneself. Hence, one understands that the action prescribed in it is something to be done by oneself (see below, C.10.4 for the sequence desire-responsibility-being prompted). In sum, *svargakāmaḥ* denotes a prompted person and, consequently, the exhortative suffix in *svargakāmo yajeta* enjoins something to be done.

What about instances where no heaven is mentioned, as in fixed and occasional rituals, and in prohibitions? In these cases, admits the S, there is no evidence to find out whether an apūrvakārya is meant. Still, since an apūrvakārya is surely meant in optional rituals, where heaven[1] is mentioned as result, the meaning must be the same in all cases (§C.9.9).

3.4 Getting at duty through metaphor (§C.9.3-C.9.3.2; §C.9.5-C.9.5.1; §C.9.11)

This process starts with the enunciation of a result (e.g. 'heaven'). Then, whoever desires heaven recognises the action prescribed in relation to this result as to be done by her/him. Hence, s/he undertakes it. In sum, the role of exhortative suffixes in Vedic prescriptions such as,"The one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Full- and New-Moon sacrifices" is in itself an evidence of their exhortative nature. Hence, in order to get out of the vicious circle sketched above, Rāmānujācārya theorises on the one hand, that a first understanding of the meaning of apūrva can be grasped through one's worldly notion of "action to be done;" on the other (§C.9.5.1; §C.9.11), that a specification of this "to be done" as apūrva (and not action) is possible because of the proximity of terms such as "heaven", which exclude actions (see below §3.5):

apūrva-content imparted from the Veda
↓
one looks at practical activity to comprehend it
↓
out of practical activity: notion of (kriyā)kārya
↓
one gets back to the Vedic context
↓
through anvitābhidhāna, one gets the meaning of apūrvakārya

Again, this linguistic explanation has major consequences. In fact, this kind of process occurs also in the case of worldly prescriptions such as, "The one who is desirous of a well-nourished condition should drink milk". Even in such cases one understands oneself as niyojya, adhikārin and then agent (§C.9.3.1).
Rāmānujācārya can now explain the possibility of understanding a passage of the Sacred Texts referring to a duty non-conveyed through any other

[1] Or other material goods, since it is not always the case that one gets them in the present life.

instrument of knowledge (and hence *a-pūrva*) through the fact that even in this-worldly experience we grasp duties inhering in actions to be done (although only insofar as they inhere in them). From this experience we can grossly acquire a proper learning (*vyutpatti*) of exhortative suffixes as meaning an action to be done. So, it is possible to understand the meaning of something to be done non-preceded by any other instrument of knowledge without getting into vicious circles, because also in the world there are things to be done. Hence, one learns through the senior speakers' usage the meaning of a certain words in regard to something to be done in the world. In regard to the Veda, one learns that these things to be done cannot be actions because they are connected with expressions such as, "One who is desirous of heaven," and an action could not lead to the achievement of a result arising much later.
In fact, these suffixes primarily mean something-to-be-done (kārya) and only secondarily its abode (namely, an action). But this worldly *vyutpatti* is enough to initially grasp the meaning of a Vedic sentence and initiate the "hermeneutic circle" (my terminology) that will eventually lead to one's full grasp of its exhortative significance.
In sum, the primary meaning is apūrvakārya, but since this primary meaning cannot be learnt in the ordinary world, one has to get to the primary meaning trough a secondary one. One learns the secondary meaning in common usage, later one refines this understanding through Vedic study, otherwise the Veda would have no purpose.

Due to the major importance of their connection to the world "the one who is desirous of heaven" in order to ascertain the meaning of exhortative suffixes, Rāmānujācārya dedicates a paragraph (TR IV §C.9.3.2) to the meaning of *svarga* ('heaven'). This, he explains, does not refer to concrete pleasant objects, such as sandal-paste or garlands. They are only metaphorically called *svarga* because they are instrument for the arousal of pleasure. In the Veda, *svarga* refers to a long-lasting pleasure, to be enjoyed in a future life. Hence, a perishable action is not enough to reach until it (see infra, and TR IV §C.9.4-C.9.4.9).

3.4.1 What about Implication? (§C.3.11-C.3.12)

Hence, the siddhāntin claims that the exhortative endings express both an apūrva and an action, respectively as their primary and secondary meaning:

liṅ etc. → apūrva
↘
action

Two objectors propose different explanations of the process of signification of apūrva and kriyā, according to the process of implication (*ākṣepa*). This

indicates the possibility to indirectly imply something, though this is not denoted, neither through direct designation (*abhidhā*, nor through secondary –metaphorical– signification (*lakṣaṇā*). An instance of akṣepa is the implication of the agent in the meaning of the verbal root (see §C.3.9).
The first one is a Prābhākara who wants to stress the exclusive link between exhortative suffixes and duty. Hence, he maintains that the action is not denoted by the exhortative suffix. Rather, it is implied by it, and exhortative suffixes have what has to be done as their exclusive meaning (§C.3.11). How could this be possible? The opponent mentions the example of *daṇḍin*, where the suffix does not indicate the stick, but the stick is nonetheless implied by it. Ome might add that this implication is possible because the stick is, indeed, denoted by the stem (*daṇḍ-*). The parallel with verbal forms such as *yajeta* holds, since also in their case one might argue that the action is already conveyed by the stem and hence does not need to be conveyed by the suffix. However, the siddhāntin (§C.3.11.1) replies that the verbal root denotes the action without any connection to its agent. Instead, in order to undertake an action, one has to know that it has to be done by oneself. Therefore, the suffixes must convey at the same time the idea that something has to be done and the action as this content to be done.
In sum, the action cannot be just implied, since the apūrva directly depends on it for its realisation (nobody would realise a duty, unless it were linked to oneself and one needs to know about an *action* linked to oneself in order to perform it.
The second objector's proposal is, indeed, that the apūrva implies the action (§C.3.12). This means that the apūrva should possibly be denoted according to its own nature (svarūpa), that is, independent of an action. This possibility is withdrawn since

- implication –like metaphore– presupposes that one already knows about the connection between the implier and the implied entity. But this cannot be the case in regard to apūrva and effort.
- the apūrva cannot be denoted according to its own nature, because its own nature depends, in order to be realised, on the action

One might wonder why is metaphore possible and implication impossible. In other words, why is it possible that one gets at action through metaphore via apūrva, whereas the same action cannot be implied by the apūrva? I have not yet found a comparative discussion about the two, but I think they work in the following two ways:
metaphore:

$$\text{liṅ etc.}\begin{cases} \rightarrow \text{apūrva} \\ (\text{apūrva}) \Rightarrow \text{action} \end{cases}$$

implication: liṅ etc. $\rightarrow$ apūrva

$\Downarrow$
action

(with $\Rightarrow$ indicating secondary denotation)

The second case seems to be excluded because it is not possible that the apūrva in itself signifies the action, whereas it is possible that the exhortative suffixes secondarily denote it, through its link with apūrva. But why is the apūrva-action link enough for metaphore and not for implication? The only hint one finds in the text (§C.3.12) is that to the lack of an explicit (Vedic) statement enabling the implication. This might refer to the fact that the link between action and agent (the acceptable instance of implication) is proved through sense-perception. Since, however, sense-perception cannot attain apūrva, one can only know about its links through a Vedic statement. Unfortunately, no such Vedic statement exists. On the other hand, metaphore is possible because the action is already within what can be denoted by the exhortative suffixes, though secondarily. As soon as one realises that the apūrva is not at the moment denoted, one immediately turns to the next potential meaning of the exhortative suffixes, i.e., the action.
Summing up, the apūrva cannot by itself imply anything, since there is no instrument of knowledge about it. On the other hand, exhortative suffixes denote primarily the apūrva but, in case this is not the meaning, the action.

3.5 Actions and duty

3.5.1 The exhortative suffixes convey an action to be done (§C.9.4-C.9.4.9): Pro and contra

At this point, one might wonder why it is not the action to be done the one and only meaning of optative and similar suffixes. But this kriyākārya (action to be done, lit. 'something to be done consisting in an action') cannot be the only meaning of an optative suffixe because otherwise sentences such as 'The one who desires heaven should sacrifice' (svargakāmo yajeta) would not make sense since, as shown in §C.9.4-C.9.4.3, an action cannot be the means for the accomplishment of something desired as it expires much before the arousal of the sacrifice's result (heaven, which is experienced after one's death, long after the end of the sacrificial action).
The opponent (§C.9.4.4-C.9.4.8) puts forth the view that the action leads to the result through something intermediate (e.g., a Deity pleased by the action and hence bestowing the result; or a saṃskāra inhering in the sacrificer because of having performed the action and leading later on to the result). But the siddhāntin (§C.9.4.9) closes the discussion by means of observing that, if this were the case, than the action would no longer be the real instrument for the result (as it would just be the instrument for the arousal

of its cause). Hence, it could no more be construed as what is conveyed by the exhortative suffixes as leading to a desired result.

3.5.2 An apūrvakārya is recognised even in worldly experience (§C.9.6-C.9.7): Pro and contra

On the contrary, a Prābhākara opponent claims that an apūrvakārya can be learnt already in worldly usage. He maintains that the very fact that one undertakes an action cannot be explained but through the assumption that s/he has been incited by the notion of a duty. Hence, one acts because one ought, not because of the action's own nature by itself (§C.9.6).
The siddhāntin replies that in the worldly experience one grasps a duty only insofar as it rests on an action to be done, just like one grasps a species only insofar as it rests on an individual (the siddhāntin is close to Aristotle's stand, at least as far as our common experience is concerned) (§C.9.7). Moreover, the idea of learning the meaning of an apūrvakārya in worldly experience either contradicts its apūrva-character (if one claims that it can be perceived in the world) or is impossible (as explained above, §3.2) (TR IV §C.9.7).

3.5.3 Alternative construction of the metaphor: the kriyākārya is the principal and the apūrva is its secondary meaning: Pro and contra (§C.9.8-C.9.9)

So, the S concludes, through its connection with words such as, "the one who is desirous of heaven," one ascertains that in the Veda exhortative suffixes mean something to be done. What about ordinarily language, where the apūrvakārya cannot be the meaning? In order to avoid the cumbersome postulation of two different meanings, the S suggests that the apūrvakārya is the primary meaning, but that exhortative suffixes may also convey, through secondary signification, the idea of an *action* to be done (kriyākārya) (TR IV §C.9.7.1).
Nor is it possible that the kriyākārya is the primary meaning and the apūrvakārya (the unpreceded duty) the secondary one, since one could not get to apūrvakārya through lakṣaṇā (secondary designation) starting from kriyā, since apūrvakārya cannot be known otherwise than through the Veda. First, because in order to apply a metaphorical meaning one needs to be aware of the terms involved and of their connection. In general terms, in gāṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ ('the village on the Gāṅgā', secondarily meaning 'the village on the Gāṅgā's bank') one has to know the relation of river and bank, in order for gāṅgāyāṃ to refer to the bank. The kind of relation holding between kriyā and apūrva is instead non-established unless one can get to know the apūrva. Nor can the exhortative suffixes primarily denote something to be done in general, to be later secondarily specified as kriyā- or apūrvakārya. In fact,

only qualified meanings can be expressed –the meaning of a morpheme cannot be something generical (TR IV §C.9.9, see also TR IV §C.3.3, §C.4.1, §C.4.2.1). These oddities point to the next one, insofar as metaphor cannot be the only means to know an otherwise unattainable thing. If apūrva were to be known only through metaphor, we would not have any instrument of knowledge proving the existence of apūrva. Hence, either the Veda does not convey any meaning or the apūrvakārya has to be directly signified by it.
Similarly, in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya it is said that one learns the meaning of an apaśabda (incorrect word, such as goṇi instead of gauḥ) through lakṣaṇā, because it reminds one of the correct word. Interestingly enough, this means that the primary meaning does not necessarily precede chronologically the secondary one. In fact, one learns to speak Prakrit before Sanskrit and one learns the kriyākārya meaning of an optative suffix prior to its apūrvakārya meaning. This is not just a further instance of the Indian bias towards a synchronic view of the linguistic phenomenon as a whole, since Mīmāṃsā authors are well aware that the process of language acquisition (see for instance TR IV §C.3.1) does not start with the Veda.

3.6 No apūrva has to be grasped! One undertakes an action only because it is the instrument for a desired result (C.9.10-C.9.10.4)

Just as in §§C.3.1-C.3.17.1 from a Bhāṭṭa point of view, the problem of Maṇḍana's provocative thesis about the action is now proposed within a Prābhākara frame. According to Maṇḍana's view, there is no need to understand an apūrvakārya. In fact, the apūrva (now understood as '[force] not existing before [the sacrifice]') has to be postulated only in order to enable the sacrifice to realise the result. It is hence inferable, and has not to be directly known. Exhortative suffixes on the other hand express the action insofar as it is the instrument to realise a desired result (§C.9.10).
The siddhāntin (§C.9.10.1) replies that the fact of being an instrument for a desired result is not in itself enough, since there are many counter-examples. For instance, one does not act in regard to a past instrument for something desired, nor in regard to a present one. One also does not act in regard to all future instruments for desired results. One does not act, e.g., in regard to one's bodily signs (although they will lead one to achieve a long life, etc.), nor in regard to rain (although it will lead to crops), since it depends on fate.
But this is still not enough, since the PP may argue that even if it is not the case that one *always* act in regard to an instrument to something desired, one certainly acts *only* if it is an instrument to something desired. Hence, the fact of being to be done is nothing but the fact of being an instrument to something desired (§C.9.10.2).

3.6.1 The double meaning of kārya (§C.9.10.5)

The siddhāntin reply to this point admits the link between 'being to be done' and 'being an instrument towards something desired'. The latter, however, is only indirectly identical with the former.

In fact, argues the siddhāntin, one immediately knows that something pleasant is something to be done'. In this regard, it is worth remembering that the subject Mīmāṃsakas refer to is always a desiring subject (see infra, §6.1). He strolls in the saṃsāra because of desire and is primary determined to achieve more pleasant objects. In the words of Francis X. Clooney:

> The presumption is that the Veda and the sacrifice do not command the attention of someone who lacks desire; and if there is such a person, he is of no interest to Jaimini[2].

Hence, the fact that one undertakes an action in regard to something desired is self-understood. Pleasure is, hence, in itself a kārya (something to be done). This may surprise a modern Western reader (at least, it did surprise the present author), but it makes perfect sense within the desire-frame sketched above. A desiring subject has just one purpose: to satisfy her desires. Hence, s/he has only to act in regard to them. Pleasant objects are, for her, something to be done[3].

In sum, pleasure is something to be done in itself, whereas an instrument to achieve pleasure is something to be done only indirectly. On the equation between what has to be done (kāryatva) and being the desired fruit (such as sukha, pleasure), writes Brahmamitra Avasthi, in his paraphrase of VM II, 8-9:

> The fact of being to be done is not the mere fact that its being realised arises out of an undertaking of an action. Rather, what is the principal, that is, the fruit, in regard to the undertaking of the action, [...] that one is [...] what has to be done. That, for whose sake the action has been initiated, is called principal in regard to the undertaking of the action[4]

On the other hand, the kārya as (action) to be done also enjoins that the action is undertaken. Hence, it entails also an injunctive aspect, called niyoga (cf. TR IV §C.10.3).

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[2] **Clooney1986**

[3] This equation is made smoother because of the double import of the Sanskrit (and Ancient Greek, to name just another Indo-European language) optative. An optative means at the same time what has to be done and what can be done. In addition to that, the same ambiguity subsists, in the case of Sanskrit, also in optative participles, such as kārya. Kārya, hence, means at the same time 'what has to be done' (cf. Ancient Greek poiētéon) and 'what can be done' (cf. Ancient Greek poiētón).

[4] kāryatā kevala kṛti se utpanna honevālī siddhitāmātra nahiṃ hai, kintu kṛti ke prati jo pradhānabhūta arthāt phala hai [...] vahī kārya [...] hai. kṛti ke liye use hi pradhāna kahā jā saktā hai, jiske liye kṛti pravṛtta hoti hai (**Avasthi1978**).

The whole argument is meant to show that 'being to be done' is not the same as 'being an instrument to a desired result'. Rather, the latter ultimately conflates into the former, since one undertakes an action in regard to an instrument only because of its result. In this way, the siddhāntin claims to have proved that the apūrvakārya of Vedic sentences is not just an instrument towards something desired.

3.7 Reasons to act (§C.9.12-C.9.15)

A further objector proposes the Naiyāyika idea that one undertakes an action because of will (icchā). In fact, the Naiyāyikas explain the reasons for one's action according to the sequence of cognition-will-action. One acts because one strives for something and in order to strive for something one has to know it as pleasant.
In other words,

Nyāya:

cognition
↓
will
↓
action

As expressed by Vātsyāyana in his NBh ad NS 1.1.1, objects are known in order to understand whether they must be desired or avoided. Hence, the succession of knowledge, will and action. See the NBh's Introduction ad NS 1.1.1:

> This knower, after having grasped with a means of knowledge an object, either craves for it or wishes to leave it. The desire of such a person, set in motion by crave or disgust, is called initiation of the action[5].

Mīmāṃsā:

desire (Vedic injunction)
↘ ↙
(responsibility)
↓
undertaking of the action[6]

[5] pramāṇena khalv ayaṃ jñātārtham upalabhya tam īpsati va jihāsati vā. tasyepsājihāsāprayuktasya samīhā pravṛttir ity ucyate.

[6] The Mīmāṃsā account does not take for granted that an action is actually accomplished. Its theoretical interest stops at the undertaking of the action.

So, according to the Mīmāṃsā account, desire and Vedic injunction are both needed factors in order for the sacrificial action to take place. In ordinary experience, desire is enough.
The siddhāntin reply to the Naiyāyika is that to believe that cognition (jñāna) is enough for will to arise does no hold. The intellectual view of Nyāya is thus refuted. Desire is, according to Mīmāṃsā, a primary factor which cannot be explained away through its antecedents[7] (TR IV C.9.13).

Lastly, an objector proposes to identify the kārya as an impulsion, a consent or a request (all possible meanings of the optative endings according to Vyākaraṇa). But they would all hold, replies the siddhāntin, only within a dialogue, whereas the Veda lacks a speaker. Hence, in it the optative endings only mean an apūrvakārya (TR IV C.9.14-C.9.15).

3.8 Epistemological conclusions of §2 and §3

Linguistic analysis and epistemology are always closely linked in Mīmāṃsā. In fact, the main concern of Mīmāṃsā is the Veda and the Veda is a linguistic entity and, insofar as it is one, it is a valid instrument of knowledge. Hence, analysis of language is preliminary in order to understand how can the Veda convey knowledge. But, Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras agree that the Veda is made of prescriptions. How can prescriptions convey knowledge? Since it has already been observed that the discussion on instruments of knowledge plays in Indian philosophy a role comparable to the debate about truth in the Western one, the problem amounts to the Western question about whether injunctive sentences may have a truth-value (see Copi-Cohen XXX). It is, in fact, difficult to figure out how to understand "truth" in regard to a non-descriptive statement. Some thinkers (the deontic logician Stig Kanger and some Christian theologians, for instance) maintain that the definition of truth as correspondence still holds. One only has to compare the content conveyed by the prescription with what should occur according to an ideal paradigm, be it God's Will or Kant's "kingdom of ends". In this way, the oddity of a *prescriptive* truth value is solved.
Something similar is attempted by Maṇḍana (see above, §2.2.2). His view of prescriptions as *assertions* conveying the idea that the action to be undertaken is a means to a desired end makes the attribution of truth-claims (in Indian terms: the attribution of prāmāṇya, i.e. the capacity to convey valid knowledge) to them, smooth. It is indeed easy to say that the Veda is an instrument of knowledge insofar as it conveys the idea that the Full- and

[7]Instead, many other Indian philosophical schools explain desire as a consequence of (erroneous) cognitions. See the Buddhist pratītyasamutpāda, the Naiyāyika discussion on smṛtyanubandha and avidyā...It remains uncertain whether Mīmāṃsakas believed their analysis to hold only for the loka or also beyond it. In fact, their rigid empiricism could have made them believe that there is nothing beyond the loka.

New-Moon sacrifice leads one to heaven (obviously enough, verifying it is still far from easy, but this has nothing to do with the logical oddity of the Veda being at the same time prescriptive and an instrument of knowledge). Hence, the prescriptive "One ought to sacrifice" is said to be tantamount to "Sacrifice is an instrument to something good," which is much easier to analyse.
In logical terms:

$$Os \tag{3.1}$$

would be the same as

$$s \text{ is } p \tag{3.2}$$

with O=ought, the deontic modal, s=sacrificing and p=being an instrument to something good.
But in this way the *modal* specificity of prescriptions is just cleared away. This is also the fundamental objection of Rāmānujācārya against Maṇḍana (see TR IV §C.3.2): that an action is the instrument to realise something desired is an assertion. But it does *not* entail that one ought to undertake the action, although Maṇḍana might object that everyone undertakes actions, if only they lead to something desired. Finally, one no longer obeys the Veda because the Veda ordered one to do it, but rather because the action enjoined are conducive to something desired. Hence, arguably, no other harm should derive if one does not undertake them, but the non-attainment of the desired thing. Since, however the desired thing is happiness itself, its non attainment is enough to make everyone strive for the opposite.
On the other hand, the (other) Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras take seriously in account the specificity of exhortations as against statements about actual states of affairs. An exhortation, according to both schools, cannot be reduced to a descriptive statement. This is even more true in the case of the Prābhākaras, which claim that the Veda points at conveying something to be done. In this case, the validity-criterion for the Veda is that it has to convey valid knowledge in its specific field, that is, the sphere of what has to be done. Since this sphere is not attainable through any other instrument of knowledge (as all other instruments of knowledge refer to what is presently available to one's grasp), the Veda is the only possible instrument of knowledge about what has to be done. The Bhāṭṭas are somehow more moderate, insofar as they refer the Veda's validity rather to the sphere of future state of affairs –which are also beyond the grasp of our faculties.
Maṇḍana's, Kumārila's and Prabhākara's theories about the Veda's validity distinguish between what Western logicians call prescriptive sentences and imperatives. The former enjoin something, are modally distinct from statements of facts, and are hence valid in a different way (e.g., they correspond to something different of the actual state of affairs). The latter, on the other hand, are only valid if the impelled people actually perform them. The Veda consists in prescriptions and not in imperatives –all Mīmāṃsakas agree that

the actual performance of the sacrifices prescribed has nothing to do with the Veda's validity and do not derive its validity from the fact that everyone obeys it.
According to the insightful distinction of Joseph M. Bocheński (1974), the Veda's authority is, hence, deontic but only insofar as it is epistemic. It regards the sphere of what has to be done, but it derives its authority from the fact that it is the only instrument to know about it. On the other hand, the deontic authority of, e.g., an officer on her soldiers directly consists in her being obeyed. There cannot be any deontic authority which is disregarded (if it is disregarded, it is just not an authority at all).

Chapter 4

Hermeneutics of Sacrifice: Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara views

4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 The role of Mīmāṃsā in Indian hermeneutics

: OMIT THIS SUBSECTION? Indian philosophical schools have tended, through their history, to acquire a systematic character and ultimately to deal with all acknowledged philosophical topics. Nonetheless, each school has usually emerged out of a specific concern, such as natural philosophy in the case of Vaiśeṣika, debate in the case of Nyāya, or Vedic exegesis in the case of Mīmāṃsā. For this reason, the Mīmāṃsā School has served as a reservoir for exegetic rules, making it possibly the main source for the Indian approach to hermeneutics in general. It is, for instance, well known that Mīmāṃsā provided Indian jurisprudence with hermeneutical rules and principles (see . Sarkar 1909). Within Vedānta schools the same sort of influence can also be seen, where Mīmāṃsā rules, adjusted to the Vedānta view of the Veda or other sacred texts, were also applied.

Thus, although the hermeneutics of sacrificial prescriptions may appear of only indirect philosophical interest, understanding the exegetical habits of Mīmāṃsā writers along with their practical application to concrete Vedic texts is essential in the understanding of Indian hermeneutics in general.

4.1.2 The role of hermeneutics in Mīmāṃsā: shaping the chaos

The Mīmāṃsā School developed primarily out of Vedic exegesis, and hermeneutics remained the school's main concern throughout its history. The intent of this concern was first to make sense of Vedic passages and then,

above all, to build coherent textual units out of the mass of these texts. Furthermore, since the Veda was believed by Mīmāṃsakas to be faultless and independent of any author, Mīmāṃsā thinkers felt compelled to elaborate rules in order to eliminate seeming fallacies and to understand the Vedic texts without relying on an author's intent (tātparya), that is, to interpret the texts as if they were totally autonomous. As stated by Pārthasārathi Miśra, one of the most important interpreters of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa:

> How could a faulty cognition arise out of a non-faulty cause (such being the case of the Veda, which cannot possibly have a faulty cause since it lacks any cause altogether)? [...] Although no intrinsic mistake can possibly be found with regard to the Veda, which is authorless, an erroneous cognition may nevertheless arise through [the application of] rules that seem to be correct on the part of the knower alone, because his mind is bereft of a universal [rule] and [hence he] does not determine exceptions. Therefore, the Mīmāṃsā system gains significance insofar as it aims at determining the [correct] rules[1].

The guiding line in these attempts is always a prescription. In fact, according to Mīmāṃsakas only Vedic prescriptions convey knowledge independently; non-prescriptive portions of the Veda are only auxiliary to the prescriptive portions. Mīmāṃsakas, by collecting and using segments scattered throughout the Vedic literature (especially from the Brāhmaṇas), build individual coherent prescriptive units of text.

Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics developed from the hermeneutics of the Śrautasūtras. In both cases, although less so in the Śrautasūtra case, one rarely finds a systematic description of rituals designed to guide their performance (in fact, as shown by **DayaKrishna** it is possible for actual performers of rituals to even disregard Mīmāṃsā solutions). Systematic descriptions are rather the subject matter of ritual manuals, prayoga or paddhati. In contrast, the basic intention of the Śrautasūtras is to provide a systematic overview of rituals according to "scientific" principles, that is, they aim at clarifying these rituals using as few rules as possible. Just as the grammatical sūtras of Pāṇini are not meant to teach a language but rather to disclose the rules one is already acquainted with unconsciously, so the ritual sūtras have been

[1] kathaṃ punar aduṣṭena karaṇena mithyājñānaṃ janyate? [...] yady api asāv apauruṣeyasya vedasya na svagataḥ kaścid doṣo vidyate tathāpi pratipattur eva sāmānyāpahr tabuddhitvād apavādānirūpaṇāc ca nyāyābhāsebhyaḥ prasaran mithyājñānaṃ jāyate. ata eva nyāyanirūpaṇārthaṃ mīmāṃsāśāstram arthavad bhavati (AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 16, p. 286). I would like to thank Prof. Kei Kataoka for having helped me to understand the meaning of sāmānyāpahṛtabuddhitvāt by pointing to a preceding passage, namely, viśeṣādarśanena hi sāmānyamātrālocanāt sāmānyamātraparyālocanādośād (AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 14-15, p. 284).

devised in order to provide the key rules from which an entire ritual procedure can be deduced (a certain instruction mentioned in the paribhāṣā section will, e.g., not be repeated at each point needed in the performance, as noted by Alfred Hillebrandt, (**Hillebrandt1879**). Hillebrandt explains:

> Es ist klar, dass die Sûtra's bei solch präciser Fassug dem praktischen Bedürfniss weder genügen noch überhaupt auf dasselbe berechnet sein können; vielmehr sind sie lediglich construierte wissenschaftliche Systeme, in welchem die bei den einzelnen Handlungen zur Anwendung kommenden Vorschriften einheitlich verschmolzen werden. Bei einer praktischen Darstellung war darum auf Commentare und Leitfäden, welche die wissenschaftliche Darstellung wieder in die Praxis umsetzen, eingehend Rücksicht zu nehmen [...] (Hillebrandt 1879: XI).

In summary, the Śrautasūtras presuppose the acquaintance with the ritual they describe, and the Mīmāṃsā presupposes the acquaintance with both the ritual and its Śrautasūtra description. Thus only the structure of the ritual is dealt with, independent of its actual performance. It would not be possible to perform the ritual based only on the Mīmāṃsā descriptions thereof; indeed its performance possibly lies outside the Mīmāṃsā main concern (at least, this could explain the survival of Mīmāṃsā discussions about rituals which were no longer performed).
In the following, I will examine the passage of TR IV that constructs a distinct coherent prescriptive unit regarding the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices[2]. This appears, in TR IV, after a discussion that establishes the main contents of the Veda to be prescriptions (see chapter 2), which are characterised as urging (śabdabhāvanā) people to undertake (arthabhāvanā) [ritual] actions (for these and the following terms, see §2.1.3). An instrument (karaṇa) and a procedure (itikartavyatā) are connected to this central focus. Expectation (ākāṅkṣā) is the hermeneutic device for understanding what must be connected first and what role this element has with regard to the prescription. This typical Mīmāṃsā concept derives from the Śrautasūtra method of analysing texts[3]. According to this pattern of progressive connection, the author constructs the prescriptions for the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices and joins to them all ritual auxiliaries mentioned in the text and all supplementary details to which they are directly or indirectly related.

[2]"The translation "s.[=sacrifice] of new and full m.[=moon]" is incorrect because these rites begin with full moon (Bpit.[=Baudhāyana-Pitṛmedhasūtra] 1,1; KhG.[=Khādira=Gṛhyasūtra] 2,1,4ff.) and the shorter member of a copulative compound precedes according to Pāṇini 2, 2, 34 (comm. on VaiG.[=Vaikhānasa Gṛhyasūtra] 1,1); Caland, in AO 9, 59." (Gonda 1980: 421, fn 26).

[3]See the Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra, where a Vedic sentence is identified as follows: teṣāṃ [=mantrāṇāṃ] vākyaṃ nirākāṅkṣam.

Together with expectation, the other hermeneutical device constantly implemented is that of connecting what is not yet known to what is known (in Rāmānujācārya's words "to what has already been acquired [for the sake of the sacrifice]"). New elements are introduced into the structure one by one and immediately connected, as an instrument, material substance, etc., to an element that has already been acknowledged as part of the sacrifice. Such connections may be hierarchical (in the case of, e.g., an instrument being connected to its result) or "horizontal" (in the case of, e.g., a female slave being connected [to the ritual action] just as is the sacrificer's wife).

4.2 Specific ritual elements

The TR is not a Mīmāṃsaka primer in the same sense as Āpadeva's Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa (henceforth MNP) or Laugākṣī Bhāskara's Arthasaṅgraha are (not to mention Rāmānujācārya's NR, which is also much more explanatory). The TR does not explain Mīmāṃsā technical terms or concepts in detail. Rather, it assumes a general knowledge of Mīmāṃsā and attempts (just as Mīmāṃsakas do with the Brāhmaṇas' prescriptions) to build a coherent structure thereof. Rāmānujācārya tries, e.g., to unify the various classifications of prescriptions, stressing their hierarchical organization. However, since a modern reader may find certain Mīmāṃsā concepts difficult to comprehend, a few paragraphs will be here devoted to outline them.

4.2.1 Directly and Indirectly Contributing Auxiliaries (§C.4.2.8, §C.4.3.1-C.4.3.2)

Auxiliaries are actions, things or qualifications connected to the principal ritual through an application prescription (viniyogavidhi). Writes Āpadeva:

> The subsidiaries [aṅga] (of an action) are those things which are applied to it by an applicatory injunction, such as, "He shall sacrifice with the new- and full-moon rites, contributing (thereto) with the fire-sticks and other (subsidiaries)," which is attended by these (six modes of evidence). These subsidiaries are of two sorts, consisting of either fixed-elements (siddha), or actions (kriyā). Of these, fixed-elements are such things as caste (of the person qualified to participate), material (as rice-grains), number (how many things of each sort are to be used), etc[4].

[4](**Edgerton1929**). etat[ṣatpramāṇa]sahakṛtena viniyogavidhinā "samidādibhir upakṛtya darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ yajeta"-ity evaṃrūpeṇa yāni viniyujyante tāny aṅgāni. tāni dvividhāni, siddharūpāṇi kriyārūpāṇi ceti. tatra siddharūpāṇi jātidravyasaṃkhyādīni (MNP 182-3, p. 230).

One of the basic assumptions underlying Rāmānujācārya's discussion is the distinction between directly contributing (ārādupakāraka) and indirectly contributing (sannipatyopakāraka, or sannipātin) auxiliaries. The first are actions connected with the main ritual and serving an invisible purpose, e.g., pre-sacrifices that contribute directly to the main sacrifice, although they do not serve any visible purpose. In his NR, Rāmānujācārya describes such pre-sacrifices as follows:

> Owing to the context, when [all the sentences which prescribe auxiliaries of the ritual] are [constructed] with the principal sentence into a single sentence, the directly contributing [auxiliaries] are immediately connected to the main [ritual], since no intermediate [substance to which they could apply] is directly mentioned [in the Sacred Texts]. Thus, it is postulated that their assistance is of the invisible type (NR ad AN IV, ix adhyāya, p.265)[5].

In this case, Āpadeva has nothing interesting to add:

> An action that is merely enjoined without reference to a material substance etc., is a directly-contributing action; such as the fore-sacrifices, etc. (**Edgerton1929**). dravyādy anuddiśya kevalaṃ vidhīyamānaṃ karmārādupakārakam: yathā prayājādi (MNP 192, p. 232).

The latter are, e.g., the threshing of the rice, which contributes to the main sacrifice via the rice. In general, they do not contribute directly to the sacrifice, but to a substance enjoined for the sacrifice or the like. They can serve a visible purpose, such as the threshing of the rice, but also an invisible one, such as its being sprinkled with water (after which no modification of rice can be observed).
In Āpadeva's words:

> "And those [auxiliaries] consisting of actions are of two sorts, [...] indirectly-contributing and directly contributing actions. Of these, an indirectly contributing action is one that is enjoined with reference to a material-substance or other (fixed-element) subsidiary of the rite, such as the husking and sprinkling (of rice) etc., And it may serve a visible (exoteric) purpose, an invisible (esoteric or transcendental), or both a visible and an invisible purpose. Such things as husking serve a visible purpose (removing the husks from rice). Such things as sprinkling (rice) serve an invisible one (having no visible effect on the rice, they must

[5] prakaraṇena pradhānavākyaikavākyatāyāṃ satyām ārādupakārakāṇāṃ dvārasyāśrutatvāt sākṣāt pradhānenaivānvaye teṣāṃ adr ṣṭarūpaḥ upakāraḥ kalpyate.

> serve an invisible or transcendental end). [...] And this indirectly-contributing (subsidiary action) is of two kinds, according as it relates to something that is yet to be employed (in the sacrifice), or to something that has been employed. Of these the husking and sprinkling etc., relate to things that are to be employed, because the rice is yet to be used at the sacrifice. [...] And such an indirectly-contributing subsidiary is stronger than a directly-contributing one" (MNP 183-6, pp.110-2). [6]

Unlike, 'directly contributing auxiliaries' for ārādupakāraka, "indirectly contributing auxiliaries" is not a literal translation of sannipātin, literally 'falling together'. A translation more adherent to the Sanskrit original has been avoided. since it would have not helped the reader's comprehension. The term is, in fact, never glossed according to its etymological meaning and rather seems a rūḍhiśabda (a word having a conventional meaning different from its etymological one, e.g. kṛṣṇasarpa meaning a specific snake).

4.2.2 Tantra (§C.4.2.8, §C.7)

Indirectly contributing auxiliaries have a specific function and hence must be repeated whenever such a function is needed (all rice grains have, e.g., to be threshed). On the other hand, directly contributing auxiliaries are performed only once and apply to all elements of the sacrifice automatically (see §C.4.2.8), since their function does not change according to the various sacrificial elements. The principle ruling this type of application to all the elements of a pre-sacrifice that is performed only once is called tantra.
In Vedic ritual literature, tantra indicates the standard form of a ritual and its being a model for further rituals (see Gonda 1980:180, 421). Within Mīmāṃsā it became a terminus technicus indicating the device through which a subsidiary is performed only once and applied whenever needed: "There are certain Subsidiaries which, if performed once, effectually help, by that single performance, more than one Act; this help accorded by a single performance of the Subsidiary to several Primaries has been called 'Tantra' (Centralisation, Collectivation)" (Jhā 1942: 348).
Jaimini opposes tantra and āvāpa (repetition of a certain element which has to be applied singularly). Śabara's commentary on MS, distinguishes tantra

[6] kriyārūpāṇi ca [aṅgāni] dvividhāni: [...] saṃnipatyopakārakāṇy ārādupakārakāṇīti cocyante. tatra karmāṅgadravyādyuddeśena vidhīyamānaṃ karma saṃnipatyopakārakam; yathāvaghātaprokṣaṇādi. tac ca dṛṣṭārtham adṛṣṭārthaṃ dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthaṃ ca. dṛṣṭārtham avaghātādi; adṛṣṭārthaṃ prokṣaṇādi [...] tac ca saṃnipatyopakārakaṃ dvividham: upayokṣyamānārtham upayuktārthaṃ ceti. tatrāvaghātaprokṣaṇādy upayokṣyamāṇārtham, vrīhīṇāṃ yāga upayokṣyamāṇatvāt [...] tac ca saṃnipatyopakārakam ārādupakārakād balīyaḥ (MNP 183-6, pp.230-1). "An action that is merely enjoined without reference to a material substance etc., is a directly-contributing action; such as the fore-sacrifices, etc." (MNP 192, p.114). dravyādy anuddiśya kevalaṃ vidhīyamānaṃ karmārādupakārakam: yathā prayājādi (MNP 192, p.232).

and prasaṅga, stating that the conditions for the latter. But, after Śabara, prasaṅga gets confused with tantra since at least the 12th c. and altogether forgotten after that.
Even the correlate of tantra, that is, āvāpa is sometimes omitted in texts. Rāmānujācārya (TR IV, §C.7) speaks instead of āvṛtti. The latter term means 'repetition' and is used already in MS (8.3.3 and 7; 10.3.25; 10.5.11; 10.5.25; 10.5.85; 10.6.27 and 31; 11.2.25; 11.4.54; 12.3.9) and ŚBh. MS and ŚBh also use abhyāsa (for instance, in 10.5.22 and 27), which seems to have exactly the same meaning. Āvṛtti lacks, however, the implications of āvāpa as opposed to tantra (meaning that the element to be repeated applies singularly to every single ritual item at which it is repeated). It merely indicates the bare fact of being repeated.

4.2.3 Subordination (§C.4.3-C.4.3.2)

A further topic hinted at by Rāmānujācārya, though not fully explained, is how one understands that a certain substance, or the like, is subordinate to something else. In order to ascertain subordination, in fact, Mīmāṃsakas (see MNP 67-181) implement six means of knowledge (pramāṇa): direct mention (śruti), word-meaning (liṅga), syntactical connection (vākya), context (prakaraṇa), position (sthāna) and name (samākhyā) to understand which element or function has to be supplied to an over-ranked one. Of these means of knowledge, apart from mentioning the beginning of the list followed by ādi, Rāmānujācārya explicitly deals only with direct mention and context. The first is the explicit mention in a Vedic text of an item being subordinate to something else, e.g., "[One] should sacrifice with rice grains" indicating that rice grains are subordinate to the sacrifice (see §C.4.2.3). Since the order of pramāṇas also indicates their relative strength, direct mention is the strongest and ultimately overrules any conflicting evidence. Context, on the other hand, consists of the mutual expectation (ākāṅkṣā) between two statements, such as one prescribing the Full- and New-Moon sacrifices and another prescribing the performance of pre-sacrifices. In fact, the latter requires a result, which is supplied by the former, whereas the Full- and New-Moon prescription requires a procedure, which is supplied by the prescriptions concerning pre-sacrifices.
Consider the following definition of context in MNP:

> Context (*prakaraṇa*) is interdependence (or mutual requirement, mutual need for complement, *ubhaya-ākāṅkṣā*); as in such things as the fore-sacrifices. For when it is said "He offers (to) the fire-sticks," since there is in this injunction no statement of any special desired-end, there is felt a requirement (need of statement) of the benefit to be gained; that is, the questions is raised: "What is he to effect by offering (to) the fire-sticks?" Also in the injunction of the new- and full-moon rites, there is felt a requirement

> of the producer of the benefit (promist to their performer), that is, the question is raised, “How is he to gain heaven by the new- and full-moon rites?” Therefore, by reason of the mutual requirement, the fore-sacrifices etc. are shown to be subsidiary to the new- and full-moon rites[7].

The element which is subordinated to another one is said to be its śeṣa (literally ’remnant’ part). This means that it has no autonomous role and only acquires its signification once related to the main element. For instance, arthavādas (commendary statements) in the Veda are, according to Mīmāṃsakas, vidhiśeṣa, that is, they convey a meaning only once supplied to a prescription, they cannot convey any meaning by themselves (TR IV §C.6.2).
From the Bhāṭṭa point of view, the whole ritual is a śeṣa of its result, since one would not undertake it if not for the result’s sake (§C.5.5).

4.2.4 Upakāra (§C.6.1)

The upakāra is the service which the aṅgas (auxiliary rites) do for the main action. It is, hence, their *function* and is therefore different of the auxiliary acts themselves (and of the ritual items employed by them). This “assistance” constitutes the procedure through which the sacrifice’s acts lead to the arousal of the sacrifice’s result:

> darśapūrṇamāsavākye ’pi darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargaṃ bhāvayet katham ity asti upakārakākāṅkṣā (MNP 116, p. 215).

The postulation of this extra category is possibly due, on the one hand, to the pan-Indian distinction between (grossly) “body” and “soul”, that is, a physical entity and its essence. In this case, the physical entity is the actual auxiliary, whereas the assistance is the function linked (but not identical) with it. On the other hand, this distinction allows also for the case where the same assistance is performed by changing auxiliaries.
From the point of view of the upakāra, aṅgas are called upakāraka, see above, §4.2.1.

4.3 Archetypes and Ectypes (§C.6-§C.7)

Mīmāṃsā authors systematise the Śrauta Sūtra rules about sacrifices which have not been fully explained and about which the Veda just says “It has to

[7] **Edgerton1929** ubhayākāṅkṣā prakaraṇam; yathā prayājādiṣu. samidho yajatīty atra hīṣṭaviśeṣasyānirdeśāt samidyāgena bhāvayet kim ity asty upakāryākāṅkṣā. darśapūrṇamāsavākye ’pi darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargaṃ bhāvayet katham ity asty upakārakākāṅkṣā. ata ubhayākāṅkṣayā prayājādīnāṃ darśapūrṇamāsāṅgatvaṃ sidhyati (MNP 116). The conventions for translitterating the Skt text have been adapted to the present volume’s ones.

be performed as the (e.g.) Full- and New-Moon Sacrifice". Therefore, they distinguish between archetype and ectype sacrifices. The first ones are fully prescribed in the Veda, the latter are to be performed like their respective archetype, apart (possibly) from some details which might be prescribed ad hoc for them. Short, a prakṛti (henceforth "archetype") is a sacrifice for which all details are directly enjoined in the Veda. A vikṛti (ectype) is instead a sacrifice for which at least some of the elements have to be derived from the prescriptions about its archetype:

> There are several Sacrifices in connection with which the Veda does not specifically prescribe all the necessary details, but declares that 'such and such a Sacrifice shall be performed in the manner of such and such another Sacrifice'; for instance, with regard to the Iṣu-Sacrifice, after having declared its peculiar features, the Vedic text goes on to declare that 'the rest is like the Shyena-Sacrifice [śyena]'. In such cases, the Shyena-Sacrifice would be called the 'Prakṛti', Archetype, and the Iṣu-Sacrifice, the corresponding 'Vikṛti', Ectype.
>
> (**Jha1942**).

The process by means of which elements of the archetypal sacrifice are applied to the ectype one, is called atideśa, analogical extension[8] (§C.6.2):

> The Transference, then, of the details of the Archetype to Ectype is what is called 'Atidesha', which has been [defined] as 'that process whereby a detail becomes extended in its application from the Primary act to other acts cognate to it' (Bhā. Trs. p. 1239)[9]. The Prakaraṇapañcikā (p. 227) has defined it as 'that through which the Ectype becomes connected with the details of the Archetypal Sacrifice', or 'the Extension of the details of one Sacrifice to another, when there is no incongruity in such extension'[10] [...] [T]here is Transference , not only of Actions or Procedure, but also of other Sacrificial Details, like Substances and so forth. Says the Prakaraṇapañcikā: atideśaḥ prakārasya dharmāṇāṃ caiva yujyate[11]. (Jhā 1942:290-91).

Apart from the sacrifice's result, which cannot be analogically extended from one sacrifice to the other, all the rest can be analogically extended.

[8]This translation has been suggested to me by Prof. Kei Kataoka.

[9]prakṛtāt karmaṇo yasmāt tatsamāneṣu karmasu | dharmapradeśo yena syāt so 'tideśa iti sthitiḥ || (ŚBh ad MS 7.1.12)

[10]I could not locate the exact quotations, but PrP, atideśapārāyaṇa, has several similar statements. See, e.g.: [...] padārthaiś caiva vaikṛtaiḥ | prākṛtair vidhir anveti so 'tideśaś ca sammataḥ || (PrP, atideśapārāyaṇa 12b-d).

[11]"The analogical extension is proper also for the manner [of performance] and the dharmas (that is, the characteristics of all sacrificial items)" (PrP, atideśapārāyaṇa 13c-d).

Hence, an ectype may derive from its archetype its auxiliaries, but also the substances to be offered, the Deity, and, more important, the assistance (upakāra) offered by the auxiliaries.

> The only general law relating to Transference is prakṛtivad vikṛtiḥ kartavyā, 'The Ectype is to be performed in the manner of the Archetype'.
>
> (Jhā 1942: 291).

What is, instead, directly enjoined for the Ectype, does not need to be extended from the Archetype.

4.3.0.1 ūha (§C.6.3)

In later texts, ūha means 'analogical reasoning'. In Ritual and Mīmāṃsā, it first indicates the "modification of a word in a mantra in order to adapt it to the case, number, or gender required for another context: essentially a grammatical modification, often the substitution of one vocable for another, e.g., agnaye for indrāya [in case the offering is no more for Agni but for Indra]"[12] In the process of analogical extension, ūha is fundamental and has a broader significance, since more often than not the elements which undergo atideśa are to be adjusted to the new context (the name of a certain substance has to be changed into that of another, a Deity has to be removed or substituted, the melody of a certain mantra has to be changed, etc.)

4.3.0.2 bādha (§C.6.3)

MS 10.1.1-3 discuss whether all details of the Archetype have to be analogically extended to the Ectype. MS 10.1.2 puts forth the final view that the analogical extension has to occur (only) when mantras, preparations (saṃskāra) and substances are needed[13]. One has not to implement all details of the Archetype at the time one performs the Ectype, since these details have not been directly specified as something to be performed by an ad hoc prescription[14]. Writes Gaṅgānātha Jhā:

> Every one of these Details is used only when there is need for it. There is no Vedic text laying down the use of anything that is to [be] needed. In fact, the Ectype is not syntactically related to the Archetype at all; all that the text enjoining the Ectype means is that 'the desired result should be accomplished by means of the Ectype'; and the manner of this accomplishment is indicated by

[12]Pollock 1985:507, fn. 37.

[13]vidheḥ prakaraṇāntare 'tideśāt sarvakarma syāt (MS 10.1.1) api vābhidhānasaṃskāradravyarthe kriyeta tādarthyāt (MS 10.1.2).

[14]teṣām apratyakṣaviśiṣṭatvāt (MS 10.1.3).

> the General Law 'in the same manner in which it is accomplished in the Archetype'; and the effect of this is that those details that are adopted at the Archetype for the fulfilling of a certain need become excluded from the Ectype, if there is no need for them at the latter[15].

Rāmānujācārya employs with this term for all instances of non-application of an archetype element (i.e.: grinding cannot apply to a soft kind of offering) and, among them, to non-applications due to counter-statements prescribing that something must *not* be done in the ectype.

4.3.1 Mīmāṃsā view of prakṛti and vikṛti

The above summary would probably be enough (together with some detailed accounts of particular cases) to perform correctly an ectype sacrifice. But Mīmāṃsā authors are, as usual, interested in understanding the structure of sacrifice, its link to the principal prescription, its hierarchical organisation. From this point of view, archetype and ectype sacrifices offer an interesting glance into the Mīmāṃsā view of sacrifice.
First of all, from a Mīmāṃsā point of view, archetype and ectype are linked only hierarchically and not historically. See the following definition of Āpadeva:

> The word archetype means a rite which does not get its subsidiaries by the rule of transfer. Such as the new- and full-moon rites. For in them the subsidiaries are not got by the rule of transfer; for there is no need for that, since they are stated in the context itself.[16]

On this theme, writes Francis X. Clooney:

> [I]n Mīmāṃsā the important *prakṛti-vikṛti* model of derivation lacks even a temporal connotation. It merely describes in the most economical fashion the relationship between more and less complex sacrifices. For example, the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* is the *prakṛti* for the *Cāturmāsya*, but is not before it temporally: there was never a time, according to Mīmāṃsā, when the Darśapūrṇamāsa was being performed and before the Cāturmāsya was first initiated.
>
> (**Clooney1986**)

[15] Jhā 1942:300-301.

[16] codakād yatrāṅgāprāptis tat karma prakṛtiśabdena vivakṣitam; yathā darśapūrṇamāsau. tatra hi na codakād aṅgaprāptiḥ, prakaraṇapaṭhitair evāṅgair nairākāṅkṣyāt. (MNP §108).

4.3.2 prakṛtis' and vikṛtis' structures (§C.6.2)

Following his –typically Mīmāṃsaka– organisation bias, Rāmānujācārya spends much energy in understanding how to structure an archetype and an ectype sacrifice. In an archetype sacrifice, this hierarchy amounts to the following schemes. In the first one, the order with which the principal prescription promotes the action is depicted:

principal prescription
⇓
principal bhāvanā ↘
⇓
sacrificial act (instrument of the bhāvanā) — auxiliaries' prescriptions
⇓ — ↓
substances to be used in the act (dravya) — auxiliaries' bhāvanās
↓
instruments of the auxiliaries
↓
...

The principal prescription promotes the bhāvanā (and, through that, the whole sacrifice). The bhāvanā then promotes its result through instrument, etc. The relations holding among the elements of the scheme are reciprocal, insofar as they are linked by reciprocal expectation (ākāṅkṣā). Subsidiaries expect a prescription enjoining them while the principal prescription expects a procedure for its result to be realised. On the other hand, in an ectype ritual the relations are one-directional, since the subsidiaries driven out of the archetype do not have any extra expectation (their own one has already been appeased by the immediate context of the archetype sacrifice). This obviously does not hold in the case of subsidiaries mentioned ad hoc for the ectype sacrifice. However, even in the latter case the relation is asymmetrical. This time, it is the ectype's principal prescription which does not expect any further subsidiary, insofar as its expectation has already been appeased by the ones analogically extended from the archetype. This explains the fact that such ad hoc subsidiaries are not inherently needed by all ectype's prescriptions (and are indeed not present in all ectypes) (TR IV §C.6.2).
In this second scheme, the order of connection in an archetype sacrifice is depicted:

principal prescription

↑
ritual items (padārtha)
↑
assistance brought about through the ritual items

The principal prescription gets related, first of all, with what is actually present in the same context, that is, the ritual items mentioned in the context. Thereafter, it is related with the assistance they perform, which is inferable but not directly prescribed.
On the other hand, in ectype sacrifices everything has to be driven out of the archetype one. Unless there is something directly enjoined, first the assistance is logically connected to the principal prescription. In fact, the this first of all requires an assistance –it does not matter through what– in order to realise its result. In a footnote to his edition of Śālikanātha 's Prakaraṇapañcikā, a contemporary Mīmāṃsaka explains:

> In the Archetype, the relation is first with the ritual items (that is, the substances, auxiliaries, etc.) [and] immediately thereafter with [their] assistance. In the Ectype, first occurs a relation with the assistance, then with the items generated by that. Hence the difference [17].

ectype's principal prescription
↑
assistance (upakāra)
↑
ritual items generated by that

In other words, the Mīmāṃsā principle depicted by Rāmānujācārya is quite pragmatic: if something is *actually* present, then it gets connected before any postulated element. All else being equal, instead, the assistance has to be connected first, since the instrument needs an assistance (independent of which concrete element is going to yield it) (TR IV §C.6.2).

4.3.2.1 Rāmānujācārya's approach (§C.6.1, §C.7)

It may be worth noticing that in the section dedicated to this theme, Rāmānujācārya depicts Pārthasārathi 's understanding of the global meaning of a ectypal sacrifice as symmetrical to the understanding of the global

[17] prakṛtau prathamaṃ padārthānām anvayaḥ, tadanantaram upakārasyānvayo bhavati, vikṛtau pūrvam upakārasyānvayaḥ, tatas tajjanakībhūtānāṃ padārthānām iti vailakṣaṇyam (A. Subrahmaṇya Śāstrī 1961: 493; ad PrP 14, v.11).

meaning of a sentence. In both cases, the basic elements (assistence and heaps of items in one case, word-meanings in the other) are conveyed and connected to the principal element according to what it requires (ākāṅkṣ-). The ontological structure of the sacrifice is reflected in its linguistic structure (or vice versa) and in the sequence of its performance (see TR IV §C.6.1). More in detail, since §C.6.1 has been written from a Bhāṭṭa point of view, the simile is as follows: through a sentence's words, one gets word-meanings. These are connected to each other and convey a unitary sentence-meaning. Within the Veda, all clauses are connected to the principal prescription in order to convey a unitary textual meaning (see TR IV §C.4.2.10). In a similar way, through atideśa one gets many ritual items. These are supplied to the bhāvanā and gain, in this way, a significant role in the sacrifice. Just like word-meanings coming out of different words can be connected together, so can the bhāvanā receive elements transferred through atideśa.

On the other hand, Rāmānujācārya is not so much concerned with all ritual details. In fact, he does discuss the basic rules of atideśa and he mentions ūha and bādha, but he refrains from mentioning all their sub-types. Possibly, he assumes that his readers already know about them and that the purpose of his Tantrarahasya is rather to offer a complete and transparent view of the sacrifice's systematic structure. This concern is evident in the summing-up paragraphs (such as §C.7), where the structure alone is summarised.

4.4 Bhāṭṭa hermeneutics in TR IV

After establishing the Bhāṭṭa view concerning linguistic and purpose[-oriented] bhāvanās at the end of §C.3, Rāmānujācārya considers its consequences for the hermeneutics of Vedic passages. As an example, he chooses the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices.

4.4.1 Within the prescription (§C.4.1)

The linguistic bhāvanā constituting the prescription first requires (through expectation, ākāṅkṣā) an object to be brought about, that is, the purpose[-oriented] bhāvanā. This is also conveyed by the prescriptive verbal suffix (just as it would be by any other finite verbal suffix), more precisely by its finite verbal component (ākhyātatva, see 2.1.3).

In order to fulfil the role of the result that must be accomplished, this bhāvanā must be somehow desirable (the action noun ākāṅkṣā retaining its desiderative shade of meaning). Since, however, the undertaking of an action is not desirable in itself, one must assume that it is indirectly desirable given that it is the means for achieving something desirable. In this way, although sacrificing is not in itself an agreeable activity, one undertakes it as if it were something desirable because one longs for the sacrifice's result, e.g., heaven.

In fact, the purpose[-oriented] bhāvanā also requires an object to be achieved thereby. The first candidate, because of proximity, is the meaning of the verbal root, since it is part of the same verbal form whose ending conveys the objective bhāvanā. However, the meaning of the verbal root is not by itself desirable and cannot hence fulfil the role of the bhāvya. This is, instead, revealed within the same prescription by an expression such as "one-who-is-desirous-of-heaven" (svargakāma), which indirectly indicates the sacrifice's result, whereby "heaven" can be replaced by "cattle", "a son", "rain", etc. Immediately thereafter, the question arises "How can this result be achieved?" To answer this, the verbal root is connected to the bhāvanā as its instrument. Hence, by hearing "One who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice," one simultaneously understands an urging (the linguistic bhāvanā), the contents of this urging (the undertaking of an action or purpose[-oriented] bhāvanā), its result (heaven) and the instrument for its achievement (the sacrifice). But the expectation is not completely appeased, insofar as the mere knowledge that heaven is to be achieved through a sacrifice is not enough. One also needs to know how this sacrifice will be instrumental for the arising of this result. Consequently, a procedure is also required, which is offered through the other sentences describing the sacrifice.

Summing up,

object to be brought about, e.g., heaven
↗
bhāvanā → instrument, e.g., sacrifice
↘
procedure, e.g., rites composing the sacrifice

And:

object to be brought about (heaven)
↗
object to be brought about, e.g.,bhāvanā→instrument (sacrifice)
↗ ↘
śabdabhāvanā → instrument procedure
↘
procedure

Lastly, since the sacrifice would not be a suitable instrument (as it does not last until the arousal of the result, see the Prābhākara criticisms below, §C.9.4), a new potency, arisen through the sacrifice and lasting until the result is also necessarily connected as an intermediate element.

4.4.2 The "progression of the prescription" (§C.4.2.1-C.4.2.10, §C.4.3.2)

"Progression of the prescription" is an expression used by Rāmānujācārya in TR IV §C.4.3 and echoed by related metaphorical expressions in §C.5 (krameṇa) and §C.6 (yatra yatrāvatarantī ...), that stresses the dynamic character of the fulfilment of a prescription's role and of constructing a textual unit around a prescription. In fact, the principal prescription must become connected with its components gradually (krameṇa, see TR IV, §C.5, p.51) in order to appease both its expectations and, simultaneously, those of the other textual components. These textual components are entirely dependent on the prescription, since without it they are meaningless. This progression can be seen as somehow parallel to the performance of the sacrifice itself, where details acquire significance only within the entire ritual.

The principal prescription that enjoins these sacrifices states "One who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices". The Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices consist in 6 offerings to Agni and other Deities (for the full list, see §C.4.2.1). But how should one perform them? In order to answer this question, a procedure is connected to the principal prescription in the form of several prescriptions stating which substances have to be offered and to which Deity. The connection is ruled by mutual expectation since the prescriptions about substances and Deities also need something that is desirable to be brought about by them.

Summing up (and simplifying the link between prescription and instrument, etc., which indeed occurs through bhāvanā, see the scheme above, §4.4.1)

result
$\nearrow$
principal prescription $\rightarrow$ instrument
$\searrow$
...no procedure!

And

substance
$\nearrow$
6 prescriptions about offerings to Agni, etc. $\rightarrow$ Deity
$\searrow$
...no result!

Hence,

result (heaven)

↗
principal prescription → instrument (sacrifice)
↘
Deity, substance, etc. mentioned in the 6 prescriptions about Agni's offering, etc., as procedure

As for the order of incitement, §C.6 explains how the prescription lets one perform the bhāvanā, which lets one perform the sacrificial action, through particular substances, etc. (on "auxiliaries" see above, §4.2.1):

substances
↗
principal prescription → bhāvanā → action (sacrifice)
↘
auxiliaries

The same structure of mutual expectancy rules the further connections, possibly with one prescription being embedded in the other, as in the above scheme, see §4.4.1. For instance, prescriptions such as, "One should sacrifice with rice-grains" (vrīhibhir yajeta) constitute the procedure of the rice-cake offering to Agni and expect a result. Thus, they are connected to the rice-cake offering prescription and, thus, indirectly, with the principal prescription and its result (TR IV §C.4.2.2). Summing up, "One should sacrifice with rice-grains" expects a result, which is supplied as "With rice-grains one causes to be a sacrifice to Agni". How can this sacrifice to Agni fulfil the role of something desired? Because it is instrumental for the arousal of heaven.

The expectation of the principal prescription is appeased by the further elements taught in its context. Instead, in case of prescription removed from the context, the connection is still possible, but relies only on the expectation of these detached rules (§C.4.2.9). The same rule applies to ectype sacrifices (where the expectation of the principal prescription is already appeased by the archetype's auxiliaries, see supra §4.3.2 and TR IV §C.6.2). The final result is the same, since the detached rules' (or the ectype subsidiaries') expectation is enough for the connection to take place. Hence, the distinction only reflects a tenet of Mīmāṃsā textual linguistics: a word belongs to its context. It acquires its meaning together with the context it belongs to. This also means that the same word may convey slightly different meanings in different contexts. But this can only refer to the proximate context, since a shift of meaning after, say, several hours of Vedic recitation (or after thousands of pages of a novel) is hardly justifiable from a linguistic point of view.

Back to the instances of mutual expectation, more indirect is the connection of prescriptions such as, "One threshes rice-grains". In these cases, the

paraphrase sounds as “Through threshing, one causes to be rice-grains” (avahananena vrīhīn bhāvayati). The rice-grains can fulfil the role of what must be brought about because they are instrumental for the Agni’s offering, which is, in turn, instrumental for the arousal of heaven (§C.4.2.3). In the following scheme, rice, rice-cake and sacrifice are at the same time the result (from the point of view of the element below them) and the instrument (from the point of view of the element above them) (§C.4.3.2):

heaven
$\uparrow$
sacrifice
$\uparrow$
rice-cake for Agni
$\uparrow$
rice
$\uparrow$
threshing

And the sequence could go further, since threshing is realised through mortar and pestle , which have to be sprinkled (§C.4.2.5). Short, only heaven is only a result. All other elements are results only insofar as they are instrumental to it:

$\boxed{\text{heaven}}$
$\uparrow$
sacrifice
$\uparrow$
rice-cake for Agni
$\uparrow$
rice
$\uparrow$
threshing
$\uparrow$
mortar and pestle
$\uparrow$
sprinkling
$\uparrow$
...

Prescriptions about direct auxiliaries and expiation are connected directly to the main sacrifice (§C.4.2.3): through an expiation/a pre-sacrifice one causes

to be a sacrifice. This fulfils the role of what must be brought about because it is instrumental for the arousal of heaven. More in detail, through pre- and post-sacrifices one brings about an intermediate apūrva which is instrumental for the accomplishment of the sacrifice's result (§C.4.2.6). Through expiation-rites one removes an imperfection which would have else hampered the arousal of the result (§C.4.2.7).
Hence, the connection of further elements does not just occur "vertically", so to speak, since at the same time there are also "horizontally" connected sentences that are directly related to the principal prescription – e.g. those prescribing pre- and post-sacrifices – or to its elements – e.g. sentences that further qualify the sacrifice's substances. Obviously enough, the "horizontal" connections are, in fact, also hierarchical, insofar as the newly added elements are subordinate to the principal prescription or to one of the elements it has already acquired[18]. The label "horizontal" is only meant to underline the fact that the progressive connection of ritual elements does not just proceed, so to speak, from top to bottom, but creates a sort of a tree, with branches extending in all directions, although each is ultimately related to the trunk.
For instance, the prescription "One should sacrifice with barley" is linked "horizontally" to "One should sacrifice with rice," since there is no mention of a separate Deity to whom the barley-sacrifice could be offered, nor of any separate result (§C.4.2.4-C.4.2.5):



Similarly, many acts contribute to the preparation of rice, or barley (the following scheme does not take into account the sequence of the acts):



[18]On how subordination is unavoidable, see **McCrea2000**



The picture gets further complicated if one adds all other sacrificial substances beside rice. Still, there is no risk of confusion because every rite creates a distinct intermediate apūrva, which –together with all other ones– is instrumental to the arousal of the result (§C.4.2.8).
As has already been hinted, such connections are ruled by (mutual or univocal) expectation and by the principle of connecting the unknown to the known. Rāmānujācārya formulates this explicitly in another text:

> The application (viniyoga) of the subsidiaries (aṅga) [to the prescription regarding the main sacrifice], on the other hand, is sequential, since [they are] applied according to the subordination of what is still not acquired to what is acquired (nirūḍha) (NR ad AN III, ad 29, p.254)[19].

In summary, the mass of prescriptions scattered in Brāhmaṇa texts regarding the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices are hereby hierarchically organized by Rāmānujācārya. At the end of his attempt, the reader is given the impression of a coherent whole in which the mutual relationships can easily be discerned by following the thread of expectations, connecting the unknown to the known, and by using some further hermeneutic devices (e.g. the six instruments of knowledge [pramāṇa] that must be implemented in order to understand the meaning of a prescription).

4.5 Prābhākara hermeneutics in TR IV

4.5.1 Double nature of apūrva (§C.11.4)

The Prābhākara hermeneutics rounds on the apūrva. Apūrva (see also below, §3.6.1) is both an adjective (meaning 'non-preceded [by any other instrument

[19] viniyogas tv aṅgānāṃ nirūḍhaṃ praty anirūḍhasya śeṣatayā viniyogāt kramikaḥ.

of knowledge') and a substantive. In the first case, it qualifies the kārya, in the second it defines the energy that bridges the gap between a sacrifice and its result. The former apūrva is accepted by the Prābhākaras, the latter by the Bhāṭṭas. These analyse it further as follows: The whole sacrifice's apūrva is the supreme apūrva (*paramāpūrva*), which will lead to the result. This is assisted by intermediate apūrvas (*avāntarāpūrva*), leading from a minor rite to the whole sacrifice. In fact, a pre-sacrifice is long over when the main sacrifice is being performed. Without postulating an intermediate apūrva, one would not be able to explain how can the pre-sacrifice contribute to the main sacrifice.
On the other hand, Prābhākaras imagine a supreme apūrva promoting the whole sacrifice with the intermediate apūrvas possibly promoting minor portions of it. The intermediate apūrvas are conveyed by the prescriptions about parts of the sacrifice and derive their promoting power from the supreme apūrva. Only the supreme apūrva is by itself to be done and it directly promotes most aspects of the sacrifice. It promotes indirectly through the intermediate apūrvas only whenever it cannot directly promote. This only happens in a few cases. In fact, the supreme apūrva directly promotes the main sacrifice and its auxiliaries and some subordinate worldly acts do not need an ad hoc injunction. In fact, they are just performed according to worldly rules, so that if the supreme apūrva promotes the preparation of a rice-cake, there is no need to specify every step of this preparation, since one, for instance, bruises rice-grains just like one is used to do in one's everyday life. On the other hand, when a specific non-worldly act is needed, then an intermediate apūrva may promote it. For instance:

supreme apūrva
↙ ↘
principal sacrifice auxiliaries (initiation, etc.)

intermediate apūrva of initiation
↓
a particular ton of voice during initation

4.5.2 Apūrva and prompted person (§C.10.5, §C.11.5)

Once the centrality of apūrva is established, Rāmānujācārya discusses its necessary complements. One of them is the prompted person. Only a few exceptions are examined. In fact, if an apūrva of higher rank has already prompted a person to realise, along its own content, also the one of another apūrva, then the latter does not prompt anyone. Such is the case of the injunction to teach, which –according to Prābhākaras– prompts some people to teach the Veda and includes the fact that some other have to study it.

Hence, the injunction to study the Veda (svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ) does not need to further promote anyone (TR IV §C.10.5, §C.11.5).

> The Prābhākaras argue that the prescription to teach is the principal one due to the primacy of desire in one's undertaking an action. In fact, the only action which can be genuinely motivated by desire is that to teach (one teaches because one longs for the honours an ācārya ('teacher', a honorific title) deserves. The Bhāṭṭas claim, on the other hand, that the prescription to study has a specific prompting action (see **Kataoka2001b**). The study of the Veda, Bhāṭṭas maintain, serves its comprehension, this is needed in order to perform correctly all rituals and this performance will eventually yield some transcendental result, such as heaven (on this subject, see Jhā 1964: 149-152 and TR V).

Similarly, the injunction of pre- and post-sacrifices do not prompts anyone, since the person who is responsible for them has already been prompted to perform the whole sacrifice (including pre- and post-sacrifices) by the principal injunction (TR IV §C.10.5).
The latter case is explained by Rāmānujācārya through the assumption that only the promoting apūrva (and not the intermediate ones) can prompts someone (TR IV §§C.11.5-C.11.5.1).

4.5.3 Apūrva and content (§C.11.6-C.11.6.2)

On the other hand, a connection of the apūrva with a specific action –i.e., the content of the duty conveyed as "a-pūrva"– is unavoidable (TR IV §C.11.6). In §C.9 Rāmānujācārya discussed the link between action and duty. His final position was that no duty is possible unless it has an action as support. This 'action' (as with the Bhāṭṭa bhāvanā) is still not a specific act and only indicates the undertaking of something. The precise content of it is still unspecified.
Hence, the connection with an apūrva presupposes the connection with a viṣaya (content). An apūrva in itself needs, in fact, an action specified by a content to which the imperative "It has to be done" could apply. This content is conveyed by the verbal root. So:

Bhāṭṭa view about *yajeta*:

verbal root → instrument
↗
yajeta bhāvanā (verbal component)
↘ ↗
ending
↘
śabdabhāvanā (optative component)

Final analysis: *yāgena bhāvayet*

Prābhākara view:

verbal root → content (viṣaya) and instrument
↗
yajeta agent's number (verbal component)
↘ ↗
ending
↘
apūrva and action (optative component)

Or, in a different form:

yajeta	
verbal root	content (*viṣaya*) and instrument
verbal ending	agent's number
optative component of the verbal ending	*apūrva* and action

Final analysis (not explicit in Prābhākara texts): **apūrvaṃ yāgakāryam yāgena bhavati*
Hence, the optative verbal ending already conveys an action to be done, but the verbal root determines (ava-chid-) the content of such action.
Due to the close link, sketched above, between action and thing to be done, the content determines at the same time the action and the apūrva. More in detail, it determines the thing to be done via the action. This is possible because of expectation, fitness and proximity. In fact, through expectation one connects a specific content as what has to be realised by the active component of the verb. Through fitness one knows that this specific action is fit for being realised as something to be done. And through proximity one easily gets at the content, which is conveyed by the verbal root (whereas the apūrva is conveyed by the ending) (TR IV §C.11.6.2). Expectation is the main criterion, since through proximity one would connect the verbal root as what has to be brought about (since this is the first role to be fulfilled) and not wait until the instrument's role (TR IV §C.11.7.3-C.11.7.4).
In a principal prescription, the content coincides with the meaning of the verbal root. In auxiliary prescriptions, the content may consist in something

else, as one understands through a hint of Rāmānujācārya. This refers to a discussion by Prabhākara about the fact that the content of a certain indirectly contributing auxiliary prescription is the very connection with the Deity and the substance mentioned (TR IV §C.11.6.2). The same hint is repeated later, where the offering to Agni is referred to as "content" (TR IV §C.12.2.3). In fact, in auxiliary prescriptions such as, "The oblation to Soma" it is no more the sacrificial action that has to be brought forth, but rather its connection with a peculiar substance (or Deity). Further prescriptions about specific activities to be undertaken, such as, "One threshes rice" will have again the verbal root as content. Śālikanātha, in his PrP, dedicates a chapter to the viṣaya (PrP 12, viṣayakaraṇīya) and opens it with a discussion of kriyā and kārya, which is partly echoed in TR IV, chapter 9ff. Why does, instead, Rāmānujācārya postpone the discussion on the content? Because he –unlike Śālikanātha– wants to distinguish between theoretical matters (such as the status of apūrva) and the description of the structure of the ritual. The former parts are more philosophically engaged, allowing external objectors to ask threatening questions, whereas the latter are targeted to an internal (that is, Mīmāṃsaka; objections from the Bhāṭṭa, the Prābhākara or Maṇḍana's side being frequent) audience and presuppose the concepts established in the philosophical parts. The distinction between action, content and instrument is used by Mīmāṃsakas to account for the organisation of sacrificial prescriptions, but has no independent value –at least according to Rāmānujācārya's collocation of it in his TR.

4.5.4 Link between instrument and content (§C.11.7)

As already hinted at, the verbal root expresses both the instrument and the content.

4.5.4.1 Instrument and result in fixed an optional rituals (§C.11.7.2)

The relationship of instrument and result is different in optional and fixed rituals. In the first ones, the verbal root expresses first the instrument for the arousal of the result, then the content of the apūrva and lastly the instrument of the apūrva. This does not mean that the result is primary and the apūrva only secondary, since this one is only the order of connection according to the hearer's ability to understand it. And a hearer is first interested in the result, then turns to the apūrva's content, and lastly to the instrument to perform it. On the other hand, in the case of fixed rituals, the content is later connected as the apūrva's instrument. Hence, in the former ones the instrument needs to be complete in order to achieve the result –but also in order to perform the apūrva, since it is the same instrument which later turns to be the apūrva's content. One needs, therefore, to perform the optional

ritual with all the subsidiaries prescribed, in order to realise both result and apūrva. On the other hand, in fixed rituals only the available subsidiaries are used. The content was not previously the result's instrument and is, therefore, not hindered by the absence of some auxiliaries.

4.5.4.2 Difference between content and instrument (§C.11.7.6-C.11.7.7)

A content distinct from the instrument has to be postulated also to account for the following oddity. Every sacrifice should have a single content, since it has a single supreme apūrva. So, in the Full-and New-Moon Sacrifice, the six principal offerings constitute together a single content. On the other hand, they are different instruments for the realisation of the apūrva, since different acts are prescribed in them.

Hence, concludes Rāmānujācārya, the content has to do with the apprehension of apūrva (without a specific content, one does not seize the apūrva, just like one would not be able to seize a species independent of a concrete individual member of this species). On the other hand, the instrument is needed in order to realise the apūrva[20]. Still, the two are both expressed by the verbal root and are ultimately not separated insofar as the same entity is the content and the instrument. Indeed:

six main offerings	
one content	distinct instruments

Both the case of the fixed/optional rituals distinction and that of the instrumentality in the Full- and New-Moon sacrifice's main offerings, show that the instrument is understood, according to the common usage, as a necessary tool for a result to be attained. On the other hand, the category of viṣaya is a theoretic assumption and does merely need to harmonise Mīmāṃsā tenets (and not to perform anything in the outer world).

4.5.5 Grāhakagrahaṇa (12.2.3)

The collecting of all elements through the injunction (grāhaka) is the chief hierarchical process organising a Vedic sacrificial text.

The centre is constituted by the kārya, which is both the element promoting the sacrifice (through its injunctive aspect, see above, 4.5.1) and what has to be brought about. The latter aspect expects an instrument. Hence:

[20] A different position is expressed by K.T. Pandurangi in his commentary on PrP, VK: "By oneness it is not meant that the *viṣaya* and the karaṇa should have one to one agreement. But it is meant that whatever constitutes viṣaya the same is karaṇa. In this instance [the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice] wherein more than one yāga constitutes a unit, they are together viṣaya, because, they *accomplish* the kārya together. However, these are separately karaṇa, because, each item has to be separately performed" (Pandurangi 2004:432, my emphasis).

niyoga ← Agni's and the other 5 offerings as content
↑
Agni's and the other 5 offerings as instrument
↑
auxiliaries as the instrument's procedure

(the arrows indicate the order of connection)
The process by means of which the auxiliaries are collected by the injunction is defined as their becoming suitable for its purpose (aidamarthya).

4.5.5.1 Differences between directly and indirectly contributing auxiliaries (§C.12.3-C.12.4 and C.12.5)

Rāmānujācārya mentions several theses about the connection of directly and indirectly contributing auxiliaries to the main sacrifice. The following scheme illustrates the first one (§C.12.3-C.12.4):

niyoga ← directly contributing auxiliaries as instrument
↑
instrument (sacrifice)
↑
indirectly contributing auxiliaries

(the arrows indicate the order of connection)

Directly contributing auxiliaries, i.e., pre- and post-sacrifices, are directly linked to the prescription as its instruments.
Indirectly contributing auxiliaries are connected insofar as they constitute the body of the instrument, that is, they produce the ritual substances to be used in it, or they bring forth an additional quality (atiśaya) in the ritual substances (such as the quality of being sprinkled is added to the rice). This additional quality, in turn, is linked to the production of an intermediate apūrva (TR IV §C.12.3).
However, one might argue that in this way the directly contributing auxiliaries seems to be on the same level as the instrument, that is, the ritual. Hence, one might suggest (TR IV §C.12.5) that all auxiliaries contribute to the instrument, either directly (such as the pre- and post-sacrifices) or indirectly (through threshing or otherwise preparing the ritual substances):

niyoga
↑
karaṇa (sacrifice) ←directly contributing auxiliaries
↑
indirectly contributing auxiliaries

However, the indirectly contributing auxiliaries' connection may be further mediated insofar as they might be connected to a ritual substance (such as an oblation cake), or to its material (rice), or to the latter's instruments (such as the millstone used to thresh it), etc. In all these cases, Rāmānujācārya refers to the rule of gradual connection of the unknown to the known he has already explained (see above, §4.4.2).

4.5.6 Accumulation vs. Option (§C.12.4.1-C.12.4.2)

The indirectly contributing auxiliaries are performed for every ritual substance, since, obviously, every rice-grain needs to be threshed, etc. But what about directly contributing auxiliaries? Are they *all* to be performed or could one choose among them? The answer is that one must perform them all,
1. because option is only admissible when: 1st) the items among which one chooses serve the same purpose (e.g., rice and barley both serve the purpose of baking a cake with them), 2nd) their result is achieved by only one of them alone (barley alone or rice alone are enough to bake the cake). But what could be the single and same purpose of the pre-sacrifices? Only their collective assistance to the main sacrifice. In fact, if one postulates a different assistance for every pre- or post-sacrifice, the purpose is no longer the same. But, if it is so, then this assistance can only be realised by *all* of them together. On the other hand, the only result they can achieve independent of each other is the assistance of a particular pre-sacrifice. But, then, every assistance would be different and the 1st requirement would not be fulfilled any more.
2. because option in itself involves 8 faults (since, while choosing among alternatives, one rejects what is prescribed by a previous statement and accepts what one had previously abandoned).
In Garge's words:

> As a rule, Vikalpa, is not permissible except under strict necessity, because its acceptance gives rise to eight undesirable contingencies. To quote the typical instance of Vikalpa, from later Mīmāṃsakas: Yava and Vrīhi are prescribed as optional alternatives so far as the corn to be used for the offering is concerned. Accepting this option, (i) if we use Vrīhi and not use Yava, we reject the authority of the Vedic text enjoining the use of Yava, (ii) we assume the untrustworthy character of this text, (iii) if on the other hand, we use Yava, and not use Vrīhi, we reject the authority of the text prescribing Vrīhi, (iv) and assume the untrustworthy character of this text, (v) in the latter case –use of Yava– again, we accept the authority of the Yava text which we had rejected before, –(vi) and thereby reject the previously assumed untrustworthiness of the Yava text, (vii) in using the

Vrīhi again, we accept the authority of the Vrīhi text which we had rejected before, (viii) and we also reject the previously assumed untrustworthiness of that text (Garge 1952: 287-288).

Chapter 5

Prescriptions and Apūrva

The Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara stands have a deep import on the general understanding of the Veda. In fact, the Bhāṭṭas organise the Vedic text around the prescription and describe the latter as the dynamic, centripetal element within the text. On the other hand, the Prābhākaras recognise the more elusive 'thing to be done' (kārya), which is unprecedented through any other means of knowledge (apūrva), as the meaning of the Veda. This leads them to further questions about the relation between kārya and action (as seen above, chapter 3), between kārya and result and between kārya and content of the Vedic text (see above, §4.5.3).

5.1 Prescriptions according to the Bhāṭṭas (§C.5)

The need for ordered structures regards also prescriptions themselves. In fact, structuring the prescriptive component of a text allows one to better understand the text's hierarchical links. For instance, principal prescriptions (such as, "The one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the New and Full Moon sacrifices," mentioned above) are to be distinguished from subordinate ones (such as the ones enjoining pre-sacrifices or prescribing the ritual substances).
Since the Veda is authorless, the only possible perspectives on the text are the hearer's one and the text's inner one. Accordingly, at least two classifications of prescriptions are possible.
The first one is:

- originative prescription (utpattividhi)
- application prescription (viniyogavidhi)
- responsibility prescription (adhikāravidhi)
- performance prescription (prayogavidhi)

(the last two members are frequently inverted)

The second one:

- prescription having an unpreceded [content] (apūrvavidhi)
- restrictive prescription (niyamavidhi)
- exclusing prescription (parisaṅkhyāvidhi)

The first classification expresses the role of each prescription and defines it –in Mīmāṃsā terminology–"according to its own nature" (svarūpābhidhāna). The latter conforms to the role of a prescription within a text from the point of view of the hearer. If it conveys something utterly new for the hearer, then it is an apūrvavidhi. If something partly new, it is a niyamavidhi. If it looks like a positive injunction but is instead to be interpreted as a prohibition, it is a parisaṅkhyāvidhi. The latter case is one Mīmāṃsā authors generally try to avoid.
Still, these classifications are not mutually exclusive and rather mostly complement each other. In fact, they originated historically in different contexts and cover different concerns.
Besides, further kinds of prescriptions are named in Mīmāṃsā texts, and some of them also reproduce a full-fledged classification of them. In TR IV §C.4.2.4 a *phalavākya* is mentioned and assumed to be self-evident, since it is not further discussed. At the beginning of his Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā, Kṛṣṇa Yajvan describes as follows the phalavākya in its relation to the karmotpattivākya:

> tatra yena vākyenedaṃ karma kartavyam iti bodhyate tat karmotpattivākyam. yathā agnihotraṃ juhotīti. [...] utpannasya karmaṇaḥ phalākāṅkṣāyāṃ phalasambandhabodhako vidhiḥ phalavidhiḥ. yathā agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma iti. atra yaḥ svargaṃ kāmayate sa tatsādhanatvenāgnihotranāmakaṃ homaṃ bhāvayed ity agnihotravākyotpannasya karmaṇaḥ phalasambandho bodhyata iti phalavākyam idam (Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā, pp.1-2).

5.1.1 History of the utpatti- etc. classification

Śabara refers frequently to the utpatti- and the prayogavidhi. The first one has the same meaning it will have in later Mīmāṃsā. prayogavidhi has the meaning (no more the only one in later Mīmāṃsā) of "prescription about the performance" and defines the principal prescription together with its auxiliaries. Śabara usually labels them -vacana or vākya and never mentions a full-fledged classification of prescriptive passages. viniyoga and adhikāra are frequent terms, but never used in order to label a distinct vidhi. Through

Śabara, one can guess that also Kumārila knew an utpattividhi (see, e.g., utpatti in MS 4.3.28), but this is only speculative.

5.1.1.1 Order of the elements

Is there a ratio in the order of the list members in the utpatti-, viniyoga-, adhikāra-, prayogavidhi classification (also found with the last two members inverted)? It seems logical that the originative prescription precedes all other ones since it is presupposed by all of them. It makes also good sense that the application prescription (the most frequent prescription, since most prescriptions actually found in Vedic texts have this form) follows the originative one. Adhikāra and prayoga are also necessary, but their order is less clear. In general, prayogavidhi often occupies the last position in the texts which emphasise the fact that prayoga ("performance") is in fact the very essence of every prescription (hence, it is added at the end of the list, though in fact transcending it). On the other hand, the prayoga-adhikāra order may be justified if one follows the order of the topics dealt with in MS (see below §XXX).
In general, both sequences have early attestations but both only in post-Kumārila Mīmāṃsā. The adhikāra-prayoga sequence is the standard one in all Prābhākara texts I am aware of and in several non Prābhākara ones (such as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī). This could mean that it is older (the prayoga-adhikāra one would have been a 'rationale' innovation of Maṇḍana or some other Mīmāṃsaka keen to follow the MS order), or only that in early texts just the first part of the list was fixed and its further members were discussed whenever suitable. In favour of this view, the oldest commentator of Kumārila's ŚV, Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa, couples just the first two vidhis in his interpretation of a pronoun in ŚV 5.11:

> **There is epistemic validity (prāmāṇya) of every [prescription] in regard to a non-preceived objective (artha).** [...] So, through this [verse] it is shown that [the Veda] is epistemically valid Verbal Communication in regard to an object to be done (kārya). [...] And with the mention of "every" the originative and application prescriptions are meant[1].

A further (and much later) hint about the non-fixity of the list can be found in the TR itself, see TR IV, §C.11.2. Here, interestingly, it is exactly the adhikāra stage which lacks (in fact, it is included in the first step). This can be possibly explained by the flotation in the position of adhikāra, before or after prayoga.

[1] **sarvasyānupalabdhe 'rthe prāmāṇyaṃ [...]** tad anena kārye 'rthe śabdaprāmāṇyaṃ darśitam. [...] sarvagrahaṇaṃ cotpattiviniyogavidhyabhiprāyam. I am very grateful to Dr. Shilpa Sumant for having found this reference in the preparatory sheets of the Pune Sanskrit Dictionary.

More in general, most Mīmāṃā authors distinguished between an utpatti and a viniyoga stage (the first lies down the nature of the rite, the second adds a qualification to it). They also often recognised the inner-nature of prescription as consisting in performance, but only sometimes postulated it as a separate stage (the same applies to the other meaning of prayoga, see infra). Last, the adhikāravidhi has also a long independent prehistory and its inclusion within this classification is possibly due only to the effort to make the classification all-comprehensive.

5.1.2 Pramāṇas of the prescriptions (§C.5.1, §C.5.2, §C.5.4, §C.7)

ŚBh (ad 3.3.14 and ad 4.3.26) and, more systematically, MNP, MPBh (**MPBh**), AS, Rāmānujācārya and, outside Mīmāṃsā, the Vīramitrodaya commentary on the Yājñavalkyasmṛti, list assistants (sahāya) for some/all kinds of prescriptions. The rationale between these lists seems to lie in the typical Mīmāṃsā essay to classify in a proper way texts and textual elements and to logically organise them. Typically, Mīmāṃsakas detect several "pramāṇas" for understanding whether and how, e.g., a substitution has to be made (see also §4.2.3). Pramāṇas are also said to assist prescriptions in their operations and in fact some texts (AS, MNP) call pramāṇa what other ones generically call sahāya or sahakārin. Although I did not further investigate about them, these assistants might have been conceived at a time when *pramāṇa* had still not acquired its later epistemological meaning, which makes it a terminus technicus to define perception and the other kind of means to acquire fresh information (in this sense, textual pramāṇas are subclasses of śabdapramāṇa).

The MNP lists six pramāṇas accompanying the viniyogavidhi (śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna, samākhyā) and six accompanying the prayogavidhi (śruti, artha, pāṭha, sthāna, mukhya, pravṛtti). Out of the former group, vākya is defined as follows: «Syntactical-connection means connected utterance. Connected-utterance may be defined as the enunciation together of two things which are really principal and subsidiary to each other, altho there are no case-forms such as accusative etc., to indicate such relationships as objects etc. (which would constitute cases of "direct-statement by case-endings")»[2].

Some of MNP's definitions of the second group of pramāṇas: «Of these [six instruments of knowledge assisting a prayogavidhi], direct-statement is a verbal expression indicating order»[3]. «But order by sense (artha) is that in which the decision (as to order) is based on the purpose (to which the things are applied)»[4]. «Order by text is the order of textual statements

[2]Translation in **Edgerton1929**

[3]tatra kramaparaṃ vacanaṃ śrutiḥ (MNP 199). Translation in **Edgerton1929**

[4]yatra tu prayojanavaśena nirṇayaḥ sa ārthaḥ kramaḥ (MNP 201). Translation in

which indicate things»[5].

A list of pramāṇas for the utpattividhi is found (as far as I know) only in later texts: Rāmānujācārya hints at it, the MPBh mentions it in a different context and I could read it in full only in the (17th c.) Vīramitrodaya. The Mīmāṃsaka Kṛṣṇa Yajvan writes in his Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā: tad evaṃ śabdāntarābhyāsasaṅkhyāsañjñāguṇaprakaraṇāntarair karmabhedo darśitaḥ (p.22). The context is slightly different, but the discussion of abhyāsa (p. 21) refers to the case of the Pre-Sacrifices, where the same word, "yajati", is repeated five times and hints at the fact that in that case there is no chance of a niyama (the five "yajati" enjoining not different options, but different qualities of the same one). In this sense, the list may have been thought by Rāmānujācārya as subserving the purpose of identifying the ritual (or the ritual component) to be originated. The two lists differ as for denominations and order, but not in their content.

The Vīramitrodaya of Mitra Miśra on Yājñavalkyasmṛti presents a summary of the general (mainly of Mīmāṃsā origin) views about prescription and says: vidhyantarāviṣayapadārthasvarūpapratipādako 'pi vidhir utpattividhir ādyaprāpter utpattitvāt. tatra cāsya śabdāntarābhyāsaguṇasaṅkhyānāmadheyaprakaraṇākhyāni ṣaṭ sahakārīṇi (on 1.3, p. 14). Since this Dharmaśāstra text is not directly concerned with prescriptions and only summarises what was current at its time, one might imagine that a list of pramāṇas used for specific purposes (one of them being mentioned in the MPBh) has at a certain point been thought of as specific for the utpattividhi.

More in general, just like with vidhis, pramāṇas are also systematic lists of terms already well-known in Mīmāṃsā literature.

5.1.3 Meaning of the elements of the utpatti-, etc., classification (§C.5-C.5.4)

5.1.3.1 utpattividhi (§C.5.1)

An originative prescription is defined as that injunction which conveys only the nature of the rite or action that is laid down. The word 'only' is used to distinguish this injunction from the other ones, conveying additional qualities or specifications. The standard example of this is *agnihotraṃ juhoti.*

On the originative prescription writes Āpadeva: «an originative injunction is one which merely indicates the general nature of a rite; as, "he offers the agnihotra oblation"» (**Edgerton1929**)[6].

Edgerton1929

[5]padārthabodhakavākyānāṃ yaḥ kramaḥ sa pāṭhakramaḥ (MNP 202). Translation in **Edgerton1929**

[6]karmasvarūpamātrabodhako vidhir utpattividhiḥ; yathāgnihotraṃ juhoti (MNP, §63, p. 205).

5.1.3.2 viniyogavidhi (§C.5.2)

A viniyogavidhi does not prescribe the act –which has been already laid down by the utpattividhi– but rather what has to be applied to such an act. Its standard example is dadhnā juhoti (to be read after the originative prescription agnihotraṃ juhoti), which prescribes the use of dadhi for the agnihotra enjoined by the previous utpattividhi. In Āpadeva's words:

> «An applicatory injunction is one which indicates the connexion of a subsidiary with the main action, as: "He offers oblation with sour-milk"» [...] «And there are six modes-of-evidence which accompany this (applicatory) injunction: direct-statement, word-meaning, syntactical-connexion, context, position, and name» (**Edgerton1929** §64).

Rāmānujācārya's definition unites to this definition Pārthasārathi 's stress on being the instrument towards a desired aim (AN, III pariccheda, ad 21).

5.1.3.3 adhikāravidhi (§C.5.3)

An adhikāravidhi prescribes who is eligible for the performance of a sacrifice, at the same time enjoining him/her to perform it. The standard example is "The one who is desirous of heaven should offer the Agnihotra" (*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*).
There might be some disagreement about what is actually enjoined, whether the sacrifice's fruit or its responsible person. In fact, these vidhis are used by Bhāṭṭa authors as evidence of the fact that the sacrifice must produce a result and that, hence, one has to postulate an apūrva bridging the gap between a sacrifice and its result. According to such presupposals, the MPBh names it phalavidhi (p.2 and passim). On the other hand, Prābhākara authors claim that the fruit is only mentioned in order to identify the person responsible for the sacrifice's performance.
An adhikāravidhi is also said to be the principal prescription (pradhānavidhi or -vākya). In fact, the main function of the principal sentence or prescription is said to be to prescribe who is responsible for the sacrifice and, hence, its result (see TR IV §C.5.5, 1956: 52). For this reason, "principal prescription" and "prescription regarding the responsibility" coincide, although the former may also have further functions and is identified by its prayoga (performative) character.
As noted by Thibaut (**AS1882**), "A great number of adhikāra-vidhis have a merely ideal existence, as certain qualifications of the sacrificer are nowhere explicitly enounced but have to be inferred from the requirements of the case," whence the Mīmāṃsā maxim that wherever such vidhis are not found one should presuppose svarga as the fruit. Since svarga is interpreted as happiness and happiness is desired by everyone, such prescriptions enjoin nitya sacrifices.

In Āpadeva's words:

> An injunction which indicates the ownership of the fruit is an injunction of qualification. The ownership of the fruit means the right to enjoy the fruit to be produced by a (sacrificial) action. Such an injunction is "He who desires heaven shall sacrifice." [...] And this ownership of the fruit belongs only to him who is distinguisht by the characteristic of the qualified person[7].

5.1.3.4 prayogavidhi (§C.5.4, §C.7)

Within Mīmāṃsā, the prayogavidhi seems to have been understood in two –connected, but still distinct– ways. On the one hand, it indicates prayoga as the inner nature of every prescription, so that a prayogavidhi is a prescription promoting a certain action. In this sense, it can be said that prayogavidhi is the unspecified nature of all prescriptions. Hence, it is sometimes called pradhānavidhi, or "principal prescription" and said to be equipped with all subsidiaries (so in **AS1977**[8] and in **MPBh**). On the other hand, a prayogavidhi is one that prescribes to perform a ritual, thus enjoining a certain tempo. The connection between the two aspects is evident in MNP:

> «An injunction which suggests promptness in the performance is an injunction of performance (prayoga). And it is nothing but the main injunction entered into syntactical relation in the same sentence with the sentences enjoining subsidiaries. For inasmuch as it incites the performance of the main action with its subsidiaries, since there is no reason for delay, it enjoins promptness of performance, which is the same thing as avoidance of delay [...][9].

These two different aspects are recognised also in Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati's Vācaspatyam:

> prayogavidhiḥ prayogajñāpako vidhiḥ. [...] sa cāṅgavākyaikavākyatāpannaḥ pradhānavidhir eva. sa hi sāṅgapradhānam anuṣṭhāpayan vilambe pramāṇābhāvād avilambāparaparyyāyaṃ prayo-

[7]phalasvāmyabodhako vidhir adhikāravidhiḥ. phalasvāmyaṃ ca karmajanyaphalabhoktṛtvam. sa ca yajeta svargakāma ity evaṃrūpaḥ. [...] tac ca phalasvāmyaṃ tasyaiva yo 'dhikāriviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭaḥ (MNP 225-6). Translation in **Edgerton1929** §129.

[8](on prayogavidhi): prayogaprāśubhāvabodhako vidhiḥ prayogavidhiḥ. sa cāṅgavākyaikavākyatāpannaḥ pradhānavidhir eva. And Pt. Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī's commentary thereon: asya vidheḥ "agnihotraṃ juhoti" ity utpattividher iva "dadhnā juhoti" iti viniyogavidher iva ca svarūpabodhakaṃ pṛthagvākyam nāstīti darśayati –sa cetyādinā.

[9]prayogaprāśubhāvabodhako vidhiḥ prayogavidhiḥ. sa cāṅgavākyaikavākyatām āpannaḥ pradhānavidhir eva. sa hi sāṅgaṃ pradhānam anuṣṭhāpayan vilambe pramāṇābhāvād avilambāparaparyāyaṃ prayogaprāśubhāvaṃ vidhatte (MNP §196, p.117). Translation in **Edgerton1929**

> gaprāśubhāvaṃ vidhatte [...] ata evāṅgānāṃ kramabodhako vidhiḥ prayogavidhir ity api lakṣaṇam (**Vacaspatyam**s.v.).

Also in this case, Thibaut (**AS1882**) notes that:

> [...] we meet only in very rare cases with vedic passages having no other purpose than to settle the order of the acts constituting the sacrifice. In almost all cases this order of succession is to be concluded from the various indicia given in the viniyoga-vidhis, mantra etc. so that the prayogavidhis have rather an inferential than an actual existence.

Āpadeva also adds further interesting information:

> And this non-delay takes place when a fix order is adhered to. For otherwise the performance would be thrown into confusion by the arising of questions whether this is to be performed just after this or after that. [...] And in regard to this (order) there are six modes-of-evidence, direct statement, sense, text, position, chief-matter, and procedure»[10].

5.1.4 Mutuality among the elements of the classification (§C.5.5)

Uṃveka[11], Maṇḍana (see above **VV1907**), Pārthasārathi Miśra[12] and Rāmānujācārya (TR IV, §C.5.5) are explicit about the fact that the classification does not regard the nature of a prescription, but rather its role. A hint about it is present also in MNP, see §5.1.3.4. Hence, prescriptions can perform the one or the other role according to what is required. This view is linked with the idea that all prescriptions are, in fact, prescriptions of performance (prayogavidhi). Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa (ad 2.206) and Pārthasārathi

[10] sa cāvilambo niyate krama āśrīyamāṇe bhavati; anyathā hi kim etadanantaram etat kartavyam etadanantaraṃ veti prayogavikṣepāpatteḥ [...] tatra ca ṣaṭ pramāṇāni: śrutyarthapaṭhanasthānamukhyapravṛttyākhyāni (MNP 196, 198, 199). Translation in Edgerton 1929:117-8.

[11] While explaining why the Sacred Texts do not enjoin to perform a Śyena sacrifice, Uṃveka writes: adhikārahetusadbhāvam anuṣṭhāpako vidhyarthaḥ na śrutyādivad upāyamātrapratipādakaḥ, utpattiviniyogayor api prayogavidhir eva, phaladvāreṇa tv etau vyapadeśau –ayaṃ viniyogavidhir ayam utpattividhir iti, yathā dadhnā juhoti ity utpattividhir eva viniyogavidhir ity ucyate. tasmād agnihotre dadhnā juhoti iti agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ iti sarvatra prayogarūpa eva vidhiḥ (ŚVVTṬ ad 2.206).

[12] "[Objector:] Then, how can there be a fourfold [distinction] of the prescription according to the classes of coming-into-being, etc.? You have said that the prescription about the performance (prayogavidhi) is indeed the only one! [Reply]: [...] The only prescription is indeed the performance-prescription. That is said to be fourfold: " (nanūtpattyādibhedena cāturvidhyaṃ vidheḥ katham | prayogavidhir evaiko bhavataivaṃ prakīrtitaḥ || 18 || [...] prayogavidhir evaiko vidhir ity uktaṃ bhavati. caturvidhaṃ ca taṃ samācakṣate) (Nyāyaratnamālā).

Miśra (NRM after v.21) quote in this connection the following verse of TV (ad 3.1.13):

> abhidhātrī śrutir hy ekā[13] viniyoktry aparā smṛtā | vidhātrī ca tṛtīyoktā prayogo yannibandhanaḥ ||

As for the order of these mutually supplied roles, Rāmānujācārya (TR IV §C.5.5) states that a viniyogavidhi may serve as utpattividhi in case the viniyoga is already established, and states that in subsidiary sentences a prescription cannot serve as adhikāravidhi or prayogavidhi (thus implying that this can happen in principal prescriptions). The principal prescription can, instead, serve as adhikāravidhi and prayogavidhi also for its subsidiaries. This reflects Thibaut's note about the paucity of prayogavidhi and adhikāravidhi, which must be inferred from their equivalent viniyoga- and utpattividhis.

5.1.5 History of the classification according to what has been already obtained: apūrva, etc. (§C.5.1)

Śabara constantly refers to parisaṅkhyāvidhis, though calling them just parisaṅkhyā and opposing them to [affirmative] vidhis. niyamavidhi is mentioned just once in ŚBh (ad 6.8.31-2) but seems to have the same meaning found in later Mīmāṃsā authors. The continuity of their usage is shown also by the fact that niyama- and parisaṅkhyāvidhi are the only kinds of prescriptions (as far as my knowledge reaches) which have been systematically described by Kumārila (TV ad 1.2.4.38; the niyamavidhi is also described in his Ṭupṭīkā[14]). In some texts (notably, Appayya Dīkṣita's Vidhirasayana) the present classification is the central one. Pārthasārathi (ŚD), Khaṇḍadeva (Bhāṭṭadīpikā ad 1.2.4, **Bhattadipika**), Gāgābhaṭṭa, MBP (**MBP**), Veṅkaṭadhvārin (Vidhitrayaparitrāṇa) and MPBh (**MPBh**) mention it. Other texts, however, tend to limit its application to fix cases (MNP, AS, on mantras). Moreover, the parisaṅkhyāvidhi is apparently rarely "detected" by post-Kumārila Mīmāṃsakas in Vedic texts and they do not elaborate much on it. The Mīmāṃsākośa lists for instance only 3 entries about it.

In summary, the basic ideas of this classification, and especially the niyama/parisaṅkhyā opposition, is surely very ancient (see above for in-

[13]So in ŚVVTṬ (**SVVTT**). The TV edition has kācid instead of hy ekā. In fact, the verse serves a distinct purpose in the TV (showing the functioning of direct mention as an instrument of knowledge within the Veda). Jhā translates it as follows (I include in the translation the introductory statement iha tu sarvārthānām): "But in the case of all things, there are three ways in which they are spoken of by Direct Assertion: 1) There is an assertion that simply speaks of them; 2) another lays down their uses; 3) another enjoins them; and it is on this latter that all performance is based".

[14]yan na kadācid api prāpnoti sa vidhiḥ. yathā, agnihotraṃ juhuyāt –iti. pūtīkāḥ prāpnuvanti tasmād yuktam uktam niyamārthaḥ kvacid vidhiḥ (Ṭupṭīkā on 6.3.16).

stances of niyama and parisaṅkhyā in MS and ŚBh). Moreover, it is possibly the only classification of prescriptions whose basic members originated outside Mīmāṃsā. In fact, the Mīmāṃsā classification may be the result of a conflation of the Vyākaraṇa 's opposition between (apūrva)vidhi and niyama and the Dharmasūtra's distinction between vidhi, niyama and parisaṅkhyā. Properly Mīmāṃsaka is, instead, the final classification as apūrva-, niyama- and parisaṅkhyāvidhi and the fact of understanding all three as subtypes of prescriptions.
However, due probably to the faults implied by it, the parisaṅkhyāvidhi has been rather left behind in Mīmāṃsā history. Interestingly enough, after TV one hardly ever finds examples of parisaṅkhyāvidhi except the five-nailed ones, which actually derives from Dharmaśāstra literature. So, it seems that the parisaṅkhyā has been elaborated in early Mīmāṃsā and/or in Dharmaśāstra, has then been used for proper Mīmāṃsaka, that is, hermeneutic concerns by Śabara and Kumārila and then later declined into a sub-type of vidhi, typically used in Dharmaśāstra contexts only.
Both the AS and the MNP mention these prescriptions within their discussion about mantras. The AS does not explain why, whereas the MNP makes the connection explicit: one could be inclined to think that mantras have more than one purpose, but it is not so because of a niyamavidhi stating that mantras are meant to make one remember the various elements of a ritual performance.

5.1.6 Members of the apūrva-, etc., classification (§C.5.1)

5.1.6.1 apūrvavidhi (§C.5.1)

An apūrvavidhi prescribes something which has not been known before. In Appayya Dīkṣita's words:

> There are indeed three sorts of prescriptions: prescription regarding something not [known] before, restrictive prescription and enumeration prescription (excluding whatever is not in the enumeration). Among them, the first one is the prescription having as its result the acquirement of something which would else have been non-acquired in the three times (present, past, future) [and] in any possible way, like, "[One] should sprinkle rice-grains". In fact, in this case, without an injunction the acquisition of sprinkling as a preparatory act would not in any possible way occur through an [other] instrument of knowledge [15].

[15] tisraḥ khalu vidher vidhāḥ apūrvavidhir niyamavidhiḥ parisaṃkhyāvidhiś ceti. tatra kālatraye 'pi katham apy aprāptasya prāptiphalako vidhir ādyaḥ yathā vrīhīn prokṣatīti. nātra vrīhīṇāṃ prokṣaṇasya saṃskārakarmaṇo vinā niyogaṃ mānāntareṇa katham api prāptir asti. (Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha, 1; p.1).

"Not [...] in any possible way" refers to the subsequent definition of a restrictive prescription, like, "[One] should thresh rice-grains". Here, the fact that rice-grains have somehow to be threshed is deduced through the subsequent prescription about the preparation of rice-cakes. What would remain unknown, without a restrictive prescription, is hence just the method of threshing them.

This also means that an apūrvavidhi is quite akin to the usual definition of vidhi as aprāptaprāpaka ('Causing to obtain what has not been obtained yet'). This may be the reason why apūrvavidhi is not present in the most ancient instances of this classification, where it is instead just called vidhi (so in TV and in the Dharmaśāstra text Mitākṣarā[16]). Short, apūrva-ness seems to be hardly more than the character identifying a prescription in itself. A vidhi, if not further delimited, is an apūrvavidhi (since it cannot but convey something not known before, else it would be meaningless –which is impossible in case of a Vedic sentence).

In sum, in the early history of Mīmāṃsā and in its prehistorical background shared with Grammar and Ritual Sūtras, vidhi (seen as aprāptaprāpaka or as apūrvaprāpaka) was distinguished from niyama and parisaṅkhyā (which are, consequently, often labelled only as such in MS and ŚBh). ŚBh ad 1.4.27 discusses whether a certain Vedic passage is a guṇavidhi or an arthavāda and states: tatra guṇavidhir arthavāda iti saṃdehe apūrvatvād vidhir iti prāpte ("In this regard, as for the doubt on whether this is a qualificatory prescription or a commendatory statement, it is obtained that it is a prescription, since it [enjoins] something not [known] before"). TV ad 1.2.34 has:

> ([Obj.:] Is it not the case that, in this way, this is just a prescription about something non obtained before (aprāptavidhi)? [...]. What is then the distinction between prescription, restriction and exclusion? [R.:] It has to be said: A prescription refers to something which is absolutely non obtained before, a restriction to what is only [obtained] under one perspective [and it speci-

[16] The discussion is in fact in Mitākṣarā ad 81, but refers to the prescriprion found in v. 79. The passage is deeply permeated by Mīmāṃsā themes: kim ayaṃ vidhir niyamaḥ parisa khyā vā. ucyate. na tāvad *vidhiḥ, prāptārthatvāt. nāpi parisaṅkhyā doṣatrayasamāsakteḥ. ato niyamaṃ pratipedire nyāyavidaḥ. kaḥ punar eṣāṃ bhedaḥ atyantāprāptaprāpaṇaṃ vidhiḥ. yathāgnihotraṃ juhuyād aṣṭakāḥ kartavyā iti.pakṣe prāptasyāprāptapakṣāntaraprāpaṇaṃ niyamaḥ. yathā same deśe yajeteti. darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ yajeteti. yāgaḥ kartavyatayā vihitaḥ sa ca deśam antareṇ kartum aśakya ity arthād deśaḥ prāptaḥ sa ca samo viṣamaś ceti dvividhaḥ tadā yajamānaḥ same yiyakṣyate tadā same yajeteti vacanam udāste svārthasya prāptārthatvāt. [...] ekasyānekatra prāptasyānyato nivṛttyartham ekatra punar vacanam parisaṃkhyā. tad yathā. imām agṛbhṇannaśanām ṛtasyety aśvābhidhānāim ādatta ity ayaṃ mantraḥ svasāmarthyād aśvābhidhānyā gardabhābhidhānyāś ca raśanāyāgrahaṇe viniyuktaḥ punar aśvābhidhānīm ādatta ity anenāśvābhidhānyāṃ viniyujyamāno gardabhābhidhānyā nivartate. tathā pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā [...] tasmāt svārthahāniparārthakalpanāprāptabādhalakṣaṇadoṣatrayavatī parisaṃkhyā na yuktā. *The sense suggests to understand vidhi as apūrvavidhi.

> fies what to do], an exclusion refers to [something obtained] in this and in another case [and it excludes one of the two]–so it is [rightly] declared[17].

And even as late as the TV's commentator Someśvara (12th c.?):

> On the one hand, there is a restrictive prescription (niyamavidhi), on the other a prescription regarding something which has not be obtained yet (aprāptavidhi), hence, due to the fact that this difformity has not to be avoided, the whole Veda completes a purposeful meaning. This is ascertained by virtue of the prescription regarding the study[18].

Rāmānujācārya defines the originative prescription as either producing an obtainment non obtained through any other instrument of knowledge (pramāṇāntara-aprāptā prāpti) or a restriction (niyama). The latter case immediately evokes in its readers the label *niyamavidhi*, the former that of *aprāptavidhi*. Hence, the latter was still a popular alternative to *apūrvavidhi* (§C.5.1).

5.1.6.2 niyamavidhi (§C.5.1)

A niyamavidhi is a prescription enjoining a restriction among what could possibly be done. A typical example is "[S/he] husks the rice-grains" (vrīhin avahanti). In fact, once it is established that one has to remove the chaff from the rice-grains, this could be done in several ways (husking and piercing by nails being the usual candidates) and this prescription specifies how to do it [19]. In Thibaut's words:

> A niyama-vidhi defines the course of action, in cases where several alternatives are possible –each of which is partially non-established or unknown, insofar as without the vidhi, other courses of procedure would be equally likely to be resorted to [...][20].

The fact of resorting to one course of action instead of other, equally plausible, ones, is linked to the creation of an apūrva. In fact, one has to husk grains beating them because only in this way does the apūrva come into

[17] nanv evam aprāptavidhir evāyaṃ saṃjāta iti, na vaktavyaṃ parisaṅkhyeti. [...] kas tarhi vidhiniyamaparisaṅkhyānāṃ bhedaḥ. ucyate –vidhir atyantam aprāpte, niyamaḥ pākṣike sati | tatra cānyatra ca prāpte parisaṅkhyeti kīrtyate ||

[18] ekatra niyamavidhir aparatrāprāptavidhir iti vairūpyasyāparihāryyatvāt tasmāt sakalasyaiva vedasya prayojanavadarthaparyavasāyitvam adhyayanavidhibalād avasīyata iti bhāvaḥ (Someśvara's Nyāyasudhā ad TV ad 1.2.7, p.21).

[19] On this prescription, see MNP §243, **Edgerton1929** AS §50, **AS1984** and **MPBh**

[20] Thibaut's fn on his translation of Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha, **Thibaut1915**

being, although grains could be freed of their chaff even by piercing them with one's nails.
Śabara mentions this kind of prescription at least in two places (his commentary on 6.8.31 and 32). Gāgābhaṭṭa says that niyamavidhis are mostly viniyogavidhis.

5.1.6.3 parisaṅkhyāvidhi

Parisaṅkhyāvidhi literally means 'enumeration prescription'. In fact, it excludes whatever is not found in the enumeration.
It is defined as follows in the MNP:

> When both alternatives are simultaneously establisht, an injunction whose business it is to exclude one is an injunction of exclusive-specification. As in the case of Five five-nailed (animals) are to be eaten. For this sentence does not enjoin eating, since that is establisht by (man's natural) appetite. Nor yet is its business fixation, since eating of both five-nailed and non-five-nailed (animals) is simultaneously establisht (by appetite) and there is no partial non-establishment. So it is just an injunction of exclusive-specification, aiming at abstention from the eating of five-nailed animals other than the five (referred to)[21].

Edgerton further explains that "This kind of injunction is really an implied prohibition (of doing other than what is enjoined). Comm: there would be no sin in not eating the five animals referred to, nor is any fruit (reward) provided for eating them" (fn. 160 ad 244, p. 135)[22].
In sum, a parisaṅkhyāvidhi is a prohibition having the form of a prescription, i.e., it does not entail any negative particle. Writes Śabara:

> Just as in the case of "The five five-nailed ones should be eaten," through the mention of the five –the hare etc.– the eating of the other [animals] is prohibited. This is the sense one gets through

[21] ubhayasya yugapatprāptau itaravyāvṛttiparo vidhiḥ. yathā "pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ" iti. idaṃ hi vākyaṃ na bhakṣaṇavidhiparam, tasya rāgataḥ prāptatvāt; nāpi niyamaparam, pañcanakhāpañcanakhabhakṣaṇasya yugapatprāpteḥ pakṣe 'prāptyabhāvāt; ata idaṃ pañcātiriktapañcanakhabhakṣaṇanivṛttiparam iti bhavati parisaṅkhyāvidhiḥ (MNP, §244, p. 135 and p.245).

[22] Edgerton also refers to sources for the five animals.. Interestingly enough, the injunction has been quoted much more often than the list of edible animals, and hence lists diverge: "Rāmāyaṇa, Kiṣkindhā Kāṇḍa, ed. Gorresio 16.32, or ed. Krishnacharya, Bombay 1905, 17.37. The five are listed ibidem as śaśakaḥ, śallakī, godhā, khaḍgaḥ, kūrmaḥ (Gor.) or śalyakaḥ, śvāvidhaḥ, godhā, śaśaḥ, kūrmaḥ (Krishn.)" (Edgerton fn. 159 ad 244, p. 135). See also the list in Kaiyaṭa ad Mbh, Paspaśā 6 (quoted above).

> [this] sentence[23].[24]

Furthermore, the parisaṅkhyāvidhi is an injunction prohibiting to do something which had previously been enjoined. It is, hence, different from a prohibition (niṣedha), such as na kalañjaṃ bhakṣayet, which regards something never enjoined before. Explains Kumārila:

> [Obj.:] But here there is no word indicating an avoidance, nor any word indicating something to be avoided. Since both are absent, it would be an error to avoid [to do what the siddhāntin claims to be prohibited by the parisaṅkhyāvidhi]. [R:] It has to be said: This is not a prescription about the two parts of [sacrificial] clarified butter, since they are already acquired through a [preceding] injunction. What then? Through this syntactical meaning it is understood that something else has to be avoided. This [avoidance] is not acquired [yet], this is, hence, prescribed. For instance, after having said "Devadatta, Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra should eat," one hears that "On the fifth day, Viṣṇumitra should eat". In such case, it is not the eating which is prescribed, since this is already acquired. Rather, it is the avoidance [of eating] on the part of all others which is prescribed[25].

5.1.7 Conclusion on Rāmānujācārya's innovative traits (§C.5-§C.5.5)

Rāmānujācārya follows (although §§C.5-C.5.5 are within the Bhāṭṭa PP) the adhikāra-prayoga order which is the only one found in Prābhākara texts, and coexists with the prayoga-adhikāra one in Bhāṭṭa texts. Similarly, the definition of the apūrvavidhi as aprāptavidhi is an old Mīmāṃsā heritage. Rāmānujācārya uses Mīmāṃsā antecedents also in his version of the prayogavidhi, which unites the helpers traditionally linked to it and the idea of prayoga as the core of all prescriptions.
Entirely new is, instead, Rāmānujācārya's subsumption of the apūrva- and niyama- prescription within the utpatti- one and the consequent abandonment of the parisaṅkhyā one (§C.5.1).

[23] I am not interpreting vākyena as "Through the instrument of knowledge called vākya" (see above §5.1.2) since the latter is only linked to viniyogavidhis, and since it seems too narrow to fit this instance, where the meaning one derives seems to involve also a reference to a previous injunction.

[24] yathā pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā iti śaśādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ kīrtanād anyeṣāṃ bhakṣaṇaṃ pratiṣidhyata ity ayam artho vākyena gamyata iti (ŚBh ad MS 10.7.28).

[25] nanu nātra nivartakaḥ śabdo nāpi nivartyaśabdaḥ. ubhayor abhāvād bhrāntir eṣā nivṛttir iti. ucyate. ājyabhāgavidhānaṃ tāvad etan na bhavati. codakena prāptatvāt tayoḥ. kiṃ tarhi. etasmād vākyād anyanivṛttir avagamyate. sā cāprāptā, saiva vidhīyate. yathā devadattayajñadattaviṣṇumitrā bhojyantām ity uktvā punaḥ śrūyate, pañcamyāṃ viṣṇumitro bhojayitavya iti. tatra na bhojanaṃ vidhīyate, prāptatvāt. anyeṣāṃ ca nivṛttir vidhīyate (Ṭupṭīkā ad MS 10.7.28). I am indebted to Elliot Stern for pointing out this passage.

New is also his justification of the relation of all prescriptions, based on his interpretation of prayogavidhi as only embodying the essence of every prescription (and not as enjoining the rapid performance of the ritual). Consequently, all other prescriptions only aim at making ritual elements accrue to the performance one (§C.5).
Why does the TR omit the parisaṅkhyāvidhi altogether? Probably because Mīmāṃsakas were not at ease with a prescription which implies something different from what it actually states. Accepting parisaṅkhyāvidhi seems to imply, as in the case of vikalpa, some unavoidable faults6. The resort to metaphor is, hence, the only way out, but is also not in itself desirable, since also metaphor is not liked by Mīmāṃsā authors (see above). This oddity may have made the whole classification less agreeable than the utpatti- etc. one to Rāmānujācārya.
More in general, Rāmānujācārya re-reads a well-known classification according to the novelty requirement (formulated as the couple obtained/non obtained in the hermeneutical paragraphs of TR IV). Since (see 5.1.2) the Veda is an instrument of knowledge only insofar as it imparts something unknown before, the originative prescription must convey something new (§C.5.1), either completely (then, it is tantamount to an apūrvavidhi) or partially (then, it is tantamount to a niyamavidhi).
This applies to §C.5.1 as well as §C.5.5 and harmonises well with Rāmānujācārya's systematising efforts (see §4.2.3 and §4.4.2 of this study). In front of his eyes, Rāmānujācārya had several partly overlapping lists of prescriptions (apart from the two mentioned above, there is also the karmotpatti– one, the mukhya- one, etc., see my forthcoming paper on their history). He reduces them to just one and reduces the elements of this one, essentially, to just the prayoga-principle.

5.2 Apūrva as the centre of the Veda

All elements in a Vedic text relate to the thing to be done as its instrument, agent, etc. Hence, the whole Veda is an instrument of knowledge, claim the Prābhākaras, not insofar as it points to a prescription (as with the Bhāṭṭas, TR IV §§C.4.1-C.4.2), but rather insofar as it points at something to be done (TR IV §C.11.1).

5.2.1 A Prābhākara alternative to the vidhi classification (§C.11.2)

The vidhis are classified in the TR IV only in the long Bhāṭṭa PP and their classification is not directly refuted by the siddhāntin. In fact, he also refers to some elements of it, most of all to the prescriptions' coadiutors (śruti, etc., see XXX).

However, the classification of prescription was of central significance for the TR Bhāṭṭa PP (unlike for many other Mīmāṃsā authors) in order to arrange the whole sacrificial world around it. The Prābhākara needs also a centre, be it the same or different. Since he states that the meaning conveyed by the Veda is not a prescription, but an apūrvakārya, consequently, he makes the whole sacrifice revolve around its aspects.

The same apūrva (so called because it is non-preceded by any other means of knowledge) –explains Rāmānujācārya in TR IV §C.11.2– is also called niyoga (the Prābhākara correspondent of vidhi) insofar as it prompts people. It is called grāhaka ('seizer'), insofar as it collects around itself all sacrifical elements. This is true both from a linguistic and from a structural point of view. In fact, the apūrva is at the same time the logical centre of the sacrifice and the linguistic centre of the sacrificial passages (on the constant parallel between structure of the sacrifice and of the Vedic text about it, see §7.2.2). The latter convey their meanings only insofar as they are mutually connected with something to be done. For, according to the Prābhākara linguistics, words are meaningful only once connected into sentences and sentences ultimately convey something to be done.

Going back to the sacrifice's structure, when the apūrva connects these elements as one the subsidiary of the other, it is called viniyojaka ('applier'). The applicator's co-adiutors in identifying the hierarchical links between the elements are the same ones found in regard to the application prescription. Then, it undergoes the stage of prayojaka ('promoter') insofar as it causes to perform the whole sacrifice. The last two aspects are overtly similar to the viniyoga- and prayoga-vidhi ones. The responsibility is also given a place since all the above aspects only pertain to the adhikāra-apūrva and *not* to the apūrva prescribing the coming into being (utpatti) of principal and subsidiary rites. Hence, the final structure seems to be:

apūrva	
utpatti	**adhikāra**
	niyoga
	grāhaka
	viniyojaka
	prayojaka

As against:

vidhi
utpatti
viniyoga
adhikāra
prayoga

An utpattyapūrva can, in turn, refer to either the principal sacrifice or its subsidiaries:

utpattyapūrva	
principal sacrifice	auxiliary rites

5.2.2 Disputing the centrality of apūrva: role of result (§C.10.1-C.10.3.2)

An opponent objects that the apūrva is subordinate to the result, since the injunction (niyoga) prescribing optional rituals mentions a result (phala) and the enjoined action to be done is directly mentioned as the instrument for a certain result. Hence, s/he concludes, only the result is the meaning of the Vedic passage (TR IV §C.10.1).

The siddhāntin replies that the result is only mentioned in order to specify the agent, and is hence not the principal element. This is directly linked to the requirement of desire as individuation of the agent (see infra, § 6.1). Only the apūrva is, on the other hand, something to be done for its own sake (§C.10.2). With a quotation from the VM, Rāmānujācārya states that what has to be done is like a slave-owner. A slave-owner makes sure that her slaves gets enough to eat, etc., not for the slaves' own sake, but rather because she needs them. In the same way, an injunction realises the desire of the prompted person only in order to make her undertake the action enjoined. Hence, the same Vedic passage can entail two things to be realised (apūrva and result) without implying a split in the sentence, since the result is subordinate to the former (TR IV §C.10.3.1-C.10.3.2). This 'split of the sentence' (vākyabheda) is a major flaw in the Mīmāṃsā textual linguistics, since it violates the idea that a sentence conveys a single meaning (ekārtha vākya). On this subject, see the exhaustive study by Irene Wicher (Wicher 1999).

The parallel relies on the enjoining aspect of apūrva (a thing to be done requires one to execute it, see above, §3.6.1 and TR IV §C.11.2) but also on an unuttered incongruity, namely the fact that the apūrva, unlike a slave-owner, is not a conscious living being. Hence, how can it have purposes of its own? (TR IV §C.10.3.1)

The present explanation of the role of result complements the one mentioned before (in TR IV §C.10.2). Since the result is only needed as a specification of the agent, then it could also not be attained. The necessity of its achievement has to be guaranteed in another way, namely through the injunction itself, since this cares for the satisfaction of the people it prompts.

Summing up, a result will eventually follow, think the Prābhākaras, because so it is said in the Veda. But this does by no means entail that the result is in itself the motive for the undertaking of the sacrifice. The focus of the prescription lies in prompting someone to perform its content and for

this purpose a desirous person is needed. That she will actually achieve her desired result is only a consequence of the prescription, which does not directly affect it (cf. TR IV §C.10.7).
Moreover, add Rāmānujācārya, this view has the advantage of postulating just one action, instrumental to the realisation of both the apūrva and (secondarily) the result (TR IV §C.11.7.5).

Chapter 6

Desire and Contrary to Duty Obligations

The discussions mentioned above (see chapters 2 and 3) on exhortation throw some light on a major problem of ethical and deontic philosophy, namely what is the motive of action? Is it the sense of duty conveyed by imperative sentences or the reward one aims at?

6.1 Desire (§C.10.2-C.10.11)

Mīmāṃsā authors cannot even imagine a human being who acts if not because of desire. Hence, human desire has a role even in the Veda. The latter could not make people perform the rituals it entails if it could not prompt them. And in order to prompt them, it needs to single them out of the generic mass of human beings. In order to identify them, the Veda uses desire. All rituals are not prescribed for generic human beings, since in this case no one would feel the prescription as regarding him/her directly and the rituals would remain non-performed. On the contrary, the Veda prescribes rituals to specific people, identified through their desires. It prescribes, for instance, a putrakāmeṣṭi to one who desires a son, a darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice to one who desires heaven (=happiness) and so on. Hence, desire is not in itself part of the sacrifice, but it is required in order to get to the sacrifice one of its principal elements, the sacrificer (TR IV §C.10.2).

6.1.1 Sequence of desire (§§C.10.4-C.10.5)

According to Rāmānujācārya's description, whenever a Vedic passage says, e.g., "The one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices," whoever desires heaven feels addressed by that injunction (stage 1: desirous subject) and cannot avoid identifying herself as the subject to whom the injunction refers (stage 2: enjoined subject). Hence,

she understands that she is the one who is entitled to perform the sacrifice (stage 3: responsible subject)1. Finally, she engages in the performance of the prescribed sacrifice (stage 4: agent subject) (TR IV §C.10.4).
I am here rendering with 'responsible' the Sanskrit word *adhikārin*, which has usually been translated as "eligible". But in a Mīmāṃsā context (and, possibly because of a Mīmāṃsā influence, in other Śaiva and Buddhist contexts) it does not only designate the eligibility to perform a ritual, but also the fact that the eligible person is bound to perform it. So, this third stage entails at the same time eligibility and obligation, as with the usual ambivalence of the Sanskrit optative mode (see above, §3.6.1).
So, desire is the motive of (ritual) action. Indeed, there cannot be (ritual) action without desire. Moreover, desire operates directly on the (ritual) agent to be. Rāmānujācārya explains how a ritual agent is unconceivable without desire and how desire must necessarily be present for one to undertake an action. This is not just a restatement of Kumārila's well-known motto "Without a motive, even a fool does not act[1]," since desire is not (see above, §6.1) the motive of action, but rather the identification (viśeṣaṇa) of the agent. Without desire, the agent is not just inactive, but she does not even exist as a subject[2].
Rāmānujācārya also elaborates further on the three above mentioned stages by considering them in reverse order, from the view-point of what is prescribed by the Veda. The core meaning of the Veda, according to Prābhākaras, is not something established (as in Vedānta), but rather something to be brought about. Since the Veda is an independent instrument of knowledge, it gives information which cannot be ascertained through any other instrument of knowledge. Hence it is non-preceded (apūrva) by any of them. But even from such a non-human point of view, desire is necessary, because nothing can be brought about by itself. The Veda needs a doer for its acts to be realised, being a doer means being responsible towards an act, and in order to take responsibility for an act one has to be prompted to undertake it. And one feels prompted because she desires the result mentioned in the prompting prescription (TR IV §C.10.5).

6.1.2 Optional and fixed rituals and the presence of desire

At this point, the distinction between fixed (nitya), occasional (naimittika) and optional (kāmya) sacrifices needs to be made. The role of desire in the latter ones is obvious: one would not perform a sacrifice for rain, unless s/he desired rain. So, the agent of the vr ṣṭikāmeṣṭi is "One who is desirous of rain". On the other hand, the first and the second kind of sacrifices are usually described as mandatory, regardless of what one might or might not desire. The agnihotra, a typical example of the first kind, is to be performed

[1] prayojanam anuddiśya na mando 'pi pravartate (ŚV sambandhā 55 ab).
[2] On the philosophical implication of the 'emergence' of a subject, see Freschi 2008.

daily throughout one's life. The jātakarman, an example of the second kind, is compulsory required at the birth of a son. The agent of these two kinds of sacrifice seems to operate independently of desire, just for the sake of obeying the Veda.

Moreover, if the desire is only need in order to individuate the sacrificer, when the sacrificer is specified in a different way (e.g., in occasional rituals, with formulas like, "The one whose son was just born should perform the ritual ..."), the desire is no longer needed by the Veda (TR IV §C.10.7). However, it is still needed by the person to engage into the action (on the unavoidability of desire as motive of human action, see above, §3.7).

How do these two points harmonise? If desire is needed, why do people engage in sacrifices, who seemingly do not bear any result? Rāmānujācārya (TR IV §C.10.5) can explain away most cases since he says that in the viśvajit (see also Glossary) and in similar sacrifices, where no specific person is prompted, one has to postulate as sacrificer someone who is desirous of haven. In fact, since heaven means happiness according to the Śabarabhāṣya, this specification will suit everyone. In this way, one has satisfied at the same time the need for a specific sacrificer and that for a result to strive for.

In this way, the Mīmāṃsā understanding of the agent of sacrifices is the same in all cases. Fixed rituals are to be performed throughout one's life because their agent is identified as "One who is desirous of heaven". And heaven (svarga), explains Śabara means 'happiness', and everyone longs for happiness. So, the reason why the agnihotra is a fixed ritual is that the condition for performing it will never cease. One will desire happiness until her very last day, and that is why s/he is bound to perform it until her/his very last day.

But what about the case where a specific sacrificer is supplied, but no hint of a desire is left (see the formula mentioned above and TR IV §C.10.10)? In order to make sense of these cases, Rāmānujācārya (and other authors?) has to abandon his usual Mīmāṃsā 'down-to-earth' attitude. In TR IV §C.10.11 he answers that the very non-performance of a prescribed duty is, for cultivated people, something one has to desire to avoid: "In fact, dharma is also one of the human purposes (puruṣārtha)". In saying so, Rāmānujācārya interprets artha as goal and connects it automatically with one's natural desire.

More in general, since heaven is explicitly (see Matilal 1986) stated to be a soul's condition and not a physical place, a "stoical" way out telling us that the fulfilment of one's duty causes a man to be happy, is always possible.

6.2 The śyena sacrifice (§C.3.16.1, §C.4.3.3, §C.11.3.1)

One of the critical junctions of Veda's validity and moral action is the śyena sacrifice. This is a malefic sacrifice prescribed in the Veda and aiming at damaging one's enemy. Prabhākara, like Śabara and Kumārila, firmly denies that such a sacrifice is to be performed. But why, asks an objector, since it is prescribed in the Veda, like all other sacrifices? (A Western parallel may be evoked by some cruel penalties prescribed in the Bible.)
How can the Veda, which is an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) prescribe something which should not be performed? And how can we state that it should not be performed, if it is in fact prescribed in the Veda? Obviously not because of some over-ranking moral principle (such as "Morality"), since the Veda is the only Absolute acknowledged by Mīmāṃsakas and much of their philosophy would collapse if only they would not adhere to this economy of principles. Accordingly, Mīmāṃsakas state that the śyena should not be performed because of the Vedic rule "One should not perform any violence" (*na hiṃsayāt*). However, violent acts (namely, animal sacrifices such as the Agnīṣomīya one) are prescribed elsewhere in the Veda and are indeed performed[3]. Hence, the problem amounts to the presence of contradictory statements within the Veda. Nor could one or the other be eliminated, since the Veda is a valid instrument of knowledge in all its parts. The solution envisaged by Mīmāṃsakas is to circumstantiate the validity of the seeming contradictory prescriptions.

6.2.1 The Bhāṭṭa solution: novelty and desire (§C.3.16.1, §C.4.3.3)

According to the Bhāṭṭas, a prescription entails four elements (see §2.1.3):

$$
\begin{array}{ccccl}
 & & & \nearrow & \text{sādhya (fruit to be accomplished)} \\
\text{prescription} & \Rightarrow & \text{bhāvanā} & \rightarrow & \text{sādhana (instrument)} \\
 & & & \searrow & \text{itikartavyatā (procedure)}
\end{array}
$$

The formal role of the sādhya is fulfilled on the pragmatic level by the bhāvya, i.e., the result, such as heaven. All roles are necessary to the prescription, but their contents may be acquired from different sources. Instrument and procedure are known through the Veda, whereas the result is known through one's own longing (rāga) for it, without the need for the prescription to enjoin it. In fact, according to a Mīmāṃsā tenet, an instrument of knowledge, in order to be such, must convey a piece of new information (see

[3] On ritual slaughter, see **Kataoka/killing**

Kataoka2003b). On the other hand, in regard to what is already known an instrument of knowledge just does not become active (cf. TR IV, §C.10.9). Hence, if one already begets something out of one's own natural attraction for it, the Veda does not yield any additional prescriptive bias to it.

In this way can the dissimilarity between the śyena and the agniṣomīya sacrifices be explained. The second one is a subsidiary to a nityakarman, the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. Moreover, the slaughtering of an animal is part of the sacrifice, hence, it is part of the instrument and is hence prescribed by the Veda. On the other hand, the Veda cannot prescribe to one what s/he desires[4]. One desires to harm one's enemy independent of the Veda (§C.3.16.1).

Summing up, the violent act in the case of the śyena is part of the bhāvya and is hence completely within the responsibility of the agent. The Veda has nothing to do with it. Moreover, the Veda forbids violent acts, hence one should not perform the śyena, since it is forbidden by the Veda. One might ask, at this point, why at all does the śyena figure in the Veda, since it is not to be performed. The (unexpressed) answer would be that the Veda prescribes it for the sake of the ones who desire to harm their enemies, although it also blames them for doing it.

6.2.2 The Prābhākara solution

Śālikanātha remarks that the Veda prescribes that no violent act should be carried out (na hiṃsayāt). But, continues Śālikanātha, such a prohibition could be bypassed since violence performed during a ritual (e.g., during the Agnīṣomīya) would be performed for the sake of the ritual (kratvartha) and not for the sake of the agent (puruṣārtha).

However, he prefers another solution and clearly states that the Veda can cause to know what has to be done, but this does not deny one's free will to do or not to do it. And one wishes to perform an action because one desires its result, hence if one does not desire to harm anyone, one should not perform the śyena-sacrifice. Thus, the Veda only let us known that, in case we would like to harm someone, we should perform the śyena-sacrifice. It does not say that we have to long for such a result.

Coming back to the adhikāra question, the adhikāra-endowed of the śyena-sacrifice is indeed "The one who desires to harm an enemy". Hence, only one who desires to harm an enemy is obliged to fulfil such an obligation. But, since such a desire is itself forbidden, no one should ever be obliged by it:

> In the case of an adhikāra related to a wish, the prescription (niyoga) does not say that the sacrifice has to be performed, because its performance is accomplished only because of the result.

[4]One is reminded of the popular maxim: "You can decide to do what you like, but you cannot decide to like what you do".

> Although the prescription is known as something to be fulfilled and the sacrifice is [known] as the instrument for this (fulfilment of the prescription), nevertheless since in the case of a wish-related-adhikāra the Sacred Text (*śāstra*) is [only] valid until the accomplishing of a wished result, the prescription does not cause the person to act, for its (the prescription's) own fulfilment. For people accomplish the action only because of the result, since they are caused to act by desire [...][5].

Incidentally, the unavoidable presence of a purpose entails that the authority-subject is a conscious being and that he has free will. Mīmāṃsā adherence to common-sense would refuse as non-sensical a Luther-like situation where injunctions are prescribed and deontic authority is exercised over non-free subjects[6].
Rāmānujācārya integrates much of the Bhāṭṭa position, insofar as he states that the apūrva sets into action the ones who were previously inactive. Hence, it does not prompt people to undertake optional rituals, since the latter are undertaken out of one's desire for their result (TR IV §C.11.3.1). Therefore, follows Rāmānujācārya, a śyena sacrifice is not to be undertaken because of the Veda; rather, it is only undertaken if one strives for its result. And, since its result entails a forbidden act, one should not strive for it. On the other hand, the killing prescribed in the Agnīṣomīya has to be performed because it is prescribed not for its own sake, but rather as part of the ritual. The same opinion presented in §C.11.3.1 as "Someone else's opinion (*para-mata*) that not Śyena itself, but only its result is prohibited is found in Vedāntadeśika's Seśvaramīmāṃsā ad 1.1.2.
Rāmānujācārya does not propose a single structural analysis of this difference, since in the Śyena the result alone could be forbidden or the sacrifice as its instrument (since the apūrva of optional rituals would only promote the procedure, whereas the instrument would be promoted by the result).
Summing up (TR IV §C.11.3.1),
First option, valid for all rituals:

apūrva

$\swarrow$ $\searrow$

instrument procedure

desire

---

[5]na ca kāmādhikāre niyogo yāgasya kartavyatāṃ vadati. phalata eva kartavyatāsiddheḥ. yady api niyogaḥ kartavyatayā pratīyate. tatsādhanatayā ca yāgaḥ. tathāpi kāmādhikāre kāmyamānaphalasiddhiparyantatvāt śāstrasya na niyoga eva svasiddhyarthaṃ puruṣaṃ prayuṅkte rāgākṣiptapravṛttitvāt puruṣāṇāṃ phalata eva pravṛttisiddheḥ (Śālikanātha , Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā, I/36, 13-16).

[6]See Bochenski's discussion of the reciprocal relation between freedom and authority in **Bochenski1974**§ 10.

↓
result to be brought about

Second option:

apūrva of fixed and occasional rituals
↙ ↘
instrument procedure

whereas, in optional rituals:

apūrva of optional rituals
↓
procedure

desire
↙ ↘
result to be brought about instrument for its achievement

(arrows indicate the promoting action).

It may be worth noticing that no author I am aware of states that the animal slaughter in the Agnīṣomīya is not forbidden because only an animal is killed, whereas the Śyena entails the harming of a human ennemy.

6.3 śyena according to deontic logic (§C.11.3.1)

A further perspective worth considering is that of deontic logic as elaborated by George von Wright and then elaborated as a distinct kind of modal logic. In the following, I will use formal language only in order to make the logic of the Mīmāṃsā arguments more accessible. Whoever finds formal language more difficult than Sanskrit may altogether skip all formulas.
In general, the śyena-sacrifice case has to do with the issue of conflicting obligations. On one side there is a prescription regarding the śyena-sacrifice, which has harming one's enemy as a result and on the other the prohibition to perform any violence (na hiṃsayāt). This problem has been faced in deontic logic in various ways[7]:

1. principle of consistency, which excludes the possibility of genuine normative conflicts

[7]Hilpinen 1981:xii-xiv.

2. relativising the concept of obligation to circumstances

3. time (e.g., contrary to duty obligations are actualised only after one has failed to comply with his primary duty)

4. conjunction principle (instead of consistency principle), which accepts mutually incompatible obligations and excludes only self-contradictory obligations

Among them, only the first solution seems to have little to say as regards our case, whereas all other solutions may instead offer us interesting insights on the problem. It must be held in mind, that Prabhākara never denied to the prescription regarding śyena-sacrifice its Vedic-prescription-status. Thus, he has to find a way out of a conflict without rejecting the prescription itself (since, being a Vedic prescription, it cannot be annihilated).
In his new system of deontic logic, von Wright introduces in every atomic formula a second variable, separated from the first by a '/'. The variable to the left says how the world ought to be if it is as the variable to the right tells us it actually is. O(A/B), e.g., means that one ought to see that A, in the case circumstances are B.
Within a Mīmāṃsā milieu, this second variable might suitably be thought as expressing the adhikāra.
O(Y/S)
"obligation to sacrifice if there is the condition of desiring heaven"
could thus express the Vedic prescription svargakāmo yajeta, i.e. "The one who desires heaven ought sacrifice". In von Wright's formula, one ought to see that a sacrifice is performed when it is the case that one desires heaven. Since Prabhākara explains that prescriptions ought to be performed independently of any result, the right variable does not express an aim, but a condition. If however the adhikāra entails a prohibited consequence, as in the case of the śyena-sacrifice, then we shall assume that such a condition should never come to be.
In formal language:
$h \subseteq d\&Os/d\&O \sim h$
where d can be read as 'desiring to harm', h as 'harming one's enemy' and s as 'performing a śyena-sacrifice'. This means that h occurs if and only if there is a simultaneous occurrence of d and of the duty to perform a śyena-sacrifice in case one is in condition d. Moreover, one must add to that the prohibition to h. In sum, circumstances can modify obligations, as modern dyadic deontic logic recognises. In fact, when the circumstance d comes to be true, the obligation Os is created. But, at least in this case, the opposite is not true. Notwithstanding the new circumstance s, the conflicting obligation $O \sim h$ does not disappear[8]. I shall investigate further to check whether somewhere

[8] This is the case also in von Wright's new system, cf. Hansson 1971: § xii, p. 141.

else in Mīmāṃsā such a case is considered, or circumstances may only add new obligations, without cancelling "old" ones.

Kumārila surprisingly avoids condemning the śyena-sacrifice as such, although he agrees in stating that it has not to be performed. This can be made understandable if one thinks that the only condition that would allow one to perform it, entails itself something forbidden. It is hence not worthy blaming the sacrifice itself. As Thomas Aquinas, Kanger and von Wright all agree, if the act of an agent raises conflicting duties (e.g. one ought to perform a damaging sacrifice and/or one ought not to not perform any violence), then this act (the desire to harm) is itself something forbidden. An example of this application regards the obligation to choose between forbidden alternatives[9]. Thomas Aquinas denied that such can be the case unless as the consequence of a previously forbidden act. Von Wright expresses it in logical terms by saying that one cannot be perplexus simpliciter, i.e.

$\sim (O(p \vee q) \& \sim Pp \& \sim Pq)$

(where P means 'permission to do'). Nevertheless, according to von Wright's system too, it is possible to be perplexus secundum quid:

$O(p \supset q \vee r) \& \sim Pq \& \sim Pr \supset \sim Pp$

We could thus maybe explain the śyena-sacrifice case by applying these laws (called "the laws of commitment" by von Wright). It is namely impossible to be obliged to do something forbidden unless as a result of a forbidden act. Hence, one will not have to choose between failing to obey a prescription or performing violence against an enemy unless one has desired to perform violence, which should not be the case.

$O(p \supset q \vee r) \& \sim Pq \& \sim Pr \supset \sim Pp$

Reading p as 'desiring to harm an enemy', q as 'not performing the ritual prescribed for those who desire to harm an enemy' and r as 'harming an enemy through a ritual'. Such a situation can be easily compared to that of a person who has promised to do something forbidden. It is worth noticing that such a deontic conflict has been considered also in Western philosophy because of a scriptural example, namely Jephtha (11.1-12.7). Scriptures are thus, for both Indian and Western philosophy, a source of specimens in regard to duties. It has often been stated that there can be different degrees of necessity among deontic statements. The śyena-sacrifice prescription is surely regarded as a lower degree prescription if compared to the prohibition to perform any violence (na hiṃsayāt). It has to be fulfilled only by lower degree human beings, who desire to harm someone else. Hence it plays no role in the construction of a deontically perfect world. If all our obligations were fulfilled, no one will have the adhikāra to perform a śyena-sacrifice. The above sketched solution might be accepted also by Kumārila, who maintained that there is a hierarchy among prescriptions. Prescriptions aiming at some result are, in his opinion, to be abandoned, as soon as one ceases

[9] Follesdal, Hilpinen 1971:11-12.

to desire but perfect happiness. Among them is surely the one prescribing the śyena-sacrifice. Prabhākara, on the other hand, understands also these prescriptions as having no outer result and interprets the "seeming results" stated in them as expressing an adhikāra. Jaakko Hintikka states the necessity of introducing quantifiers in deontic logic. Prohibitions should hence be formalised as follows:
$(x)O \sim A(x)$
On the other hand, most of the ordinary 'positive' obligations are to be differently formalised. Hintikka shows it through an example, «When it is said that each year one ought to pay one's income tax, this does not mean that each year one's every act ought to be an instance of taxpaying»[10]. This means that the logical form of this kind of obligations is
$O(\in x)A(x)$
Hence follows, in my understanding, that prohibitions are more universally valid then prescriptions. This could throw some light on the logical opposition between "One should not perform any violence" and the prescription regarding the śyena-sacrifice. The latter one holds only conditionally, it is related to some circumstances that may happen or not. On the other hand, the prohibition holds universally. As regards Prabhākara's view, he maintains that the above-mentioned prohibition refers to the person (the sacrificer) whereas the prescription refers instead to the action (i.e. the śyena-sacrifice). This means that the prohibition is more general, since it prohibits to the person to be such a one as to harm someone else. Prabhākara's answer to the opponent asking why should not one perform a śyena-sacrifice sounds bizarre:

> This is put forth by someone who has not clear the activity of prescription. Prescription regards what has to be done. But it does not say that it has to be done[11].

I could tentatively explain it according to the difference sometimes stated and mostly self-understood between imperatives and deontic statements. The latter state what has to be done, but do not compel anyone to do it. Similarly, says Prabhākara, Vedic prescriptions are about our duty but do not say that we have to do it. If Vedic prescriptions prescribe what has to be done without compelling us to do it, this means that refraining from evil is still a matter of free will. In the case of the śyena-sacrifice, it is stated that the one who desires to harm an enemy should perform it and, elsewhere in the Veda, that no violence should be performed. This could be formalised as follows:
$O(d \supset s)\&(s \iff h)\&O \sim h$

[10] Hintikka 1971:63-4.

[11] anirūpitaniyogavyāpārasyedaṃ codyam. kartavyatāviṣayo niyogaḥ. na punaḥ kartavyatām āha. (Prabhākara , *Bṛhatī* I/38, 8f).

which can be read as "If one desires to harm someone, then one ought to perform a [śyena-]sacrifice; the sacrifice entails harming and one ought not to harm". It cannot follow that

$O \sim h$

but it can follow that

$\sim Oh$

i.e., one "ought-not" to harm.

Chapter 7

Grammar and Exegesis

TR IV does not focus on linguistic issues (unlike TR III). Nonetheless, it presupposes a linguistic understanding of the way a sentence's elements get connected. Some specific themes are highlighted below.

7.1 Assemblage of the kārakas (§C.3.13.2, §C.11.7.1)

Both in the Bhāṭṭa PP (§C.3.13.2) and in the Prābhākara S (§C.11.7.1), a long excursus is dedicated to the way sentences are built and, especially, to the meaning of instrumental and accusative. In fact, Mīmāṃsakas are made aware, through sentences such as, "He sacrifices grains" that the second-case endings do not necessarily express a result (in fact, grains are not something one longs for). Rāmānujācārya consistently follows the Vyākaraṇa distinction between two levels (called vibhaktis and kārakas in Vyākaraṇa), one describing the case endings and another their function. Moreover, Grammarians can also account for different expressions of the same event through the speaker's vivakṣā (intention, lit. 'the desire to speak'). On the other hand, Rāmānujācārya does not label vibhaktis and kārakas as such and cannot depend too heavily on vivakṣā (since his primary focus, the Veda, is authorless). Hence, he has his Bhāṭṭa PP (closely following Pārthasārathi Miśra) maintain that the same event can be described differently according to what one wishes to express (vivakṣā) –Bhāṭṭas are known to rely more on worldly experience and less on the Veda and can hence resort to vivakṣā. The S rather explains the seeming conundrum of a second-case ending which does not express a result (e.g., in *agnihotraṃ juhoti*) insofar as there is no mention of a desired entity –and something (is the implicit assumption) has to be expressed in the second-case ending (TR IV §C.11.7.1).
The general result of both discussion is that the assemblage of kārakas does not univocally reflect the structure of reality. The same event can be described with several sentences and what seems to be the object (because it

is expressed in the second-case ending) is not necessarily a desired entity (as with Pāṇini's definition of 'object'). Hence, one cannot use evidences driven out of linguistic usage as conclusive arguments against a certain these. Although linguistic arguments are constantly used, especially by the Bhāṭṭa PPs, they cannot serve as a definitive refutation. The ultimate criterion is, instead, that of common usage (vyavahāra), including language within the larger frame of human intercourse.

7.1.1 The kāraka and the reality levels (§C.3.13.2)

The definition of the functions of the kārakas only partly overlap with the Pāṇinian one. The object (karman) is defined in the standard way, as the most desired element of the action. That Mīmāṃsā authors felt no problem in adopting this definition is, perhaps, a further evidence in favour of its sacrificial origin (the element of desire is, in fact, central to sacrifice, but not necessarily to language analysis). Further, it can also be defined as "the substrate of the action's result" (§C.3.13.2) in case it is not identical with it.

The instrument is defined as that which is "included in an activity intiated for another purpose" (§C.3.13.2, §C.11.7.1). In other words, an instrument is necessarily part *–vyāp–* of the action though not being the most desired element of it, the object.

The 'subject' is used, explains Rāmānujācārya, when one wishes to express autonomy in regard to the action undertaken. This directly echoes Pāṇini's definition of the subject as *svatantrakartṛ*, although the latter might rather hint at the autonomy of the subject which is aloof of the process described by the sentence (in Pāṇini's system it is instead the instrument which expresses the agent).

These functions do not correspond to reality in a bi-unique way. In fact, the same activity can be described in different ways, according to what one wishes to express. Chopping a tree can be described, for instance, as having the axe as instrument or as agent, according to whether one wants it to figure as the autonomous element or not, and the same applies to all other elements involved (raising and lowering of the axe, wood, cutting, etc.). Hence, the same activity can be the cause of distinct settlements of the kārakas. This possibility of language to describe the same reality in various ways is also the reason, argues Rāmānujācārya, for the existence of verbs, such as "walking" and "going", which describe the same kind of activity, but are syntactically distinct (the first being intransitive).

Only the three kārakas mentioned above (subject, object, instrument) are distinct from each other. Dative, ablative and locative, maintains Rāmānujācārya, are instead closely linked with the first three. The locative is the substratum of either the subject or the object, the dative is what one holds in view through the object and the ablative is the limit of the movement

undertaken by the subject (§C.3.13.2).

NB TR IV §C.11.7.1 and the other instances of a distinction between the kāraka- and the reality-level are possible also because Mīmāṃsakas do not seem to distinguish between the formal representation (vibhakti) and its meaning a factor of action (kāraka). Hence, they can conclude that language is whimsical and does not reflect reality.

On the other hand, this distinction makes it possible for Rāmānujācārya to describe the meaning of the kārakas referring to reality, as in TR IV §C.3.13.2. For instance, the observation that "The *karman* is endowed with the result of the action" only makes sense if the two levels are distinct. To someone who does not distinguish the two levels, object and result would just be the same thing. Hence, the author (pace Bronkhorst, see **Bronkhorst1999**) did distinguish between the linguistic level and that of external reality.

7.2 Linguistic implications of TR hermeneutics

7.2.1 Proximity, Fitness and Expectation (§C.12.1)

These three are the basic criteria used in Mīmāṃsā (and Indian) linguistics to detect the boundaries of a sentence. They seem to have originated within Mīmāṃsā, since Mīmāṃsā was, unlike Grammar (Vyākaraṇa), more keen to investigate textual linguistics, rather than to build complete words out of simpler elements.

They are discussed in detail in TR III, whereas TR IV just uses them in order to show how a complex sacrificial passage holds together. Proximity makes one look for subsidiaries close to the main prescription. Fitness is possible because the responsibility apūrva is the aim and, hence, semantically fit for the connection with a content. Lastly, expectation is determined by the mutual requirement of the main prescription and the subsidiary ones. So, these criteria are used by the hearer to understand that some sentences constitute a unitary text and, conversely, it is because it fulfils these criteria that the passage can convey a unitary meaning. According to the Prābhākaras, this occurs insofar as the textual elements relate to each other and designate their meanings as related to each other's meanings (anvitābhidhāna, see §C.12.1[1].

[1]A considerable number of studies discuss Indian theories of sentence signification and anvitābhidhāna. For an introduction, **Chakrabarti1989** outlines the fundamentals elements distinguishing it from the Bhāṭṭa and Bhartṛhari's views. **Matilal/Sen1988** discusses various Indian theories from the viewpoint of their contribution to contemporary philosophy of language. **Taber1989** goes in the same direction, and focuses on Mīmāṃsā theories.

7.2.1.1 Expectation and Proximity (§C.11.5.1)

Similarly, these three criteria rule the connection of semantemes in the principal prescription. Proximity is the less important one, since it is superseded at least by expectation. For instance, one would expect the verbal root to be connected to the prescriptive ending as its object, since they are conveyed within a single verbal form. Nonetheless, the prescriptive ending rather expects something desired as its object and hence relates to a less proximate element, the result mentioned as the adhikāra for the person who has to perform the sacrifice (TR IV XXX).

However, the strict adherence to the text makes Mīmāṃsakas distinguish between the expectation of two seemingly identical terms according to what is available around them. In this sense, their analysis is *a posteriori*, since it accounts for what one sees, rather than fore-seeing what one will get. This a posteriori procedure is probably guided by the Mīmāṃsā focus on an actual text, the Veda.

For instance (§C.10.5), in the case of sacrifices lacking a *specific* prompted person (niyojya), one has to necessarily postulate one. And this one has to be necessarily specified by a desire (since a person can only be prompted insofar as s/he desires the result mentioned in the prompting sentence). Hence, one postulates a prompted person desiring heaven. In fact, heaven is (as shown in ŚBh ad 6.3.XXX) tantamount to happiness and the human kind naturally strives for happiness.

But how does the relation among the prescription's elements take place in the case of a directly mentioned (*śruta*) prompted person and in the case of a postulated one? Even in the first case, the expectation of a prompted person by the injunction is mediated by the intermediate steps of responsibility and agent-ness. Nonetheless, since the prompted person is directly mentioned, one does not need to get at it through this mediation and s/he is directly related to the injunction. Hence, the relation occurs immediately, without following the sequence of expectation. This also means that expectation is understood as the fact of requiring something, i.e., as a sequential process. If, instead, through proximity (as in this case) or fitness (?) one immediately gets a complement, the expectation process is not needed to complete the sentence. In sum, proximity applies before expectation, unless and until it is validated by it (as in the case mentioned first).

On the other hand, when the prompted person is not explicitly mentioned the order of relation follows that of expectation. In fact, in the latter case all three are not directly mentioned and there is hence no proximity to be followed before the expectation takes place.

The responsible- and the doer-stages are hardly ever directly mentioned together with the prompted person. Yet, their presence can be indirectly detected because of its effects. In fact, some prescriptions do not have any prompted person at all (nor do they need any), because the responsibility

for their performance is taken over by someone else. For instance, the prescription about the pre-sacrifices does not need a specific prompted person, since the person prompted to the main sacrifice will anyway perform it with all its auxiliaries (see §C.11.5.1). In such cases, the prescription's expectation is appeased through another prompted person once one has reached the level of the responsibility, since the responsibility for the main ritual includes that for the pre-sacrifices, too. And, in fact, these pre-sacrifices are indeed performed (doer-level). This shows that the responsible person is the same.

7.2.2 Anvitābhidhāna in the sacrificial exegesis (§C.12.1.1-C.12.2.2)

The anvitābhidhāna process sketched above has a correlate in the structure of sacrifice. Just like words get connected to each others and to the verb, and then designate connected meanings, so sacrificial elements get connected to the apūrva and gain through that their significance. The latter process is called grāhakagrahaṇa (lit. 'the seizing (i.e, including) [of all sacrificial elements] through the seizer (the apūrva)').
In his commentary on Pārthasārathi 's Nyāyaratnamālā, Rāmānujācārya defines it as follows:

> And the principal apūrva is defined as connected, like with the indirectly contributing auxiliaries, [so] also with the pre- and [post-] sacrifices, because they are suitable for a relation with it and are proximate and because of the unchecked course of the expectancy of the responsibility's apūrva. And this [process of connection] is the seizing through the seizer[2].

However, the two processes are not exactly the same, since Mīmāṃsakas are –as already hinted at– aware of the fact that language has specific rules which do not exactly reflect the structure of the outer world. In the case at stake, the principal apūrva necessarily includes (through grāhakagrahaṇa) both directly- and indirectly-contributing auxiliaries. However, the process of anvitābhidhāna is exclusive to the main prescription and the indirectly-contributing auxiliaries' ones. In fact, the latter convey a duty only insofar as they get connected to the principal prescription. The acts they prescribe are only significant insofar as they contribute to the preparation of the sacrificial elements. On the other hand, the pre- and post-sacrifices (i.e., the directly contributing auxiliaries) contribute to the main sacrifice directly, that is, not via a preparatory act, but rather insofar as they raise an intermediate

[2]adhikārāpūrvākāṅkṣāyāś ca niraṅkuśaprasaratvāt prayājādiyāgānāṃ ca tadanvayayogyatvāt sannihitatvāc ca saṃnipātibhir iva tair apy anvitaṃ pradhānāpūrvam abhidhīyate. idam eva grāhakagrahaṇam (NR ad AN II, v. 5, p.199).

apūrva. In order to raise it, their prescriptions need to be able to enjoin it. Since it would be impossible to have a prescription enjoining two duties (the principal apūrva and the intermediate one), the latter is only enjoined as subordinate to the former. Still, this makes the anvitābhidhāna process impossible (since in it no second meaning, though subordinate, is conveyed apart from the principal one). Hence, directly contributing auxiliaries can be included in the broader process of grāhakagrahaṇa, but not in that of sentence anvitābhidhāna (TR IV §§C.12.2.1-C.12.2.2). To find a linguistic parallel, one should rather look at the connection of semantic and syntactic elements within a larger textual passage, but Mīmāṃsā authors do not label it anvitābhidhāna.

Part III

Annotated Translation of TR IV

Appendix A

TR IV: Translation and notes

A.1 maṅgala

[My] mentor (guru) Jātavedas[1], the sacrificer (yajvan), who has reached the highest level as regards words, sentences and instruments of knowledge[2], is victorious over the orb of the earth. Having repeatedly observed the congenital (sahaja) feebleness of mind, body and sense faculties[3]. [and hence the difficulty to gather first-hand information or to understand correctly complex texts, such as Śālikanātha Miśra's ones], Rāmānuja has composed the Tantrarahasya for the aid of others[4].

A.2 siddhānta on kārya as the core of prescriptions

Now what must be known (prameya) through the Sacred Texts (śāstra) is investigated (nirūp-). And that is a thing to be done (kārya), having a fully new (*apūrva*) nature, [and] expressed (vācya) by the optative (liṅ) and the other suffixes (pratyaya). And that alone is the essence (tattva) of prescriptions (vidhi). The whole Sacred Text (that is, not just the prescriptions) points (para) to that. And this will be said in the following (§C.8.3, p. 54, ll.2-7 and following §§).

[1] Jātavedas is a name of Agni used, among other occurrences, in the performance of the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifice (see, e.g., Āśvalāyana Gṛhya Sūtra I.10.12).

[2] i.e., Vyākaraṇa , Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya, considered to be fundamental for any further study.

[3] karaṇa should include the mind, but it can be used also for the external senses alone, excluding manas as the internal sense.

[4] The first verse is a śloka, the second one a gītī.

A.3 PP: linguistic bhāvanā is the core of prescriptions

[PP:] «But the teacher (ācārya, Kumārila) explains what must be known (prameya) through the Sacred Texts and the essence (tattva) of prescriptions in another way. That has been said [by him]:

> The optative and the other [suffixes] express one, which is the the designation (abhidhā)-bhāvanā, | whereas there is another bhāvanā that has an [actual] object (artha) as its core (ātman), [and] is in every case the sphere of application of [all] verbal endings (ākhyāta))|| (TV ad 2.1.1.)

The meaning (artha) is [as follows]. "The bhāvanā having an [actual] object as its core " is the objective bhāvanā (arthabhāvanā), being the effort of a person, i.e. (yāvat), his/her undertaking an action (pravṛtti). That is expressed (vācya) by all verbal endings. The "designation bhāvanā" is the linguistic (śabda) bhāvanā. That is expressed by the optative [suffix] and by the [imperative (loṭ), subjunctive (leṭ) and gerundive (tavya)] ones. Therefore, the objective bhāvanā (arthabhāvanā) is expressed by all verbal endings (ākhyāta). By the optative [suffix] and the others, on the other hand, two[5] bhāvanās (i.e., the objective bhāvanā, designated by all verbal endings and the linguistic bhāvanā, peculiar to optative, etc., only) are expressed». Those who follow this opinion (mata) (i.e., the Bhāṭṭas[6]) elucidate the essence (tattva) of prescription in various ways[7].

A.3.1 Maṇḍana: a prescription expresses the means to realise what is desired

Among them, some (i.e., the followers of Maṇḍana Miśra) say: «Since immediately after the employment (prayoga) of the optative and the other [suffixes], a human undertaking of action (pravṛtti) is [commonly] seen (darśana) and it (undertaking) roots (mūla) in the cognition (jñāna) that it is the means to realise something desired (iṣṭasādhana), and this cognition is conditioned (nimitta) by a linguistic element (śabda), someone who desires to learn [the language] (vyutpitsu), standing on the side (without taking part in the action) (pārśvastha), first determines (niści-) that "What is expressed by these (optative suffix and others) is that either the entity meant (artha) by the [verbal] stem (prakṛti) or the entity meant by the suffix (pratyaya) is the means to realise something desired".
Among those two (entities), he discriminates definitely (eva) that what is expressed by the optative and the other [suffixes] is that just the [objective]

[5]Like above, with kṛtsna, api emphasises the numeral.
[6]As will be seen from what follows, Rāmānujācārya considers Maṇḍana Miśra a Bhāṭṭa.
[7]Cf the ones mentioned in VN, p. 54. QUOTE

bhāvanā, which is the entity meant by the suffix (pratyaya), is the means to realise something desired, because of the extreme closeness (sannikarṣa-atiśaya), since [both the optative ending and the verbal ending] have been obtained (upādāna) through a single suffix. And in the same way, when one says "[One] who is desirous of heaven (svargakāma) should sacrifice," what would be said is that the bhāvanā of the sacrifice (yāga) is a means to realise something desired. And this alone[8] is the essence (tattva) of prescriptions, which causes [people] to undertake [actions] (pravartaka). This has been said [by Maṇḍana Miśra]:

> People are caused to undertake (pravartaka) actions (kriyā) by nothing else than the [action's] being a means (abhyupāya) to what is desired (iṣṭa)[9] |
> they declare the incitement (pravartanā) to be dharma and cause (hetu) of [one's] undertaking an action. | | (VV p.243)

A.3.1.1 Connection of other elements to the bhāvanā

Such a bhāvanā (equivalent to the means to realise something desired) expects (ākāṅkṣ-) something to be brought about. Although the meaning (artha) of the verbal root (dhātu) has been obtained (upādā-) through the same (samāna) word (pada)[10] [as the prescriptive suffix, and hence one immediately turns to it whilst looking for what must be brought about], it is not related (anvi-) [within the prescription] as what must be brought about (bhāvya), since it is not [by itself] a human purpose (artha). In fact, [such a hypothesis] is excluded (vyāghāta) by the fact that the bhāvanā[11] is the means to realise (sādhana) something desired (i.e., a human purpose), as it is understood (avagam-) through the prescriptive suffix (pratyaya) (which, according to this PP, conveys the idea that the action enjoined is the means to realise something desired). And [all] this has been established (siddha) in the process of language acquisition (vyutpatti) [which has been described above, §C.3.1]. Therefore, although obtained through another word (pada), [the

[8] eva avadhāraṇārthe.

[9] In fact, this last clause could also be translated as suggested to me by John Taber: "Since [this] is the means (abhyupāya) to what is desired (iṣṭa)". The commentary of Vācaspati Miśra does not paraphrase directly the ablative. I chose the above rendition because of a similar passage in the tenth century Śābdanirṇaya of Prakāśātman (who extensively borrows from Mīmāṃsā sources): viśiṣṭavyavahārasya hetur nānyo nidarśane | iṣṭābhyupāyāt kāryatvaṃ hy anyathāsiddhabodhanam || (ŚN, v. 52) and the (11-12th century) commentary thereon: vyutpatsyamānena yat svātmani pravṛttinimittaṃ samadhigataṃ, tad eva pratipattur api pravṛttinimittam anumīyate. tac ca neṣṭasādhanajñānād anyat samadhigatam (vṛtti ad ŚN v. 52, p.43). I thank Dr. Hugo David for having pointed out this passage.

[10] In Indian grammar, samānapada is whatever must be treated as a single word, although it might be a samāsa (see Ā 8.4.1). I owe this notation to Dr. Alessandro Graheli.

[11] I am understanding the following one as a sāpekṣasamāsa and bhāvanāyāḥ as directly related to vidhipratyayāvagateṣṭasādhanatva°.

thing desired], such as “heaven”, lies in the domain (koṭi) of what must be brought about [because of suitability] since it is a human purpose. The meaning of the verbal root, instead, by force of (vaśāt) expectation (ākāṅkṣā), [proximity] and [suitability], [lies] in the domain of the instrument (karaṇa). All the other [words’ meanings], read in proximity (sannidhi), have place in the domain of the procedure (itikartavyatā)». [p.42].

A.3.2 Pārthasārathi Miśra against A.3.1

This opinion (mata) is criticized precisely (eva) by those of the same persuasion (tadīya) (i.e., by other Bhāṭṭa such as Pārthasārathi Miśra[12]), in the following way: «The fact that [the action to be undertaken] is a means to realise something desired (iṣṭasādhanatva) cannot be designated (abhidheya) [by optative and similar suffixes], since this would contradict [our] awareness (saṃvid). Indeed, one does not understand (avagati) the same (tulya) out of this statement (śabda): «an activity (vyāpāra) connoted as (anurakta) sacrifice (yāga) is a means (abhyupāya) for [achieving] what is desired» and out of this one: «one should sacrifice (yajeta)». And there ought to be the [same comprehension,] [if the fact that the action to be undertaken is a means to realise something desired were primarily designated], because the fact that [the action to be undertaken] is a means to realise something desired alone would constitute the prescription (vidhi), and the other statement (i.e., “An activity connoted as sacrifice…”) would have the same meaning (artha) of it. And [a prescription cannot be tantamount to a statement that the action to be undertaken is a means to realise something desired] because they are employed together (hence, they cannot be synonyms[13]). A statement expressing that [the action to be undertaken] is a means to realise something desired (samīhitasādhana) and a prescriptive statement are [indeed] [commonly] seen (dṛṣṭa) to be employed together. [For instance:] «Boy! If you execute the sandhyā [sacrifice], you will have good fortune (abhyudaya). Therefore, execute it!». [In fact,] the employment (prayoga) of two synonyms (paryāya) together is not seen [in ordinary experience], and the discernment (nirṇaya) of the meaning of linguistic elements (śabda) has ordinary experience (loka) as its instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa).
Therefore, the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] do not express that [the action to be undertaken] is the instrument to achieve something desired. And [the thesis according to which the optative and the other suffixes express the fact that the action to be undertaken is the instrument to achieve something

[12]tadīya is unmistakably used to designate Pārthasārathi Miśra in TR I, p. 5. And what follows is a rephrasing of Pārthasārathi Miśra’s rejection of Maṇḍana Miśra’s view (see fn. to the Sanskrit text).

[13]As explained a few lines below and infra, §C.3.8, p. 45. My rendering of sahaprayogāc ca as independent of bhavitavyaṃ ca tayā, which introduces the preceding two reasons, rests on the corresponding VN text (VN ad 2, p.47).

desired] does not tally with (ānuguṇya) the verse saying "The optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] express one bhāvanā, the designation one [...]».

A.3.3 Other Bhāṭṭas: the notion that the action to be undertaken is an instrument to a desired end could be implicit

Others (PP) instead [say] that «the fact that [the action to be undertaken] is a means to realise something desired (samīhitasādhana) must not be directly expressed (vācya)[14], so that this [above said opinion] would be criticised in this way. Instead, it can be seized (labhya) because of the incompletion [of the sentence, which would thus hint at it] (aparyavasāna)[15]. To elaborate: the optative suffixes (pratyaya) and the others designate (abhidhā-) the general (mātra) [condition of] being something to be done (kārya), which is common to pleasure, avoidance of pain and the means thereto (upāya), because [the meaning of the optative suffixes and the others] has been learnt (vyutpatti) precisely in this regard (that is, in regard to something to be brought about which is either pleasure, or avoidance of pain or the means thereto). [Indeed,] in ordinary experience (loka) one comprehends (pratipad-) that something must be done (kāryatva) as [meaning] that these three alone have to be realised (sādhya) through [one] undertaking an action (kṛti). Once this (what must be done) has been designated, since the action (kriyā) having the form of a bhāvanā and expressed by the optative [suffix] and the others, does not itself have the nature of pleasure or avoidance of pain, by elimination (pāriśeṣyāt) it is discerned that it (action) is the means thereto (since optative and other suffixes directly signify that something must be done through an action; as this something to be done might only be pleasure, avoidance of pain and the means thereto, one indirectly understands that the action, which is not in itself pleasure, or avoidance of pain, must be the instrument for their accomplishment).

And in the same way the frequent reference (vyavahāra) in both [Śabara's] Bhāṣya and [Kumārila's] Vārttika, to "[A statement] expressing that something must be done (kartavyatā) causes a person to undertake an action (pravṛt-) in regard to an [objective] bhāvanā" becomes congruous (upa-

[14]"Directly expressed" (sākṣād vācyam) refers to the previous term "[primarily] designated" (abhidheya), at the outset of the UP's criticism in §C.3.2. I thank Dr. Alessandro Graheli for pointing that out.

[15]"Incompletion" (aparyavasāna) is linked with the following "by elimination" (pāriśeṣyāt). In fact, according to these PPs, the prescription by itself does not directly express that the action to be undertaken is the instrument to achieve something desired. Rather, one automatically understands it, since it is the only option left (pariśeṣa) once one has ascertained that the action by itself does not amount to happiness nor to avoidance of pain. So, one supplements the prescription with the additional notion that the action is the instrument to achieve something desired since otherwise the sentence meaning would remain uncompleted (aparyavasita).

panna). In this case, too, the expectation (ākāṅkṣā) for something to be brought about (bhāvya) is fulfilled (paripūrti) as before (see A.3.1.1, C.3.1.1, p. 42, l. 26-27)».

Also this opinion has been neglected (upekṣ-) by those of the same persuasion (i.e., the followers of Pārtasārthi Miśra) because it does not tally with the verse (mentioned above, TV ad 2.1.1.). And the difference between being something to be done (kāryatā) and being a means to realise something desired (iṣṭasādhanatā) will be stated [later] (§C.9.10.1-§C.9.11, pp. 56-57).

A.3.4 PP Vedic scholars: prescription is tantamount to the optative and similar suffixes

Other (PP) Vedic scholars (śrotriya) state: «the prescription is just (eva) the optative suffix (pratyaya) and the others. That alone (eva) causes [one] to undertake [an action] (pravartaka)».

A.3.5 UP: then everyone would act! If there are further conditions, the thesis has already been refuted

[UP:] «This is wrong (ayukta). If it were like that, then every single (eva) person who heard it, would undertake an action (pravṛt-). If you (PP) say that it causes to act (pravartaka) [only] people who have learnt the meaning of words (vyutpanna), [I, the UP, ask] what meaning should one have learnt? If you [PP] [answer] [that one should have learnt that the optative and other suffixes mean] that [the action to be undertaken] is a means to realise something desired (samīhitasādhanatva), then there is no distinction (viśeṣa) from the opinion advanced (upanyas-) [above]».

A.3.6 Kumārila on linguistic bhāvanā and objective bhāvanā (vs. A.3.1.1)

Other [Bhāṭṭas] instead state that «the prescription is the function (vyāpāra) of the optative (liṅ) suffix (pratyaya) and the others». [UP:] «What is that (function)?» [PP:] «The linguistic bhāvanā (śabdabhāvanā)». [UP:] «What is that like?» [PP:] «It is a [bhāvanā] which is tantamount to (ātmika) inciting (preraṇā) another [person], [i.e.] it conduces (anukūla) to the undertaking of the action (pravṛtti) by a person. It is expressed by the optative (liṅ) and the other suffixes, and produced by them (suffixes) (that is, the optative and the other suffixes both immediately give raise to the bhāvanā, and refer to it as their meaning). The Bhāṭṭas[16] (vārtikakārīya) [say] that "The optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] beget and denote (abhidhā-) an incitement". And this

[16] I could not trace the quote, which is present also in PrP, Śāstramukha and is there attributed to a Vārttikakāramiśra (presumably Kumārila).

(linguistic bhāvanā) is expressed by the verse beginning with: "[The optative and the other [suffixes] designate one] bhāvanā, the designation [one]".
And therefore everywhere in the Vedas, which have to be recited (svādhyāya) insofar as they are taken up (parigrah-) [as a result] of the prescription about the learning [because the prescription about the learning of the Veda, svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ, promotes its realisation along with that of all other prescriptions][17], whenever the optative (liṅ) suffix and the others are employed, e.g., in "[One] should sacrifice," "[One] should offer," "[One] should give" it would be being said "[One] should bring about [a sacrifice, etc.]" (bhū-). [In fact, just as in the case of the prescription about the recitation, prescriptions do promote.]
And there being for that (the linguistic bhāvanā) a requirement (apekṣ-), [namely,] "What (kim) [is to be brought about]?," the human undertaking of an action (i.e., the objective bhāvanā), obtained (upādā-) through the same suffix (as the linguistic bhāvanā) is connected (sambandh-) [within the prescriptive sentence] as what must be brought about (bhāvya), for the incitement (i.e., the linguistic bhāvanā) brings about the undertaking of the action. Indeed a person initiates an action (pravṛt-) once incited by it (linguistic bhāvanā).
And then, there being the requirement "Through what (kena) [should one cause to be]?," the expressing (vācaka)-expressed (vācya) connection (sambandha) between the optative (liṅ) –and the other [suffixes]– and the prescription is related (anvi-) [within the prescriptive sentence], as its (of the linguistic bhāvanā) instrument (karaṇa), for a linguistic bhāvanā engenders the undertaking of an action insofar as it has been designated (abhidhā) [and, thus, what expresses it is instrumental to the arousal of the prescription's result].
[Finally,] there being a requirement "How (katham) [should one cause to be]?," the praiseworthiness [of the action to be undertaken], arisen (udita[18]) through commendatory statements (arthavāda) is [related] [within the prescription] as the procedure (itikartavyatā). For, the potency (śakti) of the prescription (vidhi), which becomes exhausted, is supported (uttambh-) by the cognition of the praiseworthiness [of the action to be undertaken].
[As for the objective bhāvanā, a result] consisting of heaven or other [desirable things] alone is connected as what must be brought about (bhāvya) by the objective bhāvanā, precisely (eva) because the [objective bhāvanā] is enclosed (avarodha) in the incitement [and not, as the PP said in §C.3.1.1, because the prescription is tantamount to the statement that the action

[17] See **Kataoka2001b** I thank Prof. Kataoka for having helped me in understanding this passage.

[18] udita could also be interpreted as the ppp of vad-, to express, and this would fit the context even better, but I chose to understand it as deriving from udi- because of the parallel VM text, where the praiseworthiness is said to be arthavāda-samuttha (from samutthā-, to elevate).

to be undertaken is the instrument to achieve something desired]. On the other hand, the entity meant (artha) by the verbal root (dhātu), [though] obtained through the [verbal] stem (prakṛti), is not [connected as what must be brought about]. For no incitement is congruous in case of something which is not a [desired] result (phala) (and, hence, the linguistic bhāvanā could not incite one to implement the objective bhāvanā unless it leads to a desired result such as heaven). The relation with the instrument and [the procedure], on the other hand, is as before (see §C.3.1.1, p.42, ll. 24-27)». [p.43]

A.3.7 S against A.3.6

This opinion has been criticised by those of our (S's) persuasion (that is, by Śālikanātha Miśra). Such a functioning (vyāpāra) of the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] is found [according to you] in regard to that (linguistic bhāvanā), [but] about this fact you alone, [allegedly] endowed with supernatural vision, are the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), not us, who have eyes of flesh (that is, normal eyes)! If you [PP] say that [this is known] as one knows (vid-), immediately after hearing a linguistic element (śabda) [such as an optative suffix], that the undertaking of an action (pravṛtti) is about to be (bhāvin) (that is, through an inference, since the possibility of grounding such a functioning on sense perception has been discarded), I disagree. In your opinion the condition (nimitta) for this (undertaking of the action) is the fact that the [action to be undertaken] is a means to realise something desired (samīhitasādhana). In our opinion, on the other hand, [the condition] is the fact of being something to be done (kāryatā). [So, the fact that an undertaking of an action will arise does not prove that the optative and the other verbal endings have such a power. In fact, you too admit that there is another cause apart from the optative and other verbal endings' functioning. Hence, the fact that one is aware that an undertaking of an action is about to arise does not mean that it is caused by a linguistic bhāvanā.]

A.3.7.1 Optative and similar suffixes cannot promote anyone as they are not a (normal) substance

Moreover [optative and similar endings cannot incite anyone, because] in our (Prābhākaras') opinion language (śabda) is a quality (guṇa) of ether (ambara), whilst in your (Bhāṭṭas') opinion it is an infinitely-extended (vibhu) substance (dravya) (and no action can inhere either in a quality or in an infinitely-extended substance[19]). Such is indeed the situation according to your [PP] opinion: «As far as phonemes are concerned (tāvad[20]), they are

[19]Because no action can inhere in a quality and because an all-pervasive substance, being all-pervasive, cannot undergo any change (changes need an empty space to be occupied or left).

[20]tāvad is repeatedly used in order to distinguish three different aspects within śabda.

substances, not qualities. And they are all-pervasive (vyāpaka) and permanent (nitya). As far as the audible sound (dhvani) is concerned, it is their property (dharma[21]), their manifesting [factor] (vyañjaka), different according to every phoneme, and momentary (kṣaṇika). As far as their temporal duration (krama), like length (dīrghatva), [shortness] and [protraction] is concerned, it is superimposed on phonemes[22]. A word (pada) is indeed phonemes specified (viśiṣṭa) by such a temporal sequence. Therefore, a difference (bheda) in sequence causes a difference in the word, a difference in (the word) causes a difference in the sentence (vākya) and a difference in the sentence causes a difference in [sentence-]meaning (artha) (since this is always conveyed by the whole sentence)». And therefore, how [can] the activity (vyāpāra) [of incitement] be connected (yoga) to such phonemes, since [all actions] rest on a substance of visible size (mūrta) [and not on an all-pervasive one[23], not to speak of a quality]? And in regard to the [connection of incitement], in the world the inciters are just (eva) wind, etc. (neither all-pervasive substances nor their qualities, such as phonemes, as you said above, §C.3.6[24]).

A.3.7.2 The connections to the linguistic bhāvanā are untenable

[S:] «Moreover, how is it that the undertaking of an action (pravṛtti) by a person is what must be brought about (bhāvya) for it (linguistic bhāvanā[25]) (as you said above, §C.3.6, p. 43, ll. 24-5)? If you [PP] say: "Because the (undertaking of an action by a person) is the content (viṣaya) of it (linguistic bhāvanā)," I [S] disagree. The person who must be incited alone (eva) is the content, of that (prescription/linguistic bhāvanā), which has the form

[21] This passage is a depiction of the Bhāṭṭa view, but Prābhākaras agree in maintaining that sound is an attribute of the phonemes. Hence, the author is possibly using dharma instead of guṇa in order to avoid the consequence (which would only arise within a Prābhākara depiction of this relation) of the sound being a guṇa of a guṇa (the phonemes).

[22] On the difference between a phoneme, which by itself cannot be heard, and the sound manifesting it, and on the sound being different according to each phoneme, see TR III §2.2, pp.23-24. On the superimposition of sequence, see TR III, §3.4.2, p. 26.

[23] Non being mūrta is in fact the distinctive characteristic of ether. See mūrtatvaṃ vihāya bhūtatvaṃ ākāśe (N.S.Ramanuja Tatacarya's Bālapriyā ad Annaṃbhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṅgraha 4).

[24] Explains Subrahmanya Śāstrī in a footnote to the corresponding VM text (VM II ad 4, Śā p. 424): «Suppose one theorizes that language is either a quality or a substance. If it is a quality, than it is impossible that it has an activity, because one would draw the inference "Language has no activity, because it is a quality, like colour". Even if it were a substance, language could not have any activity because of the inference "Language has no activity, because it is infinitely-extended, like ether". Hence [Śālikanātha Miśra] stated "Moreover [...]"» (śabdo guṇaḥ, athavā dravyam iti dvedhā vikalpya, śabdasya guṇatvapakṣe vyāpāravattvaṃ na ghaṭate. śabdo na vyāpāravān guṇatvāt rūpavad ity anumānaṃ bodhyam. dravyatvapakṣe 'pi śabdo na vyāpāravān vibhūtvād ākāśavad ity anumānena śabdasya vyāpāravattvaṃ nopapadyata ity āha –kiñceti).

[25] The Bhāṭṭa PP understands as śābdībhāvanā, what the S calls a prescription.

of an incitement (preraṇā), because [he alone] can be suitably [incited]. On the other hand, the [objective] bhāvanā (i.e., the undertaking of an action) is not [a suitable content], because it cannot be suitably [incited][26]. And indeed in ordinary experience (loka) persons alone are incited. Therefore it (prescription/linguistic bhāvanā) cannot have that (a person's undertaking an action) as its content. Furthermore, [as for what you said above, §C.3.6, p. 43, l. 26], which kind of instrumentality belongs to the cognition of the [expresser-expressed] connection (sambandha)? incitement and [objective] bhāvanā are simultaneously understood (pratipad-) since they are expressed (vācya) by a single suffix (pratyaya). Such being the case, it is not correct (yukta) [to say] that one (the objective bhāvanā) of the two comes into existence (utpatti) because of the cognition of the expresser-expressed connection referring to the other one (prescription/linguistic bhāvanā) (as maintained by the PP, who said that the objective bhāvanā is brought about by the linguistic one). And [nor could it be said that the awareness of the relation between optative and similar endings and their expressed meanings is instrumental for the arousal of the linguistic bhāvanā, since] in ordinary experience it is not seen that what is expressed comes into existence because one knows the connection (sambandha) between expresser (vācaka) and expressed (vācya) (e.g., fire does not come into existence through the awareness of the expresser-expressed relation between the word "fire" and actual fire). And [also] the [objective] bhāvanā is, according to your [PP] opinion, expressed (vācya) [by optative and similar verbal endings] (so, it would also arise out of such knowledge, instead of being the result of the incitement). Moreover, the incitement is an action (kriyā) [and] the undertaking of an action (pravṛtti) is indeed its result. Indeed, an action does not require an instrument (karaṇa) in order to engender its result, but rather just (eva) in order to come into existence [it requires an instrument]. Once come into existence, on the other hand, it (action) bears a result by itself. [And we have proved above that the expresser-expressed connection cannot be instrumental for the arousal of the incitement, either.] Indeed, going does not depend on an instrument once conjunctions (saṃyoga) and disjunctions [with various locations on the ground] (vibhāga) have begun. Therefore, the cognition of the [expresser-expressed] connection is not an instrument.
Also, how can the praiseworthiness be the procedure (itikartavyatā)? Indeed, in case the undertaking of an action towards a human purpose had a person as its agent (kartṛ), it (praiseworthiness) could, indeed, [function as] procedure because of the suitability (yuj-) of its (the praiseworthiness') instrument (that is, of the awareness of the praiseworthiness)[27] (since a per-

[26] I owe to Prof. John Taber this rendering of yogyatayā (which I previously understood from a linguistic point of view, that is, "Because he/it can be aptly connected [to the prescription]").

[27] The instrument can be identified through the corresponding VM text (VM II ad 4, Śā p.422).

son's inclination to undertake an action can be enhanced by such awareness). But not in the case of the coming into existence of an incitement effected by a linguistic element (śabda), because [in this case] its instrument would not be suitable (since a linguistic element cannot be inclined to act by the awareness of praiseworthiness)».

A.3.7.2.1 PP and S on commendatory statements as procedure

[PP:] «But, whenever a commendatory statement (arthavāda) is directly mentioned (śruti) [in connection to a prescription], there is surely praiseworthiness [hence, this must play a role in regard to the prescription, since commendatory statements cannot be useless as they are part of the Veda]». [S:] «But how can there be [praiseworthiness] in regard to those [prescriptions] where no [commendatory statements are directly mentioned]? Indeed, the commendatory statements are not transmitted (samāmnā-) everywhere (i.e., in connection with every prescription) [hence the procedure would lack in many cases]». [PP:] «In these cases also, these (commendatory statements) are acquired (prāp-) by analogical extension (atideśa) [based on a representative instance]»[28].

[S:] «It is not so [for various reasons, 1st of all,] since [your] notion (pratīti) is too cumbersome (guru)». [PP:] «Just like one acquires the [ritual] items (padārtha) through their assistance (upakāra) (because their assistance is required in the ritual), so these (commendatory statements) are acquired through the praiseworthiness (prāśastya) (because the awareness of the praiseworthiness is required by the prescription)». [S:] «It is not so, since [praiseworthiness] is not required (apekṣ-). Indeed praiseworthiness is not required like an assistance (upakāra)[29], because the apūrva can be realised (sidh-) even without it. [Moreover, commendatory statements do not constitute the procedure, 2nd reason] because, instead, the undertaking of an action (pravṛtti) occurs because of the cognition [that the action to be undertaken] is the means to realise something desired (iṣṭasādhana) [not because of the cognition that the action to be undertaken is praised, see §C.9.10.5, p. 57]. Also the potency (śakti) of a prescription (vidhi) is supported just by that (cognition that the action to be undertaken is the means to realise something desired, as according to Pārthasārathi Miśra) or by the cognition that [the prescribed act] must be done (kāryatā) (as by us) (so, it does not require any external boost as maintained by Kumārila, §C.3.6). [Moreover,] the commendatory statements [do not constitute the procedure because] (3rd

[28] Here the Bhāṭṭa seems to slightly change his mind. A few lines above he said that praiseworthiness must be admitted as an element of linguistic bhāvanā, whenever arthavādas are found, now he asserts that praiseworthiness can be always understood, either directly or indirectly (I owe this notation to Prof. Kei Kataoka).

[29] The assistance of subsidiaries (upakāra) is, instead, required as without them one would not know how the result stated in the principal prescription would be attained. See MNP 116, p. 215.

reason), on the other hand, [they] point (para) only to a specific (viśeṣa) prescription, since they characterise (lakṣ-), through praiseworthiness, a thing to be employed in the ritual. They do not point to a specific undertaking of action [and, hence, they cannot have the role of a boost, since the human undertaking of an action is the only aspect which could need one, but they are not concerned with it]. The entity meant (artha) [by the commendatory statements (artha-vāda)], both if praised or not praised, is the same (tāvān eva), nothing more (that is, it is not indicated as something to be desired nor as something to be brought about, hence it still pertains to the prescription to state that it must be brought about, or to the human being to desire it or not). And [commendatory statements do not constitute the procedure] because (4th reason), since there is no instrument of knowledge (see below, §C.6.1) which [indicates] an analogical extension, an analogical extension is rooted in the relationship (bhāva) between an archetype (prakṛti) and an ectype (vikṛti). And in this case (that of commendatory statements) this [relation] is not formed (kḷpti)».

A.3.8 Kumārila: optative and similar suffixes express two bhāvanās (as above A.3.6; vs. A.3.7)

[PP/Kumārila:] «Moreover, the objective bhāvanā (arthabhāvanā) must be brought about [by the linguistic bhāvanā/prescription], because [both are] expressed (vācya) by a single suffix (pratyaya). That has been said [in the following verse]:

> As for the connection (sambandha) between prescription and [objective] bhāvanā, which is caused by the fact that they are both grasped (grah-) by means of a single suffix, || this is ascertained well before (prathamam)[30] the meaning of the verbal root (dhātu) |» (ŚV vākyā 79cd-80ab) [p.44]

[30] prathamam is used instead of pūrvam as a conjunction with ablative, because of a poetic license (many times in the ŚV, kindly informs me John Taber, common words are replaced with uncommon ones CHECK OR DELETE). Else, one would be forced to consider prathamaṃ tāvat as an adverb, meaning "it is ascertained first". In the two hemistichs of the ŚV immediately following the above ones, an adverbial paścāt is indeed found, nor could I find any other instance of the use of prathamam as a conjunction with ablative. However, though A 2.3.7 confirms that even an ablative alone may indicate time, Pāṇini refers to an interval of time (to be translated with "in..." or "after..."), as confirmed by an example quoted in the Kāśikā on A 2.3.54 (on this use of ablative, see also Speijer 1886:§99). Hence, the gist of the passage would force one to postulate "This is comprehended first (prathamam), [before (pūrvam)] the meaning of the verbal root" (many thanks are due to Prof. John Taber for making me aware of this possibility). The only extant commentary on this section of the ŚV, Pārthasārathi 's, reads dhātvārthāt as if it were dhātvarthānvayāt, and explains how the relation between prescription and bhāvanā precedes that between prescription and meaning of the verbal root: tad yadi dhātvarthānvayād bhāvanāṃ vidadhyāt, prāg eva tu dhātvarthānvayād bhāvanāṃ kevalāṃ vidadhad anupapattyabhāvān nālam paścād bhāvanayā sambandhyamānam api dhātvarthaṃ pratyayo vidhātum iti. The same ŚV passage is also quoted by Jayanta

[UP:] «This is wrong (ayukta), because it is hardly the case (durghaṭa) that both are expressed by a single suffix». [PP/Kumārila:] «That all verbal endings (ākhyāta) express the [objective] bhāvanā is ascertained since they are in grammatical co-reference (sāmānādhikaraṇya) with the meaning (artha) of '[S/he] does' (karoti). In the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes], on the other hand, the incitement (preraṇā) in general (mātra) is additional. In fact, '[S/he] does' expresses the undertaking of the action (kṛti)[31]. And the undertaking of the action is the effort and precisely that is the initiation of an activity and the [objective] bhāvanā. Because in ordinary experience (loka), once "[She] knows" [and] "[She] wants" have been employed, we notice that the four [expressions] "[She] does," "[She] makes an effort," "[She] initiates [an action]" (pravṛt-), "[She] brings about" are employed, individually, as they are [all] synonyms (paryāya)[32]. And because, in case of a simultaneous employment [of two or more of them], there would be redundancy (paunarukti).

To elaborate, it is understood that the meaning '[S/he] does' is designated (abhidhā) by all verbal endings because one sees questions and answers in co-reference, like: "What does she do?," "[She] cooks"; "What did [she] do?," "[She] cooked"; "What will [she] do?," "[She] will cook" (where, according to the PP, the verbal stem "cook-" is in grammatical co-reference with "what?" and the verbal endings with "[she] does," etc.). In fact (ca), question and answer have the same content (viṣaya) and the grammatical co-reference has as [its] condition (nimitta) that [both words refer to] the same meaning (artha). Otherwise it would be incongruous to answer with (those) verbal endings to a question having '[she] does' as its meaning. In this regard, one determines (niści-) that this is the meaning of verbal endings because in case

Bhaṭṭa, NM II 99.10-11 (Mysore edition): vidhibhāvanāyos tv ekapratyayagrāhyatākṛtaḥ | dhātvarthāt prathamaṃ tāvat saṃbandho vyavasīyate iti ||, who comments upon it as follows (NM II 99.16): nanu ca tvayaivoktaṃ dhātvarthāt pūrvataraṃ tadbhāvanāyā vidheś ca saṃbandho 'vagamyate. Jayanta's gloss, though not a definitive evidence, also shows how the prathamaṃ tāvat sounded to a Sanskrit audience, namely, as pūrvataram. Many thanks are due to Prof. Kei Kataoka who pointed out this quote in the NM.

[31] I am translating the initial ca as 'in fact', because it is only meant to show that the statement is part of the preceding argument (after the short parenthesis on liṅ endings), since the Sanskrit lacks most punctuation marks. See also below, §C.3.16.

[32] On the sequence knowledge-will-action, see NBh ad 1.1.1. In NBh ad 1.1.10 also prayatna (effort) as a separate step is mentioned, but this is probably due to the context (the proof for the existence of a Self) and to the context-related influence of Natural Philosophy (as expressed in Vaiśeṣika) on Nyāya. In fact, the Prāśāstapadabhāṣya accurately analyzes effort, and the Vaiśeṣika influence is stronger on natural arguments than on epistemological ones (such as the list of categories in NS 1.1.1). The Mīmāṃsā, on the other hand, focuses on the mental aspect of initiating an action and seems not to be concerned with the actual performance of it, as it never takes into account the possible gap between the initiation and the actual accomplishment of the action. After having heard "S/he knows, s/he wishes," one expects something like, "S/he initiates the action" because one knows the sequence to be such. I am grateful to Prof. Karin Preisendanz for her insightful remarks on this theme.

of the employment of the suffixes ghañ [denoting nomen agentis], etc., the meaning '[She] does' is not understood and in case of the employment of the verbal endings, it is understood [hence the meaning '[She] does' does not belong to the verbal root, which is the same both if followed by a ghañ or by a verbal suffix]. And since verbal endings cannot be employed by themselves, there is merely (mātra) the simultaneous employment of the [verbal] stem (prakṛti) part, [too]. [The verbal stem], on the other hand, is not [employed] because one wishes to express (vivakṣā) its own meaning (as the primary meaning is that of the verbal ending by itself, i.e., '[She] does')».

A.3.9 S: verbal suffixes do not express the bhāvanā, but just the agent's number

[S:] «That is wrong. Although "[she] does" points (para) to an effort, nevertheless in this case (the example mentioned above) if the content (viṣaya) of the question "What does [she]?" were "What is it that [she] does?," then the meaning of the answer "[She] cooks" would be "[She] does cooking" (and this would prove that the verbal ending expressed the effort, since "What is it, that [she] does?" accurately distinguishes two meanings corresponding to the two parts of a verb). But (ca) this is not what one ordinarily (loka) wishes to express (vivakṣā). Rather, the question [is raised] when the specific activity (vyāpāra) [expressed by the verbal stem[33]] is not understood. And in that case, the answer has as content this specific [activity], viz. "[S/he] cooks" (hence, the verbal root expresses the activity in general, and one further asks about the specific activity, which is also expressed by the verbal root in "[S/he] cooks"; that is, "what" asks about a specification of the meaning of the verbal root, not about an extra meaning). [In fact,] whatever (api) question and reply (prativacana) regards something which is universally known but unknown as for a specific aspect. And in this case knowledge and non-knowledge pertain (gocara) just to the meaning of the verbal root (dhātu). Therefore they[34] are correct (yukta) just insofar as they pertain to that. Although "[S/he] does" points just to the effort, nonetheless in this case ("What does [s/he] do?" and the other questions) the meaning of "[S/he] does" intrinsically (svabhāva) conduces (anukūla) to the coming into being (bhavana) of something [still] non-existent (abhūta) (which is expressed by the verbal root). And as all verbal roots are similar [to this one], they can be asked about or specifically mentioned (nirdiś-) by means of "[S/he] does".

[33]As explained in the corresponding VM passage, see fn. to the Sanskrit text.

[34]The closest possible referent of this pronoun is "knowledge and non knowledge," but the source-text (VM II ad 4, Śā p. 425) leads one to understand instead "question and answer," which are, moreover, referred to a few lines later by another pronoun "te". That the adjective is neutral does not hinder such identification, since «si les sujets sont des noms de choses ou comportent des noms de choses, le neutre prévaut» (Renou 1968:§379). Renou refers to A 2.1.7.

Moreover, [in the hypothesis that verbal endings express the objective bhāvanā] they (question and answer) would be compatible (ghaṭ-) with [conscious agents], like Devadatta, whose actions (kriyā) are associated with effort. But how could they be compatible with [things] whose actions are not associated with efforts, like, "What does the chariot do? It goes"? And even more, how [can they be compatible] even with [people whose actions] are associated with effort, in cases like, "[He] sits," "[He] lies"? Whereas, if [questions and answers] would have as content an activity in general, they would be congruous (upapatti) in all cases. Therefore, verbal endings do not have '[s/he] does' as their meaning. [And, hence, they do not indicate the objective bhāvanā]». [PP/Kumārila:] «But the paraphrase (vivaraṇa) of "[S/he] cooks" is "[S/he] does cooking". There also, since the meaning of the [verbal] stem (prakṛti) is clear (sphuṭa) (i.e., 'cooking'), the meaning of the suffix alone [can express the meaning '[S/he] does']. Therefore, the verbal ending means '[S/he] does'». [S:] «I disagree. Because the paraphrase is congruous also in that (our) case, if one accepts (upādāya) that an implicit[35] (ārtha) effort, conducive (anukūla) to the meaning (artha) of 'cooking', belongs to (gata) the agent implied (ākṣip-) by the meaning of the verbal root (i.e., in "[S/he] cooks" the verbal root denotes the activity of cooking in general and the verbal ending implicitly denotes an agent characterised by effort and explicitly denotes its number; in "[S/he] does cooking," "[S/he] does" expresses the effort of the agent implied by the meaning of the verbal root; and the verbal ending only denotes the number of the agent). Hence, the verbal endings do not express a process (bhāva), but express the mere number (saṅkhyā) of the agent implied by the meaning of the verbal root. As stated the revered (bhagavān) Pāṇini:

> «In case of two or one, [respectively] dual and singular [verbal endings] [are employed]» «In case of many, a plural [verbal ending] [is employed][36]» (Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.4.22-21)

A.3.10 S: optative and similar suffixes express the notion that something must be done and, therefore, also the bhāvanā

And this (that is, that the verbal endings express the number) is common to the two opinions. In addition, in your [PP] opinion all verbal endings (ākhyāta) point to the [objective] bhāvanā, whilst the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] point also (ca) to the incitement (preraṇā) (i.e., the linguistic bhāvanā). On the other hand, according to our [S] opinion, the optative (liṅ)

[35] ārtha as opposed to śābda, verbally expressed.

[36] "The dual and singular case-affixes are employed severally in the sense of duality and unity," "In expressing multeity, a Plural case affix is employed". So the translation of A by Ś.C.Vasu.

and the other [suffixes] point to something to be done (kārya) and also to the bhāvanā. But they point to that (bhāvanā), as secondary in regard to what must be done (kārya), not as the principal [element][37]. Therefore indeed (eva) in our [S] opinion the [objective] bhāvanā is not the meaning of the sentence, rather [p. 45] what has to be done (kārya) alone (eva) is. In fact, (hi) one cannot denote (abhidhā) something to be done without denoting an undertaking of an action (kṛti), because what must be done is connected (sambandh-) with the undertaking of an action [hence, the undertaking does not need to be separately indicated]. Neither is the fact that [the optative and similar suffixes] have more than one meaning a fault, because it is precisely in this way that [they are] understood (avagam-)».

A.3.11 PP/ekadeśin against A.3.10: bhāvanā could be understood as a specification of what must be done

[PP/subschool of the Prābhākaras who is proposing another paradigm of the relation between what must be done (kārya) and the action's undertaking (kṛti):] «But in "person-[with a]-stick" (daṇḍin, also meaning "king," "ascetic;" from daṇḍa, 'rod', 'stick'), the suffix (pratyaya) does not denote (abhidhā-) the stick. Nonetheless (atha ca) [by hearing this word] the notion (pratīti) of a person specified by it (stick) occurs. Thus, here (in the optative and the other suffixes' case) too, although no undertaking of action (kṛti) is designated [by the optative (liṅ) and the other similar suffixes], there could be a designation [of something to be done] as specified by it (undertaking of the action)».

A.3.11.1 S: No, because the root does not specifically denote it

[S:] «It is not so. Unless the stick is clearly apprehended (pratī-) there is not the notion of a person specified by it. On the contrary, in that case ("person-[with a]-stick") the word "stick" is indeed present as the [word's] stem (prakṛti). And this (word's stem) conveys that (stick). But it is not so in our case (that of a verbal form ending with the optative or the other suffixes), because [verbal] stems (prakṛti) point to the general meaning of a process[38] (bhāvārtha) [whereas, as will be explained in the following lines, one understands that something must be done only in regard to something specific]. Moreover the person, being indeed conscious, is aware of what must be done (kārya) because of the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes]. But she is not able to perceive what is connected (sambandh-) with the undertaking of an action (kṛti) by another (para) as what she herself must do (kārya).

[37] In Pāṇini, pradhāna and upasarjana are used in order to define the relation between the two terms of a compound and indeed the compound kriyākārya (where kriyā, that is, an undertaken kṛti, is subordinate to kārya) will be found later, §C.9.2.

[38] bhāva=vyāpāra, as shown by the corresponding VM passage.

Therefore, the [explicit] denotation (abhidhā) “It (undertaking of an action) belongs to myself” has to be requested and hence there is no opportunity [for the application] of the rule of the “person-[with a]-stick” [the action denoted by the verbal stem is just an action in general, whereas in order to understand that an action must be done one must know that it is her own action].

A.3.12 Further S’s arguments about the duty implying an effort and not the opposite

Although, like the agent (kartṛ) is implied (ākṣip-) (by the meaning of the verbal root)[39] so also the effort (i.e., the “action” referred to above[40]) could be possibly implied by that (what must be done), nevertheless in that case the apūrva would not be understood, as it hangs on (adhīna) it (effort) for its realisation (siddhi). If the effort is designated (abhidhā), on the other hand, [the apūrva], which has [also] been designated insofar as it has been delimited (avacchid-) by it, [and] whose realisation hinges on it, is understood. [The apūrva] is not otherwise [understood]. Neither could [the opposite be possible:] the apūrva not delimited by an undertaking of an action (kṛti) [and] designated through its mere nature (svarūpa) imply (ākṣip-) an undertaking of action (kṛti). Because a thing (vastu) whose connection (sambandha) [with something else] has been previously (pūrva) understood can be implied (ākṣip-) through [that] other object, but without a statement (śabda) [explicitly indicating it], there is no reason (kāraṇa) for the connection (sambandha) of the apūrva with the effort. Therefore, how could [the apūrva] imply that (effort/action)? Also the designation through its own nature (svarūpa) of the apūrva –whose single intrinsic character (svabhāva) must be realised (sidh-) by an undertaking of action (kṛti)– is impossible (because the nature of the apūrva only consists in being to be brought about by an action, so the apūrva has no own nature independent of the undertaking of the action). Therefore, the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes], which designate what must be done (kārya), must inevitably (avarjanīya) designate the undertaking of the action (kṛti), but as secondary (upasarjana) [in regard to what must be done]. This is established (siddha)»[41].

[39]See above, p. 45, ll. 24-5, §C.3.9.

[40]This equation is also suggested by the VM text: tasya [puruṣasya] ca kṛtiḥ prayatnarūpā (see fn to the Sanskrit text). This discussion repeats the above (see ll. 1-2, end of §C.3.10) one, though using the synonyms apūrva instead of kārya and prayatna instead of kṛti.

[41]On this subject, see PrP, VK.

A.3.13 Other Bhāṭṭas: the prescription is the function of the optative and similar suffixes, and it is a cognition

Other [PP/Bhāṭṭas] instead, considering the tallying (ānuguṇya) with the meaning of the verse "The optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes], express one bhāvanā, the designation (abhidhā) one, [...]" state that «The prescription is precisely (eva) the function (vyāpāra) of the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes], [and] it is tantamount to incitement (preraṇā). And there is no lack of evidence (pramāṇa) for this, because everyone assents that all linguistic elements (śabda) have a function of designation. For one who is competent in language use (vyutpanna), *linguistic elements*[42] convey (pratī-) meanings. In those (linguistic elements), there is indeed a function, which is designated "designation", which can be inferred (unnī-) from the apprehension (pratīti) of meanings. And what does this [function] amount to? To a cognition pertaining (gocara) to this or that linguistic element or to a mnestic trace (saṃskāra) produced by this or that linguistic element. Indeed, a linguistic element, joined with (yuj-) that (mnestic trace or cognition regarding another linguistic element[43]), produces the clear apprehension (pratīti) of a meaning. It has been said: "Instruction (śāstra) is a cognition (vijñāna) in regard to a remote meant entity [born] out of the knowledge of words" (ŚBh ad MS 1.1.5). Or, "The last phoneme, provided with the mnestic traces of the previous ones, is expressive [of the meaning]" (ŚBh ad MS 1.1.5). The function of a [thing] is precisely the further (āgantuka) property (dharma), having acquired which, the thing is apt (paryāpta) for the [accomplishment of] what it must do (kārya). Therefore, it is not incongruous (anupapatti) for a cognition and a mnestic trace to be the function of a linguistic element».

A.3.13.1 UP vs. A.3.13: How can a statement be the instrument and the object of the meaning's cognition?

[UP:] «But if a cognition (jñāna) were the denotative (abhidhā) function (vyāpāra), then how could the word (śabda) –which is the syntactical object (karman) in regard to a cognition (e.g., "Devadatta knows a word")– be [at the same time] the instrument (karaṇa) with respect to this [denotative]

[42] tāvat for the sake of emphasis.

[43] Perhaps, the oddity consisting in a single vyāpāra which is said alternatively said to be "designation" or "cognition/mnestic trace", may be solved if one considers "designation" to be just the function's name. This function would then be said to be tantamount to cognition and mnestic traces. In fact, in order to understand the meaning of a (prescriptive) sentence, one needs both the mnestic traces of all the words one has heard, and the cognition of the signifier-signified relation between them and their meanings. Since the two together express the meaning of the sentence, they can be labelled "designation". If this interpretation is correct, then tadyogī means "joined with them (mnestic trace and cognition)". Similarly, vā in "To a cognition pertaining to this or that linguistic element or to a mnestic trace produced by this or that linguistic element" would have an inclusive meaning, as with latin vel.

function (vyāpāra)? Indeed, the usage (prayoga) "Devadatta understands a meaning by means of a word (śabda)" is [commonly] seen [so, the word is commonly known to be the cognition's instrument, and how can it be both instrument and object?]».

A.3.13.2 PP vs. A.3.13.1: the assessment of the linguistic functions depends on the delimitation of the action through the result

[PP/Bhāṭṭa as in A.3.13:] «It [must] be said [in reply]: The distinct settlement (vyavasthā) of the factors of action (kāraka) like object, instrument, agent [is not made] with respect to the general (mātra) form (rūpa) of the activity (vyāpāra), rather it is made with respect to the delimitation (avacchid-) of the activity (vyāpāra) by means of this or that result[44], even though the own nature (svarūpa) of the activity is the same. To elaborate, when precisely (eva) that cognition which [has been previously expressed as] having the word (śabda) as syntactical object (karman), is delimited (avacchid-) by a result characterised as the apprehension (pratipatti) of the meaning, and includes (vyāp-) the word (śabda) (in sentences such as, "S/he knows that meaning through that word"), then the word (śabda) is an instrument because it is included in the activity (vyāpāra) initiated (pravṛt-) for another purpose (i.e., it is an instrument because it is necessarily part –vyāp– of the action though not being the most desired element of it, the object). The meaning is, on the other hand, the syntactical object (karman) because it is the substratum of the action's result. And then that cognition receives the title (vyapadeśa) of "designation" (abhidhā) because it (the title "designation") has been comprehensively learnt (vyutpatti) in this regard (that is, in regard to what has as its syntactical object the apprehension of a meaning). When, on the other hand, one wishes to express (vivakṣā) the autonomy (svātantrya) [of the word] with regard to the function (vyāpāra) [of denoting], then the word (śabda) is the agent which designates (abhidhā) the meaning (and in fact the agent is defined in the Aṣṭādhyāyī as svatantra, "autonomous"). But when just this word (śabda) is made by the cognition into [its] content (viṣaya), then the word, partaking (bhaj-) of the result (because the word is the substratum of the result, through the connection of word and meaning), i.e., the displaying of the meaning, is the syntactical object (karman), as in "She knows [p.46] the word (śabda)". Then, indeed, the cognition does not partake of (bhaj-) the title (vyapadeśa) "designation" (abhidhā). Rather, it must be simply called "cognition", because the word (śabda) "designation" has not been learnt (vyutpatti) with regard to that (knowledge of the word, not of the meaning). Like an axe: like an axe is the

[44]Sūtra of Pāṇini saying that the arrangement of kārakas depends on vivakṣā. CHECK! Maybe 1.4.72 vibhāṣā kṛñi NO (this refers to the optional naming tiras a gati if followed by kṛn-)

syntactical object (karman) in regard to raising (udyamana) and lowering. When raising and lowering are delimited (avacchid-) by the result of splitting into two, and the axe is included (vyāp-) by them, then the axe is an instrument (karaṇa) because of being included in an activity (vyāpāra) initiated (pravṛt-) for another purpose (artha) (that is, chopping the tree). The wood, instead, is the syntactical object (karman), since it is the substratum (āśraya) of the action's (kriyā) result. And raising and lowering, then, receive the title of "cutting", since [the word "cutting"] has been learnt (vyutpatti) in their regard. However, when in regard to this same function (vyāpāra) one wishes to express [the axe's] autonomy then [the axe] appears as the agent, as in "The axe cuts the wood". When on the other hand precisely the raising and lowering are designated (abhidhā) by "S/he raises" and "S/he lowers," expressing (vācin) [an action] delimited by a result which is the conjunction (saṃyoga) [of the axe] with the upper or lower space-region, then the axe is the syntactical object (karman), partaking of (bhaj-) the result, i.e., [its] union with this or that (region), as in "S/he raises [and] lowers the axe". Therefore, it must be considered (dṛś) that the activities (vyāpāra) expressed (vac-) by this or that verbal root (dhātu) ("to raise", "to lower", and "to cut") –though sharing a single (prātisvika) own nature (svarūpa), (i.e., chopping a tree)– are the cause of a distinct settlement (vyavasthā) of these factors of action (kāraka) because of a different delimitation (avacchid-) by means of this or that action's result, and that they (activities) are expressed (vac-) by this or that word (śabda) [again, according to the different delimitation through this or that result, and not because of the activity expressed by the verbal roots themselves, which remains the same]. If, for a distinct settlement (vyavasthā) of the factors of action (kāraka), merely (mātra) the own nature (svarūpa) of the activity (vyāpāra) would be required (apekṣ-), the action (kriyā) designated as "S/he walks" could become transitive (sakarmika) like the one designated as "S/he goes[45]," or the action "S/he goes" may become intransitive (akarmaka), and there would not be any distinction (vyavasthā) in use (prayoga) (that is, "S/he walks" and "S/he goes" describe the same activity, so if it were just up to the activity itself, they would be precisely the same and there would not be any difference in their employment). [The above explained procedure] can be applied (yuj-) accordingly (yathāsambhavam) also when the denotative (abhidhā) function (vyāpāra) is characterised (lakṣana) as a mnestic trace (saṃskāra). Among the [action factors], agent (kartṛ), object (karman) and instrument (karaṇa) are factors of action (kāraka) reciprocally distinguished (pravibhakta). The agent is autonomous (svatantra) in regard to the action (kriyā), the syntactical object is endowed with the result of the action, the instrument is [necessarily] included in an action (kriyā) which has been initiated (pravṛt-) for another purpose (artha). The intrinsic characters (svabhāva) of dative,

[45]Which can have a prāpya karman, and hence be transitive.

ablative and locative, on the contrary, are intermixed with [those of] the [two] factors of action (kāraka) agent, and [syntactical object]. For instance, the locative is the the substratum of either the agent or the object, e.g., "Devadatta sits on the mat (kaṭa)," "He cooks rice in the pot". The dative is[46] what is held in view through the object, e.g. "He gives a cow to [his] teacher". [Finally,] the ablative is the general limit (avadhi) [of the action] of the agent (kartṛ) factor (kāraka), e.g., "A leave falls from the tree". [The distinct settlement of the action factors] must be considered in this way, according to what is suitable in each case (yathāsambhavam)».

A.3.14 Bhāṭṭa continuing A.3.13

[UP:] «We can admit that all linguistic elements (śabda) have a function (vyāpāra) expressed by the word "designation" (abhidhā). But what follows from that?» [PP/Bhāṭṭa] «it [must] be said [in reply]: among those (linguistic elements), such function belongs also to the suffix (pratyaya)-part, just like [it belongs] to the stem (prakṛti) part. And the function of the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] is precisely (eva) the prescriptive force. And this (prescriptive force) is called "raising into being" (bhāvanā) because it has as [its] result the coming into being (bhavana) of the initiation of an action by a person.

And in a similar way (that is, relying on the previous analysis), the initiation of an action (pravṛtti) is the syntactical object, as in "[the function of optative and similar endings] brings about (bhū-) an initiation of action," because it partakes of (bhaj-) the result –namely, [its own] coming into being (bhavana). [The function of] optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes], on the other hand, can be as before (in the axe example discussed in §C.3.13.2) an instrument or an agent[47]. When on the other hand precisely this function (of the optative and the other suffixes) is delimited (avacchid-) by the undertaking of an action (pravṛtti) [and] designated as "[the function of the optative and other endings] causes [one] to undertake an action," then the person is the syntactical object (karman), as in "[the function of optative and similar suffixes] causes a person to undertake an action," because she partakes of the result –which is [her] undertaking of the action. In this way, precisely the single function of designation of the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] is called bhāvanā or causing to act (pravartanā) according to the differences of delimitation through this result (the coming into being of the action's initiation) or that [result] (the initiation of the action by a person)».

[46]tu is merely used in order to differentiate these instances, as Ancient Greek . In fact, it must be kept in mind that, having no punctuation, Sanskrit often uses enclitics such as tu, ca, api (see above, §C.3.8, fn.&45&) in order to join clauses.

[47]i.e., liṅādi[vyāpara]ḥ pravṛttiṃ bhāvayati , liṅādi[vyāpāre]na pravṛttiḥ bhāvyate. Just like, in the axe's case "the axe fells the tree" and "one fells a tree by means of an axe".

A.3.15 Pārthasārathi Miśra vs.A.3.14: the function of optative and similar suffixes cannot incite

[UP/follower of PSM:] «But how can the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] cause a person to undertake an action (pravṛt-)? Indeed no one initiates an action [just] because he has understood a general designation, because it (initiation of the action[48]) hangs on (adhīna) the understanding that [the action to be undertaken] is the means to realise something desired (samīhitasādhana). And because, in case [the optative and the other suffixes] would designate that [the action to be undertaken is the means to realise something desired], [our] awareness (saṃvid) would be contradicted (as everyone knows that being something to be done is not the same as being a means to accomplish a result; see above, §C.3.2, p. 43, ll. 3ff.)».

A.3.16 Bhāṭṭa adjusting A.3.13 according to A.3.15

[PP/Bhāṭṭa:] «This is true. The being a means [to realise something desired] causes [one] to undertake an action. But this is not designated by the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] so that there would be a contradiction [of a conventional usage]. And (ca)[49], immediately after having heard the [optative and the other] suffixes (pratyaya), an initiation of action (pravṛtti) is [commonly] seen. This means that [they] have designated something which, once designated, [lets] it (initiation of the action) take place. And the fact of causing to act (pravartanā) must have been designated, because once this is designated that (initiation of the action) takes place. The causing to act is, indeed (ca), the fact of being the cause of an action's initiation. And this is not possible without the cognition (jñāna) that the action's initiation is the means to realise something desired (iṣṭasādhana). Therefore [p.47], the prescription, which is tantamount to incitement (preraṇā), makes [one] also postulate (kḷp-) [through indirect implication (arthāpatti)] that the [objective] bhāvanā, which is expressed by the same suffix (pratyaya) (expressing also the prescription) is a means to realise something desired (because one hears the incitement and one knows that there cannot be an incitement unless there is a result to be achieved, and so the expression of the incitement produces the awareness that the action which one is incited to undertake must be a means to realise something desired). Therefore, (as stated in §C.3.14), the function (vyāpāra) of the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] is a "raising into being" (bhāvanā), since [it] is the condition (nimitta) for the coming into being (bhavana) of a human effort. And it is also correct [to say that the function of the optative (liṅ) and the other suffixes] is the

[48]The identification of the referent of "it" is supported by the VN text (VN ad 2, pp.50-1).

[49]On the use of ca, here and some lines below, as just indicating that the same argument continues, see also above, fn. 43 in §C.3.8.

fact of causing [one] to act, since it causes one (a person) to undertake an action. One determines that the bhāvanā enclosed (avarudh-) in a prescription (vidhi) of this sort is a "bhāvanā [which brings about] a human purpose (artha)" (puruṣārthabhāvanā[50]), because this (a human purpose) is indeed what it brings about (bhāvya). It is indeed impossible that an activity (such as the bhāvanā[51]) (vyāpāra) which does not have a human purpose as its result is related to a prescription having the form of a causing to act. Because it would be incongruous [to incite someone to act] in regard to something which does not [bear] a result. Therefore, at first the bhāvanā alone is the content of the prescription (vidheya) because of a close contact (saṃsparśa) with the prescription. Then, through that (objective bhāvanā), the other [elements, namely] instrument (karaṇa) and procedures (itikartavyatā) [are prescribed].

A.3.16.1 What has to be brought about is by itself desired

Instead, the result has not to be prescribed, even though it must be realised (sādhya) insofar as it is something to be brought about (bhāvya); [and] even though [it] is characterised by an injunction (codanā) since it is imparted (pratipād-) by an injunction [and so it would seem to be acquired just through the injunction, just like instrument and procedure]. For, an initiation of action (pravṛtti) in regard to the [result] takes place just because one is attracted (rāga[52]) [to it], without a close contact (saṃsparśa) (as the one which is instead present between prescription and bhāvanā, see §C.3.16) with the prescription (vidhi). Indeed, being prescribed is being made to be performed (anuṣṭhā-) by a prescription, and a prescription (vidhi) causes one to undertake [an action] which has [still] not been undertaken (whereas, in case one desires the result, one has already undertaken the action, though possibly still not physically done anything). Precisely for this reason, since the result is not prescribed there is also dissimilarity between the śyena and the agniṣomīya [sacrifices] (in the second one, the slaughtering of an animal is prescribed as something to be done, being directly enjoined, hence it must be performed, whereas in the first case harming one's enemy is just the result and, as such, it is not enjoined). All the rest will become clear in the summary (saṅkṣepa) on the meaning of Sacred Texts (that is, in the application part, §§C.4-C.7)[53].

[50]The author here glosses arthabhāvanā (until now translated with "objective bhāvanā") with puruṣārthabhāvanā. In this way, he can conclude that what is brought about by the prescription is a (puruṣa)-arthabhāvanā since it brings about a human aim.

[51]vyāpāra refers here to a human initiation of an action (pravṛtti) and not to the function of the optative or similar suffixes.

[52]"rāga" is regarded in Mīmāṃsā as a necessary part of human experience and it does not entail any negative connotation. See Freschi 2007.

[53]p. 48, l. 30, until p. 53, l. 26. On śyena, see p. 51, ll. 16-8 (§C.4.3.3).

A.3.16.2 Conclusion of A.3.16

Hence, in this way, optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes], designate in the form of a causing to act (pravartanā) precisely the designation's (abhidhā) function (vyāpāra). Through that (causing to act) alone they are also able to communicate (budh-) that [the action to be undertaken] is a means to realise something desired (iṣṭasādhana). With that in view, it has been said:

> the suffix (pratyaya) expresses that something must be done (kartavya) (VV, p. 243)

and

> it is necessarily (nitya) known from the Veda (and not out of sense perception) that those (substance, action, quality[54]) are the means to realise [one's] benefit (śreyassādhana) (ŚV codanā 2. 14)

And in both the two bhāvanās, the three expectations (ākāṅkṣā) [of the instrument, the procedure and what must be realised] are fulfilled as before (§C.3.1.1, p. 42, ll. 26-7)».

A.3.17 (Siddhānta among Bhāṭṭas) Pārthasārathi: incitement can be of four kinds. It is surely of the fourth type in the Veda, as this is authorless

According to this opinion [the optative and the other suffixes] designate (abhidhā) their own function (vyāpāra) (since it is said that the function of the optative and the other suffixes expresses the prescription, but it is also said that the prescription is tantamount to the function of the optative and the other suffixes). Deeming that it is hard to prove [this odd view], those [Bhāṭṭas] who know the real (tattva) opinion of the teacher (ācārya, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa)[55] averred: «The reality of the prescription (vidhi)

[54]dravya, kriyā, guṇa (factors of sacrifice) are explicitly mentioned in ŚV codanā 13.

[55]I.e., Pārthasārathi Miśra, considered by our author as the best interpreter of Kumārila's thought. But in his VN Pārthasārathi says that the upholder of this view is a nyāyavid (lit. 'knower of Nyāya' or 'knower of the rules'). According to K.S. Rāmaswāmi Śāstri Śiromaṇi the nyāyavid is Vācaspati Miśra, who wrote the commentary Nyāyakaṇikā on the VV (**NR1937**), but nyāyavid is used generically by Mīmāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra authors in order to designate whoever is a savant in the field of reasoning (where nyāya is a common name, as pointed out by Prof. Karin Preisendanz). R. attributes this view, in both the TR and in the NR to Pārthasārathi Miśra. In the latter, he introduces it so: "In this regard, [Pārthasārathi Miśra] states the view he agrees upon with the words 'the knower of Nyāya'" (tatra svābhimataṃ pakṣam āha –nyāyavidām iti, NR ad VN ad 2, 1937: 84). Later on, he repeats that Pārthasārathi Miśra endorses this latter view: "Out of the said four views, the last one is the best" (ukteṣu caturṣv api pakśeṣu carama eva śreyān, NR ad VN ad 2, 1937: 87).

is just that [the action prescribed] is the means to realise something desired (iṣṭasādhana). And this does not contradict [our] awareness (see above, §C.3.2, p. 43, ll. 3ff.) (saṃvid), because [the action to be undertaken] is not designated through its own nature (svarūpa)[56] (that is, just by itself, without referring to anything else) [as a means to realise something desired]. Instead, the [prescriptive] statement (śabda) designates [it] in the form of an incitement (pravartanā) (that is, insofar as it causes one to undertake it). And incitement is dharma, which is the cause of the undertaking of an action (pravṛtti).

And this (cause of the undertaking of an action) is [of four types]: impulsion (preṣaṇa), request (adhyeṣaṇa), consent (abhyanujñāna) and the fact that [the action to be undertaken] is the means to realise something desired. And the universal (sāmānya) of causing to act is present (anugam-) in all[57] those four (that is, all are particular instances of the universal called "incitement" or "causing to act"). [Such a universal] cannot but be specified and in the Veda impulsion (praiṣa), [request] and [consent], which are human properties (dharma), are not possible. Therefore, by elimination (pāriśeṣyāt), alone the fact that [the action to be undertaken] is the means to realise something desired for the agent (kartṛ) is communicated (budh-) by the optative (liṅ) and the other linguistic elements which designate this [universal]. Since [optative and other suffixes] express (vac-) the universal (incitement), they do not have several meanings, and (ca) [this theory] is economical (laghu) (that is, optative and other suffixes are not polysemous because they just denote causing to act in general and it is this causing to act which cannot be unspecified).

In this case there is not the fault of denoting one's own function, since the fact of causing to act exceeds that (designative function of the optative and other suffixes) (as against §C.3.16.2, optative and other suffixes here designate an incitement/causing to act understood as the universal common to impulsion, etc.; they do not designate their own designative function equated to an incitement). And [our] awareness (saṃvid) is not contradicted (see above, §C.3.2, p. 43, ll. 3ff), since the fact of causing to act (pravartanā) exceeds the fact that [the action to be undertaken] is the means to realise something desired. And there is no contradiction because of simultaneous usage [of the two, which would mean that they are not synonyms], because of the difference in the conditions for their use (pravṛtti)[58]. The word 'means' (sādhana) [in istasādhana], on the one hand, immediately (sākṣāt) desig-

[56]On the notion of svarūpeṇābhidhāna, "expression [of one's meaning] through one's own nature," see also above, §C.3.12, p. 46, l.13.

[57]api generalises numerals (see Boehtlingk's Sanskrit Wörterbuch, s.v.).

[58]At first sight, this ablative clause just means "Because they are different cause of a human undertaking of an action (pravṛtti)". However, pravṛtti is also a common word for "linguistic use" (in this sense, one finds expressions such as śabdapravṛtti, vyavahārapravṛtti, śabdaḥ pravartate). The meaning of the ablative clause here adopted has been suggested by the ensuing explanation, which focuses on the different linguistic usage of the two.

nates just the fact of being a means, while on the other the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] designate it [mediately] through [their] incitement aspect. Therefore, it is established (siddha) that the essence (tattva) of a prescription (vidhi) is [making known] the being a means to realise something desired insofar as it belongs (gata) to the [objective] bhāvanā. This (being a means) is expressed by the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes], and it occurs in the guise (veṣa)[59] of an incitement (that is, not directly).

A.3.17.1 Different instrument of this incitement

Such a use (pravṛtti) [of the optative and the other suffixes], which aims at the undertaking of an action (pravṛtti) by a person, has the [human] initiation of an action referring to heaven (svarga), and similar [aims] as what it must bring about (bhāvya) (i.e., the objective bhāvanā referring to heaven and similar aims must be caused to be by the linguistic bhāvanā, whose aim is the human initiation of an action). Because there is nothing contradictory (virodha) if a [human] initiation of an action which has been comprehended (pratipad-) before through the suffix (pratyaya) of the prescription (vidhi), comes into existence (utpatti) later on[60]. The cognition [that the action to be undertaken] is the means to realise a desired result (samīhitaphalasādhana) is the instrument (karaṇa) [of the linguistic bhāvanā], like sacrifice (yāga), etc., [is the instrument of the objective bhāvanā], because it is the [side] product (janya) of an activity (vyāpāra) (that of the optative and the other suffixes) which has been initiated for another purpose (para-artha) (namely,

Rāmānujācārya's gloss on the parallel passage of the VN also stresses the relation between this sentence and the explanation which follows it: "The occasion of the linguistic usage (pravṛtti) must now be expressed. He (Pārthasārathi Miśra) examines the very difference between the [two] with the passage [beginning with] 'The [word] instrument for something desired' [...]" (pravṛttinimittaṃ vācyam. tadbhedam evopapādayati –iṣṭasādhaneti, NR ad VN ad 2, 1937: 87). If pravṛttinimittam would mean "cause of undertaking of an action," one would expect an explanation regarding the fact that they are different causes for the initiation of one's action.

[59] As stated already some lines above, l.15.

[60] This argument could have been devised partly as a reply to the UP of §C.3.5, who said that prescriptions cannot be the direct function of optative and similar endings, since otherwise everyone just upon hearing them would act. Instead, it is here claimed that a prescription raises a human undertaking of an action only once understood (prathamam pratipanna). The argument may also refer to the objection raised in §C.3.7.2 against the Bhāṭṭa, that is, since linguistic and objective bhāvanā are both conveyed by the same suffix, they should be understood simultaneously. The PP would here reply that there is nothing contradictory in maintaining that the knowledge of the one brings about the other. But if this latter interpretation is correct, than the argument seems rather poor, since one could still object that both should be known at the same time, for they are conveyed by the same suffix. Else, how could the same suffix convey two meanings at two different times? Finally, the argument could refer to the criticism raised by a PP in ŚBh ad 1.1.5, where it is stated that a result must come about when its cause is still present (just like the pleasure of being massed comes about during the massage), but no further indication in Rāmānujācārya's text favours this reading.

the arousal of the objective bhāvanā). The cognition of the praiseworthiness, instead, is the procedure (itikartavyatā).
And [this] also tallies (ānuguṇya) with the verse (TV ad 2.1.1). To elaborate (tathā hi), this is its (of the verse) meaning: "It is designated (abhidhā-) [by the optative (liṅ) and the other suffixes], hence the causing to act is called 'designation' (abhidhā)[61]. Precisely (eva) this one brings about (bhāvayati), i.e., brings into existence, a human initiation of action and therefore [it is called] bhāvanā. [The optative and the other suffixes] express it/that one[62]". Therefore, the meaning of [Vedic] sentences is the bhāvanā insofar as it is enclosed (avarudh-) in the prescription[63], is . It is established (siddha) that the content to be known through the Sacred Texts (śāstra)[64] is this [bhāvanā enclosed in a prescription].

A.4 Connections of elements to the principal prescription (according to Pārthasārathi Miśra)

According to this [theory], the summary (saṅkṣepa) of the modes (prakāra) of relating (anvaya) [other linguistic elements] with the meaning (artha) of sacred texts (śāstra) (i.e., the linguistic bhāvanā conveying the objective bhāvanā) is as follows. Both the [objective] bhāvanā and the prescription (vidhi), are the meaning (artha) of the optative (liṅ) and the other [verbal endings].

A.4.1 Connection of semantemes within the prescriptive sentence

Of these two, the [objective] bhāvanā is the effort (prayatna). The prescription (vidhi), on the other hand, is what has been called above linguistic bhāvanā (śabdabhāvanā), which is tantamount (ātman) to the fact of causing [one] to act (pravartanā). These two are first related (anvaya), because they have been obtained (upādāna) [p. 48] through the same single suffix (pratyaya) [as stated above, §C.3.16 and §C.3.1]. And this [relation] (paryavaso-) attains completion through the relationship between what is brought about and what brings [it] about, i.e., what is brought into existence

[61]This is a way out of the fault mentioned above of designating one's own designating function (svavyāpārābhidhāna).

[62]Rāmānujācārya is here strictly following Pārthasārathi Miśra, who only quoted the first hemistich of the verse, and hence comments only upon it, although he himself quoted the whole verse (see §C.3).

[63]In my translation, I stressed the predicative function of vidhyavaruddhā since, as stated in the next line, §C.4, and then again in the final statement of this mahāpūrvapakṣa, §C.7.1, the Sacred Texts actually mean both the prescription and the bhāvanā enjoined by it.

[64]As in the title of this chapter. According to this PP, "the content to be known through the sacred texts" is the objective bhāvanā conveyed through the linguistic bhāvanā.

and what brings [it] into existence (utpad-) [that is, respectively, objective and linguistic bhāvanā]. Due to [its] relation (anvaya) with the prescription, it is also inevitable that the [objective] bhāvanā is a means to realise something desired (samīhitasādhana) (since, as explained in §C.3.17, 1956:48, a Vedic prescription can only cause someone to undertake an action insofar as it conveys the idea that such an action is the instrument to realise something desired). And in this way, [within a Vedic prescription] only the result (phala) [, e.g., heaven,] remains (avasthā-) as what must be brought about (bhāvya), [as it is] by itself expected (ākāṅkṣ-) by that [objective bhāvanā] (since the bhāvanā is a bringing about and hence requires something to be brought about). Therefore, in "S/he who is desirous of heaven (svargakāma) should sacrifice with the sacrifices of the Full- and New-Moon" the bhāvanā skips over (atilaṅgh-) the meaning of the verbal root (dhātu), although it is proximate (sannihita) [to it] because it has been obtained through the same word (pada) [i.e., 'should sacrifice', yajeta, for both the bhāvanā and the meaning of the verbal root], and [it, the bhāvanā,] rests (avalamb-) only on the result, obtained (upādā-) through another word (pada). Then, the bhāvanā, related (anvita) to what must be brought about (bhāvya), requires (apekṣ-) an instrument (karaṇa) in order to realise (siddhi) this. And in the same way the meaning of the verbal root (dhātu) is related (anvi-) [within the prescription] as the instrument (karaṇa). And that this momentary (instrument) is the means to realise (sādhana) a result, deemed to happen at a later time, would not be possible without the apūrva. So it (apūrva) is postulated (kḷp-), as an intermediate (avāntara) function (vyāpāra).

A.4.2 Connection of other sentences to the main sentence

A.4.2.1 Connection of the six offerings to the main presciption

And then, how does it (bhāvanā), related (anvi-) to both (instrument and result), beget the result through it (the instrument)? Therefore, the [bhāvanā] continues (avasthā-) to require a procedure (itikartavyatā) [to answer this question]. In this way, in the sentence (vākya) [stating the] responsibility (adhikāra) the principal bhāvanā bears the three expectations (ākāṅkṣā) (for a result, an instrument and a procedure). Therefore, [one looks in the sentences close to it for them]. Since in the sentences handed down (āmnā-) in proximity to this one, namely, "The [rice cake] on eight pans for Agni on the new moon's day;" "And on the full moon's day;" "The coagulated milk (dadhi) for Indra on the new moon's day;" "The milk for Indra on the new moon's day;" "The [rice cake] on eleven pans for Agni and Soma at full moon;" "[One] sacrifices in the meantime the whispered offering (upāṃśuyāja)"[65], the connection (sambandha) [with a prescription] of the Deities (devatā) and

[65] All these sentences, as will be seen in the following, describe the six principal rites composing the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices.

the substances (dravya) [mentioned] is not [even] smelled (āghrā-[66]) through any other instrument of knowledge, one postulates (kḷp-) the [responsibility prescription]'s prescriptive suffix (pratyaya) [in these ones] (that is, one understands that these statements are stating a substance to be offered and a Deity to whom it is to be offered, and hence one construes them as a prescription). Having then postulated (kḷp-) through this connection (with the prescription) a sacrifice (yāga), the sentence meaning is completed in this way: "Through sacrificing (yāga) at these times one should bring about (bhū-) some benefit (śreyas)".

A.4.2.2 Expectation of a result by other prescriptions directly related to the principal one

Also these (of the above rites) intermediate (avāntara) bhāvanās continue to expect (ākāṅkṣ-) a specification (viśeṣa) [answering the question] "That which must be brought about (bhāvya), of what benefit (śreyas) is it?". And among [the other sentences to be directly connected with the principal prescription], also in sentences (vākya) like, "One should sacrifice with rice (vrīhi), one should sacrifice with barley," [having analysed the sentences as] "Some benefit (śreyas) must be brought about (bhāvya) by means of the sacrifice (yāga) specified by rice and [barley]," the bhāvanās do (eva) expect (ākāṅkṣ-) a specification (viśeṣa) about what must be brought about. And also in pre-sacrifice (prayāja) and [post-sacrifice] sentences like, "One sacrifices the Kindling-Sticks [sacrifice]," "One sacrifices the Sacred Fire (tanūnapāta) [sacrifice]," [having analysed the sentences as] "There is some benefit (śreyas) to be brought about (bhū-) through sacrifices (yāga) called[67] "Kindling Sticks", etc.," [the bhāvanās do require a specification as for what must be brought about]. And [so] it is settled (sthiti) that these intermediate (avāntara) bhāvanās continue to expect (ākāṅkṣ-) a specification (viśeṣa) about what must be brought about (bhāvya) [answering the question] "Of what benefit (śreyas) is it?".

A.4.2.3 Expectation of a result by prescriptions indirectly related to the main one, through characterizing a substance, an action, etc.

As for sentences like, "One threshes (avahan-) rice," "One sprinkles (prokṣ-) rice [with water]," "One grinds (piṣ-) [rice] grains (taṇḍula)," "One rolls (prath-) the rice cake (puroḍāś) out," "One cooks (śrā-) [the rice cake] in the

[66] "Since it is impossible [even] to smell". I would like to thank Prof. John Taber for having suggested this translation to me. For a parallel use of a sensory verb in a cognitive sense, see an-āsvādita in Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa, chapter 1, p.11 (translated as 'non sensing' in Watson 2006: 223).

[67] That samidhaḥ and tanūnapātam in these sentences indicate names of sacrifices is established in ŚBh ad MS 9.2.

pans (kapāla)," even in these sentences, although the sentence-paraphrase (vipariṇāma) is "One brings about (bhū-) rice, [rice grains] and [rice cake], through threshing, [sprinkling, grinding, rolling out] and [cooking]" since rice, etc., are understood (avagam-) as what must be brought about (bhāvya) because of the direct mention (śruti) of the second [case ending] (and direct mention is the most powerful instrument for understanding the meaning of a prescription, see fn &70& and the text it refers to), nevertheless the bhāvanās expect (ākāṅkṣ-) [something else] concerning the part of what must be brought about (bhāvya), because one does not have the cognition (avagam-) of something desired (samīhita), since the rice is not for the sake of the person (puruṣārtha) (i.e., it is for the sake of the rite[68]). In the same way, also in sentences [prescribing] an expiation (prāyaścitta) like, "Having broken one offers [the expiatory oblation], having dropped one offers [the expiatory oblation]," the bhāvanās do expect (ākāṅkṣ-), [a specification regarding what must be brought about] [after having analysed the sentence as] "Once the pan (kapāla) of the archetype (prakṛti) (that is, of the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifice) is broken and once the sacrificial substance (havis) [of the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifice] is dropped, one brings about (bhū-) something desired (samīhita) through the [expiatory] offering (homa)". [Such an analysis is possible] because the words (śabda) "broken", etc., being etymological (yaugika) [and not conventional] words have place in (niviś-) the topic under discussion (i.e., the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifice) (and hence, through context, one comes to know that the pan, which could be broken, and the barley offering, which could be dropped, are the ones prescribed in the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices)[69].

A.4.2.4 Connection of the six offerings and of the indirectly related sentences to the main one because of expectation

In this way (described above), by force of mutual expectation (ākāṅkṣā) (as seen in §C.4.2.1 the bhāvanā of the sentence prescribing the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifice expects a procedure, etc., and as seen in §C.4.2.1-C.4.2.2, [it results that] the intermediate bhāvanās also expect something to be brought about), the other [sentences] are simultaneously related (anvaya) to the sentence [expressing] the result (phalavākya) (that is, "One who is desirous of heaven, should sacrifice with the Full- and New-Moon sacrifices") because of [their forming] a single sentence. This [relation] being resulted (prasañj-), among these [sentences], the sentences «The [rice cake on eight pans] for

[68] For this opposition between puruṣārtha and kratvartha, see MS and **Clooney1990**

[69] If the words 'broken' (bhinna), etc., had not been used according to the "etymological" meaning one gets at through a standard grammatical analysis, then one should conclude that they could mean anything and, hence, one could not interpret them as related to the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices. I am grateful to Prof. Kei Kataoka for having helped me to understand this last passage.

Agni on the new moon's day]» and [the others prescribing rites and mentioned in §C.4.2.1], can (sambhū-) be expressed (vac-) by the words (śabda) "Full- and New-Moon" [in the principal sentence] because one clearly apprehends (pratīti) [their] connection with time. Hence, they initially form this (idam) single sentence (eka-vākya) together with the sentence [expressing] the responsibility (adhikāra): «He brings about (bhū-) the result (phala) through the six sacrifices (yāga) of the [rice cake] for Agni, etc., named "Full- and New-Moon"».

On the other hand, as for the [auxiliary] sentences[70] like, "S/he should sacrifice with rice," a single sacrifice (that of the Full- and New-Moon one) (yāga) results (phalita) [from these], although there are two sentences. For, through the sentence [expressing] the result, these become a single sentence since a separate rite would be incongruous (anupapatti), because, although the substance for the sacrifice has [already] been seized, no Deity is seized (labh-) [apart from those mentioned in the principal prescriptions characterising the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifice, that is «the [rice cake] on eight pans for Agni on the new moon's day», etc.].

And this sacrifice (yāga) is already acquired (prāpta), in the sentence [expressing its] result (phala) (that is, "One who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice through the Full- and New-Moon sacrifices"), as something desired (samīhita), since it is a means to realise some benefit (śreyassādhana). Hence, [in "He should sacrifice with rice" and "He should sacrifice with barley"], the bhāvanā pertaining to the prescriptive (vidhi) sentence rests (avalamb-), with regard to what must be brought about (bhāvya), on that very sacrifice obtained (upādā-) through the same (samāna) word (pada) (i.e., yajeta, "[One] should sacrifice," including both the meaning of the root, which is the sacrifice, and the bhāvanā expressed by the verbal ending). [The bhāvanā depends on] rice, on the other hand, as an instrument (karaṇa) [so that the paraphrase of the prescription is "Through rice one should bring about the sacrifice"] [p.49]. And therefore, the sentence meaning arises in this way: "One should bring about (bhū-) through rice and [barley], this Full- and New-Moon sacrifice, which is [already] accepted (nirūḍha) as a means to realise (sādhana) heaven (svarga)".

And in this way, since when the rite (yāga) encloses (avarudh-)[71] the rice

[70] Plural (instead of dual), since he is referring to auxiliary sentences in general, not just to "S/he should sacrifice with barley".

[71] Edgerton's excellent translation of the MNP renders puroḍāśāvaruddhe yāge in a parallel passage (see fn. to the Sansrkrit text) as "When the sacrifice is limited to a rice cake". Although avaruh- may mean both 'to be limited to' and 'to be included in,' several occurrences incline me to the latter translation. See, within TR IV, §C.3.16, §C.3.17.1, §C.12.5. And, in Vāsudeva Dīkṣita's Adhvaramīmāṃsākutūhalavṛtti: na cotpattiśiṣṭaikadhātvarthāvaruddhāyāṃ bhāvanāyāṃ dhātvantarānvayāsambhavān naikyam iti vācyam [...] tathā ca phalavākyaikavākyatāpannaiḥ sarvair vākyair militaiḥ sarvadhātvarthaviśiṣṭaikā bhāvanā vidhīyata ity avarodhaḥ (introductory lines ad MS 2.2, **Adhvaramimamsa**

cake[72] (puroḍāśa) taught in originative prescriptions (utpatti-śiṣṭa) ("The [rice cake] on eight pans for Agni on the new moon's day" etc.), the rice is not immediately (sākṣāt) related (anvaya) as a means to realise (sādhana) [it], hence it must be related (anvaya) as its (the rice cake's) originative material (prakṛti) according to the sense (arthāt)[73].

A.4.2.5 Connection of prescriptions that are secondary in regard to a secondary prescription because of expectation (e.g., 1 darśapūrṇamāsayāgena svargam bhāvayet, 2. puroḍāśena tam yāgam bhāvayet, 3. vrīhibhir puroḍāśam bhāvayet, 4. avahanena vrīhīn bhāvayet, 5. ulūkhalamusalābhyām avahananam bhāvayet).

On the other hand, as for sentences about threshing (avahan-), etc., once they [have constituted] a single sentence with the sentence about the Full- and New-Moon [sacrifices], this sentence meaning arises: "Through threshing [one] should bring about (bhū-) rice connected (sambandh-) to the Full- and New-Moon [sacrifices]". [Such a sentence meaning arises] because rice accomplishes (nirvah-) the role of what is desired (samīhita), as one clearly apprehends (pratīti) –after having taken into consideration (paryāloc-) application (viniyoga) sentences such as, "One should sacrifice by means of rice," etc.– that it (rice) is what must be supplied (śeṣa) to the Full- and New-Moon [sacrifices]. For this very reason (i.e., understanding what accomplishes the role of the desired thing), when there is no application (viniyoga) [of an auxiliary act, such as threshing] to the substance (dravya), no substance must be brought about (bhāvya), although the second ending is directly mentioned (śruti), since this (substance) does not accomplish (nirvah-) the role of what is desired (samīhita). Rather, [in such cases] [the second ending means] the fact of being an instrument (karaṇa) with regard to the action (kriyā), as in "One offers groats" (which hence means "One causes to be [the sacrifice] with an offering by means of groats"). In this way, even in sentences subsidiary (aṅga) to the threshing (avahan-) like, "One threshes with mortar and pestle," once they [have constituted] a single sentence [with the Full- and New-Moon sacrifice prescription] the sentence meaning becomes "With mortar and pestle one should complete the threshing [already] accepted (nirūḍha) as connected (sambandh-) to the Full- and New-Moon [sacrifices]". [And they constitute a single sentence with the Full- and New-Moon sacrifice prescription] since threshing accomplishes (nirvah-) the role

[72]In prescriptions prescribing the rice cake, as, e.g., agniṣomīyaṃ paśupuroḍāśam ekādaśakapālaṃ nirvapati, see fn 107 of the Sanskrit text.

[73]This is an answer to the possible objection that "He should sacrifice with rice" cannot be connected to the Full- and New-Moon sacrifices, since their originative prescriptions do not mention rice. In fact, rice is to be understood as the material of the rice cake prescribed in such originative prescriptions. This passage is made clear through the parallel passage in the MNP (MNP 70, p.206, quoted in a fn. to the Sanskrit text).

of something desired (samīhita), through the application (viniyoga) [to it of mortar and pestle]. [In fact, threshing may be the desired element] as it is a supplementary part of the Full- and New-Moon [Sacrifice], [to which it is connected] gradually (paramparayā) with [sentences like,] "One threshes rice". In the same way, barley (yava) is also threshed according to the [above said] instructions (upadeśa) (that is, "One threshes rice" and "One threshes with mortar and pestle"), because there is no distinction (viśeṣa) in the way [it] is connected (sambandh-) with it (the Full- and New-Moon [sacrifice]). Indeed, the connectedness (sambandh-) to the Full- and New-Moon [sacrifice] has been indirectly signified (lakṣ-) by the word "rice". Similarly, also the relation (anvaya) of sentences like, "The girl slave threshes like the wife" must be considered according to what has [already] been accepted and what has [still] not been accepted (nirūḍha) (that is, new elements are to be connected just like the acquired ones) (something like, "patnyā avahananam bhāvayet"—» "dasyāvahananam bhāvayet", just like with rice and barley).

A.4.2.6 Connection of pre- and post-sacrifices, which contribute to the main ritual through intermediate apūrvas

In sentences like the [one prescribing the] Kindling Sticks [sacrifice] (samidh), (that is, in sentences prescribing pre-sacrifices or a similar direct assistance), instead, given that through the sentence [expressing] the result they constitute a single sentence, the sentence meaning is thus: "S/he should bring about through sacrifices [called] Kindling Sticks, etc., the bhāvanā [that is conducive] to the result". And since it is impossible that this [bhāvanā conducive to the result] is brought about (bhāvya) immediately (sākṣāt), it attains completion (paryavaso-) when its (of the bhāvanā) instrument is assisted (upakāra) through an intermediate apūrva (that is, when the pre-sacrifices assist the sacrifice, that is the instrument for realising the bhāvanā).

A.4.2.7 Connection of expiation rites

As for "Having broken he offers [the expiatory oblation]" and other [prescriptions regarding expiation rites], the bhāvanā conducive to the result is related (anvaya) as what must be brought about (bhāvya) according to the rule of pre-sacrifices (prayāja) and [post-sacrifices] (see §C.4.2.6). [So,] it is postulated (kḷp-) that –if there is an occasion (nimitta) [for the person responsible for the main sacrifice to perform an expiation rite], conforming to the connection (sambandha) with the occasion (nimitta) directly mentioned (śruta) in its own sentence (svavākya)[74]– in regard to the (result-conducive-bhāvanā), the fact that it is to be brought about (bhāvya) is accomplished

[74]The expiation prescription is "Having broken, one offers [the expiatory oblation]". Hence, in the same sentence the occasion ("having broken") is also mentioned.

(nirvah-) by avoiding (parihāra) the offence (pratyavāya), [which consists in an] imperfection (vaiguṇya), at the time it comes up [and affects] the ritual. Therefore, indeed, it is not the case that, as in these pre-sacrifices (prayāja) and [post-sacrifices], the one who is responsible (adhikārin) for the [main] sacrifice (yāga) in general (mātra) is responsible (adhikṛta) [for expiation rites, too; rather, he must also have an occasion (nimitta) to perform the expiatory rite]. Neither, does he have only an occasion (nimitta) as in the free (svatantra)[75] and occasional (naimittika) [sacrifices]. Instead, [his] being responsible [for expiatory rites] consists in being responsible with regard to the [main] sacrifice (yāga) and [also] having the occasion (nimitta) [to perform an expiation][76].

A.4.2.8 Summary of the connection of directly and indirectly contributing auxiliaries

In the same way, also as for [auxiliary] sentences like, "S/he purifies clarified butter (ājya)," "S/he milks milk," "S/he should coagulate milk (dadhi)," "S/he cuts a branch," "S/he drives away calves with a branch," one may consider [their] relation (anvaya) [within the principal prescription] according to the same mode (prakāra) (as seen above, in §C.4.2.5) (i.e., according to the mode of connection of, say, "S/he threshes rice"). Therefore, there is no distinction (viśeṣa) between the [ritual] qualifications (dharma) consisting in the indirectly contributing [auxiliaries] (sannipat-)[77], like purifying, threshing, coagulating, milking –which qualify (dharma) clarified butter, herbs (auṣadha) and milk– as far as their being [all] indirectly signified (lakṣaṇā) through [their] connectedness to the Full- and New-Moon sacrifice, since they form a single sentence with the sentence [prescribing] the principal [sacrifice]. Nevertheless, [their respective] relation (anvaya) [within the Full- and New-Moon sacrifice's prescription] is realised (siddhi) without intermixture (a-saṅkara) because also the relation (anvaya) [and not just its elements] through the factors of action (kāraka) [already] accepted (nirūḍha) —like rice and clarified butter, which have been directly mentioned (śruta)— is not abandoned; and because of the different intermediate (avāntara) apūrvas. The relation (anvaya) between the directly [contributing] auxiliaries (ārādupakārin), such as pre-sacrifices (prayāja) and [post-sacrifices], instead, [occurs] through supplying (śeṣa) [them] to all instruments (karaṇa) because [they] do not have a distinct (vaiṣamya) assisting function (upakāra) (, that

[75] Employed as a synonym of kāmya.

[76] In fact, expiation rites are classified as naimittika ones. Just like one must perform a jāteṣṭi if a son is born, similarly one must perform an expiation in case of errors, omissions, etc.

[77] Sannipātidharma is used as a synonym of sannipātyipakārin, but the author uses here sannipātidharma because he wants to stress the link of these ritual qualifications with the substance they refer to (their dharmin), rather than the assistance (upakāra) they perform.

is, there is no difference in the way they help, say, the purification of clarified butter or the threshing of rice). Therefore, by means of contrivance (tantra), they are performed just once (sakṛt) [but apply to all instrumental actions].

A.4.2.9 Connection of isolated sentences

In the same way, also in case of sentences taught outside the context [of the Full- and New-Moon sacrifice] (anārabhya), such as, "He who has a ladle (juhū) made of Butea Frondosa wood [hears no evil rumour]," "He who has a small spoon (sruva) made of Acacia Catechu [...]," the relation (anvaya) occurs only to the Full- and New-Moon [sacrifices], in so far as they are the archetypes (prakṛti) among all the rituals (kratu) [to whom the detached sentences could be connected], (in this form:) "He should bring about (bhū-) with the substances (dravya) Butea Frondosa, Acacia Catechu, etc., a ladle, etc., connected (sambandh-) to the Full- and New-Moon [sacrifices]"[78]. For, a ladle, etc., are desired (samīhita) [and hence can play the role of what must be brought about], as they are invariably (avyabhicar-) connected (sambandh-) to the Full- and New-Moon rituals (kratu), by force of their own (of the sentences concerning the ladle and the spoon) expectation (ākāṅkṣā). Indeed, [this is so] even though the expectation (ākāṅkṣā) of the principal (pradhāna) bhāvanā has ceased (upaśam-) by means of the subsidiaries (aṅga) belonging to [its] context (prakaraṇa) (whereas, as already mentioned, the small spoon and the ladle have been prescribed out of context).

A.4.2.10 Summary of A.4.2

And in this way the meaning of the period (mahāvākya) is completed (sampanna) as follows: "He should bring about (bhū-) the result through six rites (yāga) expressed (vac-) by the word 'Full- and New-Moon', [entailing] a heap of items (padārtha) recalled (smṛ-) by various mantras during the implementation (prayoga) of [the sacrifice], and whose defectiveness (vaiguṇya) has been allayed by an expiation (prāyaścitta). [These six rites] are assisted (upakṛ-) by pre-sacrifices and [post-sacrifices] [and they] are completed (sampad-) according to the suitable connection (yathāyogam) [p.50] through the substance (dravya) rice cake –prepared (saṃskṛ-) by sprinkling [the rice with water], threshing [it], grinding [rice grains], rolling out, cooking in a dish, cutting (avadāna) into four, etc. [in case of "The [rice cake] on eight pans for Agni," etc.]– [and] through clarified butter, coagulated milk, etc. –prepared (saṃskṛ-) through purification, milking, coagulation, etc. [in case of "Indra's coagulated milk," etc.]". One must consider in this way the

[78] That is, even detached rules do not apply to both the archetype and its ectypes, but only to the archetype. On the connection of detached rules, such as the rules above, see MS 3.6.2 and MNP 107, quoted in a footnote to the Sanskrit text of this passage.

mode (prakāra) of the mutual relation (anvaya) between subsidiary (aṅga) and principal sentences (i.e., between the sentence prescribing a principal sacrifice and the sentences prescribing its auxiliaries), also in the case of the sacrifices (yāga) of the cattle and of the soma, which are archetypal (prakṛti) [sacrifices] (just as the Full- and New-Moon sacrifice).

A.4.3 Means of knowledge for ascertaining the connection of the bhāvanā, of what must be realised, of the instrument and of the procedure in archetypes

As for this [mode of the mutual connection between principal and subsidiary sentences], one clearly apprehends (pratī-) that the prescription (vidhi), whose only centre (ekarasa) is to cause [people] to act (pravartaka), is related within the principal sentence (pradhānavākya) first of all with the bhāvanā. Nevertheless, since that (bhāvanā) is not suitable for (ayogya) being performed alone, it does not attain completion (paryavaso-) until it is related (anvaya) to the three suitable (yogya) parts (aṃśa) (i.e., what must be realised, the instrument and the procedure), according to direct mention (śruti) and [the other six means]. This stage (avasthā) is called the commencement (prakrama) of a prescription (vidhi)[79]. And [among these parts] in the same way, what must be brought about (bhāvya) is related to the sentence as it is suitable (yogyatā) [for this role] (i.e., it is something desired). The relation of the instrument (karaṇa) [to the prescription] [occurs] through direct mention (śruti), as [both] have been obtained (upādāna) through a single word (pada) (since, for instance, yajeta is paraphrased as "Through sacrificing one should cause to be," and hence yajeta expresses simultaneously bhāvanā and instrument, see above §C.3 and §C.3.1.1, p. 42, l. 18 and below, p.51 l. 11). The relation (anvaya) with the procedure (itikartavyatā) [occurs] through direct mention (śruti), context (prakaraṇa), and [the other means], according to the suitable case (yathāyogam).

A.4.3.1 Means of knowledge for ascertaining the connection of directly contributing auxiliaries as the procedure [prayājair yajeta → prayājair kiṃcic chreyo bhāvayet → prayājair pradhānabhāvanāṃ bhāvayet→ pradhānabhāvanayā phalam bhāvayet]

Within this (connection with the procedure), as for subsidiary (aṅga) sentences about directly [contributing] auxiliaries (ārādupakāraka), it is exactly the principal bhāvanā that, through context (prakaraṇa), is immediately (sākṣāt) (that is, not through the medium of a substance to be brought

[79]The idea behind this simile is that the prescription is not accomplished at once, but it rather implies a procedure that gradually connects it to its various components.

about, as in the case of the indirectly contributing auxiliaries) related (anvaya) as what must be brought about (bhāvya) by the bhāvanā of presacrifices and [post-sacrifices], related (anvi-) to the prescription (vidhi)[80].

A.4.3.2 Means of knowledge for ascertaining the connection of indirectly contributing auxiliaries as the procedure

As for the indirectly contributing [auxiliaries] (sannipātin), on the other hand, rice, [milk] and [the other substances] connected (sambandh-) to the principal [prescription] are related (anvaya) as what must be brought about (bhāvya) through direct mention (śruti), etc., together with context (prakaraṇa).
Also in both [direct and indirect auxiliaries] [just as in the principal prescription] it is just the meaning of the verbal root (dhātu) that is related (anvaya) as the instrument (karaṇa) since it is obtained (upādāna) through the same (samāna) word (pada) [as the bhāvanā]. In sentences prescribing substance (dravya), qualities (guṇa) or species/universals/classes (jāti), [however,] just substances, [qualities] and [classes] are related as the instrument (karaṇa) through the mention (śruti) of the third ending, since the meaning of the verbal root (dhātu) is what must be brought about (bhāvya) (in those cases the paraphrase of, e.g., "One should sacrifice with rice" is, e.g., "Through rice one should cause to be a sacrifice," vrīhibhir yāgam bhāvayet). In such cases, that is, in subsidiary [sentences] (aṅga), the relation with the procedure (itikartavyatā) is generally (i.e., not always) present (prāyika) (that is, one does not need to express it; in fact, one cannot express the procedure for every single act as it would lead to a regressus ad infinitum)[81].

A.4.3.3 What has to be brought about is by itself desirable

In all those cases (of subsidiary prescriptions and principal one), the prescription (vidhi) is immediately (sākṣāt) related (anvaya) with the bhāvanā [because the suffix conveys both prescription and bhāvanā], whereas its relation with its parts (aṃśa, i.e., what must be realised, instrument and procedure) occurs through bhāvanā alone. Among those [parts], since the part (aṃśa) of what must be realised (bhāvya) is immediately (sākṣāt) or mediately (paramparayā) desired (samīhita), [one] initiates by oneself an action (pravṛtti) caused by interest (rāga) for it. Hence, the prescription (vidhi) does not have any function (vyāpāra) in regard to it, because there

[80] As stated below, §C.4.3.3, 1956: 51, the bhāvanā is immediately connected to the prescription, as they are expressed by the same morpheme (the verbal termination of the optative, etc., expressing both the undertaking of an action – bhāvanā – and its prescriptiveness).

[81] On this use of prāyika, see infra, §C.11.6, 1956:60. See also VM, II, ad 27: niyojyānvitābhidhānañ ca prāyikam, ādhānādhyayanāṅgapradhānotpattiniyogānāṃ niyojyaśūnyāyām abhidhānābhyupagamāt (Śā p. 441).

could not (a-yoga) be any connection (anvaya) [of the result that must be realised] with a prescription which [only] causes to act (pravṛt-) someone who previously did not act (whereas the person to be caused to act has already undertaken the action because of its own interest for the result). Its (the prescription's) function [occurs] through the bhāvanā only in regard to the parts (aṃśa) that are instrument (karaṇa) and procedure (itikartavyatā). Hence indeed the śyena [sacrifice], which consists of violence [and is] characterised as an evil spell (abhicāra), since it is said "One should sacrifice by casting a spell with the śyena," is the instrument (karaṇa) of an offence (pratyavāya), because [it] lies in the sphere of application (gocara) of the prohibition (niṣedha) "One should not perform violence," for it is not prescribed (vidhā-).

A.5 Kinds of prescriptions

And this prescription (vidhi) has four sequential (krama[82]) stages (avasthā), because of the difference among coming-into-being (utpatti), application (viniyoga), responsibility (adhikāra) and promoting [the ritual, hence "performance" of it] (prayoga). Among these, prescription is intrinsically (svabhāva) promoter (prayuj-), since its only intrinsic character is the fact of causing [people] to act (pravartanā). The other three conditions (avasthā), instead, have the purpose (artha) of realising (siddhi) the [relation of other elements to the promotion], since [otherwise] [such] relation with it (promotion) would be incongruous (anupapatti).

A.5.1 Originative prescription and its inner partition (aprāptavidhi and niyamavidhi)

To elaborate: once clearly apprehended (pratī-), the prescription (vidhi) brings about (kḷp-) first of all the acquisition, not acquired (prāp-) through any other instrument of knowledge, of the meaning of the verbal root (dhātu) [which defines the instrument of the action prescribed], the [ritual] substances, etc., which have been comprehended as specifications (viśeṣaṇa) of the bhāvanā through direct mention (śruti) and [the other six means of knowledge used to determine the subordinate elements]. [The prescription brings about such acquisition not acquired through any other means of knowledge] for the sake of realising (siddhi) its own [role of] causing to act (pravṛt-) someone who had still not undertaken an action[83]. If, instead,

[82]The order of stage is, in fact, far from fix and different successions are listed in various Mīmāṃsā texts. In fact it is evident that for Āpadeva, just like for Rāmānujācārya, these divisions are only functional ones, since the same prescription can cover one or the other role according to its ritual function.

[83]I am interpreting this as a sāpekṣāsāmasa, like the following pravartakatvaśaktivilopāt.

these (instrument, ritual substances and Deities etc.) were acquired (prāp-) through other means of knowledge, then, [the prescription] would loose (vilopa) its own potency (śakti) of causing to act (pravṛt-) because the initiation of action (pravṛtti) would have been realised (siddhi) through these (other means of knowledge) alone. When, on the other hand, substance (dravya), etc., are [already] acquired (prāp-) through other means of knowledge with respect to one side (pakṣa), [that is,] in so far as they are means to realise (sādhana) the action (kriyā) just because of their capacity (sāmarthya) [and not because a prescription says they are means to realise the action], [the prescription] brings about (kḷp-) [their] being acquired (prāpti) with regard to the aspect of restriction (niyama)[84]. For instance, [a sacrifice] must be realised (sādhya) by some substance and hence the substances like rice are already acquired (prāp-) [as possible ritual items]. Nonetheless, in case of a prescription beginning with "He should sacrifice [with rice" or "with barley"]," [the prescription] brings about (kḷp-) their acquisition (prāpti), not acquired through any other means of knowledge, by means of a restriction (niyama) (that is, one knows already that rice or barley can be suitable substances for a sacrifice, but it is only through this prescription that one obtains the knowledge that it is, for instance, rice alone that must be used in this particular rite). The same applies also to prescriptions regarding qualities (guṇa) and [actions]. When, on the other hand (tu), the action (kriyā) also, e.g., in the case of threshing, has been already acquired, there too it (prescription) brings about a restriction (niyama) [thus prescribing a certain way of removing the chaff from the rice grains, namely by threshing them instead of piercing by nails]. At that step, it is called "prescription regarding the coming into existence (utpatti) [of a duty] (i.e., originative prescription)"[85]. Its (this prescription's) companions are repetition (abhyāsa), other words (śabda), etc.

A.5.2 Application prescription

When, on the other hand, they (substance, quality or action/substance, Deity, etc.) are postulated (kḷp-) as means to realise (sādhana) [a result], because a person cannot be caused to undertake an action (pravṛt-) in re-

[84]The underlying assumption is that a prescription should convey a new piece of information and not be redundant, a hermeneutical principle typical of Mīmāṃsā. Hence, it brings about the fact that the action it conveys is "new", either from one point of view or from the other. Hence, it brings about the fact that it (action) is newly acquired, i.e., it brings about its acquisition not acquired before through any other instrument of knowledge. In this sense, the one described here is certainly not a physical act, but perhaps also not a mental one (although it occurs in the reader's/listener's intellect), since it is described from the perspective of the prescription. Many thanks are due to Prof. John Taber who made me aware of this question.

[85]&127& Utpattividhi and niyamavidhi refer to a similar aspect in the function of a prescription according to two different classifications, see study XXX.

gard to those (substance, quality or action/substance, Deity, etc.) which are not means to realise a result, then we have an "application (viniyoga) prescription". Application (viniyoga) means understanding (avagam-) the relationship (bhāva) between what is principal/primary (aṅgin) and what is subsidiary (aṅga). What is desired (samihīta) is principal and the means to realise (sādhana) it is subsidiary. And, as regards them, the bhāvanā leading to result (phala)[86] is [principal] through the fact that it is the immediate instrument to the result, [whereas] the others, i.e., instrument (karaṇa) and procedures (itikartavyatā) are [subsidiary] [p.51] [through the fact that they become instruments to the result] gradually, because they are [first] connected to it (bhāvanā leading to result). And in regard to this application prescription (viniyoga), direct mention (śruti) and [the other instruments for knowing an application] are the companions. It is said that an application (viniyoga) prescription is a prescription (vidhi) accompanied by direct mention (śruti), etc.

A.5.3 Prescription regarding the responsibility

When there is the idea (buddhi) that [a certain sacrifice] must be performed (anuṣṭhā-) in force of/due to the fact that it is the means to realise (sādhana) the result, then we have the "prescription regarding the responsibility (adhikāra)". Indeed the idea that [a sacrifice] must be performed hangs on the prescription.

A.5.4 Promoting prescription

When on the other hand it causes to perform [the sacrifice], then it is a prescription regarding the promoting (prayoga). And its companions are the praiseworthiness (prāśastya) produced by commendatory statements, the recollection (smaraṇa) of [ritual] items (padārtha) understood (avagam-) through the mantra-portion [of the Veda][87], the sequence (krama) understood through direct mention (śruti), sense (artha), text (paṭh-), etc., and time and [space and agent (cf. §C.7)] (those latter serving to determine whether the immediately contributing auxiliaries are to be performed just once or are to be repeated, see infra §C.7, notwithstanding the different order).

[86]&67& I.e. the objective bhāvanā. But phalabhāvanā is also used to distinguish it from the apūrvabhāvanā. Both are instances of objective bhāvanā, but the former leads to a concrete result, while the latter to apūrva. See infra, p. 62, §C.11.7.5.

[87]Mantras, arthavādas, brāhmanas/vidhis (and, possibly, nāmadheyas) are opposed to the "whole Veda" several times in Mīmāṃsā literature, see, e.g., Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā, p. 18, l. 20 and p. 20, l.19. But the compound could also mean, as suggested by John Taber, 'different division of [individual] mantras' (every part of mantra makes one recollect a different item).

A.5.5 Interactions among prescriptions

Among these [four stages], a prescription is capable (sāmarthya) of bringing about (kḷp-) [these] four stages (avasthā) by itself alone, since all prescriptions (vidhi) have as [their] only centre (rasa) the fact of causing to undertake actions (pravṛt-). Nonetheless, if [the four stages] starting from the [one regarding] the coming into existence, have also arisen (and are hence available) (sambhū-), as they have been realised by another prescription, then [a prescription] undertakes [its] actions (pravṛt-) by itself having verily[88] these (four stages) as substratum (āśri-). But [it] does not bring them about (kḷp-[89]), like the prescription of the Full- and New-Moon [Sacrifices] [does not bring about] the ones regarding the [rice cake] for Agni, etc. [and rather acts relying on them]. And also the application (viniyoga) prescription, [if the application is already realised] points (para) only to the coming into existence (utpatti) of the [acts applied to the principal prescription], and it does not point to their application, since the application (viniyoga) of its own acts (karman) is realised (siddhi) by another [prescription][90].
Or (vā), the same [happens] also in subsidiary (aṅga) sentences, where subsidiary prescriptions do not separately (pṛthak) (i.e., by themselves, independently of the principal prescription) point (para) to responsibility (adhikāra) and promoting [of the ritual] (prayoga) [just] because the coming-into-being (utpatti) and the application (viniyoga) [of some duties] is [already] realised (sidh-). In fact, responsibility and performance (anuṣṭhāna=prayoga) are established (siddhi) in regard to subsidiaries (aṅga) just (eva) because the potency (śakti) of the principal prescription (vidhi) is transferred (saṅkrama) to the subsidiaries (aṅga), [and the transfer occurs], because of the connection (sambandha) with the principal bhāvanā, through it (principal bhāvanā) [hence, subsidiary prescriptions cannot by themselves postulate responsibility and performance]. [And application and coming-into-existence may have been already realised, in turn,] through their own prescriptions accompanied by direct mention and [the other companions] according to what is suitable (yathārham) [for each of them]. [The application, in detail, can be established] immediately (through the above said means) or gradually, insofar as it must be supplied (śeṣa) to the principal bhāvanā. And [in the same subsidiary-principal connection,] also the principal prescription (vidhi), by itself points only to performance (prayoga) and responsibility (adhikāra), since it relies on (upajīv-) the [subsidiary prescriptions]; for the coming-into-existence (utpatti) of the subsidiaries (aṅga) and the ap-

[88] eva is used to contrast āśrī- and kḷp-.

[89] The causative of the root kḷp- is a terminus technicus used to designate the activity of the prescription whenever it must postulate something not directly stated in the text.

[90] That is, if the application of, e.g., rice is already established when one hears the prescription applying it, then the latter must be understood as prescribing the coming-into-being of rice as a ritual element. I am grateful to Prof. John Taber for having helped me in understanding this passage.

plication (viniyoga) of the subsidiaries (aṅga) as supplements (śeṣa) to [the principal prescription] itself are realised (sidh-) precisely (eva) through the subsidiary prescriptions. On the other hand, since the application (viniyoga) of the principal [ritual] as a supplement (śeṣa) to the result (phala) is not realised (sidh-) by another [prescription], [the principal prescription] effects [the application's function] (kṛ-) by itself[91].

When, on the other hand, coming into existence, etc., are not realised (sidh-) by another prescription (vidhi), [the principal prescription] itself begets the four [stages] of coming into being, etc., [of the prescriptions] connected (sambandhin) to itself. Like, in the ectype [ritual] (vikṛti), the prescription (vidhi): "The one who is desirous of the glory of Brahman should pour out (nirvap-) the Sūrya's oblation (caru)". In this case, unlike in the case of the [rice cake] for Agni, a separate coming into existence (utpatti), saying "There is the oblation for Sūrya," is not directly mentioned (śru-), therefore [the principal prescription] brings it about (kḷp-), too.

A.6 Accomplishment of the prescription in archetypes

So, (that is, just as in the "progress of prescription" mentioned in §C.4.3), once the bhāvanā, related (anvi-) with the three parts (result, instrument, and procedure) has been comprehended, the relation (anvaya) of the bhāvanā with the prescription (vidhi), clearly apprehended (pratī-) at first as "The prescription causes the person to undertake an action (pravṛt-) in its (the bhāvanā's) regard (tatra)" —since s/he (the person) is fit (yogya) for the performance (anuṣṭhā-) [of the ritual]— attains completion (paryavaso-). And this step (daśā) is called the completion (paryavasāna) of the prescription. In it, it is the bhāvanā (i.e., the initiation of the action) that is at first prescribed (vidhā-) and through it (bhāvanā) the [actual/ritual] action (kriyā). And through that (action) the substance (dravya), etc. And at this [step], just as the principal prescription causes [one] to perform (anuṣṭhā-) the instrument (karaṇa) (i.e., the sacrifice) and the subsidiaries (aṅga), for the sake of realising (siddhi) the result, in the very same way also the principal bhāvanā, which has as its sphere of application (gocara) the result and is made present (ākram-[92]) by the prescription, alighting (avatṛ-) here and there, brings about (niṣpad-) this and that, as it cannot by itself immediately (sākṣāt) bring about the result. At that point the prescriptions relative to

[91] I am grateful to Prof. Kei Kataoka for having helped me in understanding this and the previous sentence by pointing out the parallel between aṅgānāṃ svaśeṣatayā viniyogasya and pradhānasya phalaśeṣatayā viniyogasya.

[92] Lit. "having approached by means of the prescription". ākrānta is used in the sense of "included" also by Veṅkaṭanātha: ataḥ śyenādiṣu dharmalakṣaṇākrānteṣv api phalataḥ prabhūtānarthaparyavasānād adharmatvopacāraḥ (Seśvaramīmāṃsā ad 1.1.2, p. 34).

subsidiaries (aṅga) and their respective bhāvanās neither cause [one] to act (pravṛt-) (as the principal prescription), nor bring about (niṣpad-) [the result] (as the principal bhāvanā). Such is the sequence (krama) of the relation (anvaya) in the archetype [ritual] (prakṛti).

A.6.1 Accomplishment of the prescription in ectypes

In ectype [rituals] (vikṛti), on the other hand, once the bhāvanā of the ectype [ritual], related (anvi-) with the instrument (karaṇa) and what must be brought about (bhāvya), has been comprehended (pratipad-), there is the expectation (ākāṅkṣā) of a procedure (itikartavyatā) in the form of an assistance (upakāra)[93] to the instrument (karaṇa) (that is, the sacrifice, which is instrumental to the arousal of the result), [as one needs to know] "How can the result be realised (sidh-) through that (sacrifice)?". This being the case, once first the archetypal assistance and then the heaps of items produced by that are delivered (samṛ-)[94] [by the various words and morphemes, in order to appease this expectation], the [ritual] items (padārtha) which are [extended] from the archetype [ritual], are also supplied (śeṣa) to the bhāvanā of ectype [rituals] through the means of knowledge [fit to ascertain] the analogical extension (atideśa) –number (vacana), appellation (nāmadheya), sign (liṅga) and injunction (codanā)– because of the same principal prescription (vidhi) [of the ectype ritual]. This [process] occurs just as in the case of "He should sacrifice with soma," where also soma, provided (upasthā-) [as a ritual item] by another word (pada) (and not by the prescriptive verbal ending) is supplied (śeṣa) [to the bhāvanā] through the same sacrificial (yāga) prescription (vidhi). (Soma, though provided through something else, is prescribed by the prescription. In the same way the prescription of an ectypal ritual can prescribe items provided through analogical extension).

[93]The subsidiaries's auxiliary function (upakāra) is introduced in order to explain how a certain result must be brought forth, cf. darśapūrṇamāsavākye 'pi darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargaṃ bhāvayet katham ity asti upakārakākāṅkṣā (MNP 116, p. 215).

[94]sam-ṛ- indicates the semantic element conveyed by verbal root, verbal ending etc., and to be connected as instrument, procedure, or "what must be done," see infra, p. 56 l.25, and te cātidiṣṭā arthavādā arthabhāvanāyāṃ phalaṃ samarpayanti rātrisatravat, evam ārthavādike phale bhāvyatayā 'vasīyate 'dhyayanaṃ samānapadopāttaṃ karaṇākāṅkṣāparipūrakatvena samarpyate (PrP Śāstramukha 1904, 6). In AN, III, ad 22, p. 240 it is opposed to prāpta in the sense that the former indicates something already well established while sam-ṛ indicates what new shade of meaning has been added by a certain morpheme: pūrvapakṣavādī tāvad evaṃ manyate –kriyāsāmarthyād eva tāvad guṇabhūtaḥ puruṣaḥ prāptaḥ. tatra svargakāmaśabdena na kaścit puruṣaviśeṣo rājaśabdeneva vrīhyādiśabdeneva vā dravyaviśeṣaḥ samarpyate.

A.6.2 Differences between archetype and ectype as for the accomplishment of the prescription: principles of analogical extension

In the archetype [ritual] (prakṛti), one clearly apprehends (pratī-) through the subsidiaries' (aṅga) prescriptions (vidhi) that [subsidiaries] are supplied (śeṣa) to the bhāvanā of the archetype [ritual] (prakṛti). And [their] application (viniyoga) [to the main ritual] has a prescription as instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa). Therefore (that is, since in the ectype ritual, on the other hand, the subsidiary prescriptions' expectation is already appeased by the principal ritual), only the principal prescription (vidhi) of an ectype [ritual] (vaikṛta) causes the application (viniyuj-) of subsidiaries through supplying [them] to the bhāvanā of the ectype [ritual] (vaikṛta). In the archetype [ritual] (prakṛti), the relation (anvaya) depends on the reciprocal expectation (ākāṅkṣā) of subsidiary (aṅga) and principal (pradhāna) [acts]. In the ectype [ritual] (vikṛti), on the other hand [p.52], the reciprocal relation depends only on the expectation of the principal, since the subsidiaries' (aṅga) expectation is appeased just through their relation to the archetype [ritual]'s (prākṛta) [principal act].

As for the directly enunciated (uddiś-) subsidiaries (aṅga) (that is, the ones typical of the ectype and explicitly mentioned in its regard, and which, hence, are not analogically derived from the archetype), on the other hand, the relation (anvaya) depends only on the expectation (ākāṅkṣā) of [these] subsidiaries (aṅga), since the principal's expectation is [already] appeased by the archetypal (prākṛta) subsidiaries (aṅga).

In the archetype [ritual] (prakṛti), at first the principal bhāvanā expects (ākāṅkṣā) a procedure (itikartavyatā) in the form (rūpa) of an assistance (upakāra) to [its] instrument (karaṇa). Nevertheless, since there is no linguistic element (śabda) providing (upasthā-) it (auxiliary function), [the bhāvanā] is first related (anvaya) to the subsidiaries (aṅga) directly mentioned (śruta), according to what is the main [element] (śeṣin) and what must be supplied (śeṣa) [to it]. An auxiliary function (upakāra) is postulated (kḷp-) [only] afterwards, in order to accomplish (nirvah-) them. In the ectype [ritual] (vikṛti), on the other hand, since there is no linguistic element (śabda) providing (upasthā-) neither the items (padārtha) (that is, the subsidiaries) nor the assistance (upakāra), there is first the relation with the assistance (upakāra), according to the sequence (krama) of expectation (ākāṅkṣā). Then [the relation] of the items (padārtha) [occurs]. Therefore indeed, at first the undivided (akhaṇḍa) assistance (upakāra) –to be brought about (niṣpad-) by all subsidiaries (aṅga) together, and [bearing] the form (rūpa) of a complex (sāmagrī-mil-)– is analogically extended (atideśa) into the supreme (parama) apūrva. [In turn], this [supreme apūrva] must be produced (jan-) by the apūrvas [generated by] the coming into existence (utpatti) [of the main offerings], which are its instruments (karaṇa). Thereafter,

the intermediate (avāntara) assistances (upakāra) are analogically extended (atideśa): the one consisting in (rūpa) apūrva [is analogically extended] to the directly [contributing] auxiliaries (ārādupakāra); the one consisting in (rūpa) factors of action (kāraka) effecting something (kiñcitkāra[95]) (such as threshing, sprinkling, grinding…) to the indirectly contributing [auxiliaries] (sannipat); and the one that immediately (sākṣāt) brings about (niṣpad-) the [ritual] action (kriyā) to substances (dravya). (That is, substances, etc., have still not been analogically extended, but their assisting function has. And the assisting function of directly contributing auxiliaries consists of apūrva, since they do not affect any substance directly. The assisting function of indirect auxiliaries consists instead of a concrete act, such as threshing. The act itself is not extended, but its assisting function is. Last, the assisting function of substances consists in their directly completing the ritual action (as against Deities, which only indirectly contribute to it)). Thereafter [there is the analogical extension] of the ritual items (padārtha). (Until the last step, only functions have been analogically extended, but no concrete agent or recipient of them. In the last step, instead, substances and Deities are analogically extended.)[96]

A.6.3 Modification

Since the analogical extension (atideśa) of [ritual] items (padārtha) is preceded by [that of] the assistance (upakāra), in order to realise (sidh-) it (analogical extension of ritual items), a change (ūha) is realised (sidh-). [Such change] is an alteration (vikāra) in the usage (prayoga), characterised as the supplement (śeṣa) of ectypal (vaikṛta) mantras, substances (dravya), and Deities [to the ectypal bhāvanā]. [The alteration] regards tunes (sāman[97]), purifications/preparations (saṃskāra) and mantras in ectype [rituals] (vikṛti) which are joined (yuj-) [respectively] to other mantras, other substances, other Deities. For example (yathā), in the ectypal [ritual] (vikṛti) joined to Sūrya, there occurs a connection (sambandha) of the mantra "Agreeable (juṣṭa) to Agni, I pour [this offering] out (nirvap-)" with the ectypal (vaikṛta) Deity (that is, Sūrya). [This connection comes about] through the insertion (prakṣepa) of the word (pada) referring to him (Sūrya)[98]. In the same way (tathā), there is a connection (sambandha) of the improvements/preparations (saṃskāra) like threshing, sprinkling etc., [originally]

[95]The same term is found in PrP: iha [adhyāyanavidhau] tv adhyāpanavidhiprayuktyaivādhikāraparyavasānakalpanām antareṇānuṣṭhānaṃ labdham iti prāthamyam akiñcitkaram (PrP, Śāstramukha 1904, 10).

[96]I am indebted to Prof. Kei Kataoka for having helped me in understanding the process of analogical extension of upakāra.

[97]«sāman n […] Meist versteht man aber unter s. die Grundmelodie allein; ein und dieselbe Melodie kann also auch durchaus verschiedenen Versen zugeordnet werden» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

[98]The Saurya ritual is an ectype of the Full- and New-Moon one.

joined to rice (vrīhi), with the substance (dravya) wild rice (nīvāra) in the sacrifice (yāga) joined (yuj-) to the wild-rice-oblation[99]. In the same way, in the sacrifice (yāga) joined to another ṛc there is a relation of it (the new ṛc) with the tunes (sāman) [bearing] the form (rūpa) of a specific (viśeṣa) song (gīti). For example (yathā), the connection (sambandha) of a particular song (gīti) –defined (lakṣ-) as rathantara and having the abhivatī[100] ṛcs as [its] substratum (āśri-)– with the kavatī kind of ṛcs in "In the kavatī [ṛcs], he [should] sing the Rathantara [tune]".
Also in regard to this change (ūha) [just as in the case of analogical extension] the instrument of knowledge is the prescription (vidhi) [regarding] the ectype [rituals] (vaikṛta) accompanied (sahāya) by such an injunctive (cud-) sentence (vākya): "The assistance (upakāra) must assist (upakṛ-) the ectype [ritual] (vikṛti), joined to another Deity, etc., according to the very same mode (prakāra) and through the same subsidiaries (aṅga) through which it (assistance) has been completed (sampad-) in the archetypal rituals (prakṛti)". Sometimes, on the other hand, the assistance (upakāra) typical of the archetype [ritual] (prākṛta) cannot be completed (sampad-), [since] threshing [cannot occur] in regard to, e.g., the berries of Abrus precatorius (kṛṣṇala) [which cannot be threshed] or similarly grinding (piṣ-) [cannot occur] in the case of oblations (caru) [since they should not be grind], or else there is the contrary determination (pratyāmnāna): "One should spread Saccharum Sara grass instead of Kuśa grass (darbha)" and in the same way there is the prohibition (pratiṣedha) to choose (vṛ-) the ārṣeya [tune (sāman)]. In these cases, in the ectype [ritual] (vikṛti) a subsequent invalidating cognition (bādha) is established (sidh-), characterised as the non-relation (anvaya) (of the assistance in its archetypal form with the ectype ritual)[101], because of a [specific] limitation (saṅkoca) of the injunctive [sentence] (cud-), which operates (pravṛt-) in general (sāmānya).

A.7 Summary of the Bhāṭṭa position

A.7.1 Summary of A.4-A.6

In this way (evam), there being, for bhāvanās of archetype [rituals] (prakṛti), a relation (anvaya) with the three parts (aṃśa) (what is to be realised, in-

[99] In the archetypal sacrifice, Darśapūrṇamāsa, rice (vrīhi) is used and it is prepared through sprinkling etc., In its ectype, the Vājapeya sacrifice, wild rice (nīvāra) is prescribed instead of rice, but the same preparations (saṃskāra) must be done to wild rice, too. So, these preparations must be adjusted to the wild-rice and the alterations they undergo in order to get adjusted to the new substance are called ūha.

[100] «I.e., the verses beginning with "abhi tvā śūra nonuma" (Ṛgveda 7.32.22) over which the Rathantara Sāman is normally sung», whereas the kavatī verses are «the verses beginning with "kayā naścitra ābhuva", Ṛgveda 4.31.1» (Gaṅgānātha Jhā, translation of ŚBh 7.2.2, 1934:1254).

[101] On this application of bādha, see the tenth adhyāya of MS and TR I, p.3 ll. 2-4

strument and procedure) by means of the sixfold instruction[102]; and there being for bhāvanās of ectype [rituals] (vikṛti), on the other hand, a connection in regard to the two parts of instrument (karaṇa) and thing to be brought about (bhāvya) [but not procedure] by means of direct mentions (śruti) in the sentences referring to them (ectype sacrifices) (svavākya), and [also] a relation with the subsidiaries (aṅga) which are explicitly taught (upadiś-) by means of direct direct mention (śruti) and [the other six means] [the other auxiliaries constituting the procedure are, instead, analogically extended from the archetype sacrifice], an archetype [ritual] (prākṛta) and an ectype [ritual] (vaikṛta) prescription[103] (the author refers to the mahāvākya prescription, as in 4.2.9) causes a person (puruṣa), who is either desirous of this or that result or points to the avoidance (parihāra) of [her] offences (pratyavāya), to perform (anuṣṭhā-) these various (tās tāḥ) bhāvanās (that is, ritual actions), specified (viśiṣṭa) by all subsidiaries (aṅga). In sacrifices (yāga) consisting in many instruments (karaṇa) (such as the Full- and New-Moon one, which is composed of six main offerings, or the King's initiation, see §C.11.7.7)[104] [the prescription causes the person to perform the bhāvanās] according to the sequence (krama) understood by means of knowledge such as direct mention (śruti), sense (artha), text (paṭhana), etc. (that is, the means of knowledge of the performative (prayoga) aspect of a prescription, which causes one to perform the sacrifice in the proper order). [The sacrifice's auxiliaries' performance occurs] through contrivance (tantra) of the directly [contributing] auxiliaries (ārādupakāraka), since [they bestow] a single assistance (upakāra), or –if there is a difference of place, time, agent (kartṛ)– through their repetition (āvṛtti)[105],[106].

A.7.2 Summary of the siddhānta of A.3

Therefore it is established (sidh-) that the meaning of the prescription, expressed (vac-) by suffixes (pratyaya) such as the optative (liṅ) and having as core the incitement (preraṇā), is the content to be known (prameya) by the whole/entire (kṛtsna) Sacred Text (śāstra, i.e., the Veda) because [the whole Sacred Text] causes [one] to perform (anuṣṭhā-) [the sacrifice] (the hierarchi-

[102]I could not settle whether what is meant here are śruti and the other means of knowledge or the first six chapters of the MS, MS 1-6.

[103]I think prākṛto vaikṛtaś ca vidhiḥ … anuṣṭhāpayati should be interpreted as if it were "The archetype or the ectype prescription…" (prākṛto vaikṛto vā), in order to explain the singular in the verb. I discussed this point with Prof. Kei Kataoka, who pointed out that -to vā cannot be mistaken for -taś ca.

[104]I am grateful to Prof. Kei Kataoka for having discussed this point with me.

[105]See MS 6 XXXX.

[106]That is, when there are many instruments one follows the sequence determined by those instruments of knowledge which refer to the performance, since they are companions of the prayogavidhi. A different class of companions of the prayogavidhi, that is, time, etc. are instead used to determine whether the directly contributing auxiliaries are to be performed just once or are to be repeated (see above, §C.5.4).

cal relations of prescriptions, etc., described in §§C.4-C.6, prove that there is no portion of the Veda which is not connected to a prescription enjoining a ritual)». This is the summary (saṅkṣepa) concerning the meaning of Sacred Texts (śāstra). It has been designated/stated (abhidhā) in this way by us in the Nāyakaratna , a commentary on the Nyāyaratnamālā.

A.8 Siddhānta

A.8.1 Siddhānta against A.7.1

[S:] «This is incongruous (anupapanna). It would be like that, instead, if a [directly] denoted (abhidhā) prescription (vidhi) would be expressed (vac-) by suffixes like the optative (liṅ) ones (that is, if the optative (liṅ) and other suffixes would primarily denote a prescription). But it is not like that, since the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes], first and foremost point (para) to what must be done (kārya). The [view] that [the optative and the other suffixes] point to the prescription, which has been described by this or that (Bhāṭṭa) upholder (in §C.3.6, §C.3.8), has been despised (upekṣ-), to begin with, by those of the same persuasion (that is, by Pārthasārathi Miśra in his UPs, and here in §C.3.15). And we have criticised it (see §C.3.7, §C.3.9) (not too strong, otherwise it would have been nirākṛta).

A.8.2 Siddhānta against A.3.17

But even this (Pārthasārathi Miśra's) last position (pakṣa) (referred above, §C.3.17, p. 48, ll. 22-3) —namely, that the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] denote (abhidhā), in the guise (veṣa) of an incitement (pravartanā), the fact of being a means to realise something desired (iṣṭasādhana) belonging (gata) to the bhāvanā— even this is incongruous (anupapanna), since that the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] express the bhāvanā has been [already] refuted (nirākṛ-) above (adhastāt) (namely while explaining that a bhāvanā is only indirectly signified by exhortative sufffixes, see §C.3.10) [p.53], while the denotation (abhidhā) [of the bhāvanā as the means for achieving something desired] in the guise (veṣa) of an incitement (pravartanā) is far-fetched (dūre). Therefore, indeed, also the mode (prakāra) of the relation (anvaya) with the meaning of the Sacred Texts (i.e., the prescription) (śāstra) subscribed (abhiman-) by the (upholders of this view) (see §§C.4-C.6, p. 48, l. 30-p.53) is incongruous. And a different relation [of all Vedic semantemes with the core meaning of Sacred Texts, i.e., in our view, what must be done] will be said/stated (in §§C.10-C.13).

A.8.3 Siddhānta as in A.2

Therefore the content to be known (prameya) through the Sacred Texts (śāstra), and the essence (tattva) of prescriptions (vidhi)[107] is other (anya) [than what the Bhāṭṭas say], namely it is something to be done (kārya), which is apūrva, as it is not preceded by any other means of knowledge. For the optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] are learned (vyutpatti) as referring only to that».

A.9 Is apūrva denoted by optative (liṅ) and other suffixes?

(The §C.9 discussion parallels the §C.3 one. In §C.3 the Bhāṭṭa siddhānta upheld by Pārthasārathi Miśra was faced with objections, and now the Prābhākara siddhānta is faced with same and different objections.)

A.9.1 PP against A.8.3: what must be done cannot be unprecedented, because then one would not comprehend its meaning

[PP:] «But how can [they] be learned (vyutpatti) as referring to that? Once a meant entity (artha), which is in the sphere of application (gocara) of the means of knowledge such as sense perception, is made known through a sentence (vākya), it is correct (yukta) that one learns (vyutpatti) [the meaning of the word referring to it] because of the practical activity (vyavahāra) relating to it. But how can there be practical activity (vyavahāra) in regard to something fully new (apūrva), which is not in the sphere of application of another instrument of knowledge? And even more, how can one learn (vyutpatti) its [meaning]? And most of all, how can optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] point to that? It (apūrva) [can] not be understood (avagam-) from a Vedic sentence [either], since there would be a mutual presupposition (itaretarāśraya); namely the grasping of the potential [meaning] (śaktigraha) occurs because of a practical activity (vyavahāra) [occurring] in respect to it, [only] once [an instrument of knowledge] communicates (budh-) it. But (ca) the [Veda] communicates (budh-) [something to be done having the nature of apūrva], [only] once its [meaning] has been grasped (grah-) (since the apprehension of a meaning occurs only from a practical activity).

[107] That what must be done is the 'essence of prescriptions' (vidhitattva) will be repeated in the very last line of TR IV.

A.9.2 Something to be done can instead be expressed as an action by the verbal root, while the optative endings only express the number (see above A.3.9-A.3.10)

Moreover, if one [considers] that [a sentence associated with the optative and the other suffixes[108]] points (para) to something to be done (kārya) [not insofar as it has the nature of apūrva, but as] being an action (kriyā), then there is also an economy (laghu) of postulations (kḷp-) of [meaning] potencies (śakti). To elaborate: the verbal root (dhātu) alone utters/expresses the action (kriyā), which is something to be done (kārya). On the other hand, optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] coming after (para) the verbal root[109], which expresses (vac-) such a meaning (artha) (i.e., the action as something to be done), can only express (vac-) the number (saṅkhyā) of the agent (kartṛ) [as mentioned by the S, see above A.3.9, C.3.9, p. 45].
However, hearing the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] one understands (avagam-) that the verbal root (dhātu) operates (pravṛt-) for the sake of [expressing] such a meaning (artha) (namely, the action to be done). Hence, [by hearing the optative and the other suffixes] it is also (ca) possible (sambhū-) to understand (avagam-) that the verbal root (dhātu) means (artha) something to be done (kārya), like what is present (vartamāna), [past], etc. is ascertained (adhyavaso-) through [the suffixes] laḍ, etc. Also these [suffixes laḍ, etc.] are prescribed (vidhā-) [by Grammar] "In case of a present meaning (artha), after the root (dhātu) one is presently dealing with (vartamāna)[110]". But they themselves do not express (vac-) the time (kāla)[111]».

A.9.3 S against the A.9.2: the optative (liṅ) and the other suffixes surely denote something to be done. This is totally new (apūrva), because it can be connected with "the one who is desirous of heaven" and similar words (indicating an enjoined person) (and heaven can only be brought about by something exceeding our normal experience, see A.9.3.2)

[S:] «In this regard it [must] be said [in response] (ucyate): the fact that optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] point to something to be done (kārya), to

[108] In this context, one would expect kriyākāryaparatve to refer to either the optative (liṅ), and similar verbal endings or to the verbal root (dhātu). That kriyākāryaparatve presupposes a liṅādiyuktavākya as its logical agent is driven from the parallel VM passage, quoted in the corresponding footnote of the Sanskrit text.

[109] As an example of this use of para, see Āṣṭādhyāyī 1.4.81 and 82: te prāg dhātoḥ || chandasi pare 'pi.

[110] vartamāna is used in the Kāśikā Vṛtti to refer to the situation previous to the change applied by the rule enjoined. See ad A 1.1.29, 1.1.30, 1.1.45 and passim.

[111] Similarly, liṅ and the other similar suffixes by themselves do not express what must be done, but one can infer from them, the presence of a verbal root expressing it.

begin with (tāvat), lies beyond dispute. But, [moreover, in our opinion], they point to something to be done (kārya) which is fully new (apūrva) because of their capability (sāmarthya) to relate (anvaya) to words (pada) [such as] "One desirous of heaven". To elaborate: in [injunctions] such as, "One desirous of heaven should sacrifice," words (pada) such as, "The one who is desirous (kāma) of heaven" do not point (para) merely to the agent (kartṛ). It has instead been discerned (nirnī-) in the first topic (adhikaraṇa)[112] of the sixth book [of MS] that they refer to the one who has been enjoined (niyojya). The one who regards (ave-) something to be done (kārya) as connected (sambandh-) to himself [in this way]: "This must be done (kārya) by me" is said to be the enjoined person (niyojya). Nor is another capable (kṣam-) of understanding (vid-) what must be brought forth (abhinirvṛt-) by the activity (vyāpāra) of another as something to be done (kārya), in so far as [the fact of being something to be done] is connected to oneself[113]. Therefore the one who clearly apprehends (pratī-) that "This must be done (kārya) by me" is the enjoined person (niyojya). That is stated [in the following verse]:

> And the enjoined person (niyojya) is the one who perceives (budh-) the duty (kārya) as his own (svakīya). (VM II, v. 18)

The relation (anvaya) of the enjoined person (niyojya) [within the prescription] is the relation [of the person] insofar as she perceives (budh-) [what must be done as related to herself].

A.9.3.1 The same holds true in ordinary experience, too (so the hermeneutic circle can be set into motion in ordinary experience)

And this (connection of the enjoined person as the one who understands something as her duty) is comprehensively learnt (vyutpanna) also in world[ly usage] (loka). For instance: in [expressions] such as, "The one who is desirous of a well-nourished condition should drink milk (kṣīra)," the one desirous of a well-nourished condition is related (anvi-) (to the prescription) insofar as she perceives (budh-) that "The drinking of milk must be done by me". In the same way, when there is the employment (prayoga) of the vocative (sambodhana) in "Devadatta, cook!," Devadatta understands the cooking as something to be done (kārya) [by him].

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[112]The svargakāmādhikaraṇa (MS 6.1.1) is indeed dedicated to a discussion on adhikāra. Although it does not deal with niyojya, Śālikanātha (possibly following Prabhākara) interprets it so (see the VM and VN quotations in the footnotes of the Sanskrit text). In the same adhikaraṇa also the equivalence heaven-happiness (see below, A.9.3.2, ll. 22-29, C.9.3.2) is dealt with.

[113]The sentence could also just mean "One cannot understand what must be brought about (abhinirvṛt-) by the activity (vyāpāra) of another as something to be done (kārya) by himself". I adopted this more complicate interpretation because the easier one could have been expressed in a smoother way by just na [...] anyaḥ svakāryatvena veditum kṣamate.

A.9.3.2 "Heaven" means happiness

And the word (śabda) 'heaven' (svarga) expresses (vac-) a specific (viśeṣa) pleasure (sukha), because it is used (prayoga) referring to garlands (sraj), sandal (candana), etc., which are means to realise (sādhana) a [specific kind of pleasure][114]. And in such cases (when it refers to those things) the employment (prayoga) (of the word "heaven") is not founded/based (nibandhana) on the nature (svarūpa) of the things (vastu) by themselves, because no employment (prayoga) (of this word) is [commonly] seen (dṛś-) [in their regard] once pleasure (sukha) has ceased (apagam-) [for instance, a short while after sandal has been applied and one does not feel anymore its refreshing effect, one does not call the sandal past "heaven" anymore]. If [it] did not designate (abhidhā-) it (pleasure), [the word "heaven"] could not possibly designate a means to realise (sādhana) pleasure, [so it must indicate pleasure]. And it would be cumbersome (gaurava) [to imagine that "heaven"] designates (abhidhā) both (pleasure and its means). And once it is agreed upon (abhyupagam-) that ["heaven"] designates (abhidhā) it (pleasure), [one understands that] since [sandal, etc.] are means to realise (sādhana) that (pleasure) [they] are indeed indirectly signified (lakṣaṇā) [through the word "heaven"] . And since in the arthavādas [which are helpful for the understanding of the prescription's words in case of ambiguous meanings, see §C.9.5.1] there is direct mention (śravaṇa) of gladness (prīti), which is unmixed (asambhinna) with pain (duḥkha), can be enjoyed (upabhogya) for a long time (cira), and is to be brought about because one yearns (abhilāṣā) for it, [the word "heaven"] points (para) to it (pleasure). And this gladness (prīti) can be enjoyed (bhogya) in another body (deha). It (heaven) is something yet to be realised (sādhya) because it is joined (yoga) with longing (kām-) and there is indeed no longing in respect to something which is already realised (siddha). Therefore, the person to be enjoined (niyojya), specified/qualified (viśiṣṭa) by [a desire for] heaven (svarga) as something to be realised (sādhya), is able (alam) to perceive (budh-) that thing to be done (kārya) which is a means (sādhana) to realise what s/he longs for (svakāmya)».

A.9.4 PP: let it be that the Vedic injunctions express the action as something to be done

[PP:] «If it is so (that is, if the optative and the other suffixes denote something to be done, I argue that] it is only the action (kriyā) which is communicated (budh-) [by Vedic injunctions] as something to be done (kārya)».

[114] In the ŚBh (ad MS 6.1.1, see fn to the Sanskrit text) several examples of the usage of svarga as referring to sandal-paste, beautiful women, etc., are indeed listed.

A.9.4.1 S: No, since the action perishes immediately and cannot realise happiness

[S:] «If it were so, the relation (anvaya) with the enjoined person (niyojya) [of the action] would be destroyed/empaired (vighaṭ-) because it is impossible (yoga) that this [action], perishing at each moment, is a means to realise (sādhana) a heaven enjoyable (bhogya) in another time (kāla) or in another body (deha)[115]/because of the unfitness (ayoga cannot be 'non connection') of that action to be a sādhana, a connection [of it] with the niyojya would be unsuitable. Therefore, what is expressed (vac-) by optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] supers (that is, does not exclude, but is more than that) (uttṝ-) this [action]. That has been said [in the following verse]: [p.54]

> Therefore, what must be done (kārya), capable (samartha) of being connected (sambandh-) to the enjoined person | and lasting until some other time (kāla)[116], is said to be different (bhinna) from the action (kriyā) by the upholders of the prescription (vidhi) [i.e., the Mīmāṃsakas] . || (VM II, v. 23)

A.9.4.2 PP: the action could be said not to perish

[PP:] «But the very action (kriyā) can be [said to] last until some other time (kāla) on the strength of the direct mention (śruti) of [its being the] means to realise [something desired], like, "He should sacrifice with the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices," "He should sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice". And if the action (karman) has [such an extra] potency (śakti) (namely, that of being the means for realising something desired), what is the use of apūrva?».

A.9.4.3 S vs. A.9.4.2

[S:] «It is not so, for the sake of establishing (siddhi) what has been clearly apprehended (pratī-) (that is, that the Full- and New-Moon sacrifices, etc., are the means for realising something desired) something non-contradictory (a-viruddha) must be postulated (kḷp-). But that the action (kriyā) lasts is contradicted (virudh-) by the other means of knowledge. And the continuation (avasthāna) of the potency (śakti), when the action (karman), bearing the potency (śakti) is destroyed/has perished, is contradictory (viruddha)».

[115] I am reading bhogyasvargasādhanatvāyogāt as a sāpekṣasamāsa.

[116] For this usage of kālāntarasthāyin, see Kāśikā ad 3.3.17 (sthiraḥ iti kālāntarasthāyī padārtha ucyate. sa ciraṃ tiṣṭhan kālantaraṃ sarati).

A.9.4.4 PP: then the action pleases a Deity who brings about one's happiness

[PP:] «But then it might be that the action (kriyā) of sacrifice (yāga), etc., which consists of honouring (ārādh-) the Deity (devatā), is expressed (vac-) by optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] as something to be done (kārya). The Deity, honoured by that (action), is satisfied (prasad-) and at another time (kāla) joins/unites the [sacrifice's] agent (kartṛ) with the result [s/he aims at through sacrificing]. And arthavādas such as, "He (the Deity), pleased (prī-), pleases him" and "He causes him to reach/attain prosperity" etc., are directly mentioned [in the Sacred Texts] (śru-). And the root "to sacrifice" (yaj-) is prescribed in Smṛti texts[117] (smṛ-) for the purpose of adoration (pūjā): «The root "to sacrifice" is [used] in the [case of] adoration (pūjā) of a Deity (deva), instrument (karaṇa) for conjunction [with a wished result] (saṅgati) and gift (dāna)». And it is instructed (upadeśa) by learned[118] people (abhiyukta) that the sacrifice (yāga) is the relinquishment (tyāga) of the substances (dravya) in the name (uddeśa) of the/with reference to a Deity[119]».

A.9.4.5 S: the concept of a Deity does not hold because of the conundrum of His/Her having a body

[S:] «Dharmamīmāṃsakas[120] do not toletate (sah-) that. And they assert (vad-) that it is contradicted (virodha) by the means of knowledge [, namely, inference and arthāpatti]. It would be difficult for an embodied (vigrahavat) Deity to be honoured (ārādh-) by acts (karman) undertaken (pravṛt-) simultaneously by sacrificers dwelling in many different places. And it is hard to prove omniscience in a [Deity] devoid of body. This is all fully explained

[117] Vyākaraṇa is included among Smṛtis by Mīmāṃsakas.

[118] We have here three different (and possibly descending) levels of authority: the Sacred Texts, the Smṛti texts and the opinion of learned people (presumably Mīmāṃsakas, see fn of the Sanskrit text). Abhiyukta is never to be found elsewhere in TR. In Vedāntadeśika's Seśvaramīmāṃsā (ad 1.1.2) "uktaṃ [...] śāsanam abhiyuktaiḥ" introduces a quotation of a Viśiṣṭādvaitin author, Parāśarabhaṭṭa, thus confirming the view that abhiyukta identifies people of the same school as the author using such term.

[119] «In Vedic ritual the abandonment, tyāga, of the part committed to the fire, is always in the name of the specific god to whom the sacrifice is destined and who thereby differentiates it from otherwise identical sacrifices» (Heesterman, 1993:17).

[120] Dharmamīmāṃsā: The Pūrvamīmāṃsā of Jaimini (MW). Alessandro Graheli suggests that they could be "theistic Mīmāṃsakas". For, it is obvious that atheist Mīmāṃsakas would not accept it; moreover, being himself a theist Rāmānujācārya cannot but define himself and other theist Mīmāṃsakas as "dharmamīmāṃsakas". Such a designation cannot be employed for a group different from one's own. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that in this case the author neither answers directly nor employes the first person This, together with the usage of abhiyukta, in the above §, could hint at the fact that Rāmānujācārya himself would not refute this opinion (accepted also by people of his same persuasion), but that he must refute it within a Mīmāṃsaka perspective, such as the present one.

in the chapter on Deities (devatādhikaraṇa) [of the MS]».

A.9.4.6 PP: then the action causes a modification and this leads one to happiness

[PP:] «Then, the action (kriyā) could be said to be what must be done (kārya) because it is a purification (saṃskāra) for the sacrificer. And the purified person in another time (kāla) will partake (bhaj-) of the result (phala)».

A.9.4.7 S vs A.9.4.6

[S:] «It is not so, since there is no instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) for the [sacrifice] being a purification (saṃskṛ-). Indeed, sacrifices (yāga) etc., are not directly mentioned [in the Sacred Texts] (śru-) as purifying (saṃskṛ-) the person like [INSTEAD?] the Pāvamānī [ASK IRIS] hymns».

A.9.4.8 PP (Bhāṭṭa): the Veda only speaks of action. So an intermediary must be postulated, although it is not directly known

[PP/Bhāṭṭa:] «But the action (kriyā) alone can be expressed (vac-) as what must be done (kārya)! And since otherwise the direct mention (śru-) of it (action) as a means to realise (sādhana) the result would be incongruous (anyathā-anupapatti), something else, produced by it (action), having the self (ātman) as substratum, favourable to the arousal of the result and lasting until a later time (kāla) must be postulated (kḷp-). [But] it cannot be expressed (vac-) by optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes], [which, on the other hand, only express the action]. (Hence it is not directly mentioned but must be postulated, since the action is designated by the optative and the other suffixes as a means to realise the result but cannot be directly an instrument, as it perishes much before the arousal of the result. So, we do have an instrument of knowledge (against §C.9.4.8) for postulating it, namely, śrutārthāpatti[121].)

A.9.4.9 S: then, the action would no more be the instrument for the arousal of the result!

[S:] «It is not so. That the action is a means to realise (sādhana) the result cannot be logically justified (upapad-) through another postulated [el-

[121] One might ask why does not the Bhāṭṭa just say that an apūrva must be postulated. Probably, in order to avoid the Prābhākara terminology, but possibly also in order to be more generic. Something must be postulated, he says, no matter what it is. The Bhāṭṭa wants in this way to avoid precise answers on the part of the S, just like the ones which have already shown that neither the Deity nor the purification are viable options.

ement/entity], favourable (anuguṇa) to the result. [In that case] its (the action's) being the immediate (sākṣāt) means to realise the result would not be directly mentioned (śru-), because it would be the instrument of something else (not of the result). And indeed the instrument of the instrument is not the [real] instrument[122]. And the accomplishment (nirvah-) of [the action's] being the instrument to realise [the result], as directly mentioned, does not occur through something postulated (kḷp-), since the act (karman[123]) is destroyed (naś-) [by the time the result arises, and hence it cannot be said to be an instrument even though something else, generated by it, leads to the result].

A.9.5 S against A.9.1: it is possible to understand a transcendent thing to be done because one already knows the words expressing it as bearing the meaning of an action to be done, and the syntactical closeness to the enjoined person specifies them

Therefore, it is correct (yukta) that [words] which have been learnt (vyutpanna) in ordinary experience (loka) as pointing/referring to an action to be done (kriyākārya) refer [in the Veda] to something to be done other than that (action), by force of/due to the relation to the enjoined person (niyojya). [So, it is possible to understand the meaning of something to be done unprecedented by any other instrument of knowledge without getting into vicious circles, because also in the world there are things to be done. Hence, one learns through the senior speakers' usage the meaning of a certain words in regard to something to be done in the world. In the Veda, one learns that these things to be done cannot be actions because they are connected with expressions such as, "One who is desirous of heaven," for an action could not lead to the achievement of a result arising much later.] [In fact], the language acquisition (vyutpatti) does not [derive] only from the usage of senior speakers (vṛddhavyavahāra) alone.

A.9.5.1 A word's meaning can be learnt also because of contiguity with other well-known words

In ordinary experience (loka) it (language acquisition) is seen (dṛś-) [to derive] also from being mentioned together (samabhivyāhāra) with well known (prasiddha) words (pada). And also in the Veda, the restriction (niyama) among the [meaning] potencies (śakti) of words such as yava and varāha[124] in "The oblation (caru) is made of yava," "He puts on the varāha-made[125]

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[122]An instrument, according to Pāṇini's definition in A is the sādhakatama kāraka, i.e., the most effective action factor.

[123]Employed as a synonym of kriyā.

[124]As will be explained a few lines below, both terms have two quite different meanings.

[125]Vārāhī is a vedic femm. dual.

shoes" to the [meanings] 'barley' and 'boar' is seen (dṛś-) [to occur] because of being mentioned together [of them and some well-known words] (samabhivyāhāra) in the arthavādas. [In fact,] yava is employed (prayuj-) in the sense of 'barley' and also of 'long pepper' (priyaṅgu), varāha in the sense of 'boar' and also of 'crow' (vāyasa). [And,] there is an arthavāda near (sannidhi) to [the word] yava: "Where other herbs/grasses/plants (oṣadhi) decay/wilt/ (mlai-) they stand rejoicing". Among the [herbs], barley (dīrghaśūka) alone rejoice, while the other herbs are wilted because of ripening [, hence in this case yava means 'barley']. That has been said by the teacher (ācārya) (i.e., Kumārila):

> During the month Phālguṇa (February-March) the falling of the leaves of the other herbs occurs, | the barley-plants (yava), bearing grains, on the other hand, are seen (dṛś-) rejoicing || (TV ad 1.3.8 or 9 (Gosvāmī)[126])

In the same way, there is the arthavāda "The cows follow the varāha". Because of the idea/Due to thinking/ "It is a calf" it is correct/appropriate/ (yukta) for cows to follow only a boar (sūkara), and not a crow [hence, in this case varāha means 'boar']». [So, similarly, something to be done which is not preceded by any other instrument of knowledge can be understood from the Veda because of the closeness to well-known words such as, "The one who is desirous of heaven".] [p.55]

A.9.6 PP (Prābhākara): one can learn the meaning also in regard of a transcendent thing to be done

Disputants [PP/other Prābhākaras] who [know] only a part [of the truth] (ekadeśin), on the other hand, state that «Proficient learning (vyutpatti) occurs also in regard to a transcendent (alaukika) thing to be done (kārya). To elaborate: in ordinary experience (loka), although an action is initiated (pravṛtti) because of knowing that there is something to be done which is an action (kriyā), it is the cognition that something must be done (kārya) which is the condition (nimitta) for undertaking an action (pravṛtti). It is not the own nature (svarūpa) of action (kriyā) [which is the condition for undertaking an action], since this part (aṃśa) (the nature of action) is not applicable to the undertaking of an action (pravṛtti). Hence, a [direct] (i.e., one that does not have an action as its intermediate step) designation (abhidhā) of the transcendent (alaukika) duty (kārya), extracted (niṣkṛṣ-)

[126]Unfortunately I could not find any hint at the reason for the fall of leaves in the Nyāyasudhā commentary on this verse. Since barley grows in Tibet, the reason may well be coldness and not ripening, as maintained by Rāmānujācārya. Taber forthcoming writes: "Since barley matures in early spring when other plants have lost their leaves, this indicates that there is a practice of using *yava* to refer to barley in the Veda" (p.21, TBC CHECK, DhK Intro).

[from the action to be done, but distinct from it since one has become aware that the action is not the element causing the undertaking of the action[127]] is learnt (vyutpanna) from ordinary [linguistic] usage (loka) indeed.»

A.9.7 S vs. 9.6: only an action can be directly understood and not a transcendent thing to be done

[S:] «This is not correct (yukta). Indeed, although it could be said in this way that the [prescriptive sentences] point to something to be done (kārya) in general (mātra), nevertheless as it is [commonly] seen (dṛś-) that in ordinary experience (loka) that thing to be done (kārya) causes [one] to undertake something (pravṛt-) only if it has an action (kriyā) as a substratum, only [something to be done] having it (action) as a substratum can be clearly apprehended (pratī-), and not a transcendent (alaukika) [one]. Likewise, although a word (śabda) expresses (vac-) merely (mātra) the species (jāti), since it is [commonly] seen (dṛś-) that it has an individual as its substratum, no [one] contests (pratikṣip-) the fact that it has that as a substratum. (Similarly, although the Vedic duty is unprecedented, since it is commonly seen that duties exist insofar as there are actions to be done, one cannot doubt the fact that the duty inheres in an action.) Moreover, how could someone desirous to learn (vyutpitsu) [the meaning of optative suffixes] become acquainted with the linguistic usage/corresponding practical activity (vyavahāra) in case of something to be done (kārya) which cannot be known through any other means of knowledge? And if the [usage] is not known, how could the potential [meaning] be grasped (śaktigraha)?

A.9.7.1 In ordinary experience, the action is directly expressed and what has to be done is implicitly understood. In the Veda, vice versa.

In this way, once it has been established (sidh-) according to the said (see above, p. 55, l. 19, §C.9.5) rule (nyāya) that optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] designate something to be done (kārya) as being apūrva, in ordinary experience (loka) something to be done (kārya) is indirectly signified (lakṣ-) as an action (kriyā), because it would be cumbersome (guru) to postulate (kḷp-) a [different] [meaning] potency (śakti) in regard to both [these two different meanings of "something to be done" as an apūrva or as an action; so, it is more economical to consider one of them as the chief meaning and the other as the secondary one]. And indeed the action, if performed (anuṣṭhā-), is the means to realise (sādhana) the apūrva (though worldly actions do not realise any apūrva); hence that what must be done consists in an action (kriyā) is associated (saṅgam-) with the fact that what must be done consists in the

[127] I owe this notation about the double meaning of niṣkṛṣṭa (cf. the kriyādivyatirekini in the corresponding VM II passage) to Prof. John Taber.

apūrva. Therefore, that (apūrva) can be indirectly signified (lakṣ-) [by the optative and the other suffixes]. But, for ordinary (laukika) people it is not possible to apprehend (pratipad-) and employ (prayoga) [a word] in regard to something fully new (apūrva), which is not in the sphere of application of any instrument of knowledge; for it (apūrva) is not within the sphere of application (gocara) of common usage (loka vyavahāra). Therefore, these [ordinary people], since they [cannot] resolve/determine (avadhṛ-) what is the chief meaning, consider (abhimāna) as the chief meaning (artha) [of optative and other suffixes] what must be done (kārya) as being an action (kriyā), and [they] do not consider [this] as the indirect one (lakṣaṇā), like barbarians (mleccha) in case of the words yava and varāha [consider] 'long pepper' and 'crow' [as the chief meanings][128]. Those who are expert in the chief (mukhya) meaning (artha), on the other hand, distinguish between what is chief and what is not chief».

A.9.8 PP (see A.9.4.8): the action is principal and that it has to be done is known through indirect signification

[PP:] «Could it not be that only in regard to the fact that what must be done is an action we have the [expression] of the chief meaning, [whereas] in regard to the other (i.e., as for the apūrva) there is only indirect signification (lakṣ-)?».

A.9.9 S vs A.9.8: No, there cannot be indirect signification in regard to what is unprecedented

[S:] «No, in that (your) case the indirect signification (lakṣ-) would be incongruous (anupapatti) because there would be no complete knowledge of the connection (sambandh-) with the [apūrva], which is not within the sphere of application of another instrument of knowledge (whereas indirect signification requires one to be aware of the relation of the primarily denoted term and of the indirectly signified one, e.g. river and bank in gāṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ, indirectly meaning "The village on the bank of the Gāṅgā"). Moreover, if optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] pointed/referred to something to

[128]This whole passage bears perhaps some echo of the one quoted in TV ad 1.3.8-9. In MS 1.3.8 Jaimini expounds the doubt about what should be done when the Scripture orders to do something using words which have a double signification, like yava and varāha. The PP suggests that one should follow common usage and that since usage is the authority in linguistic matters, there is no usage which can be said to be superior to any other. The S identifies different usages with mleccha and ārya people (further distinguishing, among the latter, between cultivated and uncultivated ones) and replies that what is prescribed in the Veda itself must be followed. Thereby he quotes an arthavāda through which yava can be easiliy identified. Then the PP suggests that as far as visible matters are concerned, mleccha usage is equally authoritative. The S replies that mleccha words enjoy the same denotative power erroneous words do: they secondarily suggest a meaning which is, however, directly signified only by correct, ārya words.

be done as being an action, there would be no evidence (apramāṇaka) at all of apūrva. By the same token, the reference to something to be done in general (mātra), present (anugam-) in both (apūrvakārya and kriyākārya), would be incongruous (anupapad-), too. [In fact,] since a general (sāmānya) [term] (such as kārya) attains completion (paryavaso-) (that is, is qualified) at all events (avaśya) through [something] specific, [its] completion finds place not in regard to something unknown (aprasiddha), but only in regard to something well-known (prasiddha) (that is, the qualifier must be known, otherwise it could not qualify anything at all).

For the above reasons, there could not be a clear apprehension (pratīti) of apūrva [if it were not the primary meaning of optative and other suffixes].

In this way (see A.9.5) it is established that since the apūrva has been comprehensively learnt (vyutpatti) in case of the responsibility for [rituals performed because of one's] desire (kāma)[129] [where we have an enjoined person and the action alone cannot lead to the result], in case of the responsibility for fixed (nitya) and occasional (naimittika) [rituals] and for prohibitions (niṣedha), optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] point/refer to it [too]. [It is so established] because the chief (mukhya) meaning (i.e., something to be done having the nature of apūrva) has been seized (lābha) [in the case of optional rituals]. Insofar as the assertion (abhidhāna) that [optative and similar suffixes] point/refer to (para) something to be done (kārya) which is an action (kriyā) —which tallies (ānuguṇya) with the responsibility (adhikāra) for fixed [rituals]— is incongruous (anupapad-) when the [identification of the] responsibility is based on desire (kāma), there must be uniformity (ekarūpa) in every case [hence, only the apūrvakārya might be the chief meaning].

[Indeed,] the [idea] that the action (kriyā) to be done (kārya) is pointed to (para), that is, designated (abhidhā), tallying (ānuguṇya) with [what fits in regard to] the responsibility (adhikāra) for fixed [rituals], is incongruous (anupapad-) in the case of the responsibility for optional [rituals] (kāma), hence there must be uniformity (ekarūpa) in all cases. (In the case of fixed rituals, both an apūrva- and a kriyākārya meaning would hold, but since only the first one holds in the case of optional rituals, if one wants oneness of meaning, the principal meaning must be apūrvakārya). Therefore it is established (sidh-) that optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] designate (abhidhā) what must be done, which is apūrva[130]».

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[129] In fact, the author seems to use kāmādhikāra as a synonym of kāmyādhikāra (see §§C.10.1, C.10.6, C.10.7, C.10.10, C.10.11, C.11.3) and, consequently, kāma as a synonym of kāmya (scil. yāga)

[130] This is a difficult passage, as testified by the diverging translations of its "archetype" VM passage. Sarma writes: «But by means of the utility of the regular rite, the state of denoting the performable by the action is inconsistent in respect of the prospective rites and as such the unique result is the meaning of the sentence in all respects» (Sarma 1987:74). Wicher proposes: «Durch die Gleichartigkeit mit dem Begehrten ist aber im Hinblick auf (Vorschriften, die sich auf) die ständige Befugnis (beziehen) das Bezeichnen der Tätigkeit als Zutuendes unmöglich; somit ist in jedem Fall nur das Apūrva Satzinhalt»

A.9.10 PP (Maṇḍana), see A.3.1, A.9.4.8

[PP/Maṇḍana Miśra:] «But/But isn't it the case that/one undertakes an action (pravṛtti) because one knows that [the action to be undertaken] is a means for realising something desired (iṣṭasādhana), not because one knows that something must be done. That has been said [in the following verse]:

> Without a goal in mind, even the fool does not undertake an action (pravṛt-) || (ŚV sambandhā 55ab)

"Goal" means 'result'. That alone (eva) is expressed (vac-) by the optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes]. Hence it has been said:

> The prescription (vidhi) is considered (iṣ-) by reflective people exactly as the [suitable] instrument (upāya) for [the achievement of] something required (apekṣ-) || (Brahmasiddhi 3.104cd, **Brahmasiddhi**)

Therefore, optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] must either express (vac-) that the action (kriyā) is the means to realise what is desired (iṣṭasādhana) or that the bhāvanā (i.e. the initiation of the action) is. And what delivers the [knowledge of] the specific [thing] desired (iṣṭa) is the word (pada), for instance, 'heaven' (svarga), belonging (gata) to the enunciation of the prescription (vidhi) (e.g., "svargakāmo yajeta" as distinguished from the whole sacrificial passage endowed with subsidiaries, etc.). And since otherwise it

(Wicher 1987: 185). And in a note she explains her rendering: «Der Satz muss wie folgt korrigiert werden: kāmyādhikārānuguṇyena tu kriyākāryatvābhidhānaṃ nityeṣv anupapannam. Entsprechende Manuskriptvarianten fehlen». At first, I interpreted the sentence as she does, but the TR reading is a further evidence against it, as it would be difficult to explain why all VM and TR manuscripts agree on a completely opposite reading. Personally, I have been convinced by K.T. Pandurangi explanation of this VM passage: «So far the fact that the kārya is the import of injunctive suffix is discussed with reference to the injunctions in respect of kāmya karmas. Now, it must be worked out with refrence to nitya and naimittika karmas, and niṣedhas ie prohibitions. In these cases there is no result i.e. svarga. Therefore, it appears that it is difficult to get adhikārin and niyojya for the kārya i.e. niyoga, in these cases. However, the statement yāvad jīvam agnihotram juhuyāt states that jīvana is the ground for the adhikāra here. Hence, adhikārin and niyojya are available here without any reference to the result. It is made clear more than once that the result is not the ground for pravṛtti i.e., initiative, rather the comprehension of kārya is the ground. Therefore, in the case of nitya karmas since the adhikārin and niyojya comprehends the kārya without needing the qualification of phalakāmanā to be an adhikārin and niyojya, there is no difficulty in undertaking initiative by him. He comprehends kārya from the Vedic injunction without the need of a result» (Pandurangi 2004: 421). The example taken into consideration until now in the TR is in fact the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifice, which is the archetype of all optional sacrifices: «kāmyeṣṭi f, Wunschopfer. Diese sind nicht obligatorisch (nitya), sondern aperiodisch. Die k. dienen jeweils einem bestimmten Zweck (Erlangung eines langen Lebens, vieler Söhne, ergiebigen Regens usw.) und gehen ohne scharfe Grenze in Zauberhandlungen über; sie folgen dem Grundtyp des darśapūrṇamāsa» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

would be incongruous (anyathānupapatti) that [the sacrifice] is the instrument to realise [what is desired], the apūrva must be postulated (kḷp-). But it is not expressed (vac-)».

A.9.10.1 S vs. A.9.10: activity is not seen in regard to whatever is a means towards a desired end! (So, this is not the only possible explanation.)

[S:] «We rebut (parihṛ-) this, although [its] main point (prāya) has already been rebutted (see above, §C.3.2, §C.9.4.9). The being a means to realise something desired (iṣṭasādhana) does not promote (prayuj-) the undertaking of an action (pravṛtti), since no undertaking of action is [commonly] seen (dṛś-) in regard to present (since one is already eating, no action needs to be undertaken) and past eating, etc., which are a means to realise (sādhana) contentment (tṛpti), [and] since even in regard to future means to realise results, such as [bodily] marks (lakṣ-) revealing (sūc-) good fortune, which are made known by the experts of fortune-telling (sāmudrika), no action is undertaken (pravṛtti)[131], [and] since, similarly, no action is undertaken when the means to realise (sādhana) future results, like rain and sunshine (ātapa), depend on fate (daivika) [p.56]».

A.9.10.2 PP: being to be done (which is, according to you, the cause of one's undertaking an action) is nothing but being a means to something desired

On this matter, someone (a PP following Maṇḍana Miśra) states/says: «Being something to be done (kārya) is nothing other than being a means to realise what is desired (iṣṭasādhana). And this alone is the cause for undertaking an action (pravṛtti)» [, hence, although it may be possible that one does not undertake an action in regard to every means for the achievement of something desired, still when one does undertake an action, then the latter is surely the reason. So the previous counterexamples do not completely defeat the theory].

A.9.10.3 S: No, they are different.

[S:] «It is not so. In regard to a past and present eating and in regard to a future rain, we can say that they are the means to realise something desired,

[131] The gist of the passage, opposing bhaviṣyatsu phalasādhaneṣu and bhaviṣyatphalasādhaneṣu seems to indicate that those auspicious marks will become means for the arousal of good fortune, whereas for the time being they just indicate (sūc-) it. In fact, according to the Indian study of bodily marks, bodily marks change throughout one's life according to one's being. Again (but I could not find any direct statement supporting that), those changed marks are the cause of one's good fortune, etc. Still, one does not undertake any activity in order to modify one's bodily signs.

but not that they are to be done. Therefore, being something to be done is one thing, being the instrument to realise what is desired is another».

A.9.10.4 PP: one would not undertake ritual actions if not for the sake of a result

[PP/Maṇḍana Miśra:] «But that a painful act (karman) must be done hangs on its being a means to realise something desired[132]».

A.9.10.5 S vs.A.9.10.4: the fact of being to be done is broader than fact of being a means to realise a desired end

[S:] «[Yes], but not without any intermediate step (sākṣāt). Although two [things] (that is, being what must be done and being the instrument towards something desired) [at some point] are directed (niviś-) into one, [their] difference does not cease. Being a means to realise the result is being a device (upāya) in regard to the result (phala). Being to be done (kārya) is being what is principal (pradhāna) in regard to the undertaking of the action (kṛti), and having its essence (sattā) hanging/dependent on that (action)[133]. It is not being that whose realisation (sidh-) alone depends on the undertaking of the action (kṛti) (as stated above, see §C.3.12[134]). And the principal [factor] in regard to the undertaking of the action is that in relation (adhikṛ-) to which the action operates (pravṛt-). An action (kṛti) does not operate (pravṛtti) in relation to pain (duḥkha) or to the means to realise it. Rather [it operates in relation to] pleasure [which is hence something to be done] or the instrument to realise pleasure. And, [on the other hand,] one understands that it must be done (kārya) founded on its being an instrument to realise it (pleasure) (so, its being an instrument towards something desired leads one to understand that it must be done and the two aspects become one). But [one does] not [understand that it must be done] by virtue of [its] being the principal [factor] itself. Therefore, it is not principal in regard to

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[132] Thanks also to the polysemy of karman, meaning both 'act' and 'ritual act', this argument refers to sacrifice, which is considered by itself an unpleasant activity that human beings only undertake as they know it will lead to future, pleasant results.

[133] These two statements might seem at first sight contradictory. What is meant, however, is that something to be done cannot exist if not in relation to an action (see TR II, p.18 of the 1956 edition: idam eva karma svatas sādhyatayā sākṣād vidheyam. siddhasvabhāvayos tu dravyaguṇayos taduparāgāt.). On the other hand, the fact of being to be done is the principal factor in regard to the undertaking of the action since, as explained immediately below, it is the factor causing one to undertake an action.

[134] This turn of the argument seems to be slightly beside the point. In fact, in §C.3.12 the S has stated that the kārya is kṛtyadhīnasiddhi, that is, that what must be done depends on an action in order to be realised. Why should he now state that it is not just that? Maybe because an instrument for the realisation of something desired is instead something which depends on an action only insofar as the realisation of its result is concerned. Its link to the action is, hence, much less intimate.

the [pleasure-realising] undertaking of action (kṛti). Everyone regards (ave-) pleasure as what must be done (kārya), without requiring (apekṣ-) that it is an instrument to realise a result. (In short, the fact of being an instrument towards something desired does not by itself cause one to undertake an action, whereas the fact of being to be done, i.e. the fact of being pleasure, does.) Thus, the fact that something is to be done exceeds (uttṝ-) the fact of being an instrument to realise [a result] (because the being an instrument towards something desired merges into being something to be done, whereas the opposite is not true[135]). On the other hand, it is not just the being an instrument to realise what is desired [as the PP claimed in §C.9.10.2].

A.9.10.6 Further argument against A.9.10: through inference one knows what has to be done as the cause of action

And this thing to be done (kārya) is known (vid-) in ordinary experience (loka) through sense perception and inference [jointly]. The undertaking of action (kṛti) is indeed known (vid-) through mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa), from inference one [knows] that it is something to be realised (sādhya). It is also by itself sense-perceptible in [one's] undertaking of an action (pravṛtti) that the effort (prayatna) has a specific (viśiṣṭa) promoter (prayojana) (that is, one immediately knows through mental perception that one's efforts have been impelled by the fact that the action is to be done). Even when the undertaking is rooted in a sentence (vākya) (i.e., it is known through verbal communication as instrument of knowledge), only such a cognition that something must be done (kārya) promotes [one] (prayuj-) to undertake an action (pravṛtti), not the knowledge that something is the instrument to realise something desired [that impels one to undertake an action] (against the claim of the followers of Maṇḍana Miśra in §C.3.1 and §C.9.10).

[135]In short, either pleasure or an action instrumental to its arousal are something to be done, so kāryatva exceeds sādhanatva as a cause for the initiation of an action. In fact, what must be done (kāryatva) is tantamount to the desired fruit (such as sukha, pleasure) and both of them by themselves cause an action to be, unlike the knowledge that an action is the instrument towards a desired aim, which causes one to undertake an action only for the sake of something outside such a cognition.

A.9.11 Summary of A.9.9-A.9.10: In ordinary experience, optative and similar suffixes designate the action and, through inference, what has to be done; in the Veda, they denote what has to be done, as shown by contiguity to well-known words (see A.9.5.1)

In ordinary [linguistic] usage (loka), optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes], prescribed (vidhā-) [by Grammar[136]] [as] following the verbal roots (dhātu), which express (vac-) the action, point merely to the action (kriyā) to be done (kārya) (lit.:to what must be done insofar as it consists in an action).

In the Veda, on the other hand, they point to the apūrva, because [they] are mentioned together (samabhivyāhāra) with the enjoined person (niyojya), whose [meaning] is well known (prasiddha)[137]. Therefore it is certain (sthita) that the being something to be done is something other than the being the means to realise (sādhana) [a result]. Therefore, those who claim that also the apūrva must be done (kārya) only insofar as it is an instrument towards the result (phalasādhana), are refuted; for it is congruous (upapatti) that, like the result (phala) (which one immediately understands as something to be done by itself, see §C.9.10.5), also the apūrva is something to be done even without being an instrument to realise [a result] (sādhana). Thus, [also] in the case of [prescriptions regarding the] responsibility for fixed (nitya) and occasional (naimittika) [rituals], it is only [stated] that the [action to be undertaken] is something to be done, not that [it] is an instrument to realise (sādhana) [a result] (see §C.9.9)».

A.9.12 PP vs. A.9.11: one acts because of will (see above, A.3.8)

[PP:] «But [if the awareness that the action to be undertaken is the means to realise a desired result is not the reason for one's undertaking an action], then the will (icchā) is the cause (hetu) of the undertaking of an action (pravṛtti). "He knows-he wants-he acts" is indeed the boundary (maryādā) set by the Logic (nyāya) system (śāstra)[138] [to any further speculation on this field]. And this (wish) must be expressed (vac-) by optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes]».

[136] vihita prescribed by a rule; that for which a vidhi or injunction has been laid down. The word is very frequently used by Grammarians with respect to an affix prescribed after a base (Abhyankar, Dictionary of Sankrit Gramamar, 1986, s.v.).

[137] As seen above (p. 55, ll. 1-2) only apūrva can cause to be a connection with the enjoined person. Hence, see p. 55, ll. 21-2, through the association with an enjoined person one can grasp the apūrva. The argument is strengthened because association with a well known word is acknowledged as instrument of knowledge also by Bhāṭṭas (see A.9.5.1).

[138] See above, p. 45, ll. 3-5, C.3.8, A.3.8.

A.9.13 S vs. A.9.12

[S:]« It is not so. As a matter of fact, the will is the condition (nimitta) of the undertaking once it (will) is arisen (utpad-), not once it is known (jñā-) (hence, since through the optative and the other suffixes one only obtains a certain piece of knowledge, even if the content of this piece of knowledge were a will, these suffixes would not cause any undertaking)».

A.9.14 PP: optative and other suffixes designate impulsion, request and consent, not what must be done (see A.3.17) [the designation of a means to something desired case has already been discussed in A.9.10]

[PP:] «It might be so/perhaps it is this way/this might be the case/: since in ordinary [linguistic] usage (loka) optative (liṅ) and other [suffixes] are employed (prayoga) for impulsion (preṣaṇa), consent (āmantraṇa) and request (adhyeṣaṇa) and since they are the cause of the [consequent] undertaking of an action (pravṛtti), they point only to that (impulsion, etc.) and not to something to be done (kārya)».

A.9.15 S vs. A.9.14: impulsion, etc., just depend on the two speaker and hearer

[S:] «It is not so. Indeed something to be done (kārya) receives (labh-) the title (vyapadeśa) of impulsion (preṣ-), etc., because of the difference among this and that counterpart (pratisambandhin) (i.e., the two interlocutors). To elaborate, according to the person caused to act (pravṛt-), the impulsion (preṣ-) is something to be done (kārya) imparted (pratipad-) by a person (puṃs) who is senior (jyeṣṭha) with respect to the person caused to act (pravartya). Similarly, [something to be done imparted] by a [person] of equal age/rank is a consent and [something to be done imparted by] a junior is a request».

A.10 Connection of the result

A.10.1 PP: in optional rituals the result is the principal element

[PP:] «But as for the responsibility for optional [rituals] (kāma), it [must] be agreed (abhyupagam-) that the injunction (niyoga) is the instrument to realise the result (phala). Therefore, it [must] be agreed (abhyupagam-) that the result is the principal [element] (pradhāna), because the undertaking of the action (kṛti) is directly enunciated (uddiś-) as having a worldly result (such as rain, a son, etc.). Hence, it is correct that only this (the result) is the meaning (artha) of the sentence (vākya)».

A.10.2 S vs. A.10.1: the result is a specification of the enjoined person

[S:] «It is not so. The [result] is comprehended (pratipad-) as a specification (viśeṣaṇa) of the enjoined person (niyojya) (for instance, in "The one who desires a son should sacrifice with the putrakāmeṣṭi," the "son" serves the purpose of specifying who must perform such a sacrifice); it is not the principal [element of the sentence] (pradhāna). On the other hand, [the principal element] is only the injunction (niyoga), comprehended (pratipad-) as something to be realised (sādhya) by itself (and not for the sake of something else, such as a result). Indeed, according to our opinion (mata), it is not the result which must be brought about (bhū-); it is the apūrva alone [which must be brought about]. The result, on the other hand, is a specification (viśeṣaṇa) of the enjoined person, since it is impossible (sambhava) [for it] to be related (anvaya) [to the prescription] in another way (prakāra).

As a matter of fact, the connection [does not take place] through its (the result's) being to be realised (bhāvya), as only the apūrva is seized (labh-) by itself as something to be realised (bhāvya) (lit.: as only the apūrva to be realised is obtained by itself).

A.10.3 The real thing to be brought about is just the non-precedented [thing to be done]

A.10.3.1 The result is accomplished only in order to make the sacrificer bring about the apūrva

Therefore, just in order to accomplish (nirvah-) the injunction's (niyoga) being to be done (kārya), [what must be done] –like a slave-owner (svāmin)– realises (sidh-) the result of the person it enjoins (niyojya). [This person is, again, enjoined] to undertake an action (pravṛtti) which consists in the performance (anuṣṭhā-) of the own content (viṣaya) of the [thing to be done]. Like a slave-owner takes care (upakṛ-) of her slave (garbhadāsa), only in order to have [the slave] attending her, so also the injunction (niyoga).

Therefore, [it] does not falls off (cyuti) from the principal rank (pada). That has been said [in the following verse]:

> For the sake of the success (prasiddhi) of the enjoined person (niyojya), which is favourable to its own realisation (siddhi) |
> according to us, the principal (pradhāna) [factor], the thing to be done, (kārya) effects also [a result] such as heaven (svarga) ||
> (VM II v. 28). [p. 57]

A.10.3.2 Since the result is subordinated to apūrva they can be both accomplished without splitting the sentence

And in this way, as the apūrva and the result are [in order] principal (pradhāna) and secondary (upasarjana), there are not two things to be realised (sādhya), since although both have to be realised, [they] are prescribed (vidhā-) [as to be realised] by only one [element]. Therefore there is no splitting of the sentence (vākyabheda)».

A.10.4 Further discussion on the connection of the result as a specification of the enjoined person: succession of enjoined, responsible, agent

[PP:] «But how it is that no other way [beside using it as a specification for the enjoined person, see above p.57, l.27; §A.10.2] is possible in order to relate (anvaya) the result [within the prescription]? [S:] It must be said [in response]: for instance the one who is desirous of heaven (svargakāma) is firstly related (anvi-) as the enjoined one (niyojya), insofar as s/he perceives (budh-) that "This duty (kārya) of mine is indeed unprecedented [by any other instrument of knowledge] (apūrva) (that is, I have to do something I did not know about before hearing this Vedic prescription)". Thereafter, [s/he is related] as the responsible one (adhikārin) since [s/he understands that] "As the [ritual] act (karman) is the means to realise (sādhana) it (heaven), this act (karman) must be performed (anuṣṭhā-) by me for the sake of realising (siddhi) that". The responsibility (adhikāra) in relation to an act is the cognition of [its] being for one's purpose (see A.10.5). It amounts to (yāvat) [one's] domain [over the act] (aiśvarya). [Finally, one is connected] as an agent (kartṛ) when one performs (anuṣṭhā-) it (the ritual act). Thus, the three stages (enjoined, responsible and agent) are the sequential [conditions] of the same very [person] (i.e., the one who is desirous of heaven). Among them, the condition of being enjoined is in regard to the injunction (niyoga). The other two stages are in regard to the act (karman).

A.10.5 What happens when the enjoined person is not specified by a result?

And the enjoined person is n[ever] unspecified (viśiṣṭa), thus heaven is related as the specification of the enjoined person (if any other specification lacks). Since the enjoined person is not unspecified, when indeed in the Viśvajit and other [sacrifices] the enjoined person is not directly mentioned (śruta), the enjoined person is supplied (adhyāhāra) by force of the expectation (ākāṅkṣā) for an enjoined person, and the result is then postulated (pariklṛp-) as her specification (viśeṣaṇa). To elaborate: in "One should sacrifice with the Viśvajit [sacrifice]" the apūrva is clearly apprehended as something to be done through the optative (liṅ) [suffix]. And since this [apūrva]

which must be done (kārya) cannot by itself be performed (anuṣṭhā-), it does not arise (sambhū-) without the performance of [its] content (viṣaya). Therefore the agent (kartṛ) who performs (anuṣṭhā-) it, is [indirectly] implied (ākṣip-). And one cannot be an agent without [bearing] the responsibility (adhikāra). Whoever knows (jñā-) that "This act (karman) refers to me," he performs (anuṣṭhā-) it. And the responsibility is not [possible] without the being enjoined. The one who knows the injunction as "This must be done (kārya) by me" (that is, the enjoined person), s/he ascertains (adhyavaso-) the act (karman), which is the means to realise it (what must be done) (sādhana), in this way: "It is for my own sake, since it is the means to realise what I have to do" (that is, s/he becomes responsible for the act). And s/he is not liable to be unspecified (viśiṣṭa); therefore heaven (svarga) –which has pleasure (sukha) as [its] general (sāmānya) characteristic (lakṣ-), which recurs (anuvṛt-) in the manifold means to realise (sādhana) pleasure such as cattle, a son, food (annādya), and which is required (apekṣ-) by everyone– is postulated (parikḷp-) [if a specification lacks].

Also in the case (sthala) of an enjoined person (niyojya) which has been directly mentioned (śru-), the expectation (ākāṅkṣā) of the enjoined person (niyojya) by the injunction (niyoga) [occurs] only through the intermediate steps (praṇālikā) of responsibility (adhikāra) and agent (kartṛ). Nevertheless, in this case since the enjoined person (niyojya) is immediately (sākṣāt) mentioned (śru-) [in the Sacred Texts], the relation [occurs] first of all with him (because what is postulated is the enjoined person himself, in the form of "someone who is desirous of heaven," which immediately identifies the sacrificer as an enjoined person and not as a responsible person or as an agent, see above, A.10.4). And therefore, also, the relation (anvaya) [occurs] even (api) without taking into account (ādṛ-) the sequence (krama) of expectation (ākāṅkṣā), which is as follows: in order to establish (siddhi) him (enjoined person) [the connection occurs first] with the responsible person (adhikārin) and the agent. On the other hand, it is settled (sthiti) that in the case (sthala) of [an enjoined person] not directly mentioned (śruta) the relation (anvaya) with the enjoined person (niyojya), the responsible one and the agent [occurs] according to the sequence (krama) of expectation, since all three are non specified because of not being directly mentioned (śru-). Since the relation (anvaya) with the enjoined person (niyojya) [occurs] through the intermediate steps (praṇālikā) of agent, etc., an enjoined person is not postulated (kḷp-) where the performance of the action is obtained through another [person], as in the prescription (vidhi) regarding learning (adhyayana) (the prescription about teaching enjoins some specific people to teach, and hence there is no need to enjoin specific people to learn). Indeed, [the prescription regarding learning] does not require (apekṣ-) an enjoined person (niyojya) [since] the performance (anuṣṭhāna) of its content (viṣaya) is implemented (prayuj-) by the prescription to teach. And the prescription to teach implements (prayuj-) also the learning because it is impossible to teach without

[someone who] learns. Like, also, the placement of a fire (ādhāna[139]) to be promoted (prayojya) by a prescription (vidhi) regarding a later ritual (kratu). Or like the prescription regarding the pre-sacrifices (prayāja) and the [post-sacrifices]. These, indeed, have as their content (viṣaya) something caused to be performed (anuṣṭhā-) by the prescription regarding the principal (pradhāna) [sacrifice] and hence do not postulate (kḷp-) a separate enjoined person (niyojya) which would be responsible [for them only]».

A.10.6 PP: if a result is needed as a specification of the enjoined person, why do fixed and occasional rituals and prohibitions have no result?

[PP:] «But why a result (phala) is not postulated (kḷp-) also in the [statements about the] responsibility for prohibitions (niṣedha), fixed (nitya) and occasional (naimittika) [rituals], as [it happens] in the [case of] the Viśvajit and the other [sacrifices where heaven has been postulated as result]? Moreover, it has been said that as far as the responsibility for optional (kāmya) [rituals] is concerned, the injunction (niyoga) realises (sidh-) her (of the enjoined person) result in order to make the enjoined person (niyojya) realise (siddhi) the performance (anuṣṭhā-) of its own content (see above, §A.10.3.1). Therefore, according to this rule, here (in fixed and occasional rituals, and in prohibitions) there should be a result, too».

A.10.7 S vs. A.10.6: Indeed, the enjoined person is specified even in fixed and occasional rituals

[S:] «It is not so. Indeed, in regard to the responsibility for optional [rituals] (kāma), the injunction (niyoga) is not what causes an action to be undertaken (pravṛt-) because it is the means to realise (sādhana) the result, but rather only because it is something to be done (kārya). On the other hand, a result is granted (anuman-), because it is directly mentioned [in the Sacred Texts] (śru-). In ordinary experience (loka), one employs (upayuj-) also the [concept] of "means to realise (sādhana) the result" only in order to understand (avagam-) that something must be done (kārya). But not in order to initiate an action (pravṛtti). This one (initiation of an action), on the other hand, [occurs] just because [something] is understood (avagam-) as to be done (kārya). Also the immediate result (which is not by itself desired, such as threshed rice in case of "One threshes rice"), is cause (hetu) of the initiation of the action (pravṛtti) just insofar as it is understood as

[139] According to Mylius it is found exclusively in Gṛhya texts. However, Rāmānujācārya seems to hint more generally at the ritual placement of a fire (called agnyādheya). See Krick 1982. The prescription to set up a fire does not need a specific enjoined person, since it must be implemented by the person enjoined to perform a ritual –for all rituals need a prior set up of the fires.

something to be done (kārya). And in fixed [rituals] (nitya) (which do not entail a result) the apūrva is clearly apprehended (pratī-) as something to be done (kārya) because a [Vedic] statement (śabda) independent (of any result) [prescribes it]. And the enjoined person (niyojya) is seized (labh-) exactly in the sentences which refer to himself (svavākya). For example, in "Until one lives, one should offer the Agnihotra" the alive one [is enjoined], in "Once a son is born, the eight pans [oblations] [should be offered]" the one whose son was born [p.58] [is enjoined to act]. And he undertakes (pravṛt-) the performance (anuṣṭhā-) [of these rituals] once there has been the prohibition (niṣidh-) "He should not consume kalañja"[140]. "Until he lives," etc., are specifications (viśeṣaṇa) of the enjoined person (niyojya), since it is impossible (sambhū-) for a non specified (viśiṣṭa) [person] to be an enjoined person. Therefore, in the case [of fixed rituals] a duty (kārya) independent (of any result) (nirapekṣa) promotes (prayuj-) the enjoined person (niyojya), directly mentioned (śru-) in a sentence referring to himself (svavākya), to perform (anuṣṭhā-) its (the duty's) content (svaviṣaya). In the case of the Viśvajit sacrifice and [of the other sacrifices were no specific sacrificer is mentioned], on the other hand, since the enjoined person (niyojya) is not directly mentioned (śru-), s/he is postulated (parikḷp-) as qualified [by the desire for heaven]. As for the responsibility for fixed and occasional [rituals] (naimittika), also the relation (anvaya) [supported] by other [PPs, such as Pārthasārathi Miśra, (see §C.7 above)] of the avoidance (parihāra) of offences (pratyavāya) as something to be brought about (bhāvya) [by such occasional rituals] is incongruous (upapad-). (In sum, in these rituals the result is only mentioned in order to specify the enjoined person and, if the enjoined person is already known in some other way, there is no need to postulate a result or to make the avoidance of sins fulfil the role of the result to be brought about)».

A.10.8 PP/Naiyāyika: what has to be done is known through the Veda but contradicted by inference, as it bears no result

[PP/Naiyāyika[141]:] «But, although it is clearly apprehended (pratī-) from a [Vedic] statement (śabda) that something must be done (kārya), this could be invalidated (bādh-) through an inference (anumāna) out of its bearing no result, since something about which there is disagreement (viman-) [among

[140]The rule referring to the kalañja (kalañjanyāya) is discussed in ŚBh ad 6.2.19-20.

[141]Naiyāyikas (see, e.g., Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī) uphold the possibility of pramāṇasamplava, that is, the convergence of several means of knowledge on the same content. Mīmāṃsakas, instead, maintain that the means of knowledge are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the very proposal that a valid inference can invalidate a (Vedic) utterance is a further hint that the PP is here a Naiyāyika (I owe this last comment to Prof. Karin Preisendanz).

the means of knowledge] should not be done (kārya) as it is not a means to realise (sādhana) the result».

A.10.9 S vs. A.10.8: no inference can occur in regard to something which has been known through the Veda

[S:] «No, since no inference (anumā) arises (udi-) in conflict with the Sacred Texts (āgama). And it has been said that the suffixes (pratyaya) of optative (liṅ) and [other exhortative modes] cause to perceive (budh-) the apūrva as something to be done (kārya)».

A.10.10 PP: if the apūrva is kārya, then what happens if some people, though endowed with ritual responsibility, do not act?

Then, [a PP might argue:] «Although it has been understood (avagam-) that something must be done (kārya), one does not undertake any action (pravṛt-) in its regards as it does not bear any result». [S:] « Although in case of the responsibility for optional [rituals] (kāma) it has been understood (avagam-) that [their performance] is an instrument to realise (sādhana) a result, in their regards (too) someone does not undertake any action (pravṛt-). What shall we do [against it]? The mere act of displaying (pradṛś-) what is one's own purpose (artha): such alone (etāvat eva) is the function (vyāpāra) of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) (that is, the Veda as means of knowledge may only show one what she must do. It cannot force her to do it.)». [PP:] «But in case of the responsibility for optional [rituals] (kāma), if there is no performance (anuṣṭhā-) the result is not realised (sidh-). And this (non realisation of the result) is not desired (iṣṭa) [hence one acts]. But what could [happen] in case of the fixed [rituals] (nitya) [if one does not perform them]? [Just that] the prescription (vidhi) would be non realised (sidh-). What undesirable (aniṣṭa) [consequence] [follows] from that?».

A.10.11 Non performing dharma, which is a human aim, is by itself something undesired

[S:] «Just this (non performance) is undesirable, since it (dharma) is indeed one of the human purposes (puruṣārtha). Therefore, even in case of the responsibility for optional [rituals] (kāma), the realisation (sidh-) of the prescription (vidhi) is the motive (prayojana). The realisation (sidh-) of the result, on the other hand, is inseparably connected (nāntarīyakin) [with the performance of the prescription]». [PP:] «But how can it be that the non realisation (sidh-) of that (prescription) is something undesirable?». [S:] «Cultivated people (śiṣṭa) alone, who praise (stu-) in case of its realisation (sidh-) and are sorry (garh-) in case of its non realisation, will give

(pradā-) an answer on this topic. Otherwise, [one could say that] if it is non realised (sidh-), one's own mind (antaḥkaraṇa) deems (man-) it as an unaccomplished (kṛta) purpose (artha). Therefore, only what must be done is principal (pradhāna).

A.11 Connection of the other elements to the apūrva

[Thus,] this (what must be done) alone is the meaning (artha) of the [Vedic] sentences (vākya). The optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] point (para) to it immediately (sākṣāt). [But] also the other sentences, recited in this or that context (prakaraṇa), point (para) to their own meanings (artha) as related (anvi-) with this or that thing to be done (kārya), because all words (pada) are denotative/comprehensively learnt (vyutpatti) insofar as they are related with something to be done (kārya).

A.11.1 Connection vs. A.4.2

To elaborate: a relation (anvaya) of the words (pada) recited in this or that context (prakaraṇa) [occurs] in a manifold way (prakāra). The relation [occurs] for some of them because of their [expressing] the instrument (karaṇa), for some of them because of their [expressing] an enjoined person (niyojya), for some of them because of [expressing] the procedure (itikartavyatā), for some of them because of [expressing] the [sacrifice's] appellation (nāmadheya), for some of them (, that is, the mantras) because of recalling (smṛ-) the [ritual] items (padārtha) which are part of the [ritual's] performance (anuṣṭhā-) at the [proper] situation (that is, when and where they are needed for the ritual's performance) (avastha); for some of them because of praising (stu-). Sung mantras of eulogy (stotra) [are related] because they throw light (prakāś-) on qualities (guṇa) situated (niṣṭha) in qualities-endowed (guṇin) [elements], and also praising (śastra) mantras, which are not sung, are similarly related. On the other hand, impelling (praiṣa) mantras [are related] because of their convincing (pratyāyaka) others (para): so can the relation (anvaya) be seen (dṛś-) [to occur], according to the suitable case (yathāyoga). Therefore, the whole Veda is an instrument of knowledge exactly insofar as it points (para) to what must be done (kārya).

A.11.2 Aspects of the non-precedented thing to be done, vs. A.5

This very thing to be done (kārya), [called] apūrva because it is not within the sphere of application (gocara) of any other instrument of knowledge, is called injunction (niyoga) when it enjoins (niyuj-) a person in his own

self (ātman). That same [duty] [is called] "grasper" when it grasps (grah-), by means of supplying (śeṣa) [them] to itself, a heap of [ritual] items (padārtha) recited in its own context (prakaraṇa). When it applies (viniyuj-) the grasped heap of [ritual] items (padārtha) –through direct mention and [the other instruments for knowing an application] or autonomously (svatantra)[142]– by means of supplying [them] to a medium (dvāra)[143], [it is called] "applier" (viniyojaka). Among those (stages and corresponding appellations) the reflection (cintā) on the application (viniyoga) through direct mention (śruti), etc., [occurs] in the third [place] (after "injunction" and "grasper"). In the forth [place] [it is called] promoter (prayojaka) when it causes to perform (anuṣṭhā-) that bundle (kalāpa) of procedures (itikartavyatā) —and sometimes also the instrument (karaṇa)— [previously] grasped by means of its supplying (śeṣa) [them] to itself, and then applied by means of its supplying [them] to a medium (dvāra). Therefore, the conditions of grasper, applier and promoter (prayojaka) [occur] in sequence (krama). And those (conditions) pertain only to the apūrva of the responsibility (adhikāra)[144]. They do not pertain to the apūrvas of coming into being (utpatti) of subsidiary (aṅga) and principal (pradhāna) [rituals].

A.11.3 The promoter role of the non-precedented duty

Sometimes even what can promote (prayuj-) does not promote (prayuj-), for example the regular (prāsaṅgika[145]) apūrva of the fixed Jyotiṣṭoma [ritual], once the performance (anuṣṭhā-) of its own content (viṣaya) has been realised (sidh-) through the promotion (prayukti) of the apūrva of the optional Jyotiṣṭoma [CHECK THE RELATION BETWEEN THE 2,CHECK CALAND_HENRY 1906-7 on agniṣṭoma, Hillebrandt, ASK WERBA]. And this promoting (prayuj-) [occurs] just according to a distinct settlement (vyavasthā): As for the apūrva of the responsibility for fixed and occasional

[142]Direct mention etc., are the companions of the application prescription. See above, p. 52 l. 1, C.5.2, A.5.2. I am not sure about the meaning of "autonomously". Perhaps the author refers to the chance of understanding what must be applied just according to what can be possibly, e.g., grasped with a spoon or with a hand, instead of resorting to an instrument of knowledge conveying it. A similar procedure is possibly hinted at in ŚBh ad 1.4.30: yathāśakti vyavasthā bhāvitum arhati (I would like to thank Prof. Kei Kataoka who pointed out this passage).

[143]The standard example of viniyogavidhi is indeed dadhnā juhoti. As will be explained later, some items (such as qualities) cannot be connected directly to what must be done and need instead to be connected to a medium (dvāra).

[144]The main function of the principal sentence or prescription is also said to be to prescribe who is responsible for the sacrifice and, hence, its result (see TR IV §C.5.5, 1956: 52). For this reason, "principal prescription" and "prescription regarding the responsibility" coincide, although the former may also have further functions.

[145]prāsaṅgika echoes the maxim prasaṅgād apavādo balīyaḥ Āśv.Śr.Sū. I.1.22. Mylius 1994, 29a: "Eine Ausnahme (-Regel) ist gewichtiger als eine allgemeine Regel". A regular, normal apūrva does not prompt in the case an optional one promotes the action.

[rituals], [it occurs] in regard to the part (aṃśa) of the instrument (karaṇa) and to the part of the procedure (itikartavyatā).

A.11.3.1 The undertaking of an optional ritual action is caused by desire

On the other hand, as for the apūrva of the responsibility for optional [rituals], [it occurs] [only] in regard to the part of the procedure because on the part of the instrument (karaṇa, that is, the sacrifice) the initiation of the action (pravṛtti) is caused by attachment to the result alone. Therefore, in regard to such [optional sacrifices] there is no promoting (prayuj-) since the prescription (vidhi) has as its intrinsic character (svabhāva) the fact of causing to act one who was [previously] inactive (pravṛt-) [whilst in optional rituals on has already undertaken the action because of desire for the result].

A. 11.3.1.1 The case of śyena (vs. A.3.16.1 and A.4.3.3)

For this very reason, [p.59] in "One should sacrifice bewitching (abhicar-) with the śyena," the śyena sacrifice (yāga) is an instrument (karaṇa) whose form (rūpa) is violence (hiṃsā) as the means to realise (sādhana) the killing and whose other synonym (paryāya) is bewitching. [This sacrifice] has as content (viṣaya) an undertaking of action (pravṛtti) rooted in (mūla) [one's] attachment (rāga) [to doing harm to one's enemy]. [Hence,] it lies in the sphere of application (gocara) of the prohibition (pratiṣedha) "One should not perform any violence," for it is not caused to be performed (anuṣṭhā-) by a prescription (vidhi) (instead, the performance of its content is caused by this attachment). [Hence,] it is not a purpose (artha). Since, on the other hand, a violent [act] such as the [offering] to Agni and Soma (agnīṣomīya, see above, A.3.16.1) is caused to be performed by a prescription (vidhi) because it is a subsidiary element (aṅga) of a [larger] sacrifice (yāga), in that case the Sacred Text (śāstra) which prohibits (niṣedha) [violence] does not act (pravṛt-). Hence [the Agniṣomīya rite] is not equal (vaiṣamya) to the [Śyena one]. According to someone other's opinion (mata), on the other hand, only a result consisting in (rūpa) killing, which is tantamount to violence (hiṃsā), [and] whose other synonym (paryāya) is bewitching is not a purpose (artha), because it is within the sphere of application (gocara) of the Vedic teaching (śāstra) which prohibits (niṣedha) [violence]. And not an instrumental (karaṇa) [killing], as that [ritual killing] has been prescribed (vidhā-). Indeed, the initiation of an action (pravṛtti), if due to a contact with (spṛś-) a prescription (vidhi) cannot bring about (kḷp-) a non-purpose (artha).

A.11.4 Promoting power of supreme and intermediate apūrvas

Sometimes, even an intermediate (avāntara) apūrva [causes] a promotion which [ultimately] hangs on the supreme apūrva. For example, in "During the sacrifice of initiation (dīkṣaṇīyā) he should recite (anubrū-) pleasantly (or 'in a low tone,' mandra)," the apūrva of the initiation, which is a subsidiary (aṅga) of the Jyotiṣṭoma [sacrifice] [causes a promotion] in regard to the restriction (niyama) of voice (vāc). Although in every case only the supreme apūrva promotes [an action] (prayuj-), as it is by itself (svataḥ) something to be done (kārya), nevertheless also the [intermediate apūrva] [receives] the title (vyapadeśa) of promoter (prayuj-) in the following way: the supreme apūrva promotes just via the intermediate apūrva on the strength of (balād) applying (viniyoga) the restriction of voice (vāc) to the initiation, insofar as [this restriction] is what must be supplied (śeṣa) [to the initiation]. The apūrvas of coming into existence (utpatti) of the instruments, such as the [offering of the rice cake] for Agni, on the other hand, are related (anvaya) just as instruments (karaṇa) in regard to the supreme apūrva (that is, not as intermediate, independent, apūrvas, but as instruments of the main one). Hence, it is wrong (yukta) to postulate (kḷp-) a promotion (prayuj-) in the form of a medium (dvāra) (such as the intermediate apūrva referred to above) and a chief (dvārin) [element] (such as the supreme apūrva), when it is possible (sambhū-) that just this (supreme apūrva) immediately (sākṣāt) promotes (prayuj-). Therefore, promotion (prayuj-) in regard to the own subsidiaries (aṅga) does not hinge (āyatta) on the supreme apūrva [since in this case it is the supreme apūrva that directly promotes the instruments' subsidiaries].

On the other hand (speaking about instruments and not about their apūrvas), the promotion by threshing and bruising —prescribed in "He threshes (avahan-) rice," "He grinds (piṣ-) threshed grain (taṇḍula)"— in regard to the sprinkling (prokṣ-) prescribed (vidhā-) as their own subsidiary (aṅga) in "He threshes with the sprinkled mortar and pestle" (ulūkhalamusala)," "He grids with the sprinkled upper and lower millstone (dṛṣadupalā)," also does not hinge on (āyatta) the supreme apūrva. [It is so] because [threshing and grinding] can be realised (sādhya) by a notorious (nirjñāta) instrument (upāya) (i.e., an instrument whose nature does not need to be prescribed in the Veda[146]), since the two (threshing and grinding) are ordinary (laukika) [acts]. Since, on the other hand, the apūrva of initiation is transcendent (laukika), it cannot be realised through a notorious instrument (upāya)

[146]The same term can be found in a similar context in AN, where Pārthasārathi maintains that both the result and the (Bhāṭṭa) apūrva, inferred from the Veda, are not nirjñātopāya: pratyakṣo 'pi yāgasya phalasādhanabhāvaḥ kṣaṇikasya na sākṣāt sambhavatīty ānumānikāpūrvapraṇālyā samāśrīyate. anumite cāpūrve na phalāpūrvayoḥ kaścid viśeṣaḥ. dvayor api bhāvyatvasyāvagatatvāt. anirjñātopāyatvāc ca (AN IV, vii-viii adhyāya, p. 259).

(since no common instrument can be known to achieve a transcendent result). Hence, it (initiation's apūrva) [must] promote a restriction (niyama) of voice (vāc) [as such restriction would else not be realised, since in the world one does not have any experience of consecration, dīkṣā].

A.11.5 The relation with the enjoined person pertains to the promoting apūrva

In this way, it has been designated (abhidhā) that optative and other [suffixes] point to the apūrva, due to the relation (anvaya) with the enjoined person (niyojya) (as already hinted at, see A.9.11, C.9.11, p. 57, ll. 14-5). But (ca) this relation (anvaya) [with the enjoined person] [pertains] only to the promoting (prayuj-) apūrva, because [such relation] is clearly apprehended (pratī-) insofar as the undertaking of the action (kṛti) (caused to be by the promoting apūrva) is directly enunciated (uddiś-).

A.11.5.1 Exceptions

The apūrvas of the coming into existence (utpatti) of principal (pradhāna) or subsidiary (aṅga) [rituals], and of [coming into existence of] learning are [instead] designated (abhidhā-) as devoid of that (relation with the enjoined person). To elaborate, since the prescription to learn obtains (lābha) to be performed (anuṣṭhā-) just through the promotion (prayuj-) [operated] by the prescription to teach, [its] designation (abhidhāna) is devoid of the enjoined person (niyojya). Also the injunctions (niyoga) relative to the coming into existence (utpatti) of a subsidiary (aṅga) are realised (sidh-) once the performance (anuṣṭhā-) of their own content (viṣaya) has been obtained (labh-) from an injunction prescribing the responsibility, since they have as contents (viṣaya) pre-sacrifices (prayāja), etc., which have [already] been grasped (i.e., included) by [another] grasper (grāhaka) (i.e., a different prescription has already enjoined to someone the main ritual action, of which those pre-sacrifice are parts). Hence, in regard to them there is no designation (abhidhā) of an already related (anvi-) enjoined person (niyojya). In the same way, also injunctions (niyoga) relative to the coming into existence of a principal (pradhāna) [ritual] attain (āp-) [their] realisation (sidh-) through the very performance (anuṣṭhā-) of their content (viṣaya), implied (ākṣip-) through the injunction prescribing the responsibility. Therefore in that case an enjoined person (niyojya) is not required (apekṣ-).

A.11.6 The connection of apūrva and content is inevitable

Indeed, as for the clear apprehension (pratīti) of apūrva, the enjoined person (niyojya) is followed (anubandh-) by [this] apprehension (pratīti). In the same way, also the content (viṣaya) [has as consequence the apprehension of apūrva]. Indeed, an apūrva with no content cannot be apprehended (pratī-).

But the relation (anvaya) with the enjoined person is generally (i.e., not always) present (prāyika) (see above §A.11.5.1), whilst the relation with the content is verily (eva) requisite (niyata)[147], because a content (viṣaya) is requisite (niyam-) for the apūrvas of the coming into existence of the principal and of the subsidiary (aṅga) [rituals] and for the apūrva of the responsibility. Also all the things to be done (kārya) [prescribed] in "He should sacrifice," "He should offer (hu-)," "He should give," etc., are the duty of sacrificing, the duty of offering (homa), the duty of giving, apprehended (prati-i-[148]) as [respectively] delimited (avacchid-) by the verbal meaning (bhāvārtha) of [the root] "to sacrifice", etc. Therefore, it is exactly the verbal meaning (bhāvārtha), i.e., the meaning of the [verbal] stem (prakṛti), which is related (anvi-) as the content (viṣaya) [and since a stem is necessarily present wherever a prescription is enjoined, there cannot be an apūrva without a content]».

A.11.6.1 PP: how can the verbal meaning determine the apūrva?

[PP:] «But in "He should sacrifice," etc., only the undertaking of the action (kṛti) and the apūrva to be realised (sidh-) through it, reciprocally related (anvi-), are simultaneously (yugapadam) denoted (abhidhā) by the optative (liṅ) suffix (pratyaya) and the others. By the [verbal] stem (prakṛti), on the other hand, only the verbal meaning (bhāvārtha) [is denoted]. [So], how could this (verbal meaning) delimit (avacchid-) both [the undertaking of the action and the apūrva]?»

A.11.6.2 S vs. A.11.6.1: the effort must necessarily be determined by the content to be done

[S:] «We answer: [one understands that this is possible] through a deduction[149] (parāmarśa) based on expectation (ākāṅkṣā), [proximity] and [semantic fitness]. To elaborate, what must be done (kārya) is to be realised (sidh-) through the undertaking of the action (kṛti). And it is what is most craved (īpsitatama) through the undertaking of the action (kṛti) (i.e., it is the object of the action, according to Pāṇini's definition of it as the "most craved" element) (hence, through expectation one knows that the content can determine the action) [p.60]. And the undertaking of the action (kṛti) is an activity (vyāpāra) in the form of an effort (prayatna). And this can be known (vid-) through mental perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa) by each one in

[147]The same opposition between prāyika and niyata can be found also in ŚBh ad 2.1.33: sarvavedeṣu niyataṃ vidhilakṣaṇam. etad [=mantralakṣaṇam] api prāyikam.

[148]NB the constructio ad sensum, with sarvāṇi ...kāryāṇi in plural and then predicate and verb in singular.

[149]In logic, ascertaining that the pakṣa has the hetu (Āpte). In our case, because of expectation, proximity and semantic fitness one ascertains that the content is indeed the determiner of the thing to be done (viṣaye kāryāvacchedakatvam ākāṅkṣādivāśāt).

oneself (pratyātmam). And it is called the bhāvanā as it is an activity of the self, which promotes (prayuj-), i.e., brings about (bhū-) the future (bhavitṛ) apūrva/the apūrva to be (CHECK ENGLISH). That has been said [in the following]:

> The bhāvanā is the promoting (prayuj-) activity (vyāpāra) of the agent (kartṛ) who has as his purpose (artha) the being [of something]. (VM II ad 4)

And one must say (vac-) that such [activity] must be surely (nūnam) delimited (avacchid-) through a thing (vastu) which must be brought about (bhāvya) (hence, through fitness one knows that the content can determine the action). As a matter of fact, a non delimited (avacchid-) effort (prayatna) is not possible (sambhū-). And the apūrva cannot delimit (avacchid-) [it], since it (effort) does not immediately bring forth (nirvṛt-) that (apūrva). Hence, the meaning of the [verbal] stem (prakṛti) –i.e., the verbal meaning–, which must realise it (apūrva), determines (avacchid-) the undertaking of the action (kṛti), and at the same time it delimits also what must be done (kārya) (hence, through proximity one knows that the content can determine the action's undertaking). The knower of the content (viṣaya) (Śālikanātha , author of the VK) [says] that being a content (viṣaya) consists in determining what must be done (kārya) through a determination (avacchid-) [implemented] by the undertaking of the action (kṛti). The word "content" (viṣaya) is synonym to (paryāya) "determiner", since viṣiṇoti[150] means 'delimits'. Else, the meaning of the word (śabda) "content" (viṣaya) is the non being (bhāva) elsewhere[151], for [the content] is within (madhye) undertaking of the action (kṛti) and apūrva and not elsewhere. The author of the Comment (vivaraṇa) [ad ŚBh, i.e., Prabhākara's lost Laghvī ṭīkā] [says] that in «the [rice cake] on eight pans (kapāla) for Agni», «the oblation (caru) for Soma», «the [offer] on twelve pans for Savitṛ», etc., the connection (sambandha) with the substance (dravya) and the Deity (devatā), although it is not the verbal meaning (bhāvārtha), is the content (viṣaya) on the strength (bala) of the [whole] statement (śabda) (as opposed to the meaning implied in the reality of things, ārtha).

[150]viṣiṇoti could derive from root sā-, sinoti, (to bind) mentioned in the Dhātupāṭha and by Patañjali ad A 2.3.44 and ad 8.2.44. It is not attested with the prefix *vi*, but the author may have thought of the semantic contiguity of "to bind" and "to delimit", postulating that the suffix -a in viṣaya means a nomen agentis.

[151]In this case, one would be inclined to think that vi is read as a privative and śaya as derived of the root śi-, to lye, to be. However, ś and ṣ cannot be confused in word formation and I am not aware of any forced explanation of this kind in etymological explanations.

A.11.7 Connection of the meaning of the verbal root as the instrument (cf. A.3.13.2)

Once the apūrva so (ittham) delimited by the content (viṣaya) has been understood (pratipad-), thereafter the [apūrva] expects (ākāṅkṣā) a procedure (itikartavyatā) and an instrument (karaṇa). And it is exactly the verbal meaning (bhāvārtha), which before was the content (viṣaya), which is the instrument (karaṇa) in regard to the bhāvanā [bringing about the] apūrva. Indeed, the expectation (ākāṅkṣā) of the instrument (karaṇa) is inherent (svārasikī)[152] in what must be done (kārya) [i.e., in the apūrva]. The definition (lakṣaṇa) of instrument (karaṇa) is: the instrument is what is necessarily included (vyāp-) in an activity (vyāpāra) undertaken (pravṛt-) for another purpose (artha). Also in our case, the meaning of the verbal root (dhātu) is an instrument, like the axe (paraśu), as it is included (vyāp-) in the action (kṛti) undertaken (pravṛt-) for the purpose (artha) of apūrva. Likewise, the axe included in the two activities (pravṛtti) [having the purpose] of splitting into two, i.e., elevation and descent, is the instrument (karaṇa) of these two elevation and descent, expressed (vac-) by the verbal root (dhātu) chid- (to cut). [These two, in turn,] have received (labh-) the title (vyapadeśa) of "instruments of the splitting into two," because [they] delimit (avaccheda) the result (phala) defined (lakṣaṇa) as the being split into two».

[152]For the two kinds of expectation, see TR III, p.30: [PP:] «But in sentences like, "Bring the white cow with a stick" or "there is a coloured cloth" the expression through connected [words] (anvitābhidhāna) cannot occur through the words "white" and "coloured," since even without them the sentence would be saturated (paryavasāna)». [S:] «It would be true (satya) if they would not have been employed. But since they have been employed, the expression through connected [words] operates through them because expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) has indeed been raised in regard (viṣaya) to them, as they occur within a single sentence. [And they constitute a single sentence] since denotativeness (vyutpatti) is the acting in concert (sambhūyakārin) of all the words (pada) mentioned together (samabhivyāhṛta). It has been said in the Bhāṣya: "But there is, in regard to 'coloured', expectancy". [ŚBh ad 1.2.17]. But this is the difference (viśeṣa). In the case of "door" etc., closeness (sannidhi) is postulated because of expectancy (ākāṅkṣā). In this case instead ("a coloured cloth") expectancy [is postulated] because of closeness. Therefore indeed expectancy has been said to be twofold, "provoked (utthāpita) expectancy" and "inherent (svārasika) expectancy"».(*nanv evaṃ "gām ānaya śuklāṃ daṇḍena" "raktaḥ paṭo bhavati" ity atra śuklaraktapadābhyām anvitābhidhānaṃ na syāt. tābhyāṃ vināpi vākyaparyavasānāt. satyaṃ tadaprayoge. tatprayoge tu samabhivyāhṛtasarvapadānāṃ sambhūyakāritvavyutpatter ekavākyatābalāt tadviṣayām ākāṅkṣām utthāpya tābhyām anvitābhidhānam. tad uktaṃ bhāṣye – "bhavati tu raktaṃ praty ākāṅkṣā" (ŚBh 1.2.17) iti. ayaṃ tu viśeṣaḥ – dvāram ityādāv ākāṅkṣāvaśāt sannidhiḥ kalpyate. atra tu sannidhivaśād ākāṅkṣā iti. ata evotthāpitākāṅkṣā svārasikākāṅkṣā ity ākāṅkṣādvaividhyam āhuḥ*).

A.11.7.1 The meaning of the verbal root is connected as the instrument, although it is also included in the effort, for the distinction among action factors is not fixed (see A.3.13.2)

[PP:] «But if the meaning of the verbal root (dhātu) is included (vyāp-) in the effort, in its (of the effort) regard it (meaning of the verbal root) should be the object (karman) and not the instrument (karaṇa)». [S:] «It must be said [in response] (ucyate): to begin with (tāvat), it cannot be the object (karman) because it is not craved (īpsita). That (the object) is desired through the undertaking of the action (kṛti) [according to Pāṇini's definition of the object]. All factors of action (kāraka) apart from the agent (kartṛ) are also since the very beginning (pūrvam eva) included (vyāp-) in the activity (vyāpāra) of the agent (kartṛ). They do not [attain] just by means of that (etāvatā) the status of object (karman)[153]. Nevertheless, what is desired, that alone (eva) is the object (karman). The other [factors of action] are the instrument (karaṇa), etc.

Also in the case we are dealing with (that of an axe used in order to split into two), in regard to (apekṣā) the effort (prayatna) in general, the verbal meaning (bhāvārtha) of cutting (chid-) is the object (karman), because it is brought forth (nirvṛt-) by it. But, in regard to the effort as undertaken (pravṛt-) because of another purpose (artha) (e.g., splitting into two), it is the instrument (karaṇa), like an axe. Likewise, the axe is the object (karman) with respect to (āpekṣā) elevation and descent, for one says "S/he raises the axe, s/he fells the axe". But [the same axe] is the instrument in regard to these two (elevation and descent), which have been undertaken for another purpose (artha). Therefore, it is not incongruous (upapad-) that also what is included (vyāp-) in the undertaking of the action (kṛti) can be an instrument (karaṇa) [according to the above definition, see A.11.7, l. 17, §C.11.7]. Since the meaning of the verbal root (dhātu) is verily (eva) an instrument (karaṇa), there is the specific mention (nirdiś-) of the third ending (tṛtīyā) in "One should sacrifice with the udbhid [sacrifice]," "One should sacrifice with the jyotiṣṭoma". For, words like udbhid are appellations (nāmadheya) of [ritual] acts (karman) and it (specific mention of the third ending) [expresses] the instrument (karaṇa) (hence "He should sacrifice with the udbhid" is equivalent to "He should cause to be with a sacrifice called udbhid," where both the name udbhid and the meaning of the verbal root, "to sacrifice," are indicated in the instrumental case, expressed in Sanskrit by the third ending). In "He offers (hu-) the agnihotra," "He sacrifices (yaj-) the Kindling Sticks [sacrifice] (samidh)," etc., there is the second ending (dvitīyā), because there is no [other] craved (īpsita) object (karman). In the following case (tatra) also the second ending is [commonly] seen (dṛś-): "Going to the

[153] I could understand the sense of naitāvatā karmatā through the parallel VK passage (quoted in a fn to the Sanskrit text).

village he slightly touches (upasṛp-) the roots (mūla) of a tree"[154]. In this way, it is not incongruous (upapad-) that the verbal meaning (bhāvārtha), which was [considered] a content (viṣaya) because it is followed (anubandh-) by the apprehension (pratīti) [of apūrva, see above, A.11.6, C.11.6, p. 60, l.24], is thereafter [considered] an instrument (karaṇa), because it is followed by (anubandh-) the realisation [of the apūrva].

A.11.7.2 Difference between the instrument in optional and fixed rituals

However, in the optional [rituals] (kāmya) what is firstly the instrument in regard to the result (phala) becomes then the (content, viṣaya) in regard to the apūrva. After that, it becomes an instrument (karaṇa) [in regard to the apūrva] (as explained in A.11.7.1, because it brings forth the apūrva). In the fixed [ritual] (nitya), on the other hand, the content (viṣaya) becomes the instrument (karaṇa) [in regard to the apūrva]. Therefore, in the optional [sacrifice] the instrument (that is, the ritual) is performed (anuṣṭhā-) collecting (upasaṃhāra) all subsidiaries (aṅga), while in the fixed one collecting (upasaṃhāra) [just] the subsidiaries at hand (i.e., in the fixed sacrifices only those subsidiaries which can possibly be performed are performed, whereas the performance of an optional sacrifice requires the performance of all its subsidiaries[155]). In that case (fixed sacrifices), since the apūrva is apprehended (pratīti) at first, through the assemblage (upasaṃhāra) of [just] the possible subsidiary elements, it is not requisite (niyama) to collect (upasaṃhāra) all subsidiaries, for it is possible to realise (sidh-) the apūrva even if some subsidiaries are relinquished (tyaj-) because there is no (abhāva) disappearance (vilī-) of the content (viṣaya) previously apprehended (pratī-) [and the apūrva is grasped through the content, see §A.11.7]» [p.61].

A.11.7.3 PP/Bhāṭṭa: Why should the result be connected as what must be done, and not the apūrva. although this is included in the same verb as the effort?

Those [Bhāṭṭas] who assert that the meaning of the sentence is the bhāvanā laugh at this idea, saying: «how does it happen that the meaning of the [verbal] stem (prakṛti), i.e., the meaning of the verbal root (dhātu), –having skipped over (atilaṅgh-) the apūrva, which is the principal [element] of

[154]The analogy holds because also in this case the tree's roots are not a really desired aim.

[155]Hence, it is not damaged even when some of its (minor) subsidiaries are abandoned. On the other hand, an optional sacrifice cannot become the instrument of its fruit if its subsidiaries are not all performed, because only a perfect sacrifice causes the arousal of its promised fruit (I am indebted to Prof Kei Kataoka for adjusting my understanding of this passage).

the meaning of the [optative] suffix – is related first of all with a remote (viprakṛṣṭa) result (phala), as [its] instrument (karaṇa)?» [S:] «They should be asked [not us]. Otherwise, [we could ask:] according to your [PP] opinion, how does it happen that the bhāvanā —after having set aside the meaning of the [verbal] stem (prakṛti), which is the proximate thing to be immediately (sākṣāt) brought about (bhāvya)— rests [instead] on (avalamb-) a remote result?

A.11.7.4 S vs. A.11.7.3: because of expectation

If you [PP] answer that this is due to expectation (ākāṅkṣā), it is the same (samāna) in this (our) case, too.

A.11.7.5 S: The Prābhākara view has the advantage of postulating just one action leading to both the apūrva and the result

And in this (our) way there is just a single bhāvanā [bringing about] both the apūrva and the result, as there is just one human (puruṣa) effort (prayatna) [bringing them about]. And exactly this [bhāvanā] is the undertaking of the action (kṛti). Thereafter, it has in its sphere of application (gocara) the instrument, [and,] next, what must be brought about (i.e., apūrva and result) (see §A.11.7.2). The Prābhākaras say that this is the multiplication (vivṛddhi) [NB vivṛddhi as MULTiplication (of the acts) in MS 5.3.1] of what must be realised (sādhya) (, namely, the apūrva and the result together), because whatever [thing to be realised] must be realised (sādhya) through an undertaking of an action (kṛti) having as sphere of application (gocara) the apūrva. And (ca) the instrumentality (karaṇa) regards only the bhāvanā of the apūrva [and] the bhāvanā of the result[156]. But it does not regard the apūrva or the result, since every instrument is restricted (niyama) insofar as it is fit (yogin) for/connected with? an activity (vyāpāra), and since the responsibility's (adhikāra) apūrva (that is, the principal apūrva) and the result have not the form (rūpa) of an activity (vyāpāra) whereas the bhāvanā has the form of it. Also an axe (paraśu) is an instrument only in regard to the activity (vyāpāra) of splitting into two (dvaidhīkaraṇa). But not in regard to the being two, as this (being two) is the activity's (vyāpāra) result».

[156]On those two kinds of bhāvanā see above, p.51, §C.5.2.

A.11.7.6 PP: The instrument cannot be the content. Otherwise, since, e.g., the Full- and New-Moon's six sacrifices have only one content, they should have only one instrument, hence there could not be a different procedure, hence their performance would be confused

[PP:] «But as regards the [S's thesis] that the content (viṣaya) is the instrument, since the six rites (yāga) (i.e. the rice cake's offering for Agni, etc.) included (upādā-) through contrivance (tantra[157]) in just the single root "to sacrifice" (yaj-) in "He should sacrifice with the Full- and New-Moon sacrifices," have only one content (viṣaya), also the instrument must be one only. And therefore there cannot be any differentiated relation (anvaya) with the procedure (itikartavyatā). And accordingly, there would be a confusing (sāṅkarya) relation (anvaya), of (the different procedures of each rite, that is,) moaning (vilāp-), straining (utpū-), threshing, sprinkling, milking, coagulating (ātañc-), which are the [ritual] qualifications (dharma) of clarified butter, herbs and sānnāyya [hence, since this does not occur, it is impossible that the content is the instrument]».

A.11.7.7 S vs. A.11.7.6 Although there is a single content, the instruments are distinguished according to their own nature, hence there is no confused performance

[S:] «It is not so; being a content is followed (anubandh-) by the apprehension (pratīti) [of apūrva, see above, §C.11.6; p.60, l.24]. And the [fact of being a content] can occur only according to what is designated (abhidhāna), since it is the designation which is the instrument (upāya) for the clear apprehension [of apūrva]. And the combined [six sacrifices mentioned above] are the content (viṣaya) because they are designated through contrivance (tantra) (see above, §A.11.7.6 and fn thereon). On the other hand, being an instrument is followed (anubandh-) by the realisation (siddhi) [of apūrva and/or of a certain result] (see above, A.11.7.5, C.11.7.5; p.62). And the [fact of being an instrument] can occur only according to [the potential instrument's] intrinsic character (svabhāva). [In fact,] the fact of being a means to realise (sādhanatā) of the means to realise hangs (adhīna) on [its] intrinsic character. And in the sentences [prescribing] the coming into existence (utpatti) [of the six rites], these very six rites (yāga) are comprehended (pratipad-) to have different (bhinna) natures (svabhāva) according to the differences (bheda) of substance (dravya), Deity (devatā), etc. [referred to by them]. Therefore, [they become] instruments just according to [such] difference (bheda). For this reason, out of all (api) six rites, together with their intermediate (avāntara) activities (vyāpāra), just a single

[157] On this technical term, see the Study. What is meant here is that the root "to sacrifice" is stated only once, but applies to all six rites.

apūrva is produced. And, according to the difference among instruments (karaṇa), the [ritual] qualifications (dharma) (that is, the acts preparing the substances to be ritually offered) are distinctly settled (vyavasthā). Therefore, even if promoted (prayuj-) by the [single] apūrva of the responsibility (adhikāra), since the instruments, together with their intermediate apūrvas, are different, there is a non confused (sāṅkarya) performance (anuṣṭhā-) –in accordance with the media (dvāra)– of the [ritual] qualifications (dharma) of clarified butter (ājya), herbs, substances mixed with butter (sānnāyya). It is [commonly] seen (dṛś-) that even a single [act] may be realised (sidh-) by many instruments (karaṇa). For example, Devadatta goes by cart, by means of a horse, with a lamp. In that case (Devadatta goes...) the intermediate function (vyāpāra) [of horse, lamp, cart] is different (bhid-) and also in this case (darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice) the intermediate apūrvas are different. In the same way, also in "He should sacrifice (yaj-) with the King's consecration (rāja-sūya)" although the content is one only, the instruments are different. The King's consecration is [indeed] the union of an iṣṭi, an animal [offering] and a soma [offering]. Therefore, it is well established that the content (viṣaya) is an instrument (see above, A.11.7.5, C.11.7.5, p. 61 ll. 27-28). All this is fully explained (prapañc-) in the chapter (prakaraṇa) named Viṣayakaraṇīya [of the PrP].

A.12 Summary of A.10-A.11 (vs. A.4.2.8 and A.7)

So the preceding was a summary (saṅkṣepa) of the modes (prakāra) of relation (anvaya) to the meaning of the Sacred Text (śāstra) according to the opinion of our Mentor (Prabhākara).

A.12.1 Connection of the Full- and New-Moon prescriptions as prescribing a single sacrifice through closeness, expectation and fitness

[Let us now go back to the passage in the] Sacred Text (āmnāya) "The one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Full- and New-Moon sacrifices". The [group of] six [rites], i.e., the [rice cake] for Agni, etc., suitable for the time (kāla) characterised (lakṣaṇa) by the full and by the new moon, is handed down (āmnā-) in its proximity (sannidhi). In the same way (that is, close to the principal prescription) is handed down (āmnā-) also the group (varga) of directly [contributing] auxiliary (ārādupakārin) items (padārtha). Among all these [passages], the sentence [prescribing] the Full- and New-Moon [Sacrifices] alone is the sentence enunciating (uddiś-) the prescription (vidhi), because in it alone one apprehends clearly (pratīti) the apūrva as related (anvi-) to the enjoined person (niyojya) and the content (viṣaya) (whilst all other sentences regard subsidiary elements, which are

instrumental to the main prescription). And this (apūrva related to the enjoined person) is the principal (pradhāna) [element] insofar as it is held in view (uddeśya) through the undertaking of the action (which is what one first understands, see the discussion on kriyākārya in §C.9), and it is the responsibility's (adhikāra) apūrva. This very apūrva, after having been firstly recognised (pratyabhijñā) because of [its] proximity (sannihita) with the prescription regarding the responsibility, is [then] repeated (anuvad-) also in the other sentences by the suffix (pratyaya) of this and that prescription (vidhi) [prescribing subsidiary elements] (that is, through proximity with the principal prescription, one recognises the same apūrva also in the other subsidiary prescriptions). [What] happens is a repetition (anuvāda) because also the meaning of the suffix, like the meaning of the [verbal] stem (prakṛti), has been apprehended before.

Within this [principal prescription, moreover,] the morphemes (śabda) "Full- and New-moon" express (vac-) just the coming into existence (utpatti) of the [group of] six (main rituals) dedicated to Agni, etc., because of the connection (yoga) with time (kāla). And in the dual (dvivacana) (in the dual ending of darśapūrṇamāsābhyām) just this [composite sacrifice] occurring in (āpad-) [Check englisch] two triplets [of rites] is included (upādāna). And it is included (upādā-) through contrivance (tantra) by the root "to sacrifice" (yaj-) in "He should sacrifice" (since the root, though pronounced just once, refers to all six rites).

In this way, the apūrva, which is by itself the motive (prayojana) [p.62], is apprehended (pratipad-) as united (saṅghaṭ-) with the enjoined person (niyojya) and the content. [At the same time,] there is expectation (ākāṅkṣā) of the motive by the group (varga) of items (padārtha) —which are directly [contributing auxiliaries] and indirectly [contributing ones]— recited nearby, as this (group) is by itself not [connected to any] motive. And there is fitness (yogyatva) for the relation (anvaya) with the apūrva in the [prescription about] the responsibility, which has become the motive (prayojana). Hence, [since the three requirements of proximity, expectation and fitness are fulfilled,] the optative (liṅ) suffix, belonging to (gata) the sentence expressing the responsibility, simultaneously (yugapat) denotes (abhidhā) its own meaning as related (anvi-) with all (kṛtsna) the items (padārtha).

A.12.1.1 Including within the prescription

And this relation (anvaya) has the form (rūpa) of appropriateness (i.e. becoming appropriate) to the grasper (i.e., the apūrva) (grāhaka-aidamārthya) in regard to the group of items (padārtha). And the relation (anvaya) due to the relationship (bhāva) of motive and motivated (prayojanin) is established in ordinary experience (loka) by proficient learning (vyutpatti). This is called the grasping (i.e., the including within itself) [of all other elements] by the grasper (i.e., the prescription).

A.12.2 Reciprocal expression of connected words among auxiliaires and principal prescription: difference between directly and indirectly contributing auxiliaries

But among these [elements held together by the main prescription], in sentences regarding indirectly contributing [auxiliaries] (sannipātin), the apūrva of the responsibility is repeated (anuvad-) by the suffix of [the indirectly contributing auxiliary's] prescription. Therefore, threshing, sprinkling, etc., (i.e., indirectly contributing auxiliaries) denote (abhidhā) their own meaning as related (anvi-) with that, hence there is an expression of mutually related (anvitābhidhāna) [meanings]. In the sentences of directly [contributing] auxiliaries (ārādupakāraka) [on the other hand] there is no designation of their own meaning as related with that (apūrva). To elaborate; sentences [prescribing] pre- and [post-] sacrifices, (i.e., directly contributing auxiliaries) are directly mentioned (śru-) in proximity (sannidhi) of the prescription about the responsibility. They are not able (īś-), to begin with (tāvad), to denote another injunction (niyoga) (such as the principal one), [along with] its respective content (viṣaya), because the possibility (śaṅkā) that there is a repetition (anuvāda), like [it happens] in the case of [indirect subsidiary prescriptions about] threshing (avaghāta), etc.[158], is hampered (kuṇṭh-). On the contrary, they cause to know (upapad-) only the own nature (svarūpa) of the [pre- or post-] sacrifice (yāga) as specified (viśiṣṭa) by this or that Deity or substance. And in this same way, the morpheme liṅ (i.e., the optative suffix), in (gata) the sentence [prescribing] the responsibility, denotes its own meaning as related to these (pre- and post-sacrifices) [because the pre- and post-sacrifice prescriptions expect a motive and this is only available in the responsibility prescription, hence the connection of the pre- and post-sacrifice ones with it].

A.12.2.1 Exception: mutual relation of meanings in the case of pre-sacrifices and their intermediate apūrvas

Due to the momentariness (kṣaṇikatā) of pre- and [post-] sacrifices, however, intermediate (avāntara) apūrvas are resorted to (āśri-) for the realisation (siddhi) of [the pre- and post-sacrifices'] assistance (upakārakatva), [which is only brought about by all pre- or post-sacrifices] in concert (samb-

[158]The same example can be found in PrP: na cāvahantyādiṣv iva kratuviṣayaniyogānuvādo 'yam avakalpate. asaṃnidhānāt kratuniyogānām. sannidhānavaśenaiva hi kratuniyogapratyabhijñānāt tatra kratuniyogānuvādopagamaḥ. na ceha sannidhānam asti. See also Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's commentary (called Nyāyasiddhi) thereon: nanv avahantyādivat kratuviṣayaniyogānuvādo 'stv ity atrāha –na ceti. tatra kāraṇam āha –asannidhānād iti. darśapūrṇamāsaniyogasannidhānād avahantyādiṣv anuvādakatvaṃ yuktam. iha niyogāntarasannidhānābhāvād nānuvādakatvam ity arthaḥ (PrP, Śāstramukha, **PrP1904 PrP**). It refers perhaps to application sentences such as that prescribing threshing, which prescribe an auxiliary of an act which has been already prescribed.

hūya). In that case, this optative (liṅ) or other [exhortative suffix] [found in the pre-sacrifice prescription], doubted (śaṅk-) to [convey] a meaning (artha) previously repeated (anuvad-) (by the principal prescription's optative suffix), designates (abhidhā) now [instead] another injunction (niyoga) (that is: "prayājair yajan darśapūrṇamāsābhyām yajeta"?), [but] only insofar as it is subsidiary (aṅga) to the supreme apūrva. Not as an autonomous (svatantra) [injunction], as otherwise (anyathā) there would be the contradiction (virodha) of an injunction (niyoga) having two contents (viṣaya). And once this (other injunction regarding the intermediate apūrva of pre- and post-sacrifices) has been denoted (abhidhā), the sentences of the pre- and [post-]sacrifices sacrifices communicate (budh-) their own meanings as related (anvi-) to it. They do not cause to know their own meanings as related with the supreme apūrva, because a connection (sambandh-) with two things to be done (kārya) is incongruous (upapad-). Indeed, one thing (vastu) cannot be understood (avagam-) as connected (sambandh-) with two duties (kārya) simultaneously (yugapad). Similarly [this is not possible] because there is no denotation (vyutpatti) [of two duties through one sentence].

A.12.2.2 Solution of the seeming exception

Therefore, there is no denotation of mutually related (anvitābhidhāna) [meanings]. If [there were one], as in the case of [prescriptions prescribing] threshing and other [indirectly contributing auxiliaries], also these (sentences of the pre- and post-sacrifices) would denote (abhidhā) their own meanings as related (anvi-) to the supreme apūrva. But (ca) so (tathā), they could not have again (punaḥ) as content (viṣaya) another injunction (niyoga) because that [other injunction] once come into existence (utpatti) [must be] divergent (tiraścīna[159]) [from the main injunction]. (Hence, if the pre- and post-sacrifices prescriptions would just denote their meaning as related to the main prescription, they could not convey a separate prescription.). But an apprehension (pratīti) of the intermediate apūrvas [without an ad hoc injunction (see above, §C.12.2.1)] [would] be far-fetched.

Therefore, although there is no distinction as for grasping (grahaṇa) by the grasper (grāhaka) (i.e., both auxiliaries are included by the main prescription), in the indirectly contributing [auxiliaries]' (sannipat) sentences there is mutual denotation (abhidhāna) of related [meanings]. In the sentences of the directly [contributing] auxiliaries (ārād upakārin) it is not so. This is the distinction (viśeṣa).

[159]As stated by Wicher referring to the parallel VM passage (1987:225, fn. 294), the usual meanings of tiraścīna (transverse, horizontal, across according to MW, which seems to directly translate PW) do not directly fit the context. Its role in this sentence is however, clear. Accordingly, all translators of the VM have translated it in the same way: anya se bhinna (Avasthī 186), different (R.N.Sarma 1987:71), verschieden (Wicher 1987: 182).

A.12.2.3 Including within the prescription in regard to subsidiaries

And this grasping through the grasper occurs simultaneously through the meanings of all (kṛtsna) words (pada), mutually related (anvi-) like pigeons (kapota) in the threshing floor (khala), together with the meanings of the suffixes (pratyaya)[160]. One apprehends (pratī-) in this way the grasper, which is (bhūta) the motive (prayojana) and the main [element] (śeṣin) among all (sakala) items (padārtha). Then, the [rice cake] for Agni and the other [offerings] —which are the content (viṣaya)— are related (anvaya) as the instrument (karaṇa). [This happens] because there is expectation of an instrument since the (grasper) is by itself something to be realised (sādhya) [and hence needs an instrument]. In order to establish (siddhi) also that these (the rice cake for Agni and the other offerings) act in concert (sambhūyakārin) (that is, perform their function all together), it is assented that they are instrumental in regard to the apūrvas of the coming into existence (utpatti) of the principal (pradhāna) [ritual]. The optative (liṅ) and the other [suffixes] [of indirectly contributing auxiliaries], on the other hand, about which it was doubted (śaṅk-) that they [convey] a meaning (artha) previously repeated (anuvad-) [by the principal prescription, that is, "The one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Full-and New-Moon sacrifices"], are then its (the intermediate apūrva's/the apūrva's???ASKED KEI) expressers (vācaka). The injunction (niyoga), related (anvi-) in this way with the instrument expects (ākāṅkṣ-) the procedure (itikartavyatā) and applies (viniyuj-) [to the main ritual] also the group (varga) of items (padārtha) of both kinds (i.e., directly and indirectly contributing auxiliaries), by itself alone, by means of supplying (śeṣatā) them to its own instrument (karaṇa). This is the appropriateness (i.e.,becoming appropriate for) (aidamarthya) to the instrument (karaṇa). Through that, the appropriateness (aidamarthya) to the grasper (grahaka) is accomplished (nirvah-), too.

A.12.3 Application of indirectly contributing auxiliaries

Following that, the injunction (niyoga) —which expects (ākāṅkṣ-) the assistance (upakāra) of the instrument (i.e., the sacrifice)— in order to accomplish the appropriateness to the instrument applies (viniyuj-) [to the main ritual] first the group (varga) of indirectly contributing (sannipātin) items (padārtha), which brings forth (nirvṛt-) the constituent element (śarīra) of the instrument (i.e., substance and deity –in this case substance alone is taken into consideration). [This injunction], together with direct mention

[160]This and the next sentence may refer at the same time to the hermeneutic and to the linguistic level. In fact, padārtha means both 'meaning of the word' and '[ritual] item'. Until this point, the latter meaning has been consistently adopted, but the parallel with pratyayārtha makes the reader aware of the first one, too.

(śruti) and the [other six means accompanying the applicatory prescription] applies [the indirectly contributing auxiliaries] by means of supplying (śeṣa) [them] to this or that medium (dvāra, such as rice, grains, etc.). And (api) it applies [WHY CONCESSIVE?] just through a distinct settlement (vyavasthā), by means of supplying (śeṣatā) [them] to this or that instrument (that is, the main offerings to Agni etc.), resorting (āśri-) to the difference (bheda) between this or that instrument —[difference] which is founded on (nibandh-) the difference (bheda) between the apūrvas of this or that principal [offering][161]. By means of this, also the appropriateness to the instrument of the indirectly contributing [auxiliaries] (sannipātin) is accomplished. The fact of being an indirectly contributing auxiliary (sannipat) consists in producing (nirvṛt-) the constituent element (śarīra) of the instrument by means of (dvāra) placing (ādhāna) an excellence (atiśaya) (that is, an additional quality, such as having been sprinkled) in (gata) this or that factor (kāraka) (such as rice). The excellence (atiśaya) referring (gata) to this or that factor (kāraka) does/realises something intermediate (avāntara). [p.63]

A.12.4 Application of the directly contributing auxiliaries

In the same way, accompanied (sahāya) by the mere context (prakaraṇa), it (injunction) applies (viniyuj-) the pre- and [post-] sacrifices (prayāja) [to the main ritual] as immediate (sākṣāt) instruments, since there is no conjunction with a medium (dvāra) (unlike with indirectly contributing auxiliaries). And (api) it applies (viniyuj-) [them] supplying (śeṣatā) them as a whole (kṛtsna) instrument (karaṇa), since no distinction (viśeṣa) is understood (avagam-) [among them]. Therefore, they are related (anvaya) [to the main ritual] through [their] accumulation (samuccaya) (see next §) and are performed (anuṣṭhā-) [only once] by contrivance (tantra). In this case, only the intermediate (avāntara) apūrvas constitute the assistance (upakāra) of the instrument (karaṇa). And this [assistance] produced by them, does something. By means of this, the appropriateness (aidamarthya) [of the directly contributing auxiliaries] to the grasper (grahaka), and that to the instrument are accomplished (nirvah-). The fact of being directly [contributing] auxiliaries (ārād upakāra) consists indeed in being the assistance of the instrument, by means of the intermediate apūrvas.

A.12.4.1 Direct auxiliaries are to be performed through accumulation

[PP:] «But why is there a relation (anvaya) through accumulation (samuccaya) of the pre- and [post-] sacrifices (prayāja), (which are all performed)?

[161] That is, according to the different rites. I am grateful to Prof. Kei Kataoka who helped me making sense of this sentence and the previous one.

Why, on the other hand, should there be no connection [to the main prescription] through option (vikalpa) (among the various pre- and post-sacrifices)?» [S:] «There should be none, since it is not true that [pre- and post-sacrifices] both serve a same purpose (aikarthya), and are independent (nairapekṣya) of each other. To elaborate: there are two conditions promoting (prayojaka) the option (vikalpa) between rice and barley (yava); both (rice and barley) serve a single purpose (artha), namely the production (nirvṛt-) of oblation -cakes (puroḍāś); and what must be done (kārya) is realised (siddhi) also by [only] one of the two, because it does not depend on the other (itara). But in our case, even if the pre- and [post-]sacrifices could be independent (nairapekṣya) as regard their respective assisting functions (upakāra), there would be no singleness of purpose. In fact, [the single purpose can only be a single assistance, but] as regards the undivided assistance there would be reciprocal requirement [among them] (that is, each could independently perform its assisting function, but then one would expect the complete assistance. Hence, it would not be true that each of them has the same purpose as the other one since, on the contrary, each one's function should be summed up with the other's one in order to achieve the complete assistance). If, on the other hand, a single purpose were possible in this case, there would be no independence, because all subsidiaries (aṅga) (that is, all pre- and post-sacrifices) would have to to be brought about (niṣpad-) (that is, if one postulates that they all serve a single purpose, namely, a complete assistance, then one must perform them all and they are no more independent as far as their own distinct assistance is concerned, since there would be no more distinct assistance apart from the one of the whole of the pre-sacrifices taken together). Hence there can be no option (vikalpa).

A.12.4.2 Inherent faults in option

Moreover, it (option) is faulted by eight faults (doṣa). To elaborate: at the moment of performing what has been laid down in the Sacred Text prescribing the use of rice the first two faults consist in abandoning (parityāj-) the validity of the Sacred Text prescribing the use of barley; and owning its non validity. At the moment of performing barley the two faults occur of owning the validity of this same Sacred Text [previously] abandoned [prescribing the use] of barley and of abandoning the validity of this same Sacred Text [previously] owned [prescribing the use of rice]. Hence, there are four faults regarding the Sacred Text [prescribing the use] of barley. Similarly, also in regard to the Sacred Text [prescribing] rice, at the moment of performing what has been laid down in the Sacred Text prescribing the use of barley there are two faults (i.e., abandoning the validity of the Sacred Text prescribing the use of rice; and owning its non validity), and at the moment of performing rice, two faults (i.e. owning the validity previously abandoned and abandoning the validity previously owned). Hence on every side there

are four faults.

A.12.5 Further opinions on the relation of directly and indirectly contributing auxiliaries to the main rites

[Others, instead, maintain:] But the relation (anvaya) of the pre- and [post-] sacrifices (prayāja), does not [occur] through [their] being instrumental (as claimed in §A.12.4), because they are enclosed (avarodha) within the instrument consisting of the [rice cake offering] to Agni and the other [main rites]. An undivided (akhaṇḍa) assistance (upakāra), on the other hand, is brought about (niṣpad-) by subsidiaries (aṅga) of both types (i.e., directly and indirectly contributing auxiliaries).

According to another (para) opinion (mata), on the other hand, a relation (anvaya) with the principal (pradhāna) [rites] of the whole (kṛtsna) group of items (padārtha) [constituting the indirectly contributing auxiliaries] occurs after (pūrvaka) a connection to the media (dvāra), immediately [if they directly relate to a medium, such as threshing to the rice] or gradually (paramparā) [such as the case of sprinkling in regard to the millstone which will thresh the rice, see §C.11.4], whereas in this case (i.e., directly contributing auxiliaries) it occurs after a connection with the principal [rites only], hence the difference (vaiṣamya). But the indirect signification (lakṣaṇā) of this or that medium (dvāra, that is, an intermediate apūrva –in the case of directly contributing auxiliaries– or an act –in the case of indirectly contributing auxiliaries–) as apūrva is common (sādhāraṇa) to both the opinions (insofar as they are connected to the supreme apūrva).

As for the former case, since the [offerings] for Agni and for Agni and Soma enclose (avarodha) the oblation cakes (puroḍāśa) taught in the originative [prescriptions such as, "He should offer with a rice cake to Agni"] (utpattiśiṣṭa), rice is not the immediate (sākṣāt) instrument (karaṇa). It is, instead, only its originative material (prakṛti). In this way, once rice is related (anvi-) [to the main ritual] as the originative material (prakṛti) [of the oblation-cakes], what has still not been acquired [such as threshing] must be supplied to what is [already] accepted (nirūḍha) [such as rice]. Because of this rule (nyāya), threshing (avahan-) and the other [auxiliary acts] are related (anvi-) [to the main ritual] through the relation of medium (threshing, etc.) and chief [element] (dvārin) (rice, etc.). Similarly, the relation of the [ritual] qualifications (dharma) of the sānnāyya (substances mixed to butter), and of the [ritual] qualifications (dharma) of clarified butter (ājya) must be understood (avagam-) according to their being supplied to this or that factor of action (kāraka) (in this case, sānnāyya or butter).

A.13 Conclusion on apūrva as the prescription

In this way, it is established (siddha) that the essence (tattva) of prescriptions (vidhi), to be known (prameya) through the Sacred Text, is the apūrva of the responsibility (adhikāra) which, in its conditions of (avasthā) grasper (grah-), applicator (viniyuj-) and promoter, is related to all [ritual] items (padārtha) according to [their] application (viniyoga).

This was the section (pariccheda) called "The content to be known through the Sacred Text," which is the forth [section] of the Tantrarahasya composed by the revered Rāmānujācārya. [p.64]

A.14 Partitions of TR IV

Conventionally, I started a new paragraph whenever a new interlocutor starts his argument, although I could not follow this principle in case of extremely short interlocutions, closely following each other (as in §C.3.5) within the same argument.

The first part of TR IV focuses on the various Bhāṭṭa views of the import of Sacred Texts. The text is organized around a quotation of the TV, which is followed by different Bhāṭṭa interpretations and, finally, by Pārthasārathi Miśra's opinion (held by Rāmānujācārya to be the conclusive among the Bhāṭṭa ones). But this last one, each view is followed by a close inspection and criticism, ending up with its rejection. Mostly, the first sentence of every objector is a sort of vārttika, condensing the theory that will be then depicted in full details.

Part IV

Critical Edition of TR IV

Appendix B

Introduction to the critical edition of TR IV

Whatever his date (see 1.1, Rāmānujācārya is a distinct personality. Hence, in his case it makes sense to use a critical edition in order to reconstruct the author's text. By that I do not mean that I will be reconstructing the author's intention, but rather its output, the Tantrarahasya as a step in the history of Mīmāṃsā (as can be inferred by comparing it with its sources and the many parallel passages).
The TR has been edited twice, once in 1923 by R. Shamashastry (**TR1923** this edition will henceforth be referred to as OP) and once in 1956 by Śiromaṇi (**TR1956** this edition will henceforth be referred to as P). On the textual material these editions are based on, see infra, B.3 and B.3.1. The present edition enhances the edited text through the texts' sources (listed in the second and third apparatus) and the only ms I have been able to acquire, henceforth M, catalogued as Tantrarahasyaśikṣā, n.2177 of the Library of Mysore. I have been working on colour photographs of the ms, for whom I am grateful to Daniele Cuneo, who purchased them for me from the Library of Mysore.

B.1 Tantrarahasyaśikṣā 2177 Mysore

The Manuscript includes a collection of works and has been written by at least two people. The TR forms the first part of it (ff. 1-86) and is closed by a blank folio. Then, several works follow. Departing from f.112v, l.3, one clearly sees that a second scribe is at work. Not only is the script much more cursive and the akṣara linked to each other, the style is also more modern as far as vocalic signs are concerned (see infra), the number of lines per folio increases until 8 and in general the script is often less easily readable and seems from time to time to have been written with less care. In the following, I will focus on the TR part.

B.1.1 Basic Data of the TR part

Palm leaf.
Telegu script.
5 lines (in the first folios) or 6 or 7 per folio. Each line has averagely 54-67 akṣaras.
Two string holes.
To be read alternatively on the recto and then verso of the same folio. The last line on the recto corresponds to the the first one on the verso.
Folio numbers are on the recto. They are written in telegu (see infra).
Lateral glosses are present on a few folios and always on the recto (see infra).
Mostly correct (see infra).
The ms is in good conditions, but for some damaged margins (the damaged areas increase dramatically after the TR part).

B.1.2 Writing peculiarities possibly reflecting phonetic peculiarities

B.1.2.1 Vowels

visarga sandhi is regular, with visarga after a/ā which is more often than not changed into sibilant if followed by an unvoiced consonant, may lack if followed by a voiced consonant and sometimes also by sibilant+consonant. Sometimes visarga lacks within a word (duḥkha is written dukhka, with a few instances of duḥkhka, śreyassādhana is written śreyaḥsādhana)[1].

B.1.2.2 Consonants and consonants clusters

The cluster cch is more often than not written ch (ichati, avacheda, mlechānām…).
tha and dha are never to be distinguished.
ttha and ddha are also never to be distinguished.
Haplography is frequent in case of final consonants and possible even in internal sandhi (e.g. tadvārā instead of taddvārā, nirvāhād vitiyaśrutau instead of dvitīyaśrutau). This, together with the absence of a final visarga, makes it often impossible to distinguish between case endings and to fix a word's end. See, e.g., confusion between a nominative followed by a different word and a single compound word (e.g., pravṛtti svargādisthāniyā, f. 58r, l.2), between a locative masculine and a genitive feminine (e.g.,

[1]About the absence of a final visarga, see Maas' remark in his Critical Edition of the Samādhipāda of Pātañjalayogaśāstra: «Auslautender Visarga (*visarjanīya*) fehlt häufig. In vielen Fällen wird er bei der Abschrift einfach vergessen worden sein. Die einheimischen Autoritäten erlauben den Ausfall von Visarga (bzw. auslautendem Sibilanten) vor auf Sibilant anlautender Konsonantenverbindung (oder schreiben ihn vor). Ob der Ausfall des Visarga vor Sibilant mit Vokal als Ausweitung dieser Regel angesehen werden kann, ist unklar. (**Maas2006** See also **Allen**

pravṛttisiddhe svasya, f.62r, l.1).
Simplification of tt is usual, especially before y or v if followed by a vowel. E.g., tatva instead of tattva, pravṛtyartham instead of pravṛttyartham. The same applies to the cluster ddhy+vowel, which regularly becomes dhy+vowel (e.g., sidhyartham instead of siddhyartham, budhyā instead of buddhyā). Rarely, dd also becomes d before vowel (e.d. udiṣṭeṣu instead of uddiṣṭeṣu, f.63v, l.4). Accordingly, the optional gemination before -y- never occurs (budhyate instead of buddhyate).
On the other hand, random cases of consonant duplication are extremly rare (jjanita, f.55v, l.1; sarvāṃggaviśiṣṭās, f.64v, l.3; ulūkhalamusalābbhyām, f.72v, l.5; kiṃttu, f.76r, l.2). Rare are also reduplications of t or other consonants after r and followed by a vowel (tayor llaukikatayā, f.72v, l.5).
Between vowels, y is often duplicated (dvitiyya, kratviyya, adhyavasiyyate...).

B.1.3 Writing peculiarities

B.1.3.1 Vowels

ī and i are not distinguishable, apart from the cases where ī is indicated by adding to the consonant+i the diacritic for ā (constantly in the case of yī and frequently in the case of mī and hī). Since it is hardly the case that a long ī was only distinctly pronounced after these consonants, the confusion between i and ī has not been included among the ones possibly reflecting a pronunciation habit.
A long ā after ṅ, ñ (f.53v., l.6) and ṇ is indicated with a pollu.
The vowel *o* is indicated by the diacritical sign for *e* on the first part of the akṣara and the diacritic for *ā* in case of yo (always, even when tyo, nyo, etc.), no and ho; and often also for mo (f.58v, l.1), sto (f. 71v, l.4) stho (f.50v, l.5; f.61v, l.5), sro (f.70r, l.1). The same applies for 'au'. ko, go, ṇo, to, do, dho, bho, ro are instead always marked with the most standard diacritic for o.
In case of consonants followed by y, the diacritic signs for vowels are usually added to the underwritten y in the TR part (but not in the following one).
In a single case (upāṃśuyājam, f.58v, l.4), possibly influenced by its Vedic origin, a candrabindu is used instead of anusvāra. It is indicated with a sort of telegu g with a virāma on the top, different from the glyph proposed in Grünendahl, p.136.

B.1.3.2 Consonants

The avagraha is extremely rarely used, I can only point out a single instance, f.1, l.4, within the opening maṅgala verses.

According to the Telegu use, anusvāra is always used instead of homorganic nasals (kurvaṃti instead of kurvanti). It is regularly used also before daṇḍa and rarely at the end of a word before a following vowel.
The consonant cluster ṣṭ is written as if ṣd. ṭ is instead distinguished if followed by a vowel. Since it is hardly the case that a voiceless *s* makes the following *ṭ* non-retroflex and voiced, this change has not been included among the peculiarities possibly reflecting a pronunciation habit.
The cluster ṅkt is regularly written as ṅt (prayuṅte instead of prayuṅkte or prayuṃkte).
When preceding a consonant, r is indicated by the corresponding sign if m or v follow. In all other cases, it is indicated by the telegu glyph located after the akṣara.
The virāma is often used after t (ablatives, syāt, cet), possibly also in order to indicate a comma. A virāma can also be used after n (in this case, the special telegu glyph for n+virāma is used). The glyph for n+virāma can rarely be found also within a clause (e.g., saktūn juhoti, f.60r, l.1). A single instance of k+virāma is at f.56r, l.1. No other cases of consonants followed by virāma have been found.
śrī is written as a distinct glyph (see f.1, l.1 and f.77v, l.6).
śrū is written as śṝ (f.63r, l.2 and f.66v, l.2).

B.1.4 Punctuation and further glyphs

Single and double daṇḍas (written in a joint form) are regularly used in verses (with just one case of daṇḍa instead of double daṇḍa, f.1, l.1, possibly due to the confusing presence of a scribe maṅgala before the author's one). Single daṇḍas are rarely used, but always indicate a logical stop. Non application of sandhi also indicates a logical stop and so frequently do t+virāmas. A vertical line different from daṇḍa and with no apparent purpose is also frequently present. It is probably a later addition, as suggested by Dr. Gerhard Ehlers. It has still to be verified whether it may have some purpose for the scribe(s)' calculations of written akṣaras and consequent awards.
A sign quite similar to our '=' and measuring half an akṣara, is found at the end of a line, before the string hole or, in a single instance (f.75r, l.6), after a virāma, apparently as a filler whenever the space is not enough to write a whole akṣara. In a single case (f.75r, end of l.1) two = follow each other, although the space would have been enough for a further akṣara (maybe the scribe wrote one = and then realized that there was still some space left?).

B.1.5 Insertions and erasures

A sign similar to our '+' is found in order to indicate the need for an insertion (the akṣara to be inserted is often above the line, whereas the +

can be at the bottom or at the top, according to space reasons). At f. 54r, a longer insertion is indicated through two +, one above and one below the line and the akṣaras to be inserted are on the left margin, close to the corresponding line. In a single case, the correct akṣara is simply written underneath the cancelled one (f.63r, l.2.).
akṣaras are erased by cancelling them with more ink (as most today's children would do). See, three times in f. 51 v.
In one case (f.76v, l.7), a sort of round bracket encloses the first akṣara and then the last one of a reduplicated clause, to be deleted.
Auspicious signs are found on the margins and within the text at the beginning and end of a work or of a pariccheda.

B.1.6 Further characteristics of the manuscript

On every folio there is a number in Roman characters and blue ink pen, presumably very recent. Most photos allow one to see, on the very left margin, the telegu numbers which have been just reproduced by the Roman characters. These telegu numbers display a digit above and one below it.
A recent intervention are possibly also underlinings in blue (only under *ṛjuvimālāṃ dīpaśīkhāṃ*, f.1r, l.5) or red (possibly used most of all for underlying text partitions –e.g., under iti siddhaṃ, f. 6r, l.1; under tac ca pañcavidhaṃ, f.11 l.3; under pratyakṣaṃ, f.11 l.4– or works, e.g., under nāyakaratna , f.65r, l.1) highlighting titles of works or sections (e.g., the chapter colophon *iti śrīmadrāmānujyācāryaviracite tantrarahasye śāstra-parichedas tṛtiyyaḥ * **, f.50r, l.4).
Lateral glosses indicate the topic (e.g., one indicating the topic *upamāna* at the beginning of the discussion on it in TR I, f.16r; one indicating "anvitābhidhānaṃ" at the beginning of the discussion on this topic in TR III, f.35r). The end of a chapter is sometimes indicated by the auspicious sign * | * on the margin (e.g., at f.26r., indicating the end of TR II, see picture). TR I terminates on a verso and is hence unmarked, apart from the red underlining of its chapter colophon. TR III terminates on f.50r, but the left margin is unfortunately not entirely included in the photograph.
On 1r, on the left margin, there is a sort of scribe's maṇgala: avighnam astu śubham astu. The text then starts with a further scribe's maṅgala (śrīmahāgaṇapataye namaḥ) before the author's one. This can be read as a sign of the present manuscript having been copied by a previous one (so that the present scribe inserted the previous scribe's maṅgala within the text and then added its own on the margin). After the TR part, a further śubham astu is found on the left margin of f.271r, after a blank verso, at the beginning of a new work.



Figure B.1: The auspicious sign at the end of TR II. On the second line, one can read "racite taṃtrarahasye prameyaparichedo tritiya

B.1.7 Kind of variations

sandhi semplifications (e.g., nirāpekṣāc cabdād, f.70v, l.7).
In several cases, a vowel is written instead of another. This occurs typically for i and e (e.g. prapiṃcitaṃ instead of prapañcitam, f.75r, l.6).
Haplography (see supra).
Dittography (upāsinanasya instead of upāsīnasya, f.51r, l.6; tataḥ kiṃ idaṃ tataḥ kim idaṃ, f.56v, l.2; tasyaiva tasyaiva, f.68r, l.4; tadanutadanutiṣṭhan, f.70r, l.1).
Lack of a sillable (e.g., pradhānabhāvanām instead of pradhānabhāvanāyām, f. 58v, l.3; bhāvaye ti instead of bhāvayed iti, f.59r, l.2; na tv ed evam instead of na tv etad evam, ; karmādhyatvam instead of karmārādhyatvam, f.66v, l.4; kriyākāryapatvābhidhānaṃ instead of kriyākāryaparatvābhidhānaṃ, f.68r, l.3; upasarjabhāvā dvayor instead of upasarjanabhāvād dvayor, f. 69v, l.4). Aural errors: 1. retroflex/dental (purodāśa instead of puroḍāśa, f.61r, l.1; akhaṃda instead of akhaṇḍa, f.77r, l.5; phālgune instead of phālguṇe, f.67r,l.6). 2. aspirate/non aspirate (anuṣdāpakatayā instead of anuṣṭhāpayati, see above for the writing peculiarity ṭ/d, f.64v, l.6; cid- instead of chid-, f.74r, l.2). 3. non aspirate/aspirate (pinaṣṭhi instead of pinaṣṭi, f.72v, l.4).
Graphic errors: 1. confusions of similarly written varṇas (e.g., anyavyāpārābhinitvartyaṃ instead of -abhinirvartyam, due to the similarity of t and r when compounded with va, f.65v, l.5; -ekalo instead of -ekato due to the close similarity of l and t, f.69v, l.4; praṇāśikayā instead of praṇālikayā, possibly through the intermediate step of ḷ, which closely resembles ś, f.70r, l.7 and f.70v, l.2; lananyatra instead of anyatra, because of la closely resembling an initial a, f.73v, l.3). 2. confusion of similarly written varṇas and influence of the next akṣara (hinedhādhyeṣaṇam instead of hīne cādhyeṣaṇam, f.69r, l.5; bha instead of ca, although the word ca is well known and does not sound at all like bha, whereas bha and ca are similarly written and the scribe might have been influenced also by the following bhojanādau, f.68r, l.6). Common confusions such as that between sa and na have not been listed here.
Very few unexplainable lectiones (liṅvālicyā instead of liṅādivācyā; gā instead of vā, f.70r, l.3; śuṇinikāro, f.71v, l.4).

B.2 History of M and Datation

M preserves all sort of variants referred to as “older” in texts about Telegu script (see Hill 1991). Among them, the usage of pollu for ā (after ṅ, ṇ, ñ, see supra), the *o* written through the diacritical sign for *e* on the first part of the akṣara and then the diacritical sign for *ā*, the constant (no exception recorded in the whole manuscript) use of sunna (=anusvāra) instead of

homorganic nasals.
All of that points to a pre-19th c. manuscript.
The variations called above “graphic errors”, together with dittographies and lacks of a syllable incline one to think that M has been copied from a written exemplar, possibly in telegu, and has not been dictated. The manuscript is however surely not the one written (or dictated) by Rāmānujācārya himself, as proved by a instances of graphic errors such as bha instead of ca, which can be easily explained only if one assumes that the scribe was carelessly copying a model where the two signs looked very similar.

These two considerations make Ramaswami’s (**Tattvabindu1936**) and Potter’s datation of the text “C. A.D. 1750” (**Potterbibliography**) implausible, since it hardly allows the time for the text to be written and (badly) copied.

B.3 Evaluation of the witnesses and attempt of a stemma codicum

The 1956 editor, at the end of his Preface, laments:

> It is regrettable that the edition of the Tantrarahasya of Rāmānujācārya is to be prepared with the help f one unique and single MS of the work preserved in the Mysore Collection of MSS and no other copy of it is available in any of the rich MS Libraries of both South and North India (Preface, p.viii).

On the other hand, the other work of the same author (the Nāyakaratna , a commentary on the Nyāyaratnamālā of Pārthasārathi Miśra) is easily found in many copies throughout India. This is due to the inherent appeal of Pārthasārathis’ text but possibly also to the different fortune of Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā in India.
Unfortunately, the situation has not improved since 1956 and I have also been only able to collate one single manuscript (M). I could not find any trace of the three manuscripts mentioned in the editio princeps (about which, see infra, B.3.1).

As already hinted at, M has been mentioned in the 1956 edition (which univocally identifies it thanks to its catalogue number). Its readings appear in the appendix, which should list all different readings (although it does only list selected ones). According to the 1956 editor, the emendations proposed in brackets within the edited text are his own proposals, independent of the readings of M.

B.3.1 OP and M

It is instead not clear whether M was known to the editor of the editio princeps. As for the ms material he has used, he writes:

> The edition of the text is based upon three manuscripts belonging to the Government Oriental Library in Mysore. Of them one is a palm-leaf manuscript and two are paper manuscripts, all written in Telegu characters. The palm-leaf manuscript is almost correct and the best of the three.

These appreciative words could incline one to think that he is not talking about M, although M's 'mistakes' rarely make the text obscure. In fact, since this palm-leaf ms is the only one he –though briefly– describes, one would expect his edition to be basically a reproduction of M's text, with sandhi adjustments and punctuation added. But this is not the case, and in several instances the text of OP is enhanced by the readings of M (for instance, karaṇatvam apy instead of the odd karaṇatvapy, §11.7.6; svargakāmādipadaṃ instead of svargayāgādipadaṃ, § 9.3; sukhāpagame instead of sukhāvagame, §9.3.2; sa ca nāviśiṣṭo instead of na ca sā viśiṣṭā, §10.5; anyonyānvitābhidhānam instead of anyonyābhidhānam, §12.3). In fact, one could think that it would hardly be the case that the careful editor of OP explicitly chose the "wrong" reading if he had known M and if M were the ms he appreciatively refers to.
So, one can imagine that OP is based on three mss different from M and, among them, mainly on a palm-leaf one. However, these cannot be conclusive arguments, since the editor may have followed a text partly different from the M one because the two paper manuscripts were more easily accessible or also because of his own Mīmāṃsā background, which could have made him select one reading as more familiar (although this last point hardly explains the cases mentioned above).
A conclusive evidence could only be extracted from lacunae or similar cases. In fact, a damaged margin in M (f.63v, l.1) corresponds to a lacuna in OP (§6.1, p.98), but the margin is damaged in the same way (and hence, has been damaged most likely at the same point of time) in all ff. 61-66, whereas that one is the only lacuna in OP. On the contrary, OP lacks a sentence present in M (svargo niyojyaviśeṣaṇatayānveti. yato nāviśiṣṭo niyojyaḥ), which nicely fits with the following ata eva (§10.5).
On the other hand, OP and M share some common "errors", thus proving that they at least depend on a common archetype (an odd kṛtir īpsitatamam, §11.6.2; a similar kṛtir īpsitaṃ, §11.7.1; tadanu gocarā instead of *tadanu phalagocarā or *bhāvyagocarā, §11.7.5; viṣayaniyogavirodhāt instead of viṣayadvayaniyogavirodhāt, §12.3; antarakiñcitkāraḥ instead of avāntarakiñcitkāraḥ, §12.4;) (in the table: a).
In sum, OP seems to be a testimony (partly?) independent of M. I will call

the telegu ms on which it is (possibly) mostly based T. T is at present not found.

B.3.2 P and OP

P is based on OP (Preface, p. viii). Suggestions, maintains the 1956 editor, have been added in brackets. So, the 1956 text should be, apart from those suggestions in brackets identical with the one of OP. But this is not the case and in several instances the text has been modified (see, e.g., niyamo 'ṃśe instead of niyamāṃśe, §5.1; tatsādhanatayā kalpyate instead of tatsādhanatā kalpayate, §5.2; mantrabhāga- instead of mantrabhāva-, §5.4; pradhānavidhiḥ instead of pradhānaṃ vidhiḥ, §6) possibly according to its editor's acumen. In spite of it, some minor "errors" seem to have been added (apart from typos, see the lack of tu at §4.2.6; the lack of tad uktam at §9.10). However, P mostly follows OP.

Hence, P is in principle not yielding any fresh information, but his learned editor separated the text in mostly coherent units and sometimes improved it according to its own acumen and Mīmāṃsā background.



B.4 Critical edition

Between OP and M, I have been following M, since it is the only direct piece of evidence of the TR text, whenever possible. But I emended it (mostly according to OP) whenever I felt it needed: 1. most noticeably because of a parallel in the source text (mostly VM or NRM), 2. because the text of M is longer and could include a gloss (e.g., vidhipratyayānāṃ after vyutpannānāṃ, §9.5), 3. because of the sense (e.g., viṣayadvayaniyogavirodhāt instead of viṣayaniyogavirodhāt in §C.12.2.1).

Beside that, sandhi has been uniformed and the text has been divided in paragraphs and subparagraphs.

The punctuation is mine, as based on M's use of daṇḍa, non-application of sandhi rules and of connective particles such as "ca", and on P.

B.4.1 The first apparatus

The first apparatus contains P, OP and M's different readings. Minor typos (such as °utpaty° instead of °utpatty° in §C.11.5) in P and OP, writing peculiarities described in the above paragraphs and obvious "mistakes" which could not yield to any possible meaning (such as dadhena instead of rathena, f.75r, l.5 §C.11.7.7) have been eliminated without mentioning them. The 1956 editor's emendations (in brackets in the 1956 edition) have also been proposed in the first apparatus, and identified as "in parentheses". This choice is partly due to an appraisal of his acumen but should also allow the reader to follow an interpretation different from mine (in case the emendations have been rejected) or to understand the origin of mine (in case they have been accepted). In the OP text, also, some emendations are proposed in brackets. This seems to imply (but it is not explicitly stated) that they are only the editor's suggestion, not based on any of the mss availble. Since they could derive from a ms source, these emendations are also listed in the first apparatus, but they are reproduced within OP's reading and not acknowledged as a different witness.
Distinctions in punctuation of P, OP and M from my constituted text have been listed only when entailing a difference of meaning.

B.4.2 The second apparatus

Direct quotations from a source text are listed in the second apparatus. In this category are included both literal quotations (rarely to be found in TR) and quotations which clearly reproduce the gist of an older passage, though not reproducing it verbatim. I quoted the source text in full in order to make readers aware of Rāmānujācārya's way of re-using previous texts.
As a rule, whenever a passage can be found, e.g. in PrP and in TV, only Rāmānujācārya's direct specimen is given in the apparatus. However, whenever possible, the remote specimen is also made available to readers.
In order to provide the reader with an immediate appreciation of the kind of re-usage of previous material (I am including in this periphrasis all kinds of quotations and embedded texts), I used the symbols elaborated by Ernst Steinkellner and enlarged by some other scholars working in Vienna (see **Steinkellner1988 Lasic2000 Trikha2009 Kellner2007** for an explanation of all symbols, see infra, D.1.2). For the time, being I did not adopt the symbols <Ce>, <Ce'> and <Ce'e>, proposed in **Trikha2009** instead of Ce" and Cee" or Ce"' and Ce"' and so on. I had the pleasure to discuss this subject with Dr. Trikha and Prof. Karin Preisendanz who explained that the new symbols aim at avoiding an explicit judgement about the number of steps elapsed between the original source of a passage and its occurrence in the text one is presently editing. I agree with this concern, although this is less urgent in the present case, where the number of steps is often infer-

able (e.g., Kumārila, quoted by Pārthasārathi, who is again embedded in Rāmānujācārya's text). Hence, I see no reason for omitting an additional information to the reader (i.e., whether the usage is secondary or tertiary, and so on). Moreover, as a rule, I tend to favour established conventions, in order to make them more accessible to the readers. For a longer discussion on the topic of quotations, see also **Freschiforthcoming**

B.4.3 The third apparatus

The third apparatus lists parallel passages. By referring to them in the apparatus I do not commit myself to the hypothesis of Rāmānujācārya explicitly or implicitly mentioning them. Thereby I only mean to show how a certain theme was widespread in Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā.
Obviously the distinction between indirect quotations and parallel passages may appear arbitrary as far as some border line cases are concerned. I hope to receive the reader's indulgence in such cases.

Appendix C

Annotated Text of the Śāstraprameyapariccheda, together with its sources

C.1 1

padavākyapramāṇeṣu parāṃ kāṣṭhām upāgataḥ |
jātavedogurur yajvā jayati kṣitimaṇḍale ||

karaṇakalebaramanasāṃ śaithilyaṃ sahajam asakṛd ālocya |
tantrarahasyaṃ kṛtavān rāmāvarajaḥ paropakārārtham ||

C.2 2

atha śāstraprameyaṃ nirūpyate. tac cāpūrvarūpaṃ kāryaṃ liṅādipratyayavācyam. tad eva ca vidhitattvam. kṛtsnam api śāstram tatparam eva. etac cāgre vakṣyate.

C.3 3.

ācāryās tv anyathā śāstraprameyaṃ vidhitattvaṃ ca vyācakṣate. tad uktam –

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2 jātavedogurur] So P, OP. M: jātavedagurur

10–13 abhidhābhāvanām ...sarvatrākhyātagocaraḥ] (Cee) abhidhābhāvanām āhur anyām eva liṅādayaḥ | arthātmabhāvanā tv anyā sarvākhyāteṣu gamyate (TV ad 2.1.1., v.24, p. 265, **Kataoka2004 Kataoka2004** does not mention the readings arthātmā bhāvanā and sarvatrākhyātagocaraḥ.

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1 parāṃ ...upāgataḥ] tathā hi ye 'pi yogasya parāṃ kāṣṭhām upāgatāḥ | (ŚD, ātmavāda, ātmano mānasāhaṃpratyayagamyatvam, v. 21, p. 244 –1977 edition).
7–8 tac ...liṅādipratyayavācyam] See apūrvādhikaraṇe liṅādyartho 'pūrvam ity uktam (VM II ad 1, p.29, Śā p. 417).

abhidhābhāvanām āhur anyām eva liṅādayaḥ |
arthātmā bhāvanā tv anyā sarvatrākhyātagocaraḥ || iti ||

arthātmā bhāvanā arthabhāvanā puruṣaprayatnas tatpravṛttir iti yāvat. sā sarvākhyātavācyā. abhidhābhāvanā śabdabhāvanā. sā liṅādivācyā. tataś cārthabhāvanā sarvākhyātānāṃ vācyā. liṅādīnāṃ tu bhāvanādvayam api vācyam ity arthaḥ. tanmatānusāribhir anyathānyathā vidhitattvaṃ vyākhyātam.

C.3.1 3.1

tatra kecid āhuḥ .–liṅādiprayogānantaraṃ puruṣapravṛttidarśanāt tasyāś ceṣṭasādhanatājñānamūlatvāt tajjñānasya ca śabdanimittatvāt prakṛtyarthasya pratyayārthasya vā iṣṭasādhanatvaṃ tadvācyam iti prathamaṃ pārśvastho vyutpitsur niścinoti tatraikapratyayopādānena sannikarṣātiśayāt pratyayārthasya bhāvanāyā eveṣṭasādhanatvaṃ liṅādivācyam ity eva niścinoti. evaṃ ca "svargakāmo yajeta" ity ukte yāgabhāvaneṣṭasādhanam ity

13 arthātmā bhāvanā] So OP, M. P: arthātmabhāvanā.
3 abhidhābhāvanā ...liṅādivācyā] So P, OP. M: abhidhābhāvanā śabdabhāvanā sā liṅadivācyā | abhidhābhāvanā śabdabhāvanā liṅadivācyā

12 ācāryas...liṅādayaḥ] (Ce'e) ācāryasya tu "abhidhābhāvanam āhur anyām eva liṅādayaḥ" iti vadato 'nyādṛśaṃ vidhitattvam abhimataṃ lakṣyate (VN, ad 2, p. 47– 1937:75).
11 liṅādiprayogānantaraṃ ...niścinoti] (Ce'e) tena liṅśabdānantaraṃ pravartamānasya prayojyavṛddhasya pravṛttihetubhūtecchāsaṃpādakatvena samīhitasādhanatvāvagatir eva kriyāyāṃ vyutpitsunā kalpyate (VN, ad 2, p. 46–1937: 72).

12 abhidhābhāvanām ...liṅādayaḥ] The first hemistich of TV has been quoted also in MNP, 373, p. 269.
2–3 arthābhāvanā...sarvākhyātavācyā] See *nanu sarvākhyātānāṃ bhāvanāvacanatā (VM II, ad 4, p. 34, Śā p. 424. *Śā has nanu ca) .
2–3 arthābhāvanā...sarvākhyātavācyā] See yadā hi sarvākhyātānuvartinī karotidhātuvācyā puruṣavyāpārarūpā bhāvanāvagatā bhavati (TV ad 2.1.1, Kataoka p. 74).
2 arthabhāvanā ...tatpravṛttir] puruṣavyāpārātmikāyāṃ bhāvanāyāṃ (TV ad 2.1.4).
3–6 abhidhābhāvanā ...vyākhyātam] See śābdī bhāvanā [...] eva ca pravartanātvena rūpeṇa vidhyartha iti. ayam eva cārthaḥ– abhidhābhāvanām āhur anyām eva liṅādayaḥ, iti vārtikasya. abhidhīyate 'neneti vyutpattyābhidhāśabdena vidhiśabda ucyate. tadvyāpārātmikā bhāvanā liṅādivācyeti kecid ācāryā āhuḥ. anye tv āhuḥ: [...] (MNP, 372-5, pp. 269-70).
3 abhidhābhāvanā ...liṅādivācyā] See liṅādiśabdānāṃ yaḥ puruṣaṃ prati prayojakavyāpāraḥ, sā dvitiyā śabdadharmo 'bhidhātmikā bhāvanā vidhir ity ucyate (TV ad 2.1.1, Kataoka pp. 74-5).
4–5 liṅādināṃ ...vācyam] iha hi liṅādiyukteṣu vākyeṣu dve bhāvane gamyete śabdātmikā cārthātmikā ca (TV ad 1.2.7).
11 pārśvastho vyutpitsur niścinoti] See vyutpitsuḥ pārśvastho [...] niścinoti (VN, ad 1, p. 40–1937: 63).
11 liṅādiprayogānantaraṃ ...niścinoti] tad ayaṃ vyutpitsur yajjñānāt prayatnajananīm icchām avāptavān tajjñānam eva liṅśraviṇaḥ pravṛttikāraṇam anuminoti (NKus ad 5.13).

uktaṃ syāt. idam eva pravartakaṃ vidhitattvam. tad uktam – puṃsāṃ neṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsv anyaḥ pravartakaḥ |
pravṛttihetuṃ dharmaṃ ca pravadanti pravartanām || iti ||

C.3.1.1 3.1.1

etādṛśyā bhāvanāyā bhāvyākāṅkṣāyām apuruṣārthatayā samānapadopātto 'pi dhātvartho na bhāvyatayānveti. bhāvanāyā vidhipratyayāvagateṣṭasādhanatvavyāghātāt. tac ca vyutpattisiddham. tasmāt padāntaropāttam api svargādikam eva puruṣārthatayā bhāvyakoṭau niviśate. dhātvarthas tv ākāṅkṣādivaśāt karaṇakoṭau. sannidhipaṭhitam itarat sarvam itikartavyatākoṭāv iti.

C.3.2 3.2

idaṃ mataṃ tadīyair eva dūṣitam. tathāhi– iṣṭasādhanatvaṃ nābhidheyam.

230.14–231.1 puṃsāṃ ...pravartanām] (Ce) VV p. 243. Also quoted in VN, ad 2, p. 47–1937: p. 75 (first hemistich); VM II, ad 6, p. 36, Śā p. 428; MNP 381, p. 271, Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 53.
4–7 tasmāt ...iti] (Pv) padāntaropāttam upasarjanabhūtam api svargādikaṃ puruṣārthatayā bhāvyaviśeṣatvenānvetīty āha –teneti. evaṃ bhāvyānvayāt pracyuto dhātvarthaḥ paścāt karaṇākāṅkṣāyāṃ karaṇatvenānvetīty āha –tasminn iti. paścāt kathamākāṅkṣāyāṃ dravyakarmādikam anvetīty āha –dravyādīti (NR ad AN, III pariccheda, ad 12).
1–8 iṣṭasādhanatvaṃ ...liṅādinām] (Ce'e) tatra nābhidhāyakatā yuktā saṃvidvirodhāt. na hi yāgānurakto vyāpāra iṣṭārthahetur ity asmād yajetety asmāc ca śabdāt tulyāvagatiḥ

230.12–231.1 bhāvanāyā ...iti] See uktavārtikasyāpy [TV ad 2.1.1 quoted above] ayam evābhiprāyaḥ: abhidhīyate sābhidhā samīhitasādhanatā, saiva pravartanātvenābhihitā puruṣapravṛttiṃ bhāvayatīti bhāvanā tāṃ liṅādaya āhur iti. yathāhuḥ: puṃsāṃ neṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsv anyaḥ pravartakaḥ pravṛttihetuṃ dharmaṃ ca pravadanti pravartanām iti. tat siddhaṃ yajetety atra liṅtvāṃśena śābdī bhāvanocyata iti (MNP, 380-2, p. 271).
12 bhāvanāyā ...liṅādivācyam] See anyan mataṃ samīhitasādhanatvam eva bhāvanāyā liṅābhidhīyate (VN, ad 2, p. 45). The 1937 edition differs: anyad asmanmatam –samīhitasādhanatvam eva bhāvanāyā liṅādibhir abhidhīyate (p. 72).
2–7 etādṛśyā ...iti] See yajeta svargakāma ity atrākhyātāṃśenārthī bhāvanābhidhīyate: bhāvayed iti. sā cāṃśatrayam apekṣate: kiṃ bhāvayet, kena bhāvayet, kathaṃ bhāvayed iti. tatra bhāvyākāṅkṣāyāṃ ṣaṣṭhādyanyāyena svargo bhāvyatayānveti, svargaṃ bhāvayed iti. karaṇākāṅkṣāyāṃ samānapadopātto yāgo bhāvārthādhikaraṇanyāyena karaṇatayānveti, yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayed iti. tataḥ katham iti kathaṃbhāvākāṅkṣāyāṃ yat saṃnidhau paṭhitam aśrūyamāṇaphalakaṃ ca kriyājātaṃ tad evopakāryākāṅkṣayetikartavyatātvenānvayam anubhavituṃ yogyam (MNP, 123, p. 217).
2–3 etādṛśyā ...bhāvyatayānveti] See sā (bhāvanā) ca svabhāvato bhāvyaṃ karaṇam itikartavyatāñ cāpekṣate, tatra (svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ iti) na tāvad adhyayanam eva samānapadopāttaṃ bhāvyatayā sambandham arhati, apuruṣārthatvāt (PrP, Śāstramukha 1904, p.1, Śā pp. 3-4). Words in brackets have been added by me for clarity's sake.
2–3 etādṛśyā ...bhāvyatayānveti] dhātvarthas tu sarvatra samānapadopātto 'pi balīyasyā vidhiśrutyā sādhyāṃśāt pracyāvitaḥ pratyāsattyā karaṇāṃśena niviśata iti (VN, ad 2, p. 46–1937: 73).
4–6 tasmāt ...karaṇakoṭau] See bhāvanā [...] sākāṅkṣā padāntarasamarpitena svargādinā nirākāṅkṣībhavatīty (VN, ad 2, p. 46–1937: 72). And tasmād iṣṭasādhanataiva vidhir liṅādyabhidheyeti taduktāyā bhāvanāyāḥ phalam eva bhāvyaṃ dhātvarthas tu karaṇam iti (VN, ad 2, p. 47–1937: 73).

saṃvidvirodhāt. na hi yāgānurakto vyāpāra iṣṭābhyupāya ity asmāc chabdād yajetety asmāc ca tulyāvagatir bhavati. bhavitavyaṃ ca tayā iṣṭasādhanatvasyaiva vidhitvāt, śabdāntarasya ca tatsamānārthatvāt. sahaprayogāc ca. samīhitasādhanatvavacanaśabdo vidhiśabdaś ca sahaprayujyamānau dṛṣṭau. "māṇavaka! sandhyām upāsīnasya te 'bhyudayo bhavitā. tasmād upāssva" iti. na ca paryāyayos sahaprayogo dṛṣṭaḥ. lokapramāṇakaś ca śabdārthanirṇayaḥ. tasmān neṣṭasādhanatāvācitvaṃ liṅādīnām. "abhidhābhāvanām āhuḥ" ityādi ślokānuguṇyaṃ ca nāstīti.

C.3.3 3.3

anye tu – samīhitasādhanatvaṃ na sākṣād vācyaṃ yenedaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ syāt. kiṃ tv aparyavasānalabhyam. tathāhi – liṅādipratyayas sukhaduḥkhaparihāratadupāyasādhāraṇaṃ kāryamātram abhidhatte. tatraiva vyutpatteḥ. loke trayāṇām eva kṛtisādhyatayā kāryatvaṃ pratipannam. tasmiṃs tv abhihite bhāvanārūpāyā kriyāyāḥ liṅādivācyāyāḥ svayaṃ sukhaduḥkhaparihārarūpatvābhāvāt pāriśeṣyāt tadupāyatvaṃ nirṇīyate. tathā ca "kartavyatāvacano bhāvanāyāṃ puruṣaṃ pravartayati" iti bhūyān bhāṣyavārttikayor vyavahāraś copapannaḥ. atrāpi bhāvyākāṅkṣāparipūrtiḥ pūrvavad iti. idam api mataṃ ślokānanuguṇam iti tadīyair evopekṣitam. kāryateṣṭasādhanatayor bhedaś ca vakṣyate.

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3 asmāc ca] So P, OP. M: asmāc ca loke. M's reading is possibly a (useful) gloss later inserted in the text.

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sahaprayogāc ca. loke hi samīhitasādhanatāvacano vidhiśabdaś ca yugapat prayujyamānau dṛṣṭau māṇavaka sandhyām upāsīnasya te 'bhyudayo bhavitā tasmāt saṃdhyām upāsveti na ca paryāyayoḥ sahaprayogo bhavati. lokapramāṇakaś ca śabdārthāvagama iti neṣṭasādhanatābhidhāyitvaṃ liṅādīnām (VN, ad 2, p. 47–1937: p. 75).

11–18 liṅādipratyayas ...ślokānanuguṇam] (Re until pratipannam, then Ce'e) kāryam iti yadi kṛtiṃ praty uddeśyam abhidhīyate tatas tādṛśī kāryatā sarvavastūnām aviśiṣṭeti na tadavagatiḥ pravṛttihetuḥ. pāriśeṣyāt kṛtyarhatā kāryatā vaktavyā. tadavagatir hi pravṛttihetuḥ. kṛtyarhatā ca na sukhaduḥkhaparhāratadupāyavyatirekiṇī kācid asti. tenānayanādikriyāṇāṃ svarūpeṇa sukhaduḥkhaparihārarūpatvābhāvāt tadupāyatvam eva kṛtyarhateti kriyāviṣayāyāḥ kāryāvagateḥ pravṛttihetubhūtāyāḥ samīhitasādhanatvam evāvalambanam [...] tena liṅśabdo 'pi kṛtyarthatārūpakāryam abhidadhat samīhitasādhanatvam evābhidadhyād iti na tanmatād asya viśeṣaḥ syāt. ucyate ayam asti viśeṣaḥ yat samīhitasādhanatā na tatsvarūpeṇābhidhīyate kintu liṅśabdah kṛtyarthatārūpaṃ sukhaduḥkhaparihāratadupāyasādharaṇam abhidadhati. tasmiṃs tv abhihite kriyāyāḥ svayaṃ sukhatvādyabhāvāt pāriśeṣyāt tadupāyatvaṃ niścīyate. tathā ca kartavyatāvacano bhāvanāyāṃ puruṣaṃ pravartayatīti bhūyān bhāṣyavārtikayor vyavahāra iti. idam api matam abhidhābhāvanām āhur ityādyananugatam (VN, ad 2, p. 47–1937:pp.75-6).

1–8 iṣṭasādhanatvaṃ ...liṅādinām] See also yat tv iṣṭasādhanatvaṃ vidhyartha iti tan na. tathā satīṣṭasādhanam iti śabdasya vidhiśabdaḥ paryāyaḥ syāt. na ca paryāyatvaṃ yujyate; saṃdhyopāsanaṃ ta iṣṭasādhanaṃ tasmāt tat tvaṃ kurv iti sahaprayogāt, paryāyāṇāṃ ca sahaprayogābhāvāt (MNP, 368, pp. 268-9).

15–16 kartavyatāvacano ...pravartayati] See pratyayaḥ punaḥ svārthe bhāvanāyāṃ puruṣaṃ pravartayati (Tupṭīkā ad MS 6.1.3).

15–16 kartavyatāvacano ...pravartayati] puruṣaṃ *ca vidhir arthabhāvanāyām prerayati (VM II, ad 4 p. 21, Śā p.420. *Śā omits ca).

C.3.4 3.4

apare tu śrotriyāḥ – liṅādipratyaya eva vidhiḥ. sa eva pravartaka ity āhuḥ.

C.3.5 3.5

tad ayuktam. tathātve tacchrāviṇas sarva eva pravarteran. vyutpannānāṃ pravartaka iti cet kutra vyutpattiḥ. samīhitasādhanatva iti cet, tarhy upanyastamatād aviśeṣa iti.

C.3.6 3.6

apare tu liṅādipratyayavyāpāro vidhir ity āhuḥ. ko 'sau. śabdabhāvanā. kīdṛśī. parapreraṇātmikā puruṣapravṛttyanukūlā liṅādipratyayavācyā tajjanyā ca. "liṅādayo hi preraṇāṃ kurvanti cābhidadhati ca" iti vārttikakārīyāḥ. iyam eva cābhidhābhāvanām ityādiślokenocyate. tataś cādhyayanavidhiparigṛhīteṣu svādhyāyeṣu sarvatra "yajeta" "juhuyāt" "dadyāt" ityādiliṅādipratyayaprayoge "bhāvayet" ity uktaṃ syāt. tasyāś ca kim ity apekṣāyāṃ samānapratyayopāttā puruṣapravṛttir bhāvyatayā sambadhyate. preraṇā hi pravṛttiṃ bhāvayati. tatpreritaḥ khalu puruṣaḥ pravartate. tataś ca kenety apekṣāyāṃ liṅādīnāṃ vidheś ca vācyavācakabhāvasam-

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4 tathātve ...pravarteran] (Ce'e) liṅādiśabdasvarūpasya pravartakatve sarva eva tacchrāviṇo niyamena pravartteran, nacaivaṃ dṛśyate, kasyacit kadācit pravṛtteḥ (VM II ad 4, Śā p. 419).

8–19 tasyāś ...prāśastyajñānenottabhyate] (Ce"e) tatra kim ity apekṣāyāṃ puruṣapravṛttiḥ sambaddhyate. kenety ākāṅkṣāyāṃ vidhijñānam eva yogyatayā karaṇatvenāṅgīkriyate. jñātā hi śābdabhāvanā pravṛttiṃ prasūte, yogyatayaivārthavādasamutthaprāśāstyajñanam itikartavyatāṃśe niviśate. avasīdantī hi vidhiśaktiḥ prāśastyajñānenottabhyate (VM II, ad 4, Śā p. 420 –S: p. 31 –A: pp. 69-9 CHECK). tatra liṅādīnāṃ prayojakakartṛtvaṃ, puruṣaḥ prayojyas tena kim ity apekṣāyāṃ puruṣapravartanam iti sambadhyate. atha tu yogyatayaiva liṅādiviṣayā kriyocyate pravartayed iti. tataḥ kim ity apekṣite puruṣam ity eva saṃbadhyate. [...] atha kenety apekṣite pūrvasaṃbandhānubhavāpekṣeṇa vidhivijñāneneti saṃbadhyate. katham iti? prāśastyajñānānugṛhīteneti. [...] tatra vidhiśāktir avasīdati, tāṃ prāśastyajñānam uttabhnāti (TV ad MS 1.2.7, Abhyankar-Jośi p. 12).

8–13 apare ...syāt] (Ce'e-Ce"e) keyaṃ śabdabhāvanā? ucyate– liṅādivyāpārarūpā purūṣapravṛttibhavanānukūlā. svajñānakaraṇikā, arthavādoditaprāśastyalakṣaṇetikarttavyatāyoginī preraṇātmikā kalpyate. svādhyāyādhyayanavidhinā hi sarve vidhāyakāḥ, svādhyāyapadopāttaś cātmā niyujyante bhāvayed iti. (VM II, ad 4 Śā p. 419-420 –S: p. 31 –A: pp. 69-9 CHECK). svādhyāyādhyayanavidhinetare sarve vidhāyakāḥ, svādhyāyapadopāttaś cātmā niyujyante bhāvayed iti (TV ad 1.2.7 p. 114, Abhyankar Jośi p. 12).

10–11 liṅādayo ...vārttikakārīyāḥ] (Ce'e) tad āhur vārtikakāramiśrāḥ; "liṅādayo hi preraṇāṃ kurvanty abhidadhati ceti" (PrP, Śāstramukha Śā p. 6 –1904, p. 3).

13–18 śabdabhāvanā ...itikartavyatayā] (Re") tathāhi liṅādiyukteṣu vākyeṣu dve bhāvane 'vagamyete śabdabhāvanārthabhāvanā ceti. tatra śabdabhāvanā parapreraṇātmikā tasyāḥ puruṣapravṛttir bhāvyā, tayā ca preraṇayā saha yo liṅādīnāṃ vācyavācakabhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ sa tatra yogyatayā karaṇaṃ, tad āhur vārtikakāramiśrāḥ; "liṅādayo hi preraṇāṃ

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4 tathātve ...pravarteran] See na ca liṅādiśrāviṇo niyamena pravartamānā dṛśyante. prathamaśrutād apravṛtteḥ (Kāśikā ad ŚV 2.15, **Kasika**).

16–17 kenety ...tatkaraṇatayānveti] See karaṇākāṅkṣāyāṃ liṅādijñānaṃ karaṇatvena

bandhaḥ tatkaraṇatayānveti. abhihitā hi śabdabhāvanā pravṛttiṃ prasūte. katham ity apekṣāyām arthavādoditaprāśastyam itikartavyatayā. avasīdantī hi vidhiśaktiḥ prāśastyajñānenottabhyate. preraṇāvarodhabalād evārthabhāvanāyāḥ svargādikam eva bhāvyatayā sambadhyate na tu prakṛtyupātto dhātvarthaḥ, aphale preraṇānupapatteḥ. karaṇādyanvayas tu pūrvavad iti.

C.3.7 3.7

etan matam asmadīyair eva dūṣitam. tatra liṅādes tādṛṣo vyāpāro vidyata ity atra divyadṛṣṭayo bhavanta eva pramāṇam. na tu carmacakṣuṣo vayam. śabdaśravaṇānantarabhāvinī pravṛttir eveti cet, na. tasyās tvanmate samīhitasādhanatā nimittam. asmanmate tu kāryatā.

C.3.7.1 3.7.1

kiṃ ca śabdo 'smanmate 'mbaraguṇaḥ. bhavanmate tu vibhu dravyam. itthaṃ hi bhavanmatasthitiḥ. varṇās tāvad dravyaṃ, na guṇāḥ. te ca vyāpakā nityāś ca. dhvanis tāvat taddharmaḥ tadvyañjakaḥ prativarṇaṃ vi-

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16–17 vidheś ca vācyavācakabhāvasambandhaḥ] So P. OP: vidheś ca (yo) vācyavācakabhāvasambandhaḥ. (sa); M: vidheś ca yo vācyavācakabhāvasaṃbaṃdhas.

3 liṅādes] So P, OP. M: liṅādis.

4 carmacakṣuṣo] So P, OP. M: cārmaṇaś cakṣuṣo. Although compounds are usually a later development of an analytic expression, in this case M's reading seems an explanatory gloss to an non-obvious term.

5 śabdaśravaṇānantarabhāvinī pravṛttir eveti cet] So M. P, OP: śabdaśravaṇānantaraṃ bhāvinīṃ pravṛttiṃ vettīti cet. Both readings make very good sense, and I chose M's one because of the VM parallel.

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kurvanty abhidadhati ceti" pravartyarucyutpādanayogyatayā cārthavādikī stutir itikartavyatā (PrP, Śāstramukha Śā p. 6 –1904, p. 3). iha hi liṅādiyukteṣu vākyeṣu dve bhāvane gamyete. śābdātmikā cārthātmikā ca. (TV ad 1.2.7, Abhyankar-Jośi p. 12).

233.19–234.1 preraṇāvarodhabalād ...sambadhyate] (Re) tasyāś ca puruṣavyāpārarūpā svargādibhāvyāvacchinnā bhāvārthakaraṇikā [...] ārthabhāvanā samānapratyayavācyā viṣayabhūtā iti (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p.420 –S: p. 31 –A: pp. 69-9 CHECK).

233.19–234.1 preraṇāvarodhabalād ...sambadhyate] (Pv) bhāvanāyāḥ prathamam eva vidhyanvaye jāte paścāt tadanurodhenaiva dhātvarthādīnāṃ bhāvyatvenānvayo vācya iti bhāvaḥ (NR ad AN, III pariccheda, ad 12).

3–5 etan ...na] (Ce'e) tan na, liṅādes tādṛśo vyāpāro vidyata ity atra na kiṅcana pramāṇam. liṅādiśabdānantarabhāvinī puruṣapravṛttir eva pramāṇam iti cen na (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 420 –S: p. 31–A:p. 69). The reading of M is even more similar.

3–4 tatra ...vayam] (Ce'e) liṅādivyāpārasya tu pravṛttihetutvāśrayaṇaṃ devāḥ prapadyantām, piśitacakṣuṣo mānuṣā vayaṃ neyatīṃ pramāṇabhūmim avagāhituṃ kṣamāḥ (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 419 –S: p. 31 –A:p.68).

2 kiṃ ca śabdo 'smanmate 'mbaraguṇaḥ] (Ce'e) kiñ ca śabdo 'mbaraguṇa iti (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 423 –S: p. 33 –A: p. 71).

2 kiṃ ca śabdo 'smanmate 'mbaraguṇaḥ] (Ce"e) śabdo 'mbaraguṇaḥ (Padārthadharmasaṅgraha, 8.24 (p.287, l.17).

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saṃbadhyate (MNP, 8, p. 194).

2 aphale preraṇānupapatteḥ] Against this view see niṣphale 'pi preraṇāsiddheḥ pravṛttiḥ syāt (VM II ad 4 Śā, p. 422 –S:p. 33 –A: p.70), which, however, is part of a Prābhākarā siddhānta and refers to a different context.

lakṣaṇaḥ kṣaṇikaś ca. tatkramas tāvad dīrghatvādivad varṇeṣv āropitaḥ. tādṛśakramaviśiṣṭā varṇā eva padam. ataḥ kramabhedāt padabhedaḥ. tadbhedād vākyabhedaḥ. tadbhedāc cārthabheda iti. tataś ca katham tādṛśānāṃ varṇānāṃ vyāpārayogaḥ mūrtadravyāśritatvāt. tasya ca loke vāyvādaya eva prerakā dṛṣṭāḥ.

C.3.7.2 3.7.2

kiṃ ca kathaṃ puruṣapravṛttis tasyā bhāvyā. tadviṣayatvād iti cet, na. preraṇārūpāyās tasyā yogyatayā preryapuruṣa eva viṣayaḥ. na tu bhāvanā. ayogyatvāt. loke hi puruṣa eva preryate. ato na tasyās tadviṣayatvam. kiṃ ca sambandhajñānasya vā kīdṛśam karaṇatvam. preraṇā bhāvanā caikapratyayavācyatayā yugapat pratipanne. na tatrānyataravācyavācakasambandhajñānād anyatarotpattir yuktā. na ca vācyavācakasambandhajñānād vācyotpattir loke dṛṣṭā. bhāvanā ca tvanmate vācyā. api ca preraṇā kriyā. tatphalaṃ hi pravṛttiḥ. na hi kriyā svaphalaprasavāya karaṇam apekṣate. kiṃ tu svotpattaya eva. utpannā tu sā svayam eva phalaṃ prasūte. na hi gamanaṃ saṃyogavibhāgārambhe karaṇāpekṣam. ato na sambandhajñānasya karaṇatvam. prāśastyasyāpi katham itikartavyatātvam. tad dhi puruṣakartṛkāyām eva puruṣārthapravṛttau tatkaraṇasya yogyatayā itikartavyatā bhavitum arhati. na tu śabdakartṛkāyāṃ preraṇotpattau. tatkaraṇasyāyogyatvāt.

C.3.7.2.1

nanu yatra yatrārthavādaśrutis tatrāstu prāśastyam. yatra tu na tatra

6 padabhedaḥ] So P, OP. M: padaḥ.
14 pratipanne. na] So P, OP. M: pratipannena na.
14–15 tatrānyataravācyavācakasambandhajñānād] So P, OP. M: tatrānyataravācyavācakabhāvasambandhajñānād.

7–8 tataś ...mūrtadravyāśritatvāt] (Re) ākāśaguṇaḥ śabdaḥ. na ca tasya vyāpārasambhavaḥ dravyāśritatvād vyāpārāṇām (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 424 –S: p. 33 – A: p. 71).
10 kiṃ ...bhāvyā] (Ce'e) kathaṃ ca puruṣapravṛttis tasyā bhāvyam (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p.421 –S: p. 32 –A: p. 70).
16–19 api ...karaṇāpekṣam] (Ce'e) kriyāphalaṃ hi tathā puruṣapravṛttiḥ syāt. na ca kriyā phalaprasavāya karaṇam apekṣate. na ca gamanaṃ saṃyogavibhāgārambhe karaṇāpekṣam (VM, II, ad 4 Śā pp. 421-2 –S: p. 32 –A: p.70 reads tadā instead of tathā).
1–4 prāśastyasyāpi ...tatkaraṇasyāyogyatvāt] (Ce'e) evam arthavādoditaprāśastyasyāpi itikartavyatātvaṃ vidhvastam. yogyatayā hi tasya tathābhavaḥ. na ca preraṇotpattau śabdakartṛkāyā karaṇībhūtajñānānugrahayogyatā tasya śakyate 'vagantum. puruṣakartṛkāyāṃ tu pravṛttau syāt tasya yogyatāvagamaḥ, praśaste puruṣapravṛttidarśanāt (VM, II, ad 4 Śā, p. 422 –S, p. 32 –A, p. 70).

3 varṇās ...guṇāḥ] See dravyatve sati śabdasya (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 423–S: p. 33 –A: p. 71).
7–8 tataś ...mūrtadravyāśritatvāt] See kaścid āha –na śabdasya vyāpāraḥ sambhavati. guṇatvāt. dravyatve 'pi vibhutvād iti. (VN, ad 2, 1937: p. 77).
13 kiṃ ...karaṇatvam] anantaraniṣpatteḥ, vidhijñānasya karaṇatvābhāvaprasaṅgāt (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 421, S: p. 32 –A: p.70).

katham. na hi sarvatrārthavādas samāmnāyate. nanu tatrāpy atideṣataḥ tatprāptir iti cet, na, pratītigauravāt. nanūpakāramukhena padārthaprāptivat prāśastyamukhena tatprāptir iti cet, na, anapekṣitatvāt. na hy upakāravat prāśastyam apekṣitam, tadantareṇāpy apūrvasiddheḥ. pravṛttis tv iṣṭasādhanatājñānāt. vidhiśaktir api tāvataivottabhyate kāryatājñānād vā. arthavādānāṃ tu kratvīyapadārthaprāśastyalakṣakatayā kevalaṃ vidhiviśeṣaparatvam eva. na tu pravṛttiviśeṣaparatvam. stutaś cāstutaś ca tāvān eva so 'rthaḥ na tv adhikaḥ. atideśakapramāṇābhāvāc ca prakṛtivikṛtibhāvo hy atideśamūlam. nātra tatkḷptiḥ.

C.3.8 3.8

kiṃ ca arthabhāvanāyā bhāvyatvam ekapratyayavācyatvāt. tad uktam –
vidhibhāvanayoś caikapratyayagrāhyatākṛtaḥ |
dhātvarthāt prathamaṃ tāvat sambandho 'dhyavasīyate || iti ||
(ŚV vākya 79cd-80ab)
tad ayuktam. ubhayor ekapratyayavācyatvasyaiva durghaṭatvāt. nanu sarvākhyātānāṃ bhāvanāvacanatā karotyarthasāmānādhikaraṇyenādhyavasīyate. liṅādiṣu tu preraṇāmātram adhikam. karotiś ca kṛtivācakaḥ.

11–12 vidhiviśeṣaparatvam] So P, OP. M: dhīviśeṣakaratvam (dhi and dhī are not distinguished in M).

12 pravṛttiviśeṣaparatvam] So P, OP. M: pravṛttiviśeṣakaratvam

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5–9 nanu ...apekṣitam] (Re) asti tāvad tad [arthavādoditaprāśastyam] apīti na tyajyeta*. evaṃ tarhy aśrute prāśastye tadapekṣā mā bhūt. tataś ca tadatideśādikalpanam aghaṭamānaṃ kevalasya vidher darvihomavat karaṇetikarttavyatākalpanāpi kalpanāmātram eva. darvihomavad iti cāsiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ. tatrāpi śrautadravyadevatāsmṛtyācāraprāptācamanādītikarttavyatāmātreṇopakāraklpter abhimatatvāt. na hy ekasyaiva vastuno 'nugrāhakatā, anugrāhyatā ca svātmany upapadyate (VM II, ad 4 Śā pp. 422-3 –S: p. 33 –A: p. 71).*Śā reads tyajyate, but I understand it rather as “It cannot be left out (i.e., we have to make sense of it)”.

9–10 pravṛttis tv iṣṭasādhanatājñānāt] (Re) evaṃ tarhi jñānaphalam eva pravṛttir astu, na preraṇāphalaṃ (VM II, ad 4 Śā p. 423).

236.13–237.1 atideśakapramāṇābhāvāc ...tatkḷptiḥ] (Re) tataś ca tad[prāśastya]atideśādikalpanam [...] kalpanāmātram eva (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 422 –S: p. 33 –A: p. 71).

6–7 nanu ...iti] See tad evam adhyayanavidhau sākṣād aśrutārthavādake śabdabhāvanāyām itikartavyatābhūtārthavādakāṅkṣiṇyāṃ japayajñādhyayanātideśenārthavādāḥ svīkriyante (PrP, Śāstramukha Śā p. 6–1904, p. 3).

7–8 nanūpakāramukhena padārthaprāptivat] See upakārapṛṣṭabhāvenaiva padārthaprāptiḥ (Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsā 10.1.9, p. 205).

kṛtiś ca prayatnaḥ, saiva pravṛttiḥ, saiva bhāvanā. "jānāti, icchati" iti prayujya "karoti", "prayatate", "pravartate", "bhāvayati", ceti caturṇāṃ pratyekaṃ paryāyatayā loke prayogadarśanāt. yugapat prayoge paunaruktyāc ca. tathā hi – "kiṃ karoti" pacati, "kim akārṣīt" "apākṣīt", "kiṃ kariṣyati" "pakṣyati", iti sāmānādhikaraṇyena praśnottaradarśanāt karotyarthas sarvākhyātair abhidhīyate iti gamyate. praśnottare ca samānaviṣaye. sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ caikārthanimittam. anyathā karotyarthapraśne ākhyātānāṃ taduttaratvānupapatteḥ. tatra ghañādipratyayaprayoge karotyarthatvānavagamād ākhyātaprayoge ca tadavagamād ākhyātārthatā niścīyate. kevalākhyātānāṃ prayogānupapatteḥ prakṛtyaṃśasya sahaprayogamātraṃ, na tu svārthavivakṣayeti.

C.3.9 3.9

tad ayuktam. yady api karotiḥ prayatnaparaḥ, tathāpy atra kiṃ karotīty asya praśnasya yadi yat karoti tat kim iti karotyarthaviṣayatā syāt, tadā pacatīty asyottarasya pākaṃ karotīty arthatā. na caivaṃ lokavivakṣā. kiṃ tv anavagate hi vyāpāraviśeṣe praśnaḥ. tatra cottaraṃ pacatīti tadviśeṣaviṣayam. sarvo 'pi praśnaḥ prativacanaṃ ca sāmānyato jñāte

9 saiva pravṛttiḥ, saiva bhāvanā] So M. P, OP: saiva bhāvanā
16 tatra] So P, OP. M: tatrāpi.
16–17 karotyarthatvānavagamād] So M. P, OP: karotyarthānavagamād. The reading chosen accords with the following ākhyātārthatā.

2–8 kiṃ ...karotyarthasāmānādhikaraṇyenādhyavasīyate] (Ce'e) kathañ cāsau śabdavyāpāra ārthabhāvanāviṣayaḥ? ekapratyayavācyatvāt iti. tad uktam –"vidhibhāvanāyoś caikapratyayagrāhyatā kṛtaḥ | dhātvarthāt prathamaṃ tāvat sambandho 'dhyavasīyate" || tan na. pratyayasya bhāvanābhidhānam asmin pakṣe durghaṭaṃ yataḥ. iti. nanu ca sarvākhyātānāṃ bhāvanāvacanatā karotisāmānādhikaraṇyād adhyavasīyate (VM II ad 4 Śā p. 424 –S: pp. 33-34 –A: pp.71-2). In the first line Wicher accepts from a manuscript the reading ekapratyāyavācyatvāt iti cet (Wicher 1987: 216).
9 kṛtiś ...bhāvanā] (Ce'e) bhavatyarthasya karttuḥ prayojakavyāpāro bhāvanā, saiva kṛtiḥ. (VM II ad 4 Śā p. 424 –S: pp. 33-34 –A: pp.71-2–).
12–14 tathā ...gamyate] (Ce"e) tathāhi –[...] kim akārṣīt. apākṣīt. kiṃ karoti. pacati. kiṃ kariṣyati. pakṣyati iti praśnottaradarśanāt karotyarthaḥ sarvākhyātair abhidhīyata iti gamyate (VM II ad 4 Śā p. 424 –S: pp. 33-34 –A: pp.71-2). tathā ca sarvatra sāmānyataḥ karotyartho 'vagamyate. kiṃ karoti. pacati. kim akārṣīt. apākṣīt. kiṃ kariṣyati. pakṣyati. TV ad 2.1.1. (p. 266, Kataoka p. 74).
15–18 anyathā ...niścīyate] (Ce'e) anyathā karotyarthaviṣayapraśne taduttarānupapattiḥ. tatra satyām api prakṛtau ghañantādiṣu karotyarthānavabodhāt, ākhyātapratyayasannidhāne ca tadavagamāt ākhyātānām eva so 'rtha iti niścīyate (VM II ad 4 Śā p. 424 –S: pp. 33-34 –A: pp.71-2).

9 kṛtiś ...bhāvanā] See also kṛtiś ca puṃsāṃ prayatna eva (VM, II, ad 23 Śā p. 440 –S: p. 44 –A: p.85).
12–18 tathā ...niścīyate] See also yaś ca prayatnapūrvakaṃ gamanādi karoti tasmin devadatto gamanaṃ karotīti karotiprayogadarśanāt, vātādinā spandamāne tu nāyaṃ karoti kiṃ tu vātādināsya spando jāyata iti prayogāt karotyarthas tāvat prayatnaḥ. karotisāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ cākhyāte dṛśyate: yajeta yāgena kuryāt, pacati pākaṃ karoti, gacchati gamanaṃ karotīti (MNP 385, p. 271).

viśeṣataś cājñāte. atra ca dhātvarthagocare eva jñānājñāne. tataś ca tadgocare eva te yukte. yady api karotiḥ prayatnapara eva, tathāpy atra kasyacid abhūtasya bhavane anukūlasvabhāvaḥ karotyarthaḥ. sarve ca dhātvarthās tādṛśā iti karotinā praṣṭuṃ nirdeṣṭuṃ ca śakyam. kiṃ ca saprayatnakriyeṣu devadattādiṣu te ghaṭetām. niṣprayatnakriyeṣu tu "kiṃ karoti? ratho gacchati", ityādiṣu katham. saprayatneṣv apy āste śete ityādiṣu kathantarām. vyāpāramātraviṣayatve tu sarvatropapattiḥ. ato nākhyātānāṃ karotyarthatā. nanu pacatīty asya vivaraṇaṃ pākaṃ karotīti. tatrāpi prakṛtyarthasya sphuṭatvāt pratyayārthasyaiva. tataḥ karotyartham ākhyātam iti cet, na, tatrāpi dhātvarthākṣiptakartṛgataṃ pacatyarthānukūlam ārthaṃ prayatnam upādāya vivaraṇopapattiḥ. ato nākhyātānāṃ bhāvavacanatvam. kiṃ tu dhātvarthākṣiptakartṛsaṃkhyāmātravācitvam. yathāha bhagavān pāṇiniḥ –

"dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane" "bahuṣu bahuvacanam" (Ā 1.4.22-21) iti.

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11 te ghaṭetām] So P, OP. M: te na ghaṭetām

2–6 tad ...tadviśeṣaviṣayam] (Ce'e) tad asat. kiṃ karotīty asya praśnasya yady ayam arthaḥ yat karoti tat kim iti, tatra cet pacatīty uttaraṃ syāt, tadā pākaṃ karotīty asminn arthe pacatīti varttate. tathā ca siddhyed ākhyātānāṃ karotyarthatā. na caitad evam. anavagate hi dhātuvācye vyāpāraviśeṣe tadviśeṣa evaivaṃ pṛcchyate, tatra pacatīty uttaram (VM II ad 4 Śā pp. 424-5 –S: p. 34 –A: p. 72).

8–12 yady ...katham] (Re-Ce'-Re) pacatīty atra yaḥ puruṣaprayatnaḥ, yatsambandhena pacyarthas sādhyabhūtaḥ, taṃ karotinā prakṛtibhūtenopādāya vivaraṇopapatteḥ. yatrāpi "ratho gamanaṃ karotī"ti na prayatno 'paro 'sti, tatrāpi gamanasya sādhyatāṃ darśayitum, gauṇaḥ karotiprayogo draṣṭavyaḥ. pakṣadvaye 'pi tulyatvāt (VM II ad 4 Śā pp. 425-6) .

9–10 atra ...śakyam] (Ce'e) sarve dhātvarthāś ca kasyacid bhūtasya* bhavane 'nukūlatāṃ bhajantaḥ karotyarthatām āpannāḥ karotinā praṣṭum, nirdeṣṭuñ ca śakyanta iti (VM II ad 4 Śā p. 425 –S: p. 34 –A: p. 72). *The context and Rāmānujācārya's text suggest to emend bhūtasya into abhūtasya.

10–12 kiṃ ...katham] (Ce'e) api ca saprayatnakriyeṣu devadattādiṣu vyāpārabhedasambhavāt ghaṭetāṃ praśnottare. vyatiriktakarotyarthaviṣaye "kiṃ karoti" iti praśne, "gacchati" iti cottare gamanātiriktavyāpārābhāvād anupapattir eva syāt (VM II ad 4 Śā p. 425 –S: p. 34 –A: p. 73).

238.14–239.3 nanu ...dhātvarthākṣiptakartṛsaṃkhyāmātravācitvam] (Re) kartrādi saṃkhyāmātravācitayākhyātaprayogopapattau, nādhikaṃ vācyaṃ śakyaṃ kalpayitum. api ca pākaṃ karoti devadattaḥ, ity atra tāvat pacyarthaṃ pākaśabdo bravīti, tadanuguṇan tu puruṣaprayatnaṃ karotir ācaṣṭe; ākhyātan tu kevalakartṛsaṃkhyāṃ vaktīti siddhaṃ tanmātravācitvam. ato 'nyatrāpi tatraiva varttate iti yuktam. evaṃ pacati devadattaḥ ity asya yad vivaraṇaṃ pākaṃ karoti iti, tad apy anupapannam (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 425 –S: p. 35 –A: p. 73).

1–2 ato ...bhāvavacanatvam] (Re) dhātuvācyavyāpāraviśeṣaviṣayatvenāpi [...] karotyarthavācakatākhyātānāṃ na śakyate vaktum (VM II ad 4 Śā p. 425 –S: p. 34 –A: p. 72). Wicher proposes the emendation viṣayatve 'pi instead of viṣayatvenāpi in the last line.

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11 kiṃ ...katham] See tathā ca sarvatrānugatatvād anyotpādānukūlavyāpārasāmānyam evākhyātārthaḥ, na tu prayatnamātram; ratho gacchati devadattaḥ prayatata ityādiṣu tadabhāvāt (MNP, 391, p. 272).

C.3.10 3.10

etac ca matadvayasādhāraṇam. sarvākhyātānāṃ bhāvanāparatvaṃ liṅādīnāṃ tu preraṇāparatvaṃ ca tvanmate 'dhikam. asmanmate tu liṅādīnāṃ kāryaparatvaṃ bhāvanāparatvaṃ ca. kiṃ tu kāryopasarjanatayā tatparatvam. na tu prādhānyena. ata eva asmanmate bhāvanā na vākyārthaḥ kiṃ tu kāryam eva. na hi kṛtim anabhidhāya kāryam abhidhātuṃ śakyate. kṛtisambandhi hi kāryam. na cānekārthatā doṣaḥ. tathaivāvagamāt.

C.3.11 3.11

nanu daṇḍīty atra pratyayo daṇḍaṃ nābhidhatte. atha ca tadviśiṣṭapuruṣapratītiḥ. evam ihāpi kṛtyanabhidhāne 'pi tadviśiṣṭābhidhānaṃ syāt.

C.3.11.1 3.11.1

maivam. na hy apratīte daṇḍe tadviśiṣṭapuruṣapratyayaḥ. asti ca tatra prakṛtibhūto daṇḍaśabdaḥ. sa ca tatpratyāyakaḥ. na ceha tathā. prakṛtīnāṃ

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5 bahuvacanam iti] So P, OP. M: bahuvacanam.

239.9–240.1 kiṃ ...eva] (Re) na cābhidheyatāmātreṇa bhāvanāyā eva vākyārthatvam. bhāvyam apūrvaṃ prati guṇabhāvenābhidhānam, pradhānabhāvenāpūrvasyābhidhānāt tad eva vākyārtha iti, na kiñcid anupapannam (PrP, VK Śā p. 452).

1–3 na ...tathaivāvagamāt] (Ce'e) na ca kāryābhidhānaṃ kṛtim anabhidadhatāṃ liṅādīnām upapadyate iti kṛtim apy abhidadhati. apūrvaṃ ca. na ca yugapad anekābhidhānaṃ doṣaḥ. tathāvagamāt (PrP, VK ad 1 Śā p. 452, 1904: p. 197).

1–2 na ...kāryam] (Ce'e) kin tu kāryābhidhāyino liṅādayaḥ kāryasyānyathānabhidhānāt kṛtyabhidhāyina iṣyante. kṛtisambandhi hi kāryaṃ kṛtyanabhidhāne nābhihitaṃ syāt. na hy asti sambhavaḥ, kṛtiś ca nābhidhīyate, kāryañ cābhidhīyate iti (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 426 –S: p. 35 –A: p. 74).

4–5 nanu ...syāt] (Ce"e) atha matam. yathā daṇḍīty atra pratyayena daṇḍo nābhidhīyate, atha ca tadviśiṣṭapuruṣapratītiḥ, evam ihāpi bhaved iti ((VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 426 –S: p. 35 –A: p. 74). nanu ca daṇḍīti, na tāvad daṇḍiśabdena daṇḍo 'bhidhīyate, atha ca daṇḍaviśiṣṭo 'vagamyate. evam ihāpi na tāvad ākṛtir abhidhīyate, atha cākṛtiviśiṣṭā vyaktir gamyeteti (ŚBh ad 1.3.33).

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4 dvyekayor ...bahuvacanam] Cf. the usage of this same sūtras (also in an order reverting the Ā one) in MNP: tathāpi neyaṃ smṛtiḥ kartur ākhyātavācyatve pramāṇam, kiṃ tu kartur ekatva ekavacanātmaka ity asminn arthe pramāṇam, dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane bahuṣu bahuvacanam ity anenāsyāḥ smṛter ekavākyatvāt (MNP 84, p. 210).

8–9 asmanmate ...ca] See nanu prābhākarā api bhāvanāvācakatāṃ na katham ākhyātapratyayasyecchanti. ucyate, na sarvākhyātapratyayānāṃ bhāvanāvacanatvam abhyupemaḥ (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 426 –S: p. 35–A: p. 74). Because of the TR context, I would agree with Wicher, who, following three manuscripts, omits the na after bhāvanāvācakatāṃ (Wicher 1980: p. 218).

bhāvārthamātraparatvāt. kiṃ ca puruṣo hi cetanaḥ kāryaṃ liṅādibhir avabudhyate. na cāsau parakṛtisambandhi svayaṃ kāryatayā boddhum alam iti svakīyety abhidhānam eṣitavyam. ato na daṇḍinyāyāvasaraḥ.

C.3.12 3.12

yady api kartrākṣepavat taddvārā prayatnākṣepo 'pi sambhavet, tathāpi tadānīm apūrvaṃ tadadhīnasiddhikaṃ nāvagamyate. prayatnābhidhāne tu tadavacchinnatayābhidhīyamānaṃ tadāyattasiddhikam avagamyate. nānyathā. na ca kṛtyanavacchinnaṃ svarūpamātreṇābhihitam apūrvaṃ kṛtim ākṣipet. pūrvam avagatasambandhaṃ hi vastu vastvantareṇākṣipyate. na ca śabdam antareṇāpūrvasya prayatnasambandhe kāraṇam asti. ataḥ kathaṃ tadākṣepakam. kṛtisādhyaikasvabhāvasyāpūrvasya svarūpeṇābhidhānam apy aśakyam. ataḥ kāryābhidhāyināṃ liṅādīnāṃ kṛtyabhidhānam avarjanīyam eva. kiṃ tūpasarjanatayeti siddham.

6–8 maivam …bhāvārthamātraparatvāt] (Ce"e) tan na, tatrāpy apratīte daṇḍe na tavdati pratyayaḥ. asti ca tatra prakṛtibhūto daṇḍaśabdaḥ, sa ca tasya pratyāyayitā. na ceha tathā saṃbhavati, prakṛtīnāṃ puruṣavyāpārābhidhānāniyamāt (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 426 –S: p. 35 –A: p. 74). naitat sādhu ucyate. satyaṃ daṇḍiśabdena daṇḍo nābhidhīyate, na tv apratīte daṇḍe daṇḍipratyayo 'sti. asti tu daṇḍiśabdaikadeśabhūto daṇḍaśabdaḥ, yena daṇḍaḥ pratyāyitaḥ. tasmāt sadhv etad yat pratīte viśeṣaṇe viśiṣṭaḥ pratīyate iti. (ŚBh ad 1.3.33).

8–10 puruṣo …daṇḍinyāyāvasaraḥ] (Ce'e) puruṣo hi cetanaḥ kāryaṃ liṅādibhir avabudhyate. na cāsau parakṛtisambandhi svayaṃ kāryaṃ boddhum alam iti tadīyakṛtyabhidhānam eṣitavyam. tasya ca kṛtiḥ prayatnarūpā. na ca sarvathā tadananubhave tadabhidhāyina iti, na daṇḍinyāyasyāyaṃ viṣayaḥ (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 426 –S: p. 35 –A: p. 74). As for the reading sarvathā tadananubhave, Wicher quotes a manuscript reading sambandhyananubhave, and hypothesises sambandhānanubhave. Actually, the reading accepted by Śā, A and S seems odd to me, too.

8–10 puruṣo …daṇḍinyāyāvasaraḥ] (Re) cetanaś cātmā kārye boddhṛtayānvayam* upaiti. na cānyavyāpārābhinirvarttyam anyaḥ svasambandhitayā kāryatvena saṃvedayitum alam ity ātmano mānasapratyakṣasamadhigamanīyaḥ prayatnaḥ svavyāpāraḥ (PrP, VK Śā p. 452 –1904 p. 197). *1904 reads bodhyatayānvayam.

1–7 yady …tadākṣepakam] (Ce'e) yathā liṅāṃ kartrādisaṃkhyāmātravacanatā, kriyākṣepeṇa ca kartrākṣepeṇa ca kartrādīnāṃ pratītiḥ. tathehāpi kriyā prayatnam ākṣipati, mā bhūt tasya liṅvācyatā iti. tad asat. yady api prakṛtyarthabhūtayā kriyayā prayatna ākṣipyate. tathāpi tadāyattasiddhikatayā katham apūrvaṃ gamyate. prayatnābhidhāne tadavacchinnatayā pratīyamānaṃ* tadāyattasiddhikaṃ gamyate, nānyathā. na ca kṛtyanavacchinnasvarūpamātreṇāpūrvam abhihitaṃ kṛtim ākṣeptum alam. avagatasambandhaṃ hi vastvākṣipyate. na ca śabdam antareṇāpūrvasya prayatnasambandhāvagame kāraṇam asti. ataḥ kathaṃ tatprayatnam ākṣipet (VM, II, ad 4 Śā: pp. 426-7 –S: p. 35-6 –A: pp. 74-5). *Śā edition (p. 426) refers to the C.S.S. Banares edition reading abhidhīyamānaṃ, whereas preferring to it pratīyamānaṃ. The TR reading leads to the conclusion that R. also knew a copy of the VM reading abhidhīyamānaṃ.

8–9 ataḥ …eva] (Ce'e) tasmād apūrvakāryābhidhāyināṃ prayatnābhidhānam avaśyam āśrayaṇiyam (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 427 –S: p. 36 –A: p. 75).

8–9 puruṣo …avabudhyate] See [codanā] bravītīty ucyate 'vabodhayati, budhyamānasya nimittaṃ bhavatīti. yasmiṃś ca nimittabhūte saty avabudhyate so 'vabodhayati (ŚBh ad 1.1.2).

7 kṛtisādhyaikasvabhāvasyāpūrvasya] See apūrvam […] kṛtisādhyam (VM, II, ad 23 Śā p. 440 –1904 p. 44).

C.3.13 3.13

apare tu “abhidhābhāvanām āhuḥ” iti ślokārthānuguṇyaṃ paśyantaḥ preraṇātmako liṅādivyāpāra eva vidhir ity āhuḥ. na cātra pramāṇābhāvaḥ. sarvaśabdānāṃ abhidhāvyāpārāṅgīkārāt. vyutpannasya śabdās tāvad arthapratyāyakāḥ. asti ca tatrārthapratītyunneyo ’bhidhābhidhāno vyāpāraḥ. ko ’sau. tattacchabdagocaraṃ jñānaṃ tattacchabdajanito vā saṃskāraḥ. tadyogī hi śabdo ’rthapratītiṃ janayati. tad uktam – “śāstraṃ śabdavijñānād asannikṛṣṭe ’rthe vijñānam. pūrvapūrvavarṇasaṃskārasacivo ’ntyo vā varṇo vācakaḥ” iti. yad vastu yam evāgantukadharmaṃ prāpya kāryāya paryāptaṃ, sa evāgantukadharmas tasya vyāpāra iti jñānasaṃskārayor na śabdavyāpāratvānupapattiḥ.

C.3.13.1 3.13.1

nanu jñānam evābhidhāvyāpāraś cet, jñānaṃ prati karmībhūtaś śabdaḥ katham enaṃ vyāpāram apekṣya karaṇaṃ syāt. devadattaś śabdenārtham avagacchatīti hi prayogo dṛśyate.

C.3.13.2 3.13.2

ucyate – na hi vyāpārarūpamātrāpekṣayā kartṛkarmakaraṇādikārakavyavasthā. kiṃ tu vyāpārasvarūpaikye ’pi tasyaiva

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13–14 asti ...vyāpāraḥ] (Ce’e) kiṃ punar idam abhidhābhāvanety uktaṃ sarvaśabdānām evārthapratītyunneyo ’bhidhābhidhāno vyāpāraḥ samasti (VN, ad 2, p. 48).

14–19 ko ...śabdavyāpāratvānupapattiḥ.] (Ce’e) kas tasya vyāpāraḥ svajñānam eva tajjanito vā saṃskāras tadyogī hi śabdo ’rthapratītiṃ janayati. tathā coktam. “śāstraṃ śabdavijñānād asannikṛṣṭe ’rthe vijñānam” iti. “pūrvavarṇasaṃskārasacivo ’ntyavarṇo vācaka” iti ca. yadāyam āgantukaṃ dharmaṃ prāpya kāryāya paryāpto bhavati sa evāgantukadharmas tasya vyāpāra ity ucyate tena jñānasaṃskārayoḥ śabdavyāpāratvam upapannam (VN, ad 2, pp. 48-49, 1937: pp. 77-78). śāstraṃ śabdavijñānād asaṃnikṛṣṭe ’rthe vijñānam (ŚBh ad 1.1.5, **Frauwallner1968**). pūrvapūrvajanitasaṃskārasahito ’ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyaka ity adoṣaḥ (ŚBh ad 1.1.5, **Frauwallner1968**). This second passage is quoted, somehow liberally, also in VM I ad 2 Śā p. 377 –1904, p. 1 and TR III, p. 27, l. 9.

1–2 nanu ...syāt] (Ce’e) nanu jñānasyābhidhātvam ayuktaṃ jñānaṃ prati hi karmībhūtaḥ śabdaḥ kartṛtvaṃ karaṇatvaṃ vā tasyābhidhānaṃ praty abhyupagamyate sa katham ekasminn eva vyāpāre karmatvaṃ kartṛtvakaraṇatvayor anyatarac ca pratipadyate (VN, ad 2, pp. 48-49, 1937: p. 78). On the possibility of the same substance playing the role of instrument or of object (in different situations), the earliest source might be Vātsyāyana, NBh ad 2.1.19. See also Matilal 1986: 60.

4–5 na ...kartṛkarmakaraṇādikārakavyavasthā] (Ce’e) na hi vyāpārasvarūpāpekṣaḥ karmabhāvaḥ (VN ad 2–1937: p. 78).

5–6 kiṃ ...apekṣya] (Re) tasmād eka eva vyāpāraḥ phalabhedena bahudhā nirūpyamāṇas taṃ taṃ karmabhedaṃ bhajate (VN ad 2, 1937: p 78).

10–11 preraṇātmako ...vidhir] See liṅādiśabdo vidhijñānaṃ janayitvā [...] preraṇārūpaṃ svavyāpāram ārabhate iti (VM, II, ad 4 Śā p. 422 –1904: p. 32).

13–14 asti ...vyāpāraḥ] See kḷpta eva tu liṅādīnām abhidhābhidhānalakṣaṇo vyāpāraḥ śabdāntarāṇām iva svārthaprakāśanānyathānupapattipramāṇakaḥ (Kāśikā ad ŚV 2.15, p. 8). And kiñ ca sarvaśabdānām evānumānena svārthagocaro vyāpāra unnīyate (ibidem).

vyāpārasya tattatphalāvacchedam apekṣya. tathā hi – yadā tu tad eva śabdakarmakaṃ jñānam arthapratipattilakṣaṇaphalāvacchinnaṃ, tena ca śabdo vyāpyate tadānyārthapravṛttavyāpāravyāpyatvāc chabdaḥ karaṇam. kriyāphalāśrayatvād arthas tu karma. tac ca jñānaṃ tadānīm abhidheti vyapadeśaṃ labhate. tatra tasya vyutpatteḥ. yadā tu vyāpāraṃ prati svātantryavivakṣā tadā kartā śabdo 'rtham abhidhatte. yadā tu sa eva śabdo jñānena viṣayīkriyate, tadārthaprakāśalakṣaṇaphalabhāk chabdaḥ karma "śabdaṃ jānāti". na hi tadānīṃ jñānam abhidhāvyapadeśabhāk. kiṃ tu jñānam ity evocyate. abhidhāśabdasya tatrāvyutpatteḥ. paraśuvat. yathā udyamananipātanaṃ prati karmībhūtaḥ paraśuḥ. yadā ta evodyamananipātane dvaidhībhāvalakṣaṇaphalāvacchinne, tābhyāṃ ca paraśur vyāpyate, tadā anyārthapravṛttavyāpāravyāpyatvāt paraśuḥ karaṇam. kriyāphalāśrayatvāt kāṣṭhaṃ tu karma. te codyamananipātane

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13 na hi] So M and in parentheses. P, OP: tena hi.

15 udyamananipātanaṃ] My emendation. P, OP, M: udyamananipatanam. Here and in all following cases, the meaning would suggest an emendation of nipatana ('falling', intransitive) in nipātana ('felling', as found in VN, and in the same compound in VK, see the apparatus of the present section and of §§C.11.7 and C.11.7.1.). The compound udyamananipātana is also attested since Kātyāyana, vārttika ad Pāṇini 3.3.36, and nipatana is never employed with a transitive meaning. The same udyamananipātana compound can be found also in Mīmāṃsā, see Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā, p. 2, l. 24. Nonetheless, the emendation cannot be called more that tentative because of the many occurrences of the dvandva udyamananipatana throughout this text and even in the PrP (see, e.g., VK quoted in the apparatus of §§C.11.7 and C.11.7.1). Even in the 1937 edition of the Nyāyaratnamālā, one finds side by side Pārthasārathi Miśra's text reading "udyamananipātanayoḥ" etc. (p. 78), and Rāmānujācārya's commentary reading "udyamananipatanayoḥ" (two times at p.79). Perhaps a closer investigation of the manuscripts will settle the issue.

16 evodyamananipātane] My emendation. P, OP, M: evodyamananipātane.

5–6 kiṃ ...apekṣya] (Pv) tattatphalāvacchinnakriyāmātre vyutpatter ekasyāpi vyāpārasya tattatphalāvacchede sati tattaddhātuvācyatvaṃ tattatphalaśālinaḥ karmatvaṃ ca siddham (Nāyakaratna ad VN ad 2–1937: p 79).

6–8 tathā ...karaṇam] (Re) tathā jñānasya śabdaviṣayasyāpy arthapratipattilakṣaṇaphalāvacchedalabdhābhidhābhidhānasyārtha eva karma. śabdas tu phalāntarapravṛttavyāpāravyāpyatayā tasyām avasthāyāṃ karaṇam (VN, ad 2, p. 49–1937: p. 78).

10–11 yadā ...abhidhatte] (Re) svātantryavivakṣāyāṃ ca kartṛtvam anavadyam (VN, ad 2, p. 49– 1937: p. 78).

11–13 yadā ...jānāti] (Re) tenaika eva vyāpāro yadā jānātinā viṣayaprakāśanaphalāvacchinno 'bhidhīyate tadā viṣayībhūtaḥ tatphalatākaśabda eva karma bhavati śabdaṃ jānātīti (VN, ad 2, p. 49–1937: p. 78).

14–18 paraśuvat ...karaṇam] (Ce'e) paraśuvad iti brūmaḥ paraśur hy udyamananipātanayoḥ karmo 'pi san tarudvaidhībhāvalakṣaṇaphalāvacchedena chinattipadābhidhānayos tayor eva karaṇaṃ bhavati sarvam eva hi karaṇaṃ kartṛvyāpāragocaraḥ (VN, ad 2, p. 49, 1937: p. 78).

18–23 kriyāphalāśrayatvāt ...niyacchatīti] See tathā chetṛvyāpāro 'py udyacchatiniyacchatibhyāṃ iva chinattināpy abhihitaḥ paraśukarmakaḥ syāt. tābhyām eva vābhihitaḥ chinattyabhihita iva vṛkṣakarmakaḥ syāt. (VN, ad 2, p. 50–1937: 78).

tadānīṃ chidivyapadeśaṃ labhate. tatra tasya vyutpatteḥ. yadā tu tam eva vyāpāraṃ prati svātantryavivakṣā, tadā kartā, paraśuḥ kāṣṭhaṃ chinattīti. yadā tu ta evodyamananipātane ūrdhvādhodeśasaṃyogalakṣaṇaphalāvacchinnavācibhyām udyacchatiniyacchatibhyām abhidhīyete tadā tu tattatsaṃyogaphalabhāk paraśuḥ karma, paraśum udyacchati niyacchatīti. tasmāt tattaddhātuvācyānāṃ vyāpārāṇāṃ prātisvikasvarūpaikye 'pi tattatphalāvacchedabhedāt tattatkārakavyavasthāhetutvaṃ tattacchabdavācyatvaṃ ca draṣṭavyam. kārakavyavasthāyā vyāpārasvarūpamātrāpekṣitve calatyabhihitā kriyā gacchatīty abhihiteva sakarmikā syāt. gacchatir vākarmakas syāt. prayogavyavasthā ca na syāt. evaṃ saṃskāralakṣaṇe 'py abhidhāvyāpāre yathāsambhavaṃ yojyam. tatra kartṛkarmakaraṇāny eva parasparapravibhaktāni kārakāṇi. kriyāyāṃ svatantraḥ kartā. kriyāphalaśāli karma. anyārthapravṛttakriyāvyāpyaṃ karaṇam iti. sampradānāpādānādhikaraṇāni tu kartrādikārakasaṅkīrṇasvabhāvāni. tathā hi – kartrāśrayaḥ karmāśrayo vādhikaraṇam. devadattaḥ kaṭa āste, sthālyām odanaṃ pacati, iti. karmoddeśyaṃ tu sampradānam. upādhyāyāya gām dadāti, iti. kartṛkārakāvadhimātraṃ tv apādānam. vṛkṣāt parṇaṃ patati, iti yathāsambhavaṃ draṣṭavyam.

C.3.14 3.14

astu sarvaśabdānām abhidhāśabdavācyo vyāpāraḥ. tataḥ kim. idam ucyate – tatra prakṛtyaṃśasyeva pratyayāṃśasyāpi tādṛśo vyāpāraḥ samasty eva. liṅādīnāṃ tu yo 'sau vyāpāras sa eva vidhiḥ. sa ca puruṣapravṛttibhavanaphalatvād bhāvaneti gīyate. tathā ca bhavanaphalabhāk pravṛttiḥ karma. "pravṛttiṃ bhāvayatīti". liṅādis tu pūrvavat karaṇaṃ kartā vā

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18 codyamananipātane] My emendation. P, OP, M: codyamananipātane.
19 tam] So P, OP. M: tad
21 evodyamananipātane] My emendation. P, OP, M: evodyamananipātane.
25 tattatkārakavyavasthāhetutvaṃ] So M. P, OP: tatkārakavyavasthāhetutvaṃ.
9 patati, iti] So P, OP. M: patati.

24–26 tasmāt ...draṣṭavyam] (Re) tasmād eka eva vyāpāraḥ phalabhedena nirūpyamāṇas taṃ taṃ karmabhedaṃ bhajate. [...] tatra yena dhātunā yatphalādhīnanirūpaṇaṃ yena rūpeṇa kriyābhidhīyate taddhātūktāyāṃ kriyāyāṃ tatphalabhāg vastu karma bhavati (VN, ad 2, p. 50–1937: 78).
242.26–243.3 kārakavyavasthāyā ...yojyam] (Ce'e) evaṃ saṃskāre 'py abhidhāvyāpāre yathāsambhavaṃ yojyam. na hi vyāpārasvarūpāpekṣaḥ karmabhāvaḥ tathā sati calatyabhihitāpi kriyā gacchatyabhihiteva sakarmikā syāt (VN, ad 2, p. 50). For this use of vyavasthā see also tathātve dhātuvācyavyāpārāṇāṃ sakarmakatvākarmakatvavyavasthā kārakaniyamaś ca na syād (Nayakaratna ad VN ad 2, 1937: p. 79).
3–4 liṅādīnāṃ ...gīyate] (Ce'e) liṅādīnāṃ tv asau vyāpāraḥ puruṣapravṛttibhavanaphalatvād bhāvaneti pravṛttisādhanatvāt pravartaneti ca gīyate (VN, ad 2, p. 48–1937: 76). pravṛttisādhanatvāt is omitted in VN 1904.

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5 anyārthapravṛttakriyāvyāpyaṃ karaṇam iti.] nānyarthapravṛttakṛtivyāpyatātmikā kriyāyāḥ karttavyateti (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 11, p. 307).
8 karmoddeśyaṃ tu sampradānam] See karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam || Aṣṭādhyāyī, 1.4.32.

syāt. yadā tu pravṛttyavacchinnas sa eva vyāpāraḥ pravartayatinābhidhīyate tadā pravṛttiphalabhāk puruṣaḥ karma “puruṣaṃ pravartayati”, iti. tathā caika eva liṅādīnām abhidhāvyāpāraḥ tattatphalāvacchedabhedād bhāvanā pravartanety ucyate.

C.3.15 3.15

nanu kathaṃ liṅādīnāṃ puruṣapravartakatvam. na hi kaścid abhidhāmātrāvagamāt pravartate. samīhitasādhanatāvagamādhīnatvāt tasyāḥ. tadabhidhāne ca saṃvidvirodhāt.

C.3.16 3.16

satyam. sādhanatvaṃ pravartakam. na tv asya liṅādyabhidheyatvaṃ yena virodhas syāt. pratyayaśravaṇānantaraṃ pravṛttiś ca dṛśyate. tasmād yadabhidhāne sā sambhavati tad abhidheyam. pravartanā cābhidheyā. tadabhidhāne tatsambhavāt. pravṛttihetutā ca pravartanā. sā ca pravṛtter iṣṭasādhanatājñānam antareṇa na sambhavatīti preraṇātmako vidhis samānapratyayavācyāyā bhāvanāyā iṣṭasādhanatvam api kalpayati. ato liṅādi-

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7–8 tathā caika] So P, OP. M: tac caika.

4–7 tathā ...iti] (Ce'e) tadā bhavanaphalabhāk pravṛttiḥ karma bhavati pravṛttiṃ bhāvayati śabdeneti yadā tu puruṣapravṛttiphalāvacchinnavyāpārābhidhāyinā pravartayatinābhidhīyate tadā pravṛttiphalabhāk puruṣaḥ karma bhavati puruṣaṃ pravartayatīti (VN, ad 2, pp. 49-50–1937:78).

10–12 nanu ...saṃvidvirodhāt] (Ce'e) na tv asya puruṣapravartakatvaṃ liṅābhidheyatvaṃ ca saṃbhavati na hi prekṣākārī* kaścid abhidhāmātrāvagamāt pravartate samīhitasādhanatvāvagamādhīnatvāt pravṛtteḥ (VN, ad 2, pp. 50-51–1937: 80).*1937 has prekṣāpūrvakārī.

13–14 satyam ...dṛśyate] (Ce'e) ucyate satyaṃ phalasādhanatvaṃ pravartakatvaṃ tat tu na śabdasyābhidheyam ity uktam. ato vyutpitsur bālakaḥ prayojyavṛddhaṃ pravartamānam upalabhya pravṛttihetubhūtām iṣṭasādhanatāvagatiṃ śabdajanitām adhyavasāya pūrvoktena nyāyena sākṣāc chabdasya janakatvāsaṃbhavād yenābhihitena phalasādhanatvaṃ kalpayituṃ śakyate tadabhidhāyī liṅśabda iti niścinoti (VN, ad 2, pp. 50-51–1937: 80).

14–15 tasmād ...abhidheyam] (Re) tatrāpi tu rāgadveṣamohādīnāṃ pravṛttihetūnām avācyatvād evaṃ vaktavyaṃ yo 'vagamyamānatayā pravṛttihetus tad abhidhāyī liṅśabda iti (VN ad 2 –1937: 83).

16 pravṛttihetutā ca pravartanā.] (Ce'e) pravṛttiphalatā ca pravartanārūpatā (VN ad 2 –1937: 80).

7–8 tathā ...tattatphalāvacchedabhedād] See tasmād eka eva vyāpāraḥ phalabhedena nirūpyamāṇas (VN, ad 2, p. 50–1937: 78).

14 pratyayaśravaṇānantaram ...dṛśyate] See liṅśabdaśravaṇānantaraṃ pravartamānasya puruṣasya samīhitasādhanatvāvagatiḥ śabdāt saṃjāteti kalpanīyam (VN, ad 2, p. 47–1937: 75).

15 pravartanā cābhidheyā] See tena [...] pravartanārūpeṇābhidhānaṃ liṅādibhiḥ kalpyate (VN ad 2, –1937: 80).

16–17 pravṛttihetutā ...vidhis] See idaṃ tāvat siddhaṃ yathā samīhitasādhanatvāvagatim antareṇa cetanasya svatantrā pravṛttir na ghaṭate (VN, ad 2, p. 47–1937: 75).

16–17 pravṛttihetutā ...vidhis] See atrāpara āha –satyaṃ kāryāvagamād eva pravṛttiḥ. iṣṭasādhanataiva tu kāryatā, na parā kācit, saiva pravṛttihetur vidhir ucyate (VM, II, ad 5-6 Śā p. 427 –1904 p. 36).

vyāpārasya puruṣaprayatnabhavananimittatvād bhāvanātvam. tatpravartakatvāt pravartanātvaṃ ca yuktam. evaṃvidhavidhyavaruddhabhāvanā puruṣārthabhāvaneti niścīyate. tasyaiva bhāvyatvāt. na hy apuruṣārthaphalasya vyāpārasya pravartanārūpavidhyanvayas sambhavati. niṣphale tadanupapatteḥ. ato bhāvanāyā eva prathamaṃ vidhisaṃsparśād vidheyatvam. taddvārā ca taditareṣāṃ karaṇetikartavyatānāṃ paścāt.

C.3.16.1 3.16.1

phalasya tu bhāvyatayā sādhyatve 'pi codanāpratipādyatayā codanālakṣaṇatve 'pi na vidheyatvam. tatra vidhisaṃsparśam antareṇa rāgād eva pravṛttisambhavāt. vidhyanuṣṭhāpyatvaṃ hi vidheyatvam. apravṛttapravartakaś ca vidhiḥ. ata eva phalasyāvidheyatvāt śyenāgnīṣomīyavaiṣamyam api. avaśiṣṭaṃ sarvaṃ śāstrārthasaṅkṣepe vyaktībhaviṣyati.

C.3.16.2 3.16.2

tad evam abhidhāvyāpāram eva pravartanārūpeṇa liṅādayo 'bhidadhati. tadbalād eveṣṭasādhanatvam api bodhayeyuḥ. etad evābhipretyoktam–

18–20 ato ...puruṣaprayatnabhavananimittatvād] (Ce'e) liṅādīnāṃ tv asau vyāpāraḥ puruṣapravṛttibhavanaphalatvād bhāvaneti pravartaneti ca gīyate (VN, ad 2, p. 48).

245.20–246.1 evaṃvidhavidhyavaruddhabhāvanā ...tadanupapatteḥ] (Ce'e) evaṃvidhavidhyavaruddhā ca bhāvanā puruṣārthasādhanatayā niścīyate. na hy apuruṣārthaphalasya vyāpārasya pravartanārūpavidhyanvayasaṃbhavaḥ. prekṣāpūrvakāriṇāṃ niṣphale pravartayitum aśakyatvāt (VN, ad 2, p. 51).

1–2 ato ...paścāt] (Pv) bhāvanāyāḥ prathamam eva vidhyanvaye jāte paścāt tadanurodhenaiva dhātvarthādīnāṃ bhāvyatvenānvayo vācya iti bhāvaḥ (NR ad AN, III pariccheda, ad 12, p. 238).

1–2 ato ...paścāt] (Pv) bhāvanāyā eva sākṣāt [sic!] vidheyatvam. taddvāreṇa tadaṃśānām iti prāg uditam (NR ad AN, III pariccheda, ad 13-14, p. 242).

3–6 phalasya ...vidhiḥ] (Re) tac ca puruṣārthātmake phalāṃśe sarvasya svayam evānuṣṭhānaṃ bhavatīti prasiddhatvān na vedād utpadyamānam apekṣyate. sādhanetikartavyatayos tv apravṛttapuruṣaniyogāc chāstram eva prāśastyapratipādanāyākāṅkṣyate (TV ad 1.2.7, Abhyankar Jośi p. 13).

2–5 tad ...ca] (Ce'e) tad evaṃ vidhiśabdenaiva pravartanārūpavidhim abhidadhatārthād vidheyasya kartavyatā phalasādhanatā cāvabodhyeta ity abhiprāyeṇa kartavyatāvacanaḥ pratyayaḥ "śreyaḥsādhanatā hy eṣāṃ nityaṃ vedāt pratīyata" iti ca vyavahāraḥ (VN, ad 2, p. 52–1937: pp. 80-1).

245.20–246.1 evaṃvidhavidhyavaruddhabhāvanā ...tadanupapatteḥ] See aphale preraṇānupapatteḥ (TR IV, §C.3.16).

245.20–246.1 evaṃvidhavidhyavaruddhabhāvanā ...tadanupapatteḥ] apuruṣārthaphale ca vyāpāre puruṣasya pravarttayitum aśakyatvāt. tena pravartanātmakavidhyanvayād eva samīhitarūpe bhāvye 'pekṣite tadviśeṣamātraṃ vākyād avagamyate (AN, III pariccheda, ad 12).

245.20–246.1 evaṃvidhavidhyavaruddhabhāvanā ...tadanupapatteḥ] sā ca cetanapravartanātmakavidhyavaruddhā puruṣārtharūpaṃ bhāvyaṃ vinā vidhyanupapatteḥ puruṣārtharūpaṃ bhāvyam avalambamānā [...] (MBP, II adhyāya, p.74).

3–4 phalasya ...vidheyatvam] See codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ (MS 1.1.2).

4–6 tatra ...vidhiḥ] See hanane hi rāgadveṣādibhiḥ svayam eva pravartate. na tu vidhivākyāt. ato liṅvyāpārasyātatpravartakatayā prāptyabhāvāt tadanuvādo na ghaṭata ity (NR ad VN ad 2, 1937: 88).

kartavyatāvacanaḥ pratyayaḥ (VV p. 243)
śreyassādhanatā hy eṣāṃ nityaṃ vedāt pratīyate." iti ca. (ŚV codanā 14ab)

ubhayatrāpi bhāvanādvaye ākāṅkṣātrayaparipūrtiḥ pūrvavad iti.

C.3.17 3.17

asmin mate svavyāpārābhidhānaṃ durupapādam iti manvānā ācārya-matatattvavedinaḥ prāhuḥ —iṣṭasādhanatvam eva vidhitattvam. na ca saṃvidvirodhaḥ. svarūpeṇānabhidhānāt. pravartanārūpeṇa tu śabdo 'bhidhatte. pravṛttihetuś ca dharmaḥ pravartanā. sa ca preṣaṇam adhyeṣaṇam abhyanujñānam iṣṭasādhanatvaṃ ca. teṣu caturṣv api pravartanāsāmānyam anugatam. tataś ca tadabhidadhatā liṅādiśabdena nirviśeṣasya tasyāsambhavād vede ca puruṣadharmāṇāṃ praiṣādīnām asambhavāt pāriśeṣyāt kartur iṣṭasādhanataiva bodhyate. sāmānyavācitvān nānekārthatvaṃ, lāghavaṃ ca. nātra svavyāpārābhidhānadoṣaḥ, tadatirekāt pravartanāyāḥ. nāpi saṃvidvi-

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2–3 tad ...bodhayeyuḥ] (Ce'e) tad evam abhidhāvyāpāram eva pravartanārūpeṇābhidadhānā liṅādayas tadbalād eva phalasādhanatvaṃ bodhayanti (VN, ad 2, p. 51).

8–9 asmin ...prāhuḥ] (Re) nanu svavyāpāre 'bhidhīyamāne svarūpābhidhānaprasaṅgaḥ na hy anabhidhāya viśeṣaṇaṃ viśiṣṭam abhidhātuṃ śakyam (VN, ad 2, p. 52–1937: pp. 80-1).

8–9 asmin ...prāhuḥ] (Ce'e) svavyāpārābhidhānaṃ durupapādaṃ granthānuguṇyaṃ api nātīva dṛśyate (VN, ad 2, p. 54–1937: 86).

9–11 iṣṭasādhanatvam ...pravartanā] (Ce"e) nyāyavidāṃ tv iṣṭasādhanatvam evābhimataṃ na ca saṃvidvirodhaḥ tena rūpeṇābhidhānābhāvāt pravartanārūpeṇa tu śabdo 'bhidhatte pravṛttihetuś ca dharmaḥ pravartanā (VN, ad 2, p. 52–1937: 83). pravṛttihetuṃ dharmaṃ ca pravadanti pravartanām (VV, p. 243).

9–11 iṣṭasādhanatvam ...pravartanā] (Ce'e) tenābhidhāvyāpāravat pravartanārūpeneṣṭasādhanatāṃ śabdo 'bhidhatte. na svarūpeṇeti*. idam eva hi bhagavato maṇḍanamiśrasyāpi "puṃsāṃ neṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsv anyaḥ pravartakaḥ | pravṛttihetuṃ dharmaṃ ca pravadanti pravartanām ||" (VN ad 2 –1937: 83). *The 1904 edition has "na svarūpeṇetina pratītivirodhaḥ". pravṛttihetuṃ dharmaṃ ca pravadanti pravartanām (VV, p. 243, also quoted above, §3.1).

11–15 sa ...bodhyate] (Ce'e) preṣaṇam adhyeṣaṇam abhyanujñānam iṣṭasādhanatvañ ceti bahavo 'rthāḥ śabdasya kalpyeran. [...] pravartanāsāmānyam abhidadhatā liṅśabdena nirviśeṣasāmānyabodhasyānarthakyāpatter apauruṣeye ca vede puruṣadharmāṇāṃ praiṣādīnāṃ viśeṣāṇām asambhavāt pāriśeṣyād iṣṭasādhanataiva bodhyata iti (VN, ad 2, p. 53– 1937: 83, 84).

11–15 sa ...bodhyate] (Ce'e) sā cāpauruṣeye vede praiṣādīnām asaṃbhavāt pāriśeṣyād iṣṭābhyupāyataiva niścīyate (VN, ad 2, p. 52–1937: 83).

11–15 sa ...bodhyate] See pravṛttyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ pravartanā. sa ca vyāpāraḥ praiṣādirūpo vividha iti. pratyekaṃ vyabhicāritvād vidhiśabdavācyatvānupapatteḥ pravartanāsāmānyam eva vidhiśabdavācyam iti kalpayati. (MNP 371, p. 269).

11–15 sa ...bodhyate] See anye tv āhuḥ: satyaṃ pravartanāsāmānyaṃ vidhyarthaḥ, tathaiva śaktigrahāt. pravṛttyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ pravartanā. apauruṣeye ca vede praiṣāder asambhavāt kaścit puruṣapravṛttyanukūlo vyāpāraviśeṣaḥ kalpanīyaḥ; vidhiśabdābhidheyapravartanāsāmānyasya viśeṣaṃ antareṇāparyavasanāt. tatra ko 'sau vyāpāraviśeṣa ity apekṣāyāṃ dhātvarthagataṃ samīhitasādhanatvam eveti kalpyate (MNP 375, p. 270).

rodhaḥ, iṣṭasādhanatvātirekāt tasyāḥ. na sahaprayogavirodhaś ca, pravṛttinimittabhedāt. sādhanaśabdas tu sādhanatvam eva sākṣād abhidhatte. liṅādayas tu tad eva pravartanāveṣeṇābhidadhati. tasmāt pravartanāveṣāpannaṃ bhāvanāgateṣṭasādhanatvam eva liṅādivācyaṃ vidhitattvam iti siddham.

C.3.17.1 3.17.1

asyās tu puruṣapravṛttyarthaṃ pravṛtteḥ pravṛttis svargādisthānīyā bhāvyā. prathamaṃ vidhipratyayapratipannāyāḥ pravṛtteḥ paścād utpattyavirodhāt. samīhitaphalasādhanatvajñānaṃ parārthapravṛttavyāpārajanyatayā yāgādivat karaṇam. prāśastyajñānaṃ tv itikartavyatā. ślokānuguṇyam api. tathā hi tasyāyam arthaḥ –abhidhīyate ity abhidhā pravartanā. saiva puruṣapravṛttiṃ bhāvayati utpādayatīti bhāvanā. tām āhur iti. tasmād vidhyavaruddhā bhāvanaiva vākyārthaḥ. saiva śāstraprameyam iti siddham.

C.4 4

atretthaṃ śāstrārthānvayaprakārasaṅkṣepaḥ –liṅādīnāṃ bhāvanā vidhiś cobhayam apy arthaḥ.

C.4.1 4.1

tatra bhāvanā –prayatnaḥ. vidhis tu pūrvoktā śabdabhāvanā pravartanātmikā. tayor ekapratyayopādānāt prathamam anvayaḥ. sa ca bhāvyabhāvakabhāvenotpādyotpādakabhāvena paryavasyati. vidhyanvayabalād bhāvanāyās samīhitasādhanatvaṃ cāvarjanīyam. evaṃ ca tasyās svata ākāṅkṣitaṃ bhāvyaṃ phalam evāvatiṣṭhate. tataś ca "darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svar-

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15 sāmānyavācitvān ...ca] (Ce'e) evañ cānekārthatvaṃ kalpitaṃ na bhavati [...] pravartanāsāmānyavācitve tu lāghavaṃ syāt (VN, ad 2, p. 53–1937: 83).
17–19 na ...pravartanāveṣeṇābhidadhati] (Ce'e) na ca sahaprayogavirodhaḥ pravṛttinimittabhedāt paryāyatvābhāvāt. iṣṭasādhanaśabdo hi tatsādhanatām eva sākṣād abhidhatte liṅādayas tu pravartanārūpeṇa kṛtyarhatārūpeṇa veti nāsti paryāyatā (VN, ad 2, p. 54–1937:86).
2–5 asyās ...itikartavyatā] (Ce'e) tad evaṃ śabdakartṛkaṃ pravartanārūpeṣṭasādhanatvābhidhānam eva śabdabhāvaneti gīyate. tasyāḥ puruṣapravṛttyarthaṃ pravṛtteḥ puruṣapravṛttir hi svargādisthānīyā bhāvyā samīhitasādhanatāvijñānan tu parārthapravṛttaśabdavyāpārajanyatayā yāgādivat karaṇaṃ prāśastyajñānan tv itikartavyateti vivektavyam (VN, ad 2, pp. 53-54–1937: 85-86).
6–7 tathā ...iti] (Ce'e) "abhidhābhāvanām āhur" ity asyāpi vārtikasyāyam evārthaḥ. abhidhīyata ity abhidhā pravartanā kartavyatā vā* saiva ca puruṣapravṛttiṃ bhāvayatīti bhāvanā tām āhur iti (VN, ad 2, p. 53–1937: 85).*1937 and Kataoka 2004 (p.167, fn. 190) omit kartavyatā vā and probably R. does not know (or explicitly avoids) such a reading.
6–8 vidhyanvayabalād ...evāvatiṣṭhate] (Pv) vidhyanvayabalāt [sic!]bhāvanāyāḥ puruṣārthabhāvyatvam ity uktam (NR ad AN, III pariccheda, vv.13-14, p. 242).

19–20 tasmāt ...iti] See tad evaṃ vidhiśabdenaiva pravartanā rūpavidhim abhidadhatārthād vidheyasya kartavyatā phalasādhanatā cāvabodhyata ity (VN, ad 2, p. 52).
2–5 asyās ...itikartavyatā] See evam arthavādoditaprāśastyasyāpi itikartavyatātvaṃ vidhvastam (VM, II ad 4 Śā p. 422 –S: p. 32–A: p.70).

gakāmo yajeta" ity atra bhāvanā samānapadopādānāt sannihitam api dhātvartham atilaṅghya padāntaropāttaṃ phalam evāvalambate. tataś ca bhāvyānvitā bhāvanā tatsiddhyarthaṃ karaṇam apekṣate. tathā ca dhātvarthaḥ karaṇatayānveti. tasya ca kṣaṇikasya kālāntarabhāviphalasādhanatvam apūrvam antareṇa na sambhavatīty avāntaravyāpāratayā tat kalpyate.

C.4.2 4.2

C.4.2.1 4.2.1

tataś cobhayānvitā sā katham anena phalaṃ kuryād itītikartavyatām apekṣamāṇāvatiṣṭhate. ittham adhikāravākye pradhānabhāvanāyām

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8–9 darśapūrṇamāsābhyām ...yajeta] (Cee) Cf. MS 2.1.1,4; 2.2.2; 2.3.4; 3.1.3,7; 3.7.18; 4.4.29,34; 6.1.1.,4,6,8; 1.1.13,17,24; 6.2.3; 6.4.43; 7.1.2,3; 7.4.10; 8.1.2,20,21,34; 9.1.4,9,34; 10.1.26; 10.4.23; 10.8.35; 11.1.1,3,8,9,11-16,35,36; 11.2.1,6,7,12,37; 11.4.2 etc. etc. «This is an oft-quoted Vedic text found in every Mīmāṃsā work. It is, however, not found in this form, in any of the extant Vedic texts. The only passages that come close to it are ApŚ 3.14.8, svargakāmo darśapūrṇamāsau and 10.2.1. However, it is hardly likely that this is the source of the passage. It may be from some other Śrautasūtra now lost to us» [Garge 1952: 128].

9–12 atra ...karaṇatayānveti] (Ce'e) saṃnihitam api dhātvartham apuruṣārthatayātilaṅghya padāntaropāttam upasarjanabhūtam api svargādikaṃ puruṣārthatayā bhāvyaviśeṣatvenānvetīty āha –teneti. evaṃ bhāvyānvayāt pracyuto dhātvarthaḥ paścāt karaṇākāṅkṣāyāṃ karaṇatvenānvetīty āha (NR ad AN, III pariccheda, ad 12, p. 242).

9–10 atra ...evāvalambate] (Ce'e) vidhir hi samānapadopāttād dhātvarthād bhāvanāyāḥ sannikṛṣṭaḥ prathamam eva tām avarudhya puruṣārthāya nayati pravartanātmakatvāt (AN, III pariccheda, ad 12, p. 238). The incongruity of the prescription being here the subject instead of the bhāvanā is explained in Rāmānujācārya's commentary thereon: vidhir hīti. puruṣārtharūpam eva bhāvyaṃ tasyāḥ [bhāvanāyāḥ] kalpayatīty arthaḥ (NR ad loc., p. 242).

9–10 atra ...evāvalambate] (Ce'e) tasmāt puruṣārthaphaletyadhyavasāya tadviśeṣam apekṣamāṇaḥ samānapadasthaṃ dhātvartham apuruṣārthatvād ullaṅghya padāntaroktam apekṣate (AN, III pariccheda, ad 15-17, p. 239).

9–10 atra ...evāvalambate] See punar iyaṃ bhāvanā [...] dhātvarthaṃ samānapadopādānam api puruṣaviśeṣaṇam apy apekṣitatayā svargam eva bhāvyam avalambate (NK, p. 3 The printed edition has dhātvarthamasamānapadopādānam).

249.12–250.1 tasya ...sambhavatīty] nāsau phalasādhanībhavituṃ samarthā bhaṅguratvād iti cen na apūrvadvāreṇopapatteḥ (VN, ad 2, p. 43).

249.12–250.1 tasya ...sambhavatīty] vinaśvarī ca kriyā tena neyaṃ kālāntarīyaphaladānena kāminaṃ ramayatīti (VN, ad 1, p. 40–1937: p. 63).

249.12–250.1 tasya ...sambhavatīty] kriyā hi kṣanikatvena na kālāntarabhāvinaḥ | svargādeḥ kāmyamānasya samarthāḥ jananaṃ prati || 21 || (VM, II, v. 21 Śā p. 434 –1904 p. 41).

249.12–250.1 tasya ...sambhavatīty] kriyā *kṣaṇabhāvinī na kālāntarabhāvinaḥ svargādeḥ sādhanāyopapadyate iti kālāntarāvasthāyi kriyāto bhinnaṃ kāryam apūrvaṃ liṅādayo bodhayantīti sthitam (VK, 1904 p. 197–Śā pp. 451-2). *Śā has kṣaṇabhaṅginī.

249.12–250.1 tasya ...sambhavatīty] apūrvaṃ punar asti, yata ārambhaḥ śiṣyate svargakāmo yajeteti. itaratāh hi vidhānam anarthakaṃ syāt. bhaṅgitvād yāgasya. yady anyad anutpādya yāo vinaśyet, phalam asati nimitte na syāt. tasmād utpādayatīiti (ŚBh ad MS 2.1.5).

249.12–250.1 tasya ...sambhavatīty] tasmād bhaṅgī yajiḥ, tasya bhaṅgitvād apūrvam astīti (ŚBh ad MS 2.1.5).

ākāṅkṣātrayavatyāṃ “āgneyo ’ṣṭākapālo ’māvāsyāyāṃ ca paurṇamāsyāṃ ca”, “aindraṃ dadhy amāvāsyāyām”, “aindraṃ payo ’māvāsyāyām”, “agniṣomīyam ekādaśakapālaṃ pūrṇamāse” “upāṃśuyājam antarā yajati”, iti tatsannidhau yāni vākyāny āmnātāni teṣu dravyadevatāsambandhasya mānāntarānāghrātatayā tadvidhipratyaye kalpite tena ca sambandhena yāge kalpite saty evaṃ vākyārthas sampadyate –etatkālīnair yāgaiḥ kiṃcic chreyo bhāvayed iti.

C.4.2.2 4.2.2

etāś cāvāntarabhāvanāḥ tat kiṃ śreyo bhāvyam iti viśeṣam ākāṅkṣamāṇā evāvatiṣṭhante. yāni ca tatra “vrīhibhir yajeta, yavair yajeta” ityādīni vākyāni teṣv api vrīhyādiviśiṣṭena yāgena kiṃcic chreyo bhāvayed iti bhāvanā bhāvyaviśeṣākāṅkṣiṇya eva. yāni ca “ samidho yajati tanūnapātaṃ yajati ” ityādiprayājādivākyāni teṣv api samidādināmakair yāgaiḥ kiṃcic chreyo bhāvayed iti. etāś cāvāntarabhāvanāḥ tat kiṃ śreya iti bhāvyaviśeṣam ākāṅkṣamāṇā evāvatiṣṭhanta iti sthitiḥ.

C.4.2.3 4.2.3

yāni tu “vrīhīn avahanti”, “vrīhīn prokṣati”, “taṇḍulān pinaṣṭi”, “puroḍāśam prathayati”, “kapāleṣu śrapayati”, ityādīni teṣv api dvitīyāśrutyā vrīhyādīnāṃ bhāvyatvāvagamād avaghātādibhir vrīhyādīn bhāvayed iti vākyavipariṇāme ’pi vrīhīṇām apuruṣārthatayā samīhitatvānavagamāt bhāvyāṃśe bhāvanās sākāṅkṣāḥ. tathā “bhinne juhoti”, “skanne juhoti”,

3 avatiṣṭhate] So P, OP. M: avatiṣṭhante.
2 yāgaiḥ] So P, OP. M: yogaiḥ.
11 taṇḍulān] My emendation. P, OP: tanḍulān SIC. M: taṃḍulās.

4–5 āgneyo …ca] (Cee) yad āgneyo ’ṣṭākapālo ’māvāsyāyāṃ paurṇamāsyāṃ cācyuto bhavati (JS 1.4.9, 2.2.3, 2.3.27, 3.4.37, 4.1.29, JS 5, 6.3.5., 6.4.1, 10.4.23, 10.8.29, 43. In a shorter form at MS 6.3.18; 6.4.4; 11.2.1,4). Source –TS 2.6.3.3. [All informations driven from Garge 1952: 87, 168].
5 “aindraṃ dadhy amāvāsyāyām”] TS 2.5.4 [Garge 1952: 168].
5 “aindraṃ payo ’māvāsyāyām”] See Garge 1952: 168.
5–6 “agniṣomīyam ekādaśakapālaṃ pūrṇamāse”] See agniṣomīyaṃ paśupuroḍāśam ekādaśakapālaṃ nirvapati JS 12.4.1 [Garge 1952: 298].
6 “upāṃśuyājam antarā yajati”] MS 10.8.47, 62 and 66. Source –TS 2.6.6.4 [Garge 1952:74, 89].
7–8 samidho …yajati] JS 3.3.11, 5.1.4, 9.2.59; 2.2.3, 4.1.4, 6.3.18, 11.1.5.8, 16. 3.6.6. and 11.1.11 Only the first clause. Source –TS 2.6.1.1 (ŚBh 1.5.3.9,10; KB 3.4). [All informations driven from Garge 1952: 86].
7 samidho yajati] (Cee) samidho yaja (ŚBr 1.5.3.8; 2.2.3.18; 5.2.30; 6.1.23; 4.4.5.14; KŚ 3.2.16; ĀŚ 2.17.4; MŚ 1.3.2.2).
7–8 tanūnapātaṃ yajati] (Cee) tanūnapātaṃ yaja (ŚBr 1.5.3.8).
11 “vrīhīn avahanti”] MS 2.1.9, 3.1.7, 4.2.26, 11.1.27 and 11.4.41. TB 3.2.5.6. (adhyavahanti°) [Garge 1952: 115].
11 “vrīhīn prokṣati”] MS 1.5.33,34 and 9.1.11,13. TB reads enān prokṣati, cf. Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā 4.1.6, KS 31.4 [Garge 1952: 115]. TB 3.2.5.4. enān (sc. vrīhīn) prokṣati. Cf. MS 4.1.6 (7.17), KS 31.4 (5.3) prokṣati (sc. vrīhīn) [Edgerton 1929: 207].

ityādiṣu prāyaścittavākyeṣv api bhinnādiśabdānāṃ yaugikatvena prakṛtaniveśitayā prakṛtikapāle bhinne haviṣi ca skanne sati homena samīhitaṃ bhāvayed iti sākāṅkṣā eva bhāvanāḥ.

C.4.2.4 4.2.4

evaṃ ca parasparam ākāṅkṣāvaśāt phalavākyenetareṣām ekavākyatayā yugapad anvaye prasakte tatra prathamam āgneyādivākyeṣu kālasambandhapratīteḥ darśapūrṇamāsaśabdavācyatvasambhavād idam adhikāravākyenaikavākyaṃ bhavati. āgneyādiyāgaṣaṭkena darśapūrṇamāsanāmakena phalaṃ bhāvayed iti. "vrīhibhir yajeta" ityādivākyeṣu tu yāgadravyalābhe 'pi devatāyā alābhena pṛthagyāgatvānupapatteḥ phalavākyenaikavākyatāyāṃ vākyadvaye 'py eka eva yāgaḥ phalito bhavati. tasya ca yāgasya phalavākya eva śreyassādhanatvena samīhitatayā prāptatvād vidhivākyagatā bhāvanā samānapadopāttaṃ tam eva yāgaṃ bhāvyatayāvalambate. vrīhīṃs tu karaṇatayā. tataś caivaṃ vākyārtho bhavati –yo darśapūrṇamāsayāgaḥ svargasādhanatvena nirūḍhaḥ, taṃ vrīhibhiḥ bhāvayed iti. evañ cotpattiśiṣṭapuroḍāśāvaruddhe yāge vrīhīṇāṃ sākṣāt sādhanatvenānanvayād arthāt tatprakṛtitayānvayaḥ syāt.

C.4.2.5 4.2.5

avahananādivākyeṣu tu darśapūrṇamāsavākyaikavākyatāyāṃ vrīhibhir yajetetyādiviniyogavākyaparyālocanayā vrīhīṇāṃ darśapūrṇamāsaśeṣatvapratīteḥ samīhitatvanirvāhād darśapūrṇamāsasambandhino vrīhīn avahananena bhāvayed iti vākyārtho bhavati. ata eva yatra dravyaviniyogo nāsti tatra samīhitatvānirvāhāt dvitīyāśrutau satyām api na dravyabhāvyatā. kiṃ tu karaṇatvam eva kriyāṃ prati bhavati. yathā "saktūn juhoti" iti. evam, "ulūkhalamusalābhyām avahanti" ity avahananāṅgavākyeṣv api vrīhīn avahantīty anena paramparayā darśapūrṇamāsaśeṣatvenāvahananasya

2 prathamam āgneyādivākyeṣu] So M and in parentheses. P, OP: prathamādivākyeṣu.

15–17 tathā ...sati] (Re) prāyaścittam adhikāre sarvatra doṣasāmānyāt || MS 6.5.45 || darśapūrṇamāsayoḥ śrūyate, bhinne juhoti skanne juhotīti. tatra kiṃ darśapūrṇamāsayor evaitat, bhinne skanne ca prāyaścittam uta yatra bhidyate skandati ceti. kiṃ prāptam. prakaraṇe yat prāyaścittam evaṃjātīyakaṃ kiṃcid utpannam, tat sarvatra yatra yatra bhidyate skandati vā, tatra tatra syāt. kasmāt. doṣasāmānyāt, samānaṃ nimittaṃ skandanaṃ bhedanaṃ vā. sa evātra doṣa ity abhipretam. prakaraṇād darśapūrṇamāsayoḥ prāyaścittam, vākyād anyatrāpi, prakaraṇāc ca vākyaṃ balīyaḥ. tasmāt sarvatra skanne bhinne ca prāyaścittam iti (ŚBh ad 6.5.45).

11–13 evañ ...syāt] tatra vibhaktiśrutyāṅgatvam, yathā vrīhibhir yajeteti tṛtīyāśrutyā vrīhīṇāṃ yāgāṅgatvam. na cotpattiśiṣṭapuroḍāśāvaruddhe yāge kathaṃ vrīhīṇām aṅgatvam iti vācyam; puroḍāśaprakṛtitayopapatteḥ (MNP 70, p. 206).

11–13 evañ ...syāt] See tena vrīhīn upādāya tair yaṣṭavyam iti. karaṇatvaṃ ca teṣām utpattiśiṣṭapuroḍāśāvaruddhe yāge tatprakṛtitvena sambhavatīti (AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 18, p. 287).

18–19 dvitīyaśrutau ...juhoti] See ŚBh ad MS 2.1.12: sa eva dvitīyāntaḥ saktūnāṃ homasya ca saṃbandhaṃ karoti [...] tenocyate tṛtiyāyāḥ sthāne dvitīyety avagamyate.

viniyogena samīhitatvanirvāhāt tadekavākyatāyāṃ darśapūrṇamāsasambandhitayā nirūḍham avahananam ulūkhalamusalābhyāṃ sampādayed iti vākyārtho bhavati. evaṃ vrīhiśabdena darśapūrṇamāsasambandhitvasyaiva lakṣitatvād yavānām api tatsambandhitvāviśeṣāt teṣv apy avahananam upadeśata eva bhavati. evaṃ "dāsy avahanti patnīva" ityādivākyānvayo 'pi nirūḍhānirūdhabhāvena draṣṭavyaḥ.

C.4.2.6 4.2.6

samidādivākyeṣu tu phalavākyaikavākyatāyāṃ satyām evaṃ vākyārtho bhavati –samidādiyāgaiḥ phalabhāvanāṃ bhāvayed iti. tasyāś ca bhāvyatvaṃ sākṣān na sambhavatīty avāntarāpūrvadvārā tatkaraṇopakāramukhena paryavasyati.

C.4.2.7 4.2.7

bhinne juhotītyādiṣu tu prayājādinyāyena phalabhāvanāyā bhāvyatvenānvaye sati tasyāḥ bhāvyatvaṃ svavākyaśrutanimittasambandhānusāreṇa nimitte saty upajāyamānasya kratuvaiguṇyasya pratyavāyasya parihāreṇa nirvahatīti kalpyate. ata evaiteṣu prayājādiṣv iva na yāgamātrādhikṛto 'dhikārī. nāpi svatantranaimittikeṣv iva kevalanimittavān. api tu yāge 'dhikṛto nimittavān ityadhikṛtādhikāritvam.

C.4.2.8 4.2.8

tathā "ājyam utpunāti" "payo dogdhi" "dadhy ātañcyāt", "śākhāṃ chinatti", "śākhayā vatsān apākaroti" ityādivākyeṣv api anenaiva prakāreṇānvayo draṣṭavyaḥ. ata evājyauṣadhapayodharmāṇām utpavanāvahananātañ-

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24 evaṃ] So P, OP. M: ata eva.
6 tu] So M, OP. P: om.
6 prayājādinyāyena] So P, OP. M: prayājādinyāye.
7 tasyāḥ] My emendation. P, OP, M: tasyāṃ. But see tasyāś ca bhāvyatvaṃ [...] paryavasyati in C.4.2.6. I am grateful to Prof. Chlodwig Werba for having discussed with me this point.

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19 saktūn juhoti] MS 2.1.11. Source –TS 3.3.8.4 (°juhuyāt) (ĀpŚ 13.24.16, BŚ 4.11). [Garge 1952:90].
6–11 bhinne ...ityadhikṛtādhikāritvam] (Re) bhinne juhoti, skanne juhoti iti śrūyate. tatra sandehaḥ –kiṃ nimittaparyanta evāyam adhikāraḥ uta kāryaparyanta iti. anena bhāṣyakārīyasaṃśayo vyākhyātaḥ. yadi hi bhedanavataḥ, svatantro 'yam adhikāraḥ syāt. atha tu kāryaparyantaḥ, prakṛtakratūpakāraparyanto 'yam adhikāraḥ tadā darśapūrṇamāsayor eva bhedane sati homaḥ tadaṅgabhūtaḥ kartavya iti (Ṛjuvimalā ad 6.5.45, **Rjuvimala**).

14–18 ata ...ārādupakāriṇām] See adṛṣṭārthatvaṃ tu kriyāyā eva. sā ca dvedhā sannipatyopakārarūpā prokṣaṇādiḥ. ārādupakārakarūpā prayājādiḥ. sannipatyopakārakāṇi ca dṛṣṭārthāni karmmāṇi svakārakāṇāṃ karmmādīnām utpattiṃ prāptiṃ vikāraṃ vā kurvanti santi tatsādhyasya pradhānasyopakurvanti. yathā saṃyavanaṃ piṇḍasyotpattim. dohanaṃ payasaḥ prāptim. avaghāto vrīhivikāram (NRM, aṅganirṇaya, ad 3, pp. 120-1). And ārādupakārakaṃ kratvarthaṃ pravṛttirūpaṃ vaidikaṃ karma adṛṣṭārtham eva, yathā prayājāḥ (Mīmāṃsābālaprakāśa, p. 72, quoted in Mīmāṃsākoṣa).

canadohanādīnāṃ sannipātidharmāṇāṃ pradhānavākyaikavākyatāyā darśapūrṇamāsasambandhitvalakṣaṇāyā aviśeṣe 'pi śrutājyavrīhyādinirūḍhakārakadvārānvayasyāpy aparityāgād avāntarāpūrvabhedāc cāsaṅkareṇānvayasiddhiḥ. prayājādīnāṃ tv ārādupakāriṇām upakāravaiṣamyābhāvāt sarvakaraṇaśeṣatayānvayaḥ. ata eva teṣāṃ tantreṇa sakṛd evānuṣṭhānam.

C.4.2.9 4.2.9

tathā "yasya parṇamayī juhūḥ, yasya khādiras sruvo bhavati" ityādyanārabhyādhītavākyeṣv api pradhānabhāvanākāṅkṣāyāḥ prākaraṇikair evāṅgair upaśame 'pi svākāṅkṣāvaśād avyabhicaritadarśapūrṇamāsakratusambandhitvena juhvādīnāṃ samīhitatvād darśapūrṇamāsasambandhino juhvādīn parṇakhadirādidravyeṇa bhāvayed iti sarvakratuprakṛtibhūtadarśapūrṇamāsayor evānvayaḥ.

C.4.2.10 4.2.10

evaṃ ca prokṣaṇāvahananapeṣaṇaprathanakapālaśrapaṇacaturavadānādisaṃskṛtena ca vraiheṇa puroḍāśadravyena utpavanadohanā tañcanādisaṃskṛtaiś cājyadadhyādibhir yathāyogaṃ sampāditena prayājādyupakṛtena prāyāścittapraśamitavaiguṇyena prayogadaśāyāṃ tattanmantrasmāritapadārthavargeṇa darśapūrṇamāsaśabdavācyena yāgaṣaṭkena phalaṃ bhāvayed iti mahāvākyārthas sampanno bhavati. evaṃ prakṛtyātmakayoḥ paśusomayāgayor api pradhānāṅgavākyānām anyonyānvayaprakāro draṣṭavyaḥ.

16–17 śrutājyavrīhyādinirūḍhakārakadvārānvayasyāpy] So M. P, OP:śrutājyavrīhyādinirūḍhakārakadvārānvayasya.
3 pradhānabhāvanākāṅkṣāyāḥ] So P, OP. M: pradhānabhāvanākāṅkṣāyāṃ.
8 prathana] So M and in parentheses. P, OP: pradhāna.

14–17 utpavanāvahananātañcanadohanādīnāṃ ...avāntarāpūrvabhedāc] (Pv) avahananādīnāṃ śrutavrīhyādidvārāparityāgenaiva darśapūrṇamāsāpūrvaśeṣatvam (NR ad AN, III, ad 27, p. 252). The NR text sounds somehow incomplete as far as the compound °dvārāparityagena is concerned. I would rather expect °dvāratva° or any other substantive between °dvāra° and °aparityāgena.
15–17 sannipātidharmāṇāṃ ...śrutājyavrīhyādinirūḍhakārakadvārānvayasyāparityāgād] (Pv) saṃnipātināṃ tu śrutavrīhyādidvārāparityāgenāpūrvasādhanalakṣaṇayā viniyoge sati (NR ad AN IV, ix adhyāya, pp. 265-6).
2–3 tathā ...ityādyanārabhyādhītavākyeṣv] anārabhya kiṃcid ucyate. yasya khādiraḥ sruvo bhavati [...] yasya parṇamayī juhur bhavati (ŚBh ad 3.6.1). Sarma 1990:119. yasya khādiraḥ sruvo bhavati... MS 3.6.1., 4.3.1, 17, 19. Source –TS 3.5.7.1. yasya parṇamayī juhur bhavati... MS 3.6.1 and 4.3.1, 2. Source –TS 3.5.7.2. [Garge 1952: 91, 181].

2–7 tathā ...evānvayaḥ] See sā ceyaṃ parṇatānārabhyādhītā na sarvakratuṣu gacchati, vikṛtiṣu codakenāpi prāptisaṃbhavena dviruktatvāpatteḥ; kiṃ tu prakṛtiṣu. tad uktam: prakṛtau vādviruktatvāt [MS 3.6.2] iti (MNP 107, p. 214).
11–12 prayogadaśāyāṃ tattanmantrasmāritapadārthavargeṇa] prayogakālīnārthasmaraṇahetutayā mantrāṇām upayoga iti vakṣyate. prayogo 'nuṣṭhānaṃ tatkālīnety arthaḥ (Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā, p. 3).

C.4.3 4.3

atra prathamaṃ pradhānavākye bhāvanāyāḥ pravartakaikarasavidhyanvaye pratīte 'pi kevalāyās tasyā anuṣṭhātum ayogyatayā śrutyādibhir yogyāṃśatrayānvayaparyantaṃ sā na paryavasyati. iyam avasthā vidhiprakrama ity ucyate. tathā ca yogyatayā vākyena bhāvyānvayaḥ. ekapadopādānaśrutyā karaṇānvayaḥ. yathāyogaṃ śrutiprakaraṇādibhir itikartavyatānvayaḥ.

C.4.3.1 4.3.1

tatrārādupakārakāṅgavākyeṣu vidhyanvitāyāḥ prayājādibhāvanāyāḥ prakaraṇena sākṣāt pradhānabhāvanāyā eva bhāvyatayānvayaḥ.

C.4.3.2 4.3.2

sannnipātiṣu tu prakaraṇasahitaiḥ śrutyādibhiḥ pradhānasambandhinām eva vrīhyādīnāṃ bhāvyatayānvayaḥ. ubhayatrāpi samānapadopādānena dhātvarthasyaiva karaṇatayānvayaḥ. dravyaguṇajātivākyeṣu dhātvarthasya bhāvyatvāt tṛtīyāśrutyā dravyādīnām eva karaṇatayānvayaḥ. tatrāṅgeṣv itikartavyatānvayas tu prāyika eva.

C.4.3.3 4.3.3

atra sarvatra sākṣāt bhāvanānvitasya vidhes tadaṃśānvayas tu bhāvanādvāraka eva. tatra bhāvyāṃśasya sākṣāt paramparayā vā samīhitatayā svayam eva tatra rāgāt pravṛtteḥ apravṛttapravartakavidhyanvayāyogāt na tatra vidhivyāpāraḥ. karaṇetikartavyatāṃśayor eva bhāvanādvārā tadvyāpāraḥ. ata eva "śyenenābhicaran yajeta" ityabhicāralakṣaṇasya hiṃsātmakasyāvidheyatayā "na hiṃsyāt" iti niṣedhagocaratayā śyenasya pratyavāyakaraṇatvam.

1–4 prathamaṃ ...ucyate] (Pv) aṃśatrayānvayāt pūrvam evātyantasaṃnidhānāt bhāvanayā vidhir anveti. sa cānvayas tadāmīm eva na paryavasyati. kiṃtu aṃśatrayānvayaparyantaṃ vilambate. iyaṃ ca daśā vidhiprakrama iti gīyate. [...] ayogyatvād iti. prayatnamātrātmikāyā bhāvanāyā nirviṣayāyā bhāvārthānuparaktāyā anuṣṭhātum ayogyatvād ity arthaḥ (NR ad AN, III pariccheda, v. 15, p. 243).

1–4 prathamaṃ ...ucyate] (Re) vidhibhāvanayoḥ śrutyā saṃgatiḥ pūrvam iṣyate | ayogyatvāt tadā tv eṣā nirvṛttiṃ naiva vindati || (AN, III pariccheda, v.15, p. 328).

1–4 prathamaṃ ...ucyate] (Re) prathamaṃ tāvad ekaśabdopāttayor vidhibhāvanayoḥ śrutyā sambandhaḥ pratīyate. tasyāṃ tv avasthāyāṃ bhāvanāyāḥ kevalāyā ananuṣṭheyatvāt pratītāpi saṅgatir naiva niṣpadyate (AN, III pariccheda, ad 15, p. 239).

4–5 ekapadopādānaśrutyā ...itikartavyatānvayaḥ] (Re) pratyāsattivaśād bhāvārthādhikaraṇanyāyena samānapadopāttaṃ dhātvarthaṃ karaṇatayā svīkaroti. tataḥ kathaṃbhāvāpekṣāyāṃ śrutyādyavagatāny aṅgānītthaṃbhāvena gṛhṇāti (AN, III pariccheda, ad 15-17, p. 239).

13–14] (Pv) evaṃ cāṃśatrayasyāpi prāthamikaḥ śābdo 'nvayo bhāvanayaiva. anyonyānvayas tu bhāvanādvārā teṣāṃ paścāt paryavasyati (NR ad AN IV, vii-viii adhyāya, p. 261).

10–11 dhātvarthasyaiva ...bhāvyatvāt] See a PP quoted in MNP: tat siddhaṃ dhātvarthasya na karaṇatvenaivānvaya iti. kiṃ tarhi kvacit karaṇatvena kvacit sādhyatvena kvacid āśrayatveneti. guṇavidhau sādhyatvenaivānvayaḥ saṃbhavatīti (MNP, 39, p. 200).

C.5 5

sa ca vidhir utpattiviniyogādhikāraprayogabhedāt krameṇa caturavastho bhavati. tatra pravartanaikasvabhāvatvād vidheḥ prayojakatvaṃ svābhāvikam. anyās tu tisro 'vasthās tadanvayānupapattyā tatsiddhyartham bhavanti.

C.5.1 5.1

tathāhi –vidhiḥ pratītas san prathamaṃ svasyāpravṛttapravartakatvasiddhyarthaṃ śrutyādibhir bhāvanāviśeṣaṇatayā pratipannānāṃ dhātvarthadravyādīnāṃ pramāṇāntarāprāptām prāptiṃ kalpayati. pramāṇāntaraprāpte tu tenaiva pravṛttisiddheḥ svasya pravartakatvaśaktivilopāt.

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3 tadanvayānupapattyā] My emendation. P, OP, M: tadanupapattyā. But the AN text suggests a different reading and so does the sense. Else, what could tad in tadanupapattyā and tatsiddhyartham refer to? It cannot refer to prayoktṛtva, in the sense that the other three conditions would lead to the "establishment of the performance, since this would not be possible for them," since it would be illogical to say that this constitutes the inner nature of all prescriptions and that it is at the same time "logically impossible" for them. And it would equally be problematic to say that prayoktṛtva would not be possible without those three stages, in the sense that the other three conditions would lead to the "establishment of the performance, since otherwise it would not be possible," since it has been said to be the inner nature of all prescriptions, and hence seems not to need any extra aid.

7 pramāṇāntarāprāptām prāptiṃ] My emendation. P, OP, M: pramāṇāntarāprāptiṃ.

1–4 anyās ...bhavanti] (Ce'e) tad[=pravarttakaikarasa]anvayānupapattyaivetarat trayaṃ kalpayatīti (AN, III pariccheda, ad 21, p. 240).

2–3 tatra ...svābhāvikam] (Re) vidhiśabdo hi pravarttakaikarasaṃ vidhyātmānam abhidhatte (AN, III pariccheda, ad 21, pp. 239-240).

3 sa ...'vasthās] (Re) utpattyāditrayāṇāṃ ca vidhyanvayabalād gateḥ | svarūpeṇa prayoktṛtvāc caturvidhyaṃ vidher matam (AN, III pariccheda, 21, p. 239).

5 vidhiḥ ...prathamaṃ] (Re) tad evaṃ prathamam eva vidhyanvayapratīteḥ puruṣārthasya bhāvyatvaṃ sidhyati (AN, III pariccheda, ad 17, p. 239).

5–7 svasyāpravṛttapravartakatvasiddhyarthaṃ ...kalpayati] (Ce'e) apravṛttapravarttakasvarūpasya vidher yadā tatsiddhyarthaṃ karmasvarūpaparatvaṃ bhavati tadā vidhyanvayapratipattivaśād eva tadviṣayasya karmaṇaḥ pramāṇāntarāprāptiparikalpanāt utpādakatvasiddhiḥ (AN III, vi adhyāya, ad 21, p. 239)

1–3 sa ...svābhāvikam] abhidhātrī śrutiḥ kācid viniyoktry aparā tathā || vidhātrī ca tṛīyoktā prayogo yannibandhanaḥ (TV ad 3.1.13, the second hemistich of which is quoted in AN, III pariccheda, ad 21, p. 240).

1–2 sa ...bhavati] sa ca vidhiś caturvidhaḥ: utpattividhir viniyogavidhiḥ prayogavidhir adhikāravidhiś ceti (MNP 62, p. 205).

1–2 sa ...bhavati] vidhivyāpāra ākṣepāparaparyāyo mīmāṃsakaiḥ pratipannaḥ, utpattiviniyogā-dhikāra-prayogaviṣayaḥ pratijñāyate (PrP, aṅgap., 2 par., p.479

1–2 sa ...bhavati] apūrvavidhir utpattividhiviniyogavidhyadhikāravidhiprayogavidhibhedena caturdhā (Gāgābhaṭṭa, Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, tarkapāda, vidhibhedanirūpaṇa, p. 75).

5–10 vidhiḥ ...kalpayati] vidhir atyantam aprāptau niyamaḥ pākṣike sati (TV ad 1.2.38).

7 pramāṇāntarāprāptām ...kalpayati] yo vidhir atyantāprāptam arthaṃ prāpayati so 'pūrvavidhiḥ (Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā, p. 5).

7 pramāṇāntarāprāptām ...kalpayati] atyāntāprāptaviṣayaprāpako vidhir apūrvavidhiḥ (Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, tarkapāda, vidhibhedanirūpaṇa, p. 71).

dravyādīnāṃ tu sāmarthyād eva kriyāsādhanatayā pakṣe mānāntaraprāptatayā niyamāṃśe prāptiṃ kalpayati. tathā hi –"yajeta" ityādau yatkiñciddravyasādhyatayā vrīhyādidravyasya prāptāv api niyamena prāptiṃ pramāṇāntarāprāptāṃ kalpayati. evaṃ guṇādividhiṣv api. yatra tu kriyāpi prāptaivāvahananādiṣu tatrāpi niyamaṃ kalpayati. tasyāṃ daśāyām utpattividhir ity ucyate. asya ca śabdāntarābhyāsādayaḥ sahāyāḥ.

C.5.2 5.2

yadā tv aphalasādhaneṣu teṣu puruṣasya pravartayitum aśakyatayā tatsādhanatā kalpyate, tadā viniyogavidhiḥ. viniyogo nāma, aṅgāṅgībhāvāvagamaḥ. samīhitam aṅgi. tatsādhanam aṅgam. tatra ca phalabhāvanāyās sākṣāt phalasādhanatayā tatsambandhād itareṣāṃ karaṇetikartavyatānāṃ paramparayā. tatra ca viniyoge śrutyādayas sahāyāḥ. śrutyādisahito vidhir eva viniyogavidhir ity uktaṃ bhavati.

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8 pravṛttisiddheḥ svasya] So P. OP: pravṛttisiddheḥ. svasya [...]. M: pravṛttisiddhe svasya [...].

10 niyamāṃśe prāptiṃ] My emendation se potrebbe andare al negativo. M: niyamāṃśe aprāptiṃ. P: niyamo 'ṃśe 'prāptiṃ. OP: niyamāṃśe 'prāptiṃ. I thank Prof. Kataoka for having discussed with me this point.

2–3 tatsādhanatā kalpyate] So M. P: tatsādhanatayā kalpyate. OP: tatsādhanatā kalpayate

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2–3 yadā ...viniyogavidhiḥ] (Re) tadvaśenaiva [=utpattividhyutpādakatvavaśenaiva] ca tadviṣayasya phalasādhanatvaṃ phalavadupakārakatvaṃ vā kalpyata iti viniyojakatvam (AN, III pariccheda, ad 21, p. 239).

9–10 pakṣe ...kalpayati] yo vidhiḥ pakṣe prāptam arthaṃ niyamayati sa niyamavidhiḥ (Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā p.5).

9–10 pakṣe ...kalpayati] pakṣe prāptasyāprāptāṃśapūraṇaphalo vidhir niyamavidhiḥ (Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, tarkapāda, vidhibhedanirūpaṇa, p. 71).

9–10 sāmarthyād ...kalpayati] See dṛṣṭaprayojanenaiva tatsvarūpe prāpte niyamamātraṃ tena prayujyate (AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 17, p. 287).

12–13 yatra ...kalpayati] yathā tatraiva vrīhīn avahantīti (Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā p.5).

12–13 yatra ...kalpayati] yathā vrīhīn avahantīti vrīhīṇāṃ puroḍaśadvārā yāgasādhanatvasya tuṣavimokasādhanībhūtāvaghātanakhavidalanānyatarākṣepakatayāvaghātasya pakṣaprāptatvāt (Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, tarkapāda, vidhibhedanirūpaṇa, p. 71).

3–4 viniyogo ...aṅgāṅgībhāvāvagamaḥ] See aṅgapradhānasaṃbandhabodhako vidhir viniyogavidhiḥ. yathā dadhnā juhotīti (MNP 66, p. 206).

3–4 viniyogo ...aṅgāṅgībhāvāvagamaḥ] aṅgatābodhako vidhir viniyogavidhiḥ, yathā dadhnā juhotīti (Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, tarkapāda, vidhibhedanirūpaṇa, p. 75).

6 tatra ...sahāyāḥ] etasya ca vidheḥ sahakāribhūtāni ṣaṭ pramaṇāni, śrutiliṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyārūpāṇi (MNP 67, p. 206).

6 tatra ...sahāyāḥ] tatrāṅgatvabodhakapramāṇāni śrutiliṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyābhedena ṣaṭ (Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā, p. 6).

6 tatra ...sahāyāḥ] śrutiliṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyānāṃ samavāye pāradaurbalyam arthaviprakarṣāt (MS 3.3.14).

C.5.3 5.3

yadā ca phalasādhanatvabalenānuṣṭheyam iti buddhir bhavati tadādhikāravidhiḥ. vidhyadhīnā hy anuṣṭheyabuddhiḥ.

C.5.4 5.4

yadā tv anuṣṭhāpayati tadā prayogavidhir iti. asya cārthavādajanyaprāśastyaṃ mantrabhāgāvagatapadārthasmaraṇaṃ śrutyarthapaṭhanādyavagatakramaḥ kālādayaś ca sahāyāḥ.

C.5.5 5.5

atra tu sarveṣām eva vidhīnāṃ pravartakaikarasatayā svata evāvasthācatuṣṭayakalpanāsāmarthye 'pi vidhyantarasiddham utpattyādikaṃ sambhavati cet tad evāśritya svayaṃ pravartate. na tu tat kalpayati. yathā darśapūrṇamāsavidhir āgneyādīn. viniyogavidhir api svakarmaṇām anyato viniyogasiddheḥ svayaṃ tadutpattimātraparaḥ. na tu viniyogaparaḥ. yathā vā aṅgavākyeṣv api yathārhaṃ śrutyādisahitaiḥ svasvavidhibhir evotpattau siddhāyāṃ sākṣāt paramparayā vā pradhānabhāvanāśeṣatayā

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4 mantrabhāgāvagatapadārthasmaraṇaṃ] So P. OP, M: mantrabhāvāvagatapadārthasmaraṇaṃ

8 pravartate] So P, OP. M: vidhiḥ pravartate.

9 viniyogavidhir] So M. P, OP: niyogavidhir.

1–2 yadā ...tadādhikāravidhiḥ] phalasambandhabodhako vidhir adhikāravidhiḥ (Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, tarkapāda, vidhibhedanirūpaṇa, p. 75).

1–2 yadā ...tadādhikāravidhiḥ] See yad āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālo bhavatīty etadvihitasya karmanaḥ phalaviśeṣaṇasaṃbandhamātraṃ [...] tasyādhikāravidhitvam (MNP, 47, p. 202). And phalasvāmyabodhako vidhir adhikāravidhiḥ (MNP 225, p. 241).

1–2 yadā ...tadādhikāravidhiḥ] phalasādhane ca karmaṇi puruṣasyādhikāraḥ svāmitvaṃ sidhyatīty(AN, III pariccheda, ad 21, p. 239).

3–5 yadā ...sahāyāḥ] See prayogaprāśubhāvabodhako vidhiḥ prayogavidhir iti. sa cāvilambo niyate krama āśrīyamāṇe bhavati [...] tatra ca ṣaṭ pramāṇāni: śrutyarthapaṭhanasthānamukhyapravṛttyākhyāni (MNP 197-9, p. 234).

3–5 yadā ...sahāyāḥ] See pradhānavidhir evāṅgavidhibhir ekavākyatayā mahāvākyatāpannaḥ san sarvāṅgaviśiṣṭapradhānaprayogavidhāyakatvāt prayogavidhir ucyate (Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā, p. 2).

3 yadā ...iti] svāṅgānuṣṭhānabodhako vidhiḥ prayogavidhiḥ (Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, tarkapāda, vidhibhedanirūpaṇa, p. 75).

3–4 cārthavādajanyaprāśastyaṃ mantrabhāgāvagatapadārthasmaraṇaṃ] arthavādānāṃ vidheyaprāśastyaparatayā, mantrāṇām anuṣṭheyārthasmārakatayā (Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā p. 20).

5 kālādayaś] samānadeśakālakartṛtayā anyenālābhāt (Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, tarkapāda, vidhibhedanirūpaṇa –in the context of prayogavidhi–, p. 75).

6–20 atra ...karoti] agnihotraṃ juhotīty utpattyaikaparatvam. samidho juhotīty utpattiviniyogaparatvam. asati vidhau prakaraṇaviniyogāsiddher iti prāg eva gatam. jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeteti viniyogādhikāraprayogaparatvam. utpatteḥ somena yajetety anena siddhatvāt. udbhidā yajeta paśukāma iti catuṣṭayaparatvam. ekasyāpy anyato 'siddheḥ. yathā ca viniyojakatve 'pi vidheḥ śrutyādīnāṃ viniyojakatvaṃ sidhyati tathā prāg evābhihitam (AN, III pariccheda, ad 22, p. 240).

6–8 evāvasthācatuṣṭayakalpanāsāmarthye ...kalpayati] tadavasthāsambandhitāṃ vidhiḥ kalpayati (PrP, aṅgapārāyaṇa, 2par., p.479

viniyoge ca siddhe pradhānabhāvanāsambandhāt taddvārā pradhānavidhiśakter evāṅgeṣu saṅkramāt tenaivāṅgeṣv adhikārānuṣṭhānayos siddheḥ na pṛthag aṅgavidhayo 'dhikāraprayogaparāḥ. pradhānavidhir apy aṅgotpatter aṅgānāṃ svaśeṣatayā viniyogasya cāṅgavidhibhir eva siddhatvāt tad upajīvya svayaṃ prayogādhikāramātraparaḥ. pradhānasya phalaśeṣatayā viniyogasya tv anyato 'siddhatayā svayam eva karoti. yatra tūtpattyādayo na vidhyantarasiddhās tatra svayam eva svasambandhinām utpattyādicatuṣṭayaṃ karoti –yathā vikṛtau "sauryaṃ caruṃ nirvaped brahmavarcasakāmaḥ" iti vidhiḥ. nātrāgneyādivat, "sauryaś carur bhavati" iti pṛthag utpattiḥ śrūyata iti tām api kalpayati.

C.6 6

ittham aṃśatrayānvitāyāṃ bhāvanāyāṃ pratipannāyāṃ tasyānuṣṭhānayogyatayā tatra vidhiḥ puruṣaṃ pravartayatīti prathamapratīto vidhibhāvanānvayas tadā paryavasito bhavati. iyaṃ ca daśā vidhiparyavasānam ity ucyate. atra bhāvanāyā eva prathamaṃ vidheyatvam taddvārā kriyāyāḥ. taddvārā ca dravyādīnām. atra ca yathā yathā pradhānavidhiḥ phalasiddhyarthaṃ karaṇam aṅgāni cānuṣṭhāpayati tathā tathā phalagocarāpi vidhyākrāntā pradhānabhāvanā svayaṃ sākṣāt phalaṃ niṣpādayitum aśaknuvānā tatra tatrāvatarantī tat tan niṣpādayati. tadānīm aṅgavidhīnāṃ tattadbhāvanānāṃ ca na pravartakatvaṃ naiva niṣpādakatvaṃ ceti. itthaṃ prakṛtāv anvayakramaḥ.

C.6.1 6.1

vikṛtiṣu tu bhāvyakaraṇānvitāyāṃ vikṛtibhāvanāyāṃ pratipannāyāṃ katham anena phalaṃ sādhayed iti karaṇopakārarūpetikartavyatā-

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10 viniyogasiddheḥ svayaṃ] So in parentheses in the edition. P, M: viniyogasiddhiḥ svayam [...]. OP: viniyogasiddhiḥ. svayam [...].
14 tenaivāṅgeṣv] So M. P, OP: tenaivāṅge.
7 pradhānavidhiḥ] So P. OP, M: pradhānaṃ vidhiḥ.
10 tatra tatrāvatarantī] So P, OP. Possibly to be emended as: yatra yatrāvatarantī.
10 niṣpādayati] So P, OP. M: niṣpādayanti (i and ī are not distinguished in M).

258.20–259.2 yathā …kalpayati] (Re) sauryañ caruṃ nirvaped ityādau sādhikāro vidhiḥ pratipanna utpattiṃ vinānupapadyamāna utpattim ākṣipati (PrP, aṅgap., 2par., p.479).
258.20–259.1 sauryam …brahmavarcasakāmaḥ] MS 2.3.12, 4.3.20, 28. Similar in MS 6.3.8; 7.4.1.8; 8.1.2.26; 9.3.1; 10.1.34,45,49; 10.3.56; 10.4.25; 11.1.6, 18; 11.2.39; 10.7.64. Parallel passages – Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā 2.2.2, TS 2.3.2.3. [Garge 1952: 104].

13–14 pradhānavidhiśakter …saṅkramāt] See vidhiśakter guṇe saṃkramāt (MNP, 24, p. 197).
3–6 ittham …vidheyatvam] tasyāṃ tv avasthāyāṃ bhāvanāyāḥ kevalāyā ananuṣṭheyatvāt pratītāpi saṅgatir naiva niṣpadyate. aniṣpannāyām api ca tasyāṃ tatpratipattyā tadaivaṃ puruṣo nirūpayati –asyās tāvad vidhyanvayena bhavitavyam iti [...] tatas sarvāṃśaviśiṣṭā bhāvanā vidhīyate. tad evaṃ prathamam eva vidhyanvayapratīteḥ puruṣārthasya bhāvyatvaṃ sidhyati. pratītasyāpi ca vidhyanvayasyāṃśatrayasambandhottarakālam eva nirvṛtter aṃśānām api vidheyatvaṃ sidhyati (AN III, ad 15-17, p. 239).
5–6 vidhiparyavasānam ity ucyate] See yathā hi śabdābhihito vidhir viṣayaniyojyādibhir vinā na paryavasyati (NK, p. 3).

kāṅkṣāyāṃ vacananāmadheyacodanāliṅgair atideśapramāṇaiḥ prathamaṃ prākṛta upakāre tadanu tajjanakeṣu padārthavargeṣu samarpiteṣu prākṛtapadārthānāṃ vaikṛtabhāvanāśeṣatvam api "somena yajeta" ity atra yāgavidhinaiva padāntaropasthitasya somasyāpi śeṣatvavat pradhānavidhita eva bhavati.

C.6.2 6.2

prakṛtāv aṅgavidhibhiḥ prakṛtibhāvanāśeṣatvasyaiva pratīter viniyogasya ca vidhipramāṇakatvāt vaikṛtapradhānavidhir eva prākṛtāṅgānāṃ vaikṛtabhāvanāśeṣatvena viniyojakaḥ. prakṛtau aṅgapradhānayoḥ parasparākāṅkṣāvaśād anvayaḥ. vikṛtau tv aṅgānāṃ prākṛtasambandhenaiva nirākāṅkṣatayā pradhānākāṅkṣāvaśād eva parasparānvayaḥ. uddiṣṭeṣu tv aṅgeṣu pradhānasya prākṛtāṅgair eva nirākāṅkṣatayāṅgākāṅkṣāvaśād evānvayaḥ. prakṛtau pradhānabhāvanāyāḥ prathamaṃ karaṇopakārarūpetikartavyatākāṅkṣāyām api tadupasthāpakaśabdābhāvāc chrutair aṅgaiḥ prathamaṃ śeṣaśeṣibhāvenānvaye sati tannirvāhārthaṃ paścād upakārakalpanam. vikṛtau tūpakārasya padārthānām apy upasthāpakaśabdābhāvād ākāṅkṣākrameṇa prathamam upakārānvayaḥ. paścāt padārthānām. ata

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2–3 samarpiteṣu prākṛtapadārthānāṃ] So in parentheses in P. P, OP: samarpita .... padārthānāṃ (both with 8 dots). M: samarp.t. .. .. dārthānāṃ. Kei Kataoka suggests, along with prākṛtapadārthānāṃ, also atidiṣṭapadārthānāṃ

3 vaikṛtabhāvanāśeṣatvam] So P. OP: vaikṛtabhāvanā śeṣatvam

7 prākṛtāṅgānāṃ] So in parentheses in P. P, OP, M: nāṅgānāṃ. Kei Kataoka suggests, along with prākṛtāṅgānāṃ, also atidiṣṭāṅgānāṃ.

10 uddiṣṭeṣu] So P, OP, M. In parentheses: upadiṣṭeṣu. Although upadiṣṭa (as opposed to atidiṣṭa) is a terminus technicus, the emendation does not seem necessary to me, since the subject of upadeśa vs. atideśa is not dealt with here.

11 prākṛtāṅgair] So P, OP. M: prākṛtāv [SIC] aṃgair.

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3 "somena yajeta"] MS 1.4.1. ĀpŚ 10.2.8. MS 2.2.1, 17; 2.4.2. [Garge 1952:180-1].

11–16 prakṛtau ...padārthānām] (Re) yady api prakṛtāv upakāraḥ śāstrapadārthapūrvaka eva tathāpi vikṛtāv atideśāvasthāyāṃ sarveṣāṃ śāstrapadārthakāryāṇāṃ kḷptatvāviśeṣe 'pi kathaṃbhāvāpekṣā vikṛtibhāvanā prakāram eva prathamaṃ svīkaroti (AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 1, p. 266).

11–16 prakṛtau ...padārthānām] (PV) yady api prakṛtāv api prathamam upakāra evākāṅkṣitaḥ tathāpi tasyākḷptatvāt tadupasthāpakaśabdābhāvāc ca taṃ vihāya śrutānām aṅgānāṃ prathamam anvayaḥ. paścāc copakārakalpanaṃ bhavati. vikṛtau tu tasya kḷptatvād ākāṅkṣitasya tasya tyāge kāraṇābhāvāt prathamata evopakārānvaya iti bhāvaḥ. prāg evopakārātideśaḥ. sa tu katham ity āśaṅkya tasyaiva sākṣād atideśaḥ tadviśeṣaṇatayā padārthānām atideśas tv ārthika ity (NR ad AN IV, x adhyāya, p. 270).

12–14 prakṛtau ...upakārakalpanam] (Pv) prakṛtāv aśābdatve 'py ākāṅkṣāvaśāt prathamaṃ mahopakāre 'tidiṣṭe paścāc chābdānāṃ padārthānām evātideśo yuktaḥ. (NR ad AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 11, p. 280).

16–18 ata ...atideśaḥ] (Pv) paramāpūrvotpādanavelāyām āgneyotpattyapūrveṇa yā sāma-

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1–3 prathamaṃ ...prākṛtapadārthānāṃ] See akhaṇḍopakārātideśapurassara eva padārthānām atideśa iti (NR ad AN IV, ix adhyāya, p. 264).

11–16 prakṛtau ...padārthānām] prakṛtau tu svaśabdatvāt padārthānāṃ puro 'nvayaḥ | upakārasya kalpyasya paścād iti paraṃ bhidā || 11 || vyutkrameṇopakāreṇa padārthaiś caiva vaikṛtaḥ | prākṛtaiḥ vidhir anveti so 'tideśaś ca sammataḥ || 12 || (PrP, 14. 11-12).

eva karaṇotpattyapūrvaiḥ paramāpūrve janayitavye sāmagrīmelanarūpasya sarvāṅganiṣpādyasyākhaṇḍasyopakārasya prathamam atideśaḥ. paścād ārādupakāreṣv apūrvarūpāṇāṃ sannipātiṣu tu kārakakiñcitkārarūpāṇāṃ dravyeṣu tu sākṣātkriyāniṣpattirūpāṇām avāntaropakārāṇām atideśaḥ. tadanu padārthānām.

C.6.3 6.3

yata evopakārapūrvakaḥ padārthātideśaḥ atas tatsiddhyarthaṃ devatāntaradravyāntaramantrāntarayuktāsu vikṛtiṣu mantrasaṃskārasāmnāṃ vaikṛtadevatādravyamantraśeṣatvalakṣaṇaprayogavikāra ūhas siddho bhavati. yathā "agnaye juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi" iti mantrasya sūryayuktāyāṃ vikṛtau tatpadaprakṣepeṇa vaikṛtadevatāsambandhaḥ. tathā vrīhiyuktānām avahananaprokṣaṇādīnāṃ ca saṃskārāṇāṃ naivāracaruyukte yāge nīvāradravyasambandhaḥ. tathā gītiviśeṣarūpāṇāṃ sāmnāṃ ṛgantarayukte yāge tatsambandhaḥ. yathā "kavatīṣu rathantaraṃ gāyati" iti abhi-

7 yāge] So P, OP. M: yoge.
9 yāge] So P. OP, M: yoge.

grī akhaṇḍopakāralakṣaṇā apekṣitā sātrāpi syād ity atidiśyata ity arthaḥ (NR ad AN IV, x adhyāya, p. 270).
2–5 tatsiddhyarthaṃ ...bhavati] (Ce'e) tatsiddhyartham ūhaḥ sannipātināṃ mantrasāmasaṃskārāṇāṃ siddho bhavati (AN IV, ix adhyāya, p. 264).
5–9 yathā ...tatsambandhaḥ] (Pv) nīvāradravyāyāṃ vikṛtau vrīhiṣv eva prokṣaṇe kriyamāṇe tathopakāro na sidhyed iti nīvārāṇām eva prokṣaṇaṃ kartavyam iti ūhaḥ sidhyatīty arthaḥ. evaṃ sāmnām iti prakṛtau yasyām ṛci yo gītiviśeṣaḥ kḷptaḥ vikṛtau tasyā ṛcaḥ sthāne mantrāntare vihite sati sa eva gītiviśeṣas tasmin mantrāntare kartavya ity arthaḥ. mantrānām apīti. sūryadevatāyuktāyāṃ vikṛtāv agnaye juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmīti mantrasya sūryapadaprakṣepeṇohaḥ (NR ad AN IV, ix adhyāya, p. 265).
5 "agnaye juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi"] MS 9.1.38f. [Garge 1952: 75]. (Cee) agnaye vo juṣṭān nirvapāmy amuṣmai vo juṣṭān (Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā 1.1.5: 3.4. Pratīkas: agnaye vo juṣṭān nirvapāmi (Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā 4.1.5: 7.1); agnaye vo juṣṭān (Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā 4.1.5: 7.4).
5–9 mantrasya ...tatsambandhaḥ] (Re) na hi vrīhiṣu kriyamāṇaṃ prokṣaṇaṃ naivāracaroḥ prākṛtam upakāraṃ sādhayatīty ūhitavyam. evaṃ sāmnām apy ṛgantarasaṃcāre draṣṭavyam. mantrāṇām api devatāntaradravyāntaravatyāṃ vikṛtāv avikṛtānāṃ prakṛtivad upakārakatvaṃ na saṃbhavatīti [...] ūhas sidhyati (AN IV, ix adhyāya, p. 265).

16–17 ata ...janayitavye] See āgneyādiṣaṭkasyevotpattyapūrvadvāreṇa paramāpūrvasādhanatvam (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 6, p. 299).
9–10 yathā ...kavatīṛksambandhaḥ] See kavatīṣu rathantaraṃ gāyatīti. katham. tad ucyate, iha kavatīṣu rathanatraṃ gāyatīty asya vākyasya dve vacanavyaktī bhavataḥ. kavatīṣu yad rathantaram, tad gāyatīty ekā. rathantaraṃ yat, tat kavatīṣu gāyatīty aparā. tayor yaiṣā dvitīyā, rathantaraṃ yat tat kavatīṣu gāyatīti. sā svarasya sāmatve na saṃbhavatīty uktam. na hy abhivatīsvaraḥ kavatīṣu samāveśayituṃ śakya iti. pūrvā tu saṃbhavati. kavatīṣu yad rathantaram, tad gāyatīti. (ŚBh ad MS 7.2.9). And also evaṃ ca sāmaśabdānām ṛkśabdānāṃ ca sāmañjasyaṃ bhavati. kavatīṣu rathantaraṃ gāyati iti kavatīśabda ṛca eva vakṣati, rathantaraśabdaś ca sāma. itarathā kavatīśabde vā deśalakṣaṇā syāt. rathantaraśabde vā dharmalakṣaṇā. tasmād gītau sāmaśabda iti (ŚBh ad MS 7.2.21). The whole ŚBh adhikaraṇa is dedicated to this issue.

vatīṛgāśritasya rathantaralakṣaṇasya gītiviśeṣasya kavatīṛksambandhaḥ. asminn api ūhe prakṛtiṣu yair aṅgair yena prakāreṇopakāras sampāditaḥ tais tenaiva prakāreṇa devatāntarādiyuktāṃ vikṛtim upakuryād ity evaṃrūpacodakavākyasahāyo vaikṛtavidhir eva pramāṇam. yatra tu kṛṣṇalādiṣv avahananena tathā caruṣu peṣaṇena prākṛta upakāras sampādayitum aśakyaḥ, tathā darbhāṇāṃ sthāne śaraiḥ prastaritavyam iti pratyāmnānaṃ, tathā nārṣeyaṃ vṛṇīta iti pratiṣedhaś ca, tatra sāmānyapravṛttasyāpi codakasya saṅkocāt vikṛtāv ananvayalakṣaṇo bādhas siddho bhavati.

C.7 7

C.7.1 7.1

evaṃ prakṛtibhāvanānāṃ ṣaḍvidhenopadeśenāṃśatrayānvaye vikṛtibhāvanānāṃ tu bhāvyakaraṇāṃśayoḥ svavākyaśrutibhyām anvaye śrutyādibhir evopadiṣṭaiś cāṅgair anvaye sati sarvāṅgaviśiṣṭās tās tā bhāvanāḥ prākṛto vaikṛtaś ca vidhiḥ śrutyarthapaṭhanādipramāṇāva-

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9–10 abhivatīṛgāśritasya] So M. OP: abhavatīṛgāśritasya, P: akavatīṛgāśritasya.

11 ūhe prakṛtiṣu] So in parentheses. P, OP: upāprakṛtiṣu; M: upā prakṛtiṣu.

1 ananvayalakṣaṇo] So M and in parentheses. P, OP:anvayalakṣaṇo.

2 svavākyaśrutibhyām anvaye] So M. P, OP: svavākyaśrutibhramānvaye. In brackets: svavākyaśrutikramānvaye.

10–13 asminn ...pramāṇam] (Re) yadā tu yathā prakṛtāv upakṛtaṃ tathā vikṛtāv ity upakāraḥ pūrvaṃ prāptas tathāvidhaś copakāras tair eva padārthair jñātotpattir iti tatsiddhyarthaṃ teṣām atideśaḥ paścād bhavati tadā yena yathopakṛtaṃ tena tathaivopakartavyam iti (AN IV, ix adhyāya, p. 264).

261.13–262.1 yatra ...bhavati] (Pv) padārthātideśasyāpi sāmānyatvena pratyāmnātapratiṣiddhaluptadvārakāṅgavyatiriktāṅgaviṣayatayā saṃkocāt tādṛśāṅgānām atideśasyaivābhāvena nivṛtter bādhaḥ sidhyatīti (NR ad AN IV, x adhyāya, p. 271).

16 nārṣeyaṃ vṛṇīta] See ārśeyaṃ vṛṇīte (MS 6.1.43, 6.8.33, ApŚ 24.5.2,7). [Garge 1952: 136, 303] And na hotāraṃ vṛṇīte nārṣeyaṃ (7.4.4, 5, 10.8.1, Source– Maitrāyaṇi Saṃhitā 1.10.18 and TB 1.6.9.1-2) [Garge 1952: 103].

261.13–262.1 yatra ...bhavati] See pratyāmnānasthale tu avāntarakāryātideśasaṃbhave 'pi tatsādhanākāṅkṣāyā aupadeśikapadārthenaiva nivṛtter na codakasya prākṛtapadārthaprāpakatvamity āha –pratyāmnāna iti. pratiṣedhasthale tu “nārṣeyaṃ vṛṇīte” ityādivākye nañaḥ paryudāsatvam āśritya codakaikavākyatve saty ārṣeyavaraṇavyatiriktapadārthāḥ prakṛtivat prayoktavyā ity evaṃ codakārthalābhena tatsaṃkoco bhavatīty āśayavān āha –tatheti. viṣayaviśeṣād ārṣeyavaraṇādirūpāt, utkālanaṃ saṃkocenānyatraiva saṃcāraḥ. evaṃ bādhasiddhāv avirodhaṃ nigamayati –tasmād iti. luptārthādīnām aṅgānāṃ vaikṛtayāgaśeṣatayā vacanena prāptir eva nāstīty uktam (NR ad AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 3, p. 274).

13–14 yatra ...aśakyaḥ] See nāsti bādha iti. kṛṣṇaleṣu dṛṣṭopakārāsaṃbhave 'pi adṛṣṭārtham avaghātasaṃbhavān nāsti bādha ity arthaḥ (PP in NR ad AN IV, x adhyāya, p. 270).

13–14 yatra ...aśakyaḥ] See satyām eva tu prāptau kṛṣṇalādiṣu hantyādeḥ prayojanābhāvād ananuṣṭhānalakṣaṇo bādho bhavati (AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 4-5 p. 274).

gatakrameṇa bahukaraṇeṣu yāgeṣv ārādupakārakāṇām upakāraikyāt tantreṇa deśakālakartṛbhede tu teṣām evāvṛttyā tattatphalakāminaṃ pratyavāyaparihāraparaṃ puruṣaṃ vānuṣṭhāpayatīti

C.7.2 7.2

tasmāt preraṇātmā liṅādipratyayavācyo vidhyartho 'nuṣṭhāpakatayā kṛtsnaśāstraprameyam iti siddham. ayaṃ śāstrārthasaṅkṣepaḥ. ittham eva nyāyaratnamālāvyākhyāne nāyakaratne 'smābhir abhihita iti.

C.8 8.

C.8.1 8.1

tad etad anupapannam. yadi tv abhihito vidhir liṅādipratyayavācyaḥ syād evam. na tv etad evam. liṅādīnāṃ kāryaparatvāt. tattadvādyupavarṇitaṃ vidhiparatvaṃ tāvat tadīyair evopekṣitam. dūṣitaṃ cāsmābhiḥ.

C.8.2 8.2

yas tu caramaḥ pakṣaḥ bhāvanāgateṣṭasādhanatvam eva pravartanāveṣeṇa liṅādayo 'bhidadhatīti so 'py anupapannaḥ —liṅādīnāṃ bhāvanāvācitvasyādhastād eva nirākṛtatvāt. pravartanāveṣeṇa abhidhānaṃ tu dūre. ata eva tadabhimataśāstrārthānvayaprakāro 'py anupapannaḥ. anyathānvayaś ca vakṣyate.

C.8.3 8.3

ato 'nyad eva śāstraprameyaṃ vidhitattvaṃ ca mānāntarāpūrvam apūrvātmakaṃ kāryam. tatraiva liṅādīnāṃ vyutpatteḥ.

C.9 9.

C.9.1 9.1

nanu kathaṃ tatra vyutpattiḥ. pratyakṣādipramāṇagocare 'rthe vākyena pratipādite sati tatra vyavahārāt vyutpattir yuktā. mānāntarāgocare tv

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4–5 vidhiḥ śrutyarthapaṭhanādipramāṇāvagatakrameṇa] So P. OP, M: vidhiśrutyarthapaṭhanādipramāṇāvagatakrameṇa. But M often omits a final visarga.

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1 nanu …vyutpattiḥ] (Ce'e) nanv evam api kathaṃ liṅādīnāṃ kārye vyutpattir ity (VM II, ad 9, p. 38, Śā p. 430).

2–6 mānāntarāgocare …iti] (Ce'e) apūrvañ ca na pramāṇāntaragocaraḥ. na ca śabdād eva tad avagamya sambandhāvadhāraṇam itaretarāśrayaprasaṅgāt, avasitaśakter avabodhakatvāt, avabodhakatvād eva śaktyavagamāt (VM II ad 1, p. 29, Śā p. 417).

2–4 mānāntarāgocare …tatparāḥ] (Re) ke cid āhuḥ pramāṇāntarāgocaro liṅādiśabdamātrālambanaḥ kāryātmā yāgādibhāvārthagocaraḥ svargakāmādiniyojyam ātmānaṃ

5–7 ārādupakārakāṇām …vānuṣṭhāpayatīti] See prayājādīnām āgneyādiṣu tantreṇāvṛttyā vānuṣṭhānam (AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 3, p. 269).

5–7 ārādupakārakāṇām …vānuṣṭhāpayatīti] See upakārasyaikarūpatve tantraṃ prasaṅgaś copakārabhedatvāvṛttir (NR ad AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 3, p. 273).

11–12 yadi …evam] See vidhir liṅādyabhidheyeti (VN, ad 2, p. 47).

apūrve kathaṃ vyavahāraḥ. kathantarāṃ tatra vyutpattiḥ. kathantamāṃ ca liṅādayas tatparāḥ. na ca vedavākyād eva tadavagamaḥ. itaretarāśrayatvāt. tasya bodhakatve sati tatra vyavahārāc chaktigrahaḥ tadgrahe ca bodhakatvam iti.

C.9.2 9.2

kiñ ca kriyākāryaparatve śaktikalpanālāghavam apy asti. tathāhi –dhātur eva kāryabhūtāṃ kriyāṃ brūte. tathābhūtārthavācinas tu dhātoḥ pare liṅādayaṣ kevalaṃ kartṛsaṃkhyāmātravācinas syuḥ. liṅādiśravaṇe tu tathābhūtārthatayā dhātuḥ pravṛtta ity avagame sati kāryabhūtadhātvarthāvagamaś ca sambhavati. yathā laḍādibhyo vartamānādyadhyavasāyaḥ. te 'pi vartamāne 'rthe vartamānād dhātor vihitāḥ. na tu svayaṃ kālavācakā iti.

C.9.3 9.3

atrocyate –liṅādīnāṃ kāryaparatvaṃ tāvad avivādam. svargakāmapadānvayasāmarthyāt tv apūrvakāryaparāḥ. tathāhi – svargakāmo yajetetyādau svargakāmādipadaṃ na kartṛmātraparam. kiṃ tu niyojyaparam iti ṣaṣṭhādhyāyasyādye 'dhikaraṇe nirṇītam. niyojyas sa ucyate, yo mamedaṃ kāryam

15 svargakāmādipadaṃ] So M and in parentheses. P, OP: svargayāgādipadam

prerayan niyogo vidhir iti. kathaṃ punar evaṃvidhe vidhau liṅādīnāṃ vyutpattiḥ (VN, ad 1, p. 40).

2–3 mānāntarāgocare ...vyavahāraḥ] (Ce'e) evam api kathaṃ mānāntarāvedyakāryavācitā liṅādīnām ity (VM, II, ad 14, p. 39, Śā p. 432).

7–12 kiñ ...iti] (Ce'e) kiñ ca kriyāyāṃ kāryabhūtāyāṃ liṅādiyuktavākyapratipādyāyām abhyupagamyamānāyāṃ śaktikalpanālāghavaṃ syād eva. tathā hi dhātur eva kāryabhūtaṃ svārthaṃ bravītu, tathābhūtārthavācinas tu dhātoh pare liṅādayo bhavantīty āśrīyate. liṅādiśravaṇe tu tathābhūtārthaparatayā dhātuḥ prayukta ity avagamya kāryabhūtadhātvarthāvagamaḥ sampadyate. yathā laḍādibhyo varttamānādyadhyavasāyaḥ, teṣv api varttamāne 'rthe varttamānād dhātor laḍ ity eva sūtrārthaḥ. kartrādisaṃkhyāmātravācitvam eva kevalaṃ laḍādīnām iva liṅādīnām apy artha iti (VM II, ad 15, p. 40, Śā pp. 432-3). (Ce") vartamāne laṭ (Aṣṭādhyāyī 3.2.123). tasmin vartamāne 'rthe vartamanād dhātoḥ laṭ pratyayo bhavati (Kāśikā Vṛtti ad loc.).

13–16 atrocyate ...nirṇītam] (Ce'e) tathāpi vede ṣaṣṭhādyasiddhānte 'vasthite sati || 16 || svargakāmādayaḥ kārye niyojyatvena sammatāḥ | svargakāmādibhiś śabdair vaktavyā ity avasthitam || 17 || ṣaṣṭhādye hy etad uktam –liṅādiprayoge tāvat kāryāvagatir astīti nirvivādam (VM II, ad 16-17, p. 40, Śā p. 433).

13–16 atrocyate ...nirṇītam] (Re) ṣaṣṭhādye *kāryasya svasambandhitayā bodhyaḥ svargakāmādir niyojya iti vyutpāditam (VM, II, ad 23, p. 44, Śā p. 440). *Śā has tasyaiva kāryasya.

13–16 atrocyate ...nirṇītam] (Re) ṣaṣṭhādyasiddhāntarītyā kāryaṃ prati niyojyatvena svargakāmādīnām anvaya iti sthitam (VN, ad 1, p. 40– 1937: p. 63 –within a PP).

16–17 niyojyas ...avaiti] (Ce'e) niyojyo nāma yaḥ kāryam ātmīyatvena budhyate (AN, III,

14–15 svargakāmo ...iti] See, against this view: yadi ca niyojyaparaḥ svargakāmaśabdaḥ syāt tataḥ svargakāmanāviśiṣṭasya gṛhādidāhaviśiṣṭasyeva puruṣasya niyojyatvāt tadvad eva kāmanā nimittaṃ syān na phalatvaṃ svargasya sidhyet (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 2, p. 295).

14–15 svargakāmo ...iti] See kāryavākyārthavādibhir niyogasya svataḥ kāryatvena phalānapekṣatvāt tadapekṣitaniyojyapuruṣasamarpakatvaṃ svargakāmāder āśritam (NR ad AN V, xi adhyāya, 1, p. 299).

iti svasambandhitayā kāryam avaiti. na cānyavyāpārābhinirvartyam anyaḥ svasambandhitayā kāryatvena vedituṃ kṣamate. tasmān mamedaṃ kāryam iti pratyetā niyojyaḥ. tad uktam–

niyojyas sa ca kāryaṃ yas svakīyatvena budhyate | iti boddhṛtayānvayo niyojyānvayaḥ.

C.9.3.1 9.3.1

sa ca loke 'pi vyutpannaḥ. tathāhi –puṣṭikāmaḥ kṣīraṃ pibed ityādau puṣṭikāmaḥ kṣīrapānaṃ mayā kāryam iti boddhṛtayānveti. tathā "devadatta paca" iti sambodhanaprayoge devadattaḥ pākaṃ kāryatayā pratyeti.

C.9.3.2 9.3.2

svargaśabdaś ca sukhaviśeṣavācakaḥ. tatsādhane srakcandanādau prayogāt. na ca tatra vastusvarūpanibandhanaḥ prayogaḥ. sukhāpagame prayogādarśanāt. na ca sukhasādhanavacanatā tadanabhidhāne ghaṭeta. ubhayābhidhāne ca gauravam. tadabhidhānābhyupagame ca tatsādhanatāyā lakṣaṇaiva. arthavādeṣu ca duḥkhāsambhinnaciropabhogyāb-

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6 sukhāpagame] So M and in parentheses. P, OP: sukhāvagame. See also the VM II ad 22 model, quoted below.
7 na ca] My emendation. P, OP, M: om. However, OP displays a different punctuation:

23ab, p. 246).
16–17 niyojyas ...avaiti] (Ce'e) niyojyaś ca sa ucyate yaḥ kāryaṃ mamedaṃ kāryam iti budhyate (VN, ad 1, p. 40).
17–18 na ...kṣamate] (Re) na hi yaḥ kāryam iti budhyate sa niyojyaḥ. kiṃ tu yo mamedaṃ kāryam iti budhyate. na ca tataḥ pravṛttiḥ sidhyet. na hi kāryam ity eva kaścit pravartate (AN, III, ad 23-24, p. 247).
18–19 mamedaṃ ...pratyetā] (Ce'e) mamedaṃ kāryam iti pratītya (VM, II, ad 4, p. 36, Śā p. 427).
20 niyojyas ...budhyate] (Ce) niyojyas sa ca kāryaṃ yas svakīyatvena buddhyate (VM II 18)
1 boddhṛtayānvayo niyojyānvayaḥ] (Ce'e) tathāpi svasambandhikāryaboddhṛtvenaivānvayo varṇanīya iti niyojyasamarpakatvam evāśrīyate iti (VM, II ad 17, p. 40, Śā p. 433).
2–4 sa ...pratyeti] (Pv) niyojyatvasya kartṛtvād ananyatvaṃ pratipādayati [...] loke devadattaḥ pacatītyādau bhāvārtho yatkṛtisādhyaḥ sa tatkartṛkaḥ iti prabhākareṇāpy aṅgīkṛta ity arthaḥ (NR ad AN, III, ad 23-24, p. 251).
2–4 sa ...pratyeti] (Pv) vṛddhavyavahāre niyojyānvayavyutpattiṃ vadatā saṃbodhanavibhaktinirdiṣṭasya loke 'pi niyojyatvenānvayasambhavāt tatra vyutpattiḥ sambhavatīti pratipāditaṃ prābhākareṇa (NR ad AN, III, ad 25, p. 252).
5–9 svargaśabdaś ...lakṣaṇaiva] (Ce'e) nanu prītimātravacanaḥ svargaḥ iti ṣaṣṭhādye sādhitam, prītisādhaneṣu dravyeṣu svargaśabdaprayogāt. na ca teṣu svarūpanibandhana eva tatprayogaḥ, prītyapagame tadabhāvāt. na ca tatsādhanavacanatā tadanabhidhāne ghaṭate, tadabhidhānābhyupagame tadvācakataiva. lakṣaṇayā tatsādhane prayogopapatteḥ (VM, II, ad 22, p. 42, Śā p. 435).
5–7 svargaśabdaś ...prayogādarśanāt] (Re) prītiḥ svarga iti, na dravyam, vyabhicārāt, tad eva hi dravyaṃ kasyāṃcid avasthāyāṃ na svargaśabdo 'bhidhāti. prītiṃ tu na kasyāṃcid avasthāyāṃ na, nābhidadhāti. tasmād anvayavyatirekābhyām etad avagamyate, prītau svargaśabdo vartata iti (ŚBh ad 6.1.1).

hilāṣopaneyaprītiśravaṇāc ca tatparatvam. sā ca prītiḥ dehāntarabhogyā. kāmanāyogāc ca tasya sādhyatvam. na hi siddhe kāmanā. tena sādhyasvargaviśiṣṭo niyojyaḥ tad eva kāryaṃ boddhum alaṃ yat svakāmyasādhanam.

C.9.4 9.4

tatra kriyaiva kāryatayā bodhitā cet

C.9.4.1 9.4.1

kṣaṇabhaṅgurāyās tasyāḥ kālāntare dehāntare bhogyasvargasādhanatvāyo-

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na ca tatra vastusvarūpanibandhanaḥ prayogaḥ, sukhāvagame prayogādarśanāt sukhasādhanavacanatā tadanabhidhāne ghaṭeta, ubhayābhidhāne ca gauravam. See also the VM II ad 22 model, quoted below.

4 kriyaiva] So P, OP. M: kriyayaiva.

265.9–266.1 arthavādeṣu ...dehāntarabhogyā] (Ce'e) arthavādeṣu duḥkhāsambhinnaciratarop abhogyābhilāṣopaneyaprītiśravaṇāt. tatra yadi vidhyuddeśagataḥ svargaśabdaḥ tathāvidhaprītiparatayā na varṇyate, tadātiparokṣārthavādapadānāṃ vṛttir ādṛtā na bhaved iti, tadānuguṇyena tādṛśyām eva prītau svargaśabdaḥ prayukta iti niścīyate. tathābhūtā ca sā niyatam eva deśāntarabhogyā (VM, II, ad 22, p. 42, Śā p. 435). Although the printed edition of the parallel VM text has deśāntarabhogyā, Wicher notes that «[Manuskript] T liest hier und auch in PP 434,26 und 436,4 dehāntaradeśāntarabhogya-» (Wicher 1987: 221). Manuscript T is described in Wicher 1987: 228.

2–3 tena ...svakāmyasādhanam] (Ce'e) tena sādhyatvaparyantasvargādīcchāviśeṣitaḥ | tad eva śaknuyāt kāryaṃ boddhuṃ yat kāmyasādhanam || (VM II, v. 19).

2–3 tena ...svakāmyasādhanam] (Ce'e) na cākāmasādhanaṃ kāmī kāryatayā boddhum alam (VN, ad 1, p. 40).

5–6 kṣaṇabhaṅgurāyās ...liṅādivācyam] (Pv) vṛddhavyavahāre prathamaṃ kriyākārya eva vyutpattiḥ. svargasya phalatvābhyupagame tu kṣaṇikāyāḥ kriyāyāḥ phalasādhanatvāyogāt liṅaḥ kriyākāryābhidhāyitvabādhena tadatiriktasthirakāryābhidhāyitvam aṅgīkāryam iti (NR ad AN V, xi adhyāya, p. 300).

5–6 kṣaṇabhaṅgurāyās ...liṅādivācyam] (Ce'e) karmaṇaś ca kṣaṇabhaṅgurasya tatsādhanabhāvāsambhavāt tadatiriktam eva sthāsnu kāryaṃ liṅśabdaḥ pratipādayatīty (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 8, p. 305).

5–6 kṣaṇabhaṅgurāyās ...liṅādivācyam] (Ce'e) kriyā hi kṣaṇabhaṅginī na kālāntarabhāvinas svargādes sādhanayopapadyata iti, kālāntarāvasthāyi kriyāto bhinnaṃ kāryam apūrvaṃ liṅādayo bodhayantīti sthitam (PrP, VK ad 1, Śā p. 452).

5–6 kṣaṇabhaṅgurāyās ...vighaṭeta] (Re) evaṃ cāsāv āśutaravināśinī kriyā svargakāminā niyojyena saha kāryatayā sambandhuṃ nārhati, svargaṃ prati sādhanatvānupapatteḥ (VM, II, ad 22, p. 41CHECK, Śā p. 435).

5–6 kṣaṇabhaṅgurāyās ...bhogyasvargasādhanatvāyogān] (Ce'e) phalaparatve hi tasya kālāntarabhāvitvāt tatsādhanatvaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgurasya karmaṇas sākṣān na saṃbhavati (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 2, p. 296).

5–6 kṣaṇabhaṅgurāyās ...bhogyasvargasādhanatvāyogān] (Re) ato na [prītiḥ] karmānan-

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266.5–267.1 kṣaṇabhaṅgurāyās ...ucyate] See vede tu svargakāmo yajeteti kriyātmanaḥ kāryasya bhaṅguratvād āmuṣmikasvargādiphalasādhanāśakteḥ kālāntarasthāyikriyāto bhinnaṃ kāryam upeyate (Kāśikā ad ŚV 2.15).

5–6 kṣaṇabhaṅgurāyās ...liṅādivācyam] See, on the Bhāṭṭa side: nanv idam anupapannam –āśutaravināśināṃ karmaṇāṃ kālāntarabhāvisvargādiphalasādhanatvānupapatter iti cen maivam. vihitaniṣiddhakarmaṇāṃ tattadvākyais tattatphalasādhanatve 'vagate āśutaravināśināṃ karmaṇāṃ kālāntarabhāviphalasādhanatvopapattyartham antarā puṇyapāparūpam apūrvaṃ kalpyate (Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā, p.3).

gān niyojyānvayo vighaṭeta. tasmāt taduttīrṇaṃ liṅādivācyam. tad uktam–
tasmān niyojyasambandhasamarthaṃ vidhivādibhiḥ |
kāryaṃ kālāntarasthāyi kriyāto bhinnam ucyate ||
iti.

C.9.4.2 9.4.2

nanu "darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ yajeta", "jyotiṣṭomena yajeta" iti sādhanatvaśrutibalāt kriyaiva kālāntarasthāyinī syāt. yadi vā karmaśaktiḥ. kim apūrveṇa.

C.9.4.3 9.4.3

maivam –pratītasiddhyartham aviruddhaṃ kalpanīyam. kriyāsthāyitā ca pramāṇāntaraviruddhā. śaktimati karmaṇi ca naṣṭe śakter avasthānaṃ viruddham.

C.9.4.4 9.4.4

nanu tarhi yāgādikriyā devatārādhanabhūtā kāryatayā liṅādibhir ucyatām. tayārādhitā sā devatā prasannā kālāntare kartāram enaṃ phalena yojayati. "sa enaṃ prītaḥ prīṇāti", "sa evainaṃ bhūtiṃ gamayati" ityādyarthavādāś ca śrūyante. "yaja–devapūjāsaṅgatikaraṇadāneṣu" iti pūjārthe ca yajis

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6 tasmāt taduttīrṇaṃ] So in parentheses. OP, P, M: tasmād uttīrṇaṃ.
1 iti] So M. P, OP: om

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tarabhāvinīti, na tatra karmaṇa āśutaravināśinaḥ sādhanatāvakalpate (VM, II, ad 22, p. 42CHECK, Śā p. 435).
5–6 kālāntare ...bhogyasvargasādhanatvāyogān] (Ce'e) svargaś ca niyatadeśāntarakālāntarabhogyaḥ (VM, II, ad 22, p. 41, Śā p. 434).
266.7–267.1 tasmān ...ucyate] (Ce) tasmān niyojyasambandhasamarthaṃ vidhivācibhiḥ |kāryaṃ kālāntarasthāyi kriyāto bhinnam ucyate ||(VM II 23).
2–3 nanu ...syāt] (Re) ata eva ca vinaṣṭasyāpi karmaṇaḥ śāstreṇa sādhanatvaṃ bodhyate (VM, II, ad 22, p. 42, Śā p. 435).
3–4 yadi ...apūrveṇa] (Ce'e) yadi vā karmaṇa eva śaktir avasthāyinīty abhyupagamyatām (VM, II, ad 23, p. 42, Śā p. 436).
267.5–268.1 maivam ...viruddham] (Ce'e) tad idam ubhayam api pramāṇāntaravirodhān na kalpanām arhati. avirodhi hi pratītasiddhyarthaṃ kalpayituṃ śakyam. karmaṇaś cāśutaravināśinaś ciratarāvasthāyitā pramāṇāntaraviruddhā. śaktimati cātīte śaktir apy atīteti pramāṇāntarasiddham iti, na sāpi sthāyinī śakyā kalpayitum. api cāśraye nivṛtte kim āśrayā śaktir avatiṣṭhatām (VM, II, ad 23, pp. 42-43, Śā p. 436).
2–5 nanu ...śrūyante] (Ce'e) nanu yāgādikriyā devatārādhanopāyabhūtā satī kāryatayocyatām. sā tatpratyāsattidvāreṇa kālāntare 'pi phalaṃ janayitum alam eva. devatāphaladānasamarthā karmabhir ārādhyate, sārādhitā prasīdati, prasannā ca kartṝn kālāntare 'pi phalena yojayaty eva iti (VM II, ad 23, p. 43, Śā p. 436).
5–6 yaja ...smaryate] (Ce'e) nanu *devapūjārthaḥ eva yajiḥ smaryate (VM II, ad 23, p.

2–3 nanu ...syāt] See varaṃ tasyā [kriyāyāḥ] [...] ciratarāvasthāyitākalpanā (VM, II, ad 23, p. 42, Śā p. 436).
2–3 yāgādikriyā ...yojayati] See devān bhāvayatānena te devā bhāvayantu vaḥ | parasparaṃ bhāvayantaḥ śreyaḥ param avāpsyatha (Bhagavadgītā 3.11).
2–3 yāgādikriyā ...yojayati] sa stutyaḥ prītaḥ stāvakasya tasyābhīṣṭaṃ prayacchati (Pūrṇaprajñadarśana in Madhava's Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, **Purnaprajnadarsana1992**

smaryate. devatoddeśena dravyatyāgo yāga ity abhiyuktopadeśaś ceti.

C.9.4.5 9.4.5

tad etad dharmamīmāṃsakā na sahante vadanti ca pramāṇavirodham. nānādeśavāsibhir yajamānaiḥ yugapat pravṛttakarmārādhyatvaṃ vigrahavatyā devatāyā durghaṭam. vigrahaśūnyāyāś ca sārvajñyaṃ durupapādam. etat sarvaṃ devatādhikaraṇe prapañcitam.

C.9.4.6 9.4.6

tarhi yajamānapuruṣasaṃskāratayā kriyā kāryatayocyatām. saṃskṛtaś ca puruṣaḥ kālāntare phalabhāg bhaviṣyatīti.

C.9.4.7 9.4.7

maivam –saṃskāratve pramāṇābhāvāt. na hi yāgādayaḥ pāvamānīvat puruṣasaṃskāratayā śrūyante.

C.9.4.8 9.4.8

nanu kriyaiva kāryatayocyatām. tasyāś ca phalasādhanatvaśravaṇānyathānupapattyā tajjanyaṃ kālāntarasthāyi phalodayānuguṇam ātmāśrayaṃ kiñcid aparaṃ kalpyatām. mā bhūt tasya liṅvācyateti.

43, Śā p.437). *Śā has devapūjārtha

5 yaja ...iti] (Ce) yaja devapūjāsaṅgatikaraṇadāneṣu (Dhātupāṭha, bhvādigaṇa [**Dhatupatha** 1.2]).

6 devatoddeśena ...ity] (Ce') ato devatoddeśena dravyatyāgo yāga iti (VM, II, ad 23, p. 43, Śā pp. 437-8).

7–10 vadanti ...prapañcitam] (Ce'e) nānādeśagāminā puruṣeṇānuṣṭīyamānayāgātmakapūjāvagamaś ca devatāyā iti pramāṇaviruddham eva, vigrahavataś ca pratipattiyogitā, tasya ca vedenānādinārādhyatayā pratipādanam api pramāṇāntaraviruddham eva, tasyānāditvānupapatteḥ. devatādhikaraṇe ca prapañcenāyam artho nirasta iti nātīvātra yatitavyam (VM, II, ad 23, p. 43, Śā pp. 438-9).

11–12 tarhi ...bhaviṣyatīti] (Ce'e) athāpi syāt puruṣasaṃskārahetubhūtaiva kriyā śabdena kāryatayocyate, tasyāś ca svargakāmādipuruṣasambandhāt puruṣasaṃskārād eva kālāntare phalaṃ bhaviṣyati iti (VM, II, ad 23, p. 43, Śā p. 439).

268.13–269.1 maivam ...śrūyante] (Ce'e) tan na. puruṣasaṃskāratve pramāṇābhāvāt. na hi pramāṇāntarataḥ śabdato vā puruṣasaṃskārahetutā yāgādīnām avasīyate iti "karmāṇy ārambhabhāvyatvād" ity atroktam (VM, II, ad 23, pp. 43-44, Śā p. 439).

2–4 nanu ...liṅvacyateti] (Ce'e) nanu kriyaiva kāryatayocyatām, phalasādhanatā ca tasyā evāśrīyatām. tadanyathānupapattyā tu kiṅcid apy aparaṃ tajjanyaṃ phalodayānuguṇaṃ kālāntarasthāyyātmāśrayaṃ parikalpyatām, mā bhūt tasya liṅādivācyatā iti (VM, II, ad 23, pp. 43-44, Śā p. 439).

2–4 tasyāś ...kalpyatām] (Pv) apūrvasyānupapattikalpyaṃ bhāvyatvaṃ na tu vācanikam ity uktam (NR ad AN IV, vii-viii adhyāya, p. 262).

2–4 tasyāś ...kalpyatām] (Re) na cāyam apūrvasya kartavyatām āha, phalakartavyatāyāṃ hi satyāṃ tad avagamyate (ŚBh ad 4.3.10). Rāmānujācārya comments: (Pv) avagamyata ity anupapattyā kalpyata ity arthaḥ (NR ad AN IV, vii-viii adhyāya, p. 261).

2–4 tasyāś ...kalpyatām] (Re) kriyāyāḥ sākṣāt phalasādhanatvābhāve 'pi madhye kiṃcid apūrvaṃ parikalpya taddvāreṇa phalasādhanatvanirvāhaḥ syāt(NR ad AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 2, p. 300).

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6 devatoddeśena ...ity] See devatoddeśena dravyatyāgasya yāgarūpatvāṅgīkārāt (Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā, p.4).

C.9.4.9 9.4.9

maivam –na ca phalānuguṇenānyena kalpitena kriyāyāḥ phalasādhanatopapāditā syāt. sākṣāc chrutaṃ phalasādhanatvaṃ ca na syāt, anyasādhanatvāt. na hi sādhanasādhanaṃ sādhanaṃ syāt. na ca kalpitena śrutasādhanatvanirvāhaḥ. karmaṇo naṣṭatvāt.

C.9.5 9.5

tasmāl loke kriyākāryaparatayā vyutpannānāṃ niyojyānvayavaśāt tadanyakāryaparatvaṃ yuktam. na kevalaṃ vṛddhavyavahārād eva vyutpattiḥ.

C.9.5.1 9.5.1

prasiddhapadasamabhivyāhārād api loke dṛśyate. vede 'pi "yavamayaś carur bhavati, vārāhī upānahāv upamuñcate" ity atra yavavarāhaśabdayoḥ priyaṅgau dīrghaśūke vāyase sūkare ca prayujyamānayor arthavādasamab-

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7 na ...syāt] So M. P, OP: na hi sādhanasādhanaṃ syāt. In parentheses: na hi sādhanasādhanaṃ tasya sādhanaṃ syāt.
9 vyutpannānāṃ] So P, OP. M: vyutpannānāṃ vidhipratyayānāṃ.

5–8 maivam ...śrutasādhanatvanirvāhaḥ] (Ce'e) ucyate –tad dhi tadanupapattyā kalpyate, yady asyopapādakam. na ca kriyājanyenānyena phalajanakena kalpitena kriyāyāḥ phalasādhanatopapāditā bhavati. na hi sādhanasādhanaṃ tasya sādhanaṃ bhavati, avāntaravyāpāro vā śaktir vā tatsādhanatāṃ nirvāhayati (VM, II, ad 23, pp. 43-4, Śā p. 439).
6–7 sākṣāc ...syāt] (Ce'e) anyadvāreṇa kilānyasya sādhanatvaṃ kāṣṭhāder iva jvalanādidvāreṇānubhavasya vā saṃskāradvāreṇa smṛtipākasādhanatvaṃ na saṃbhavatīty asādhanaṃ karma syāt. sādhanasādhanaṃ tu syāt (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 2, p. 296).
9–10 tasmāl ...yuktam] (Re) liṅśabdasya loke kriyāyāṃ prayogād darśapūrṇamāsādivākyeṣu cāpūrve prayogād (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 9, p. 305).
10–11 na ...vyutpattiḥ] tatraitad eva tāvad vaktavyam –na kevalaṃ *lokavyavahārād eva śabdārthāvadhāraṇam (VM, II, ad 32CHECK, p. 49, Śā ad 31 p. 446). *Śā has vede lokavyavahārād.
269.12–270.5 prasiddhapadasamabhivyāhārād ...modamānatvam] (Ce'e) kintu prasiddhārthapadasambandhād api padārthāntarānvayayogyārthābhidhāyakateti sthite, tadanurūpārthābhidhāyakatā nirṇīyata eva. etac ca yavavarāhādhikaraṇe vyutpāditam. vyavahārata eva sambandhāvadhāraṇād ubhayathāpi vyavahāradarśanāt samā pratipattir iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ. padāntarasambandhād api padāntarārthādhyavasānaṃ bhavaty eva, tena vaidikavākyaśeṣānvayārhatālocanena dīrghaśūkādyarthatvam eveti rāddhāntaḥ (VM, II, ad 32CHECK, p. 49, Śā ad 31 p. 446).
269.12–270.2 vede ...prayujyamānayor] (Ce'e) "yavamayaś caruḥ, vārāhī upānahau, vaitase kaṭe prājāpatyān saṃcinoti" iti yavavarāhavetasaśabdān samāmananti. tatra kecid dīrghaśūkeṣu yavaśabdaṃ prayuñjate, kecit priyaṅguṣu. varāhaśabdaṃ kecit sūkare, kecit kṛṣṇaśakunau. vetasaśabdaṃ kecid vañjulake, kecij jambvām. tatrobhayathā padārthāvagamād vikalpaḥ (ŚBh ad 1.3.8). (Ce") vārāhī upānahau TB 1.7.9.4, Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā 4.4.6, ApŚ 18.22.1, cf. SB 5.4.3.19 [Garge 1952:113].

269.12–270.5 prasiddhapadasamabhivyāhārād ...modamānatvam] vākyaśeṣāc caikatra samunnītaḥ śabdārtho yavavarāhādyarthavadanyatrāsaty api vākyaśeṣe 'vagamyate (Kāśikā ad ŚV codanā 15).

hivyāhārāt dīrghaśūke sūkare ca śaktiniyamo dṛṣṭaḥ. "yatrānyā oṣadhayo mlāyante 'thaite modamānās tiṣṭhanti" iti yavasannidhāv arthavādaḥ. tatretarāsv oṣadhīṣu pākān mlānāsu dīrghaśūkānām eva modamānatvam. tad uktam ācāryaiḥ –

phālgune 'nyauṣadhīnāṃ tu jāyate patraśātanam |
modamānās tu dṛśyante yavāḥ kaṇikaśālinaḥ || iti |

tathā "varāhaṃ gāvo 'nudhāvanti" ity arthavādaḥ. vatsabuddhyā gavāṃ sūkaraṃ praty evānudhāvanaṃ yuktam. na tu kākam iti.

C.9.6 9.6

ekadeśinas tv alaukike 'pi kārye vyutpattim āhuḥ. tathā hi –loke kriyākāryatājñānāt pravṛttāv api kāryatājñānam eva pravṛttinimittam. na tu kriyāsvarūpam, tasyāṃśasya pravṛttāv anupayogād iti niṣkṛṣyālaukikakāryābhidhānaṃ lokata eva vyutpannam iti.

C.9.7 9.7

tad ayuktam yady apy evaṃ kāryamātraparatvaṃ vaktuṃ śakyam tathāpi tasya kāryatvasya loke kriyāśritasyaiva pravartakatvadarśanāt tadāśritam eva pratīyeta. na tv alaukikam. yathā jātimātrasya śabdavācyatve 'pi tasya vyaktyāśritatvadarśanāt tadāśritatā na pratikṣipyate. kiṃ ca mānāntarāvedye kārye vyutpitsuḥ kathaṃ vyavahāraṃ jānīyāt. tadajñāne ca kathaṃ śabdaśaktigraha iti.

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8 kaṇikaśālinaḥ] So M, OP. P: kaṇiśaśālinaḥ.

3–4 yatrānyā ...arthavādaḥ] (Ce'e) "yatrānyā oṣadhayo mlāyante, athaite modamānā ivottiṣṭhantīti" dīrghaśukān yavān darśayati vedaḥ (ŚBh ad 1.3.9).
3–4 yatrānyā ...tiṣṭhanti] (Ce') "yatrānyā oṣadhayo mlāyante 'thaite modamānās tiṣṭhanti" (TV ad 1.3.9).
4–5 tatretarāsv ...modamānatvam] (Re) priyaṅgavaḥ śaratpakvās tāvad gacchanti hi kṣayam | yadā varṣāsu modante samyagjātāḥ priyaṅgavaḥ || 418 || tadā nānyauṣadhimlāniḥ sarvāsām eva modanāt | (TV ad 1.3.9).
7–8 phālgune ...kaṇikaśālinaḥ] (Cee) phālgune 'nyauṣadhīnāṃ tu jāyate patraśātanam | modamānās tu tiṣṭhanti yavāḥ kaṇiśaśālinaḥ (TV ad 1.3.9, v. 417).
9–10 tathā ...yuktam] (Re) tasmād varāhaṃ gāvo 'nudhāvantīti sūkare varāhaśabdaṃ darśayati (ŚBh ad 1.3.9).
9 varāhaṃ ...'nudhāvanti] (Ce) Maitrāyaṇi Saṃhitā 1.6.3.
270.11–271.1 ekadeśinas ...iti] (Ce'e) ekadeśimatam adhunā nirākarttum upanyasyati –vyavahārata evāhur vyutpattim apare punaḥ | kārye mānāntarāvedye kriyādivyatirekiṇi || 33 || asyārthaḥ –kecid evam āhuḥ liṅādiyuktavākyaśravaṇe pravṛttidarśanāt, kāryāvagatinibandhanatvāt pravṛtteḥ, kāryamātram eva teṣām arthaḥ, na kriyā. *tasya śabdasya pravṛttyanupayogitvād iti kriyāniṣkṛṣṭakāryābhidhāyitā laukikavyavahārād eva nirṇīyata iti (VM II, ad 33CHECK, p. 49, Śā ad 32, pp. 446-7). *Śā has tasyāṃ and v.33 before it.
2–7 tad ...iti] (Ce'e-Re) tad idam ayuktam iti pratijānīte –[...] kārye mānāntarāvedye pārśvasthas tannibandhanam | vyavahāraṃ kathaṅkāraṃ śabdāt prāg avabudhyatām || 35 || vyavahāram avijñāya tannibandhanatadgatā | pratipattiḥ kathaṃ jñeyā śabdaśaktiḥ

269.12–270.2 vede ...prayujyamānayor] yavavarāhavetasaśabdāḥ priyaṅguvāyasajambūṣv api kila kvāpi deśantare prayujyante (TV ad 1.3.8).

C.9.7.1 9.7.1

evam uktena nyāyena apūrvakāryābhidhāyitve siddhe loke kriyākāryatvaṃ lākṣaṇikam. ubhayatra śaktikalpanāyāṃ gauravāt. kriyā hy anuṣṭhīyamānāpūrvasādhanam ataḥ kriyākāryatvam apūrvakāryatvasaṅgatam iti śakyate tal lakṣayitum. laukikānāṃ tu pratipattiprayogau mānāntarāgocare 'pūrve na sambhavataḥ. tasya lokavyavahārāgocaratvāt. atas teṣāṃ mukhyārthānavadhāraṇān mlecchānāṃ yavavarāhaśabdayoḥ priyaṅgukākayor iva kriyākāryatva eva mukhyatvābhimāno lakṣaṇānabhimānaś ca. mukhyārthakuśalānāṃ tu mukhyāmukhyaviveko bhavati.

C.9.8 9.8

nanu kriyākārya eva mukhyatā anyatra lakṣaṇā syād iti cen

C.9.9 9.9

na, mānāntarāgocareṇa tena sambandhāparijñānāt tatra lakṣaṇānupa-

9 kriyā] So in M. P, OP: yā.

kathantarām || 36 || idam atrākūtam. yady api kāryamātram eva pravṛttyupayogīti tāvan mātram eva śabdārthaḥ, tathāpi tasya loke kriyāgatasyaiva pravarttakatvadarśanāt; śakyate kriyāśritatā pratyetum. yathākṛtimātrasya śabdārthatve 'pi vyaktyāśritatāpi na pratikṣipyate, tathā kriyāśritatvaṃ pramāṇāntarapramitaṃ na pratikṣepam arhati. tena kriyātiriktakāryābhidhāyakatvam asiddham. yadi paraṃ tannibandhanavyavahāra eva syāt, tadā taddarśanāt taddhetubhūtapratipattyanyathānupapattyānumānena śabdasya vācakatvādhyavasānaṃ bhavet. na caitad asti, tasya śabdād anyataḥ prāganavagamāt tannibandhanavyavahārāpratipattiḥ, tadapratipattau ca taddhetubhūtapratipattyananumānān na śaktikalpanopapattiḥ (VM II, ad 34-36, pp. 49-50, Śā p. 447).

271.8–272.1 evam ...bhavati] (Re) pratipattiprayogau hi nāvaśyaṃ śrautavṛttyanusāriṇāv eva lakṣaṇayāpi loke taddarśanāt. tena yady api uktena nyāyenāpūrvam eva kāryaṃ liṅādīnām abhidheyam, tathāpi tasya kriyākāryatvāvyabhicārāt, tatra lakṣaṇayā tayor nānupapattiḥ. yat tu śrautapadārthe kārye loke liṅādi na prayujyate iti, tat tasyāpūrvātmanaḥ pramānāntarāpratītatvāt, pratītaviṣayatvāc ca laukikaprayogasya. kriyāsādhyan tv apūrvam. sādhitā ca satī kriyā sādhanaṃ bhavatīty apūrveṇa saha kriyākāryatvaṃ nityasambaddham iti śakyate tal lakṣayitum. yady eṣā lakṣaṇā kimiti tarhi loko nāvagacchatīty āha– lakṣaṇānabhimānas tu mukhyārthānavadhāraṇāt | ye tu mukhyārthakuśalās teṣāṃ lākṣaṇikatvadhīḥ || 44 || mukhyam artham aviditvā lākṣaṇikam apy arthaṃ śrautam iva manyante, mlecchā iva yavavarāhādyartham. mukhyārthavivekinān tu parīkṣakāṇāṃ lākṣaṇikatvadhīḥ (VM, II, ad 43-44, pp. 51-2, Śā p. 449).

8–11 apūrva ...lakṣayitum] (Re) yadā hi phalakāminiyojyasamabhivyāhārāt kriyātiriktam apūrvaṃ liṅādyabhidheyam āsthitaṃ tadā na kriyāyā api tadabhidheyatvaṃ sukalpam. anekārthatvasyānyāyyatvāt. kriyāpratīteś ca lakṣaṇayāpy upapatteḥ. apūrvakāryatā hi kriyākāryatvāvinabhūtā śabdenāvagatā tad upasthāpayatīti nābhidheyatvasambhavaḥ (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 10, p. 305).

8–9 apūrva ...gauravāt] (Re) apūrvasyābhidheyatve kriyā lākṣaṇikī bhavet | anekārthatvadoṣāt tu na dvayor abhidheyatā || (AN V, xi adhyāya, 10, p. 305).

8–9 apūrvakāryābhidhāyitve ...lākṣaṇikam] (Pr) apūrvakāryatvam eva liṅvācyam. kriyākāryatvaṃ tv lākṣaṇikam (NR ad AN V, xi adhyāyā, ad 10, p. 311).

2 nanu ...iti] (Re) na tāval laukikā gām ānayetyādiṣu liṅo lakṣanāvṛttiṃ manyante. kiṃ tu mukhyatayaiva (AN V, xi adhyāya, as 11, p. 306).

2 nanu ...iti] (Re) tasmiṃś ca kriyātirikte kārye vācye yo loke liṅādīnāṃ kriyāyāṃ prayogaḥ sa lākṣaṇiko bhavati anekārthatvasyānyāyyatvāt (VN, ad 1, pp.40-1).

3–4 na ...lakṣaṇānupapatteḥ] (Re) na ca sauryādiṣu lakṣaṇākāraṇam astīty apūrvam eva

patteḥ. kiṃ ca yadi liṅādayaḥ kriyākāryaparāḥ apramāṇakam evāpūrvaṃ syāt. ata evobhayānugatakāryamātraparatvam apy anupapannam. sāmānyasya viśeṣaparyavasānāvaśyambhāvena prasiddha eva paryavasānaṃ na tv aprasiddhe. tataś cāpūrvapratītir eva na syāt. itthaṃ kāmādhikāre 'pūrvavyutpatteḥ nityanaimittikaniṣedhādhikāreṣu liṅādīnāṃ tatparatvaṃ siddham. mukhyārthalābhāt. nityādhikārānuguṇyena kriyākāryaparatvābhidhānaṃ kāmādhikāre 'nupapannam iti sarvatraikarūpyam eva syāt. tasmād apūrvakāryābhidhāyino liṅādaya iti siddham.

C.9.10 9.10

nanv iṣṭasādhanatājñānāt pravṛttiḥ. na kāryatājñānāt. tad uktam –
prayojanam anuddiśya na mando 'pi pravartate || iti.
prayojanaṃ phalam. tasyaiva liṅādivācyatvam. tad uktam –
apekṣitopāyataiva vidhir iṣṭo manīṣibhiḥ || iti.
tataś ca kriyāgateṣṭasādhanatā bhāvanāgateṣṭasādhanatā vā liṅvācyā. iṣṭaviśeṣasamarpakaṃ ca vidhyuddeśagataṃ svargādipadam. sādhanatvānyathā-

5 apy] So M. P, OP: om.
4–5 liṅādivācyatvam ...iti] So M. OP: liṅādivācyatvam. tad uktam– iti. P: liṅādivācyatvam.
4 liṅādivācyatvam] So P, OP. M: liṅādivācyā.

tattadgatair liṅādibhir abhidhīyate (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 10, p. 305).
3 mānāntarāgocareṇa tena sambandhāparijñānāt] (Ce'e) yac ca pramāṇāntarāyogyam, tatra sambandhagrahaṇam aśakyam, sambandhigrahaṇapūrvakatvāt tasya (VM, II, ad 1, p. 29, Śā p. 417).
4–5 yadi ...syāt] (Re) kriyāsvarūpaṃ hi prakṛtyupāttam. tasya karttavyatārūpaṃ viśeṣaṇam eva liṅā pratipādayitavyam. apūrvaṃ tu nānyena kenacit prāptam iti liṅaiva karttavyatāviśiṣṭaṃ tatsvarūpam abhidhātavyam iti (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 11, p. 306).
4–5 yadi ...syāt] (Re) na laukikakriyāyās tādṛśī kartavyatāvagatāpūrveti cet. niyogasya vā kimavagatā yenābhyupagamyate (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 11, p. 307).
5 ata ...anupapannam] (Re) ubhayatra prayujyamānasya liṅśabdasya gośabdasyeva khaṇḍamuṇḍādiṣu prādhānyaguṇabhāvaviśeṣaprahāṇena khaṇḍatvamuṇḍatvādiviśeṣaprahāṇeneva sarvānugataṃ kāryatvasāmānyaṃ gotvasāmānyam iva vācyaṃ syāt (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 13, p. 308).
5 ata ...anupapannam] (Pr) kāryasāmānyābhidhānaśaktyaikayaivobhayor vācyatvopapattau viśeṣavyāpitaśaktiviṣayatvāṅgīkāro 'nyataralakṣaṇāṅgīkāraś ca na yukta iti (NR ad AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 11, p. 311).
9–10 nityādhikārānuguṇyena ...syāt] (Ce'e) nityādhikārānuguṇyena tu kriyākāryatvābhidhānaṃ kāmyeṣv anupapannam iti, sarvatrāpūrvam eva vākyārtha iti (VM II, ad 31, p. 48, Śā p. 445).
3 prayojanam ...pravartate] (Ce) (ŚV sambandhā 55 ab)
5 apekṣitopāyataiva ...manīṣibhiḥ] Ce"' (Brahmsiddhiḥ 3.104cd (p.115), in VM II ad 6)

7–10 itthaṃ ...syāt] See, diametrically opposed to this view: tat siddhaṃ kāmādhikāre 'pi vidher eva prayojakatvāt na naimittikakāmādhikārayoḥ kaścit prayuktikalpanāviśeṣa iti (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 3, p. 298).
9–10 nityādhikārānuguṇyena ...syāt] evañ ca naimittikaniṣedhādhikārayor asaty api phalavattve 'pūrvam eva vākyārtho bhaviṣyati (VN ad 1, p. 40–1937 p. 63).
2 nanv ...kāryatājñānāt] tasmān na kāryatāvagatiḥ kriyāyāṃ pravṛttikāraṇam api tu samīhitasādhanatvajñānam (VN, ad 2, p. 43).

nupapattyā cāpūrvaṃ kalpyam. na tu vācyam iti.

C.9.10.1 9.10.1

idaṃ parihṛtaprāyam api pariharāmaḥ –tṛptisādhane 'tīte vartamāne ca bhojanādau pravṛtter adarśanāt bhaviṣyatsv api phalasādhaneṣu sāmudrikaśāstravidākhyāteṣu śubhasūcakeṣu lakṣaṇeṣv apravṛtteḥ tathā daivikeṣu bhaviṣyatphalasādhaneṣu vṛṣṭyātapādiṣv apravṛtter neṣṭasādhanatā pravṛttiprayojikā.

C.9.10.2 9.10.2

atrāha kaścid –iṣṭasādhanataiva kāryatā nāparā. saiva pravṛttihetur iti.

C.9.10.3 9.10.3

tan na. atītasya vartamānasya bhojanāder bhaviṣyataś ca vṛṣṭyāder iṣṭasādhanatāsti. na ca kāryatā. tenānyā kāryatā anyā ceṣṭasādhanatā.

C.9.10.4 9.10.4

kiṃ tu kleśarūpasya karmaṇaḥ kāryatvaṃ phalasādhanatvādhīnam.

C.9.10.5 9.10.5

na tu sākṣāt. yady apy ekavastuniveśitā dvayoḥ, tathāpi bhedo 'sty eva. phalaṃ praty upāyatvaṃ phalasādhanatvam. kṛtiṃ prati pradhānatvaṃ tadadhīnasattākatvaṃ ca kāryatvam. na tu kṛtyadhīnasiddhimātram. tac ca kṛteḥ pradhānaṃ yadadhikṛtya kṛtiḥ pravartate. na ca duḥkhaṃ tatsādhanaṃ vādhikṛtya kṛteḥ pravṛttiḥ. kiṃ tu sukhaṃ sukhasādhanaṃ vā. sukhasād-

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1 sāmudrikaśāstravidākhyāteṣu] So P. M, OP: sāmudrikaśāstravidākhyāneṣu

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273.9–274.1 tṛptisādhane ...apravṛtteḥ] (Ce'e) tṛptihetau bhojane 'tīte varttamāne vāpravṛttaḥ, bhaviṣyaty api tatsādhane sāmudravidākhyāta ivānuṣṭhānābhāvāt (VM, II, ad 4, p. 36, Śā p. 427).

4 atrāha ...ceṣṭasādhanatā] (Ce'e) atrāpara āha –satyaṃ kāryāvagamād eva pravṛttiḥ. iṣṭasādhanataiva tu kāryatā, na parā kācit, saiva pravṛttihetur vidhir ucyate (VM II, ad 5-6, p. 36, Śā pp. 427). After "vidhir ucyate" follows a quotation of Brahmasiddhi and two quotations of Vidhiviveka, one of which is VV v. 26 (quoted in TR IV, p. 42, §C.3.1).

5–6 tan ...ceṣṭasādhanatā] (Ce'e) tatra tāvad idam eva vaktavyam –atītasya varttamānasya ceṣṭasādhanatāsti, na ca tat kāryatāvasīyate. tenānyā kāryatā, anyā ceṣṭasādhanatā iti (VM II, ad 5-6, p. 36, Śā pp. 428).

7 kiṃ ...phalasādhanatvādhīnam] kintu svayaṃ kleśarūpaṃ karma yat kāryatāṃ vrajet || 8 || phalasādhanatā tatra kāraṇaṃ tena kāryatā | (VM II, vv. 8cd-9ab, p. 36, Śā p. 429).

8–10 yady ...kāryatvam] (Ce'e) yady apy ekavastuniveśitā dvayoḥ tathāpi svarūpabhedo 'sty eva. tad eva hi vastuphalaṃ praty upāyabhāvāt phalasādhanam ity ucyate, kṛtyadhīnātmalābhatayā ca kāryam iti (VM II, ad 7, p. 37, Śā p. 428).

7–8 sādhanatvānyathānupapattyā ...iti] viśvajidadhikaraṇe ca pūrvapakṣe "na cāpūrvasya karttavyatām āha. phalakarttavyatāyāṃ hi satyāṃ tadavagamyate" iti vadan phalabhāvyatottarakālam apūrvakalpanaṃ darśayati (AN, IV, 7-8 adhyāya, p. 258).

7 kiṃ ...phalasādhanatvādhīnam] See yāge 'tiduḥkharūpe svataḥ pravṛttyabhāvāt phalarāgavata eva tatra pravṛttiḥ sidhyatīty arthaḥ (NR ad AN, III, ad 28, p. 253).

hane karmaṇi kāryatvāvagamaḥ tatsādhanatvanibandhanaḥ. na tu svataḥ prādhānyena. ato na tat kṛtiṃ prati pradhānam. sukhaṃ hi sarvaḥ kāryatayāvaiti na tu phalasādhanatvam apekṣate. tena sādhanatottīrṇā kāryatā. na tv iṣṭasādhanataiva.

C.9.10.6 9.10.6

tac ca kāryaṃ loke pratyakṣānumānavedyam. kṛtir hi mānasapratyakṣavedyā. tatsādhyatvam anumānāt. viśiṣṭaprayojanatāpi prayatnasya pratyakṣavedyaiva svayam eva pravṛttau. vākyamūlapravṛttāv api tādṛśaṃ kāryajñānam eva pravṛttiprayojakam. na tv iṣṭasādhanatājñānam.

C.9.11 9.11

kriyāvācibhyo dhātubhyaḥ pare vihitā liṅādayo loke kriyākāryamātraparāḥ. vede tu prasiddhaniyojyasamabhivyāhārād apūrvaparāḥ. tenānyā kāryatā anyā sādhanatā iti sthitam. etenāpūrvasyāpi phalasādhanatayaiva kāryatvaṃ bruvāṇāḥ nirastāḥ. phalavad apūrvasyāpi sādhanatvam antareṇa kāryatopapatteḥ. ata eva nityanaimittikādhikāreṣu kevalaṃ kāryatvam eva. na tu sādhanatvam.

4 pratyakṣavedyaiva] So P, OP. M: pratyakṣavedyaiva loke.

11–14 na ca ...prādhānyena] (Ce'e) na ca duḥkhaṃ duḥkhahetuṃ vādhikṛtya kṛteḥ pravṛttir utpannā*, nāpy aduḥkham, aduḥkhahetuṃ vā. kintu sukhaṃ sukhahetuṃ vā. tatra na tāvat svayaṃ sukharūpaṃ karma, sukhasādhanam api cen na syāt, na tasya kṛtiṃ prati prādhānyāvagamo ghaṭate. ataḥ karmasu kāryatvāvagamaḥ phalasādhanatāvagamanibandhana iti (VM II, ad 8-9, p.38, Śā p. 429). *Śā has upapannā.

14–15 sukhaṃ ...kāryatā] sukhaṃ hi sarvaḥ kāryatayāvaiti, na tasya phalasādhanatām apekṣate. tena phalasādhanatottīrṇakāryatāvagamena me pravṛttir iti niścitya [...] (VM, II, ad 8-9, p.38, Śā p. 430).

2–5 tac ...pravṛttiprayojakam] (Re) yat tāvat kāryāvagatiḥ pravṛttikāraṇam iti tatra kiṃ tatkāryaṃ kiṇ ca tatra pramāṇam iti vaktavyaṃ kṛtisādhyaṃ pradhānaṃ ca kāryam ity ucyate tatra kṛtisādhyatvaṃ tāvat kṛtau satyāṃ bhāvād asatyāṃ cābhāvād anvayavyatirekābhyām avagamyate. pradhānyaṃ tu taduddeśena kṛteḥ pravṛttir mānasapratyakṣeṇāvagamyate. kṛtir hi puruṣaprayatnaḥ sa ca mānasapratyakṣavedyo yaduddeśena pravartate tadviśiṣṭa eva pratyakṣeṇāvagamyate. sarvo hīdam uddiśyāhaṃ pravarta iti pravṛttivelāyām eva viśiṣṭoddeśyasambandhinaṃ prayatnaṃ pratyakṣeṇa jānātīti. pratyakṣānumānapramāṇakaṃ kāryam (VN, ad 2, p. 41–1937: p. 65).

2–4 tac ...pravṛttau] (Ce'e) prayatnaś ca kṛtiḥ. sa ca mānasapratyakṣavedya iti viśiṣṭaprayojanatāpi prayatnasya pratyakṣavedyaiva. tena pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ kāryam avagamyate (VM II, ad 13, p. 39, Śā p. 432).

6–7 kriyāvācibhyo ...apūrvaparāḥ] (Re) yatra phalakāmasya niyojyatvaṃ tatra tadbalenāpūrvam abhidhatte. anyatra tu samānapadopādānāt kriyām (AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 11, p. 306).

6–7 kriyāvācibhyo ...apūrvaparāḥ] (Re)satyaṃ loke kriyaiva kāryatayā śabdena pratipādyate vede tu phalakāminiyojyānvayānuguṇyāt sthiram eva kāryaṃ liṅādibhir abhidhīyata iti (VN, ad 2, p. 43).

6–7 kriyāvācibhyo ...apūrvaparāḥ] (Re) liṅādipratyayānāṃ yad vācyaṃ kāryaṃ tac cāpūrvarūpam ity etāvan mātram vaidikapadasambandhād avasīyate iti [...] vyutpattir api kārye 'rthe vyavahārānusāriṇī | kintu nirdhāraṇāmātraṃ vedavākyavimarśajam || 33 || (VM II, ad 33, pp. 48-9, Śā p. 446).

7–8 tenānyā ...sthitam] (Ce'e) tenānyā kāryatā, anya ceṣṭasādhanatāsti* (VM II, ad 6, p. 37, Śā p. 428). *Śā has ceṣṭasādhanatā –iti.

C.9.12 9.12

nanu tarhi icchā pravṛttihetuḥ. jānāti icchati pravartata iti hi nyāyaśāstramaryādā. sā liṅādivācyā syāt..

C.9.13 9.13

maivam. icchā hy utpannā pravṛttinimittam. na tu jñātā.

C.9.14 9.14

syād etat –loke liṅādīnāṃ preṣaṇāmantraṇādhyeṣaṇeṣu prayogāt teṣāṃ ca pravṛttinimittatvāt tatparatvam eva syāt. na tu kāryaparatvam.

C.9.15 9.15

maivam. kāryam eva hi tattatpratisambandhibhedena praiṣādivyapadeśaṃ labhate. tathā hi –pravartyapuruṣāpekṣayā jyeṣṭhena puṃsā pratipādyamānaṃ kāryaṃ praiṣaḥ. tathā samenāmantraṇaṃ hīnenādhyeṣaṇam iti.

C.10 10.

C.10.1 10.1

nanu kāmādhikāre niyogasya phalasādhanatvābhyupagamāt pha-

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1 pravartata] So M. P, OP: om.
8 hīnenādhyeṣaṇam] My em. M: hinedhādhyeṣaṇam. P, OP: hīne cādhyeṣaṇam. See also the parallel VM text.

1–2 nanu …icchati] (Ce'e) icchā yady api pravṛttihetuḥ (VM, II, ad 9, p. 38, Śā p. 430).
1–2 nanu …icchati] nanv icchaiva pravṛttikāraṇam (VN, ad 2, p. 45–1937: 52).
3 maivam …jñātā] (Ce'e) icchā yady api pravṛttihetuḥ, tathāpi sā liṅādivācyā na bhavati, tadavagamasya pravṛttāv anapekṣitatvāt. utpannā hi sā pravṛttikāraṇam, nāvagatā (VM, II, ad 9, p. 38, Śā p. 430).
3 maivam …jñātā] nanv icchaiva pravṛttikāraṇam. satyaṃ sā tūtpannā pravṛttikāraṇaṃ nāvagatā (VN, ad 2, p. 45–1937: 52).
4–5 syād …kāryaparatvam] (Re) nanu lokavyavahārāt liṅādayo vācakatayā vyutpādyamānā praiṣādiṣv eva vācakatayā vyutpattim arhanti. tatraiva teṣāṃ prayogadarśanād ity āśaṅkyāha –kāryam eva hi kartṛṇāṃ* jyāyaḥsamakanīyasām | pravṛttyāpekṣayā bhedāt praiṣādivyapadeśabhāk || 11 (VM II, ad 11, p. 38CHECK, Śā p. 430). *Śā has vaktṛṇāṃ in the text and kartṛṇāṃ in a fn. specifying that this reading can be found in the printed edition (ed. by Mukunda Śāstrī, Caukhambā Sanskrit Granthamālā n.17, Banarasa 1904).
6–7 kāryam …labhate] (Re) kāryam eva praiṣādivyapadeśayogīti siddham (VM II, ad 12, p. 39, Śā p. 431).
6–7 kāryam …labhate] (Re) na ca kāryam eva jyāyaḥ samakanīyobhiḥ pratipādyamānaṃ praiṣādivyapadeśabhāk sarvānugataṃ śabdārtha iti (VN, ad 2, p. 53).
7–8 pravartyapuruṣāpekṣayā …iti] (Ce'e) pravarttyapuruṣāpekṣayā jyāyasā vaktrā pratipādyamānaṃ kāryaṃ praiṣa iti vyapadiśyate. samenāmantraṇaṃ hīnenādhyeṣaṇam iti praiṣādipratipādakā api ca liṅādayaḥ (VM II, ad 11, p.38CHECK, Śā pp. 430-1).

7–8 pravartyapuruṣāpekṣayā …iti] preṣaṇādhyeṣaṇayoḥ ko viśeṣa iti cet nikṛṣṭaviṣayaṃ preṣaṇam. utkṛṣṭaviṣayam adhyeṣaṇam iti (Karka on Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra, quoted in **Bhide1982**

lasyaiva laukikaphalavatkṛtyuddeśyatayā prādhānyābhyupagamāt tasyaiva vākyārthatvaṃ yuktam.

C.10.2 10.2

maivam –na hi niyojyaviśeṣaṇatayā pratipannasya tasya prādhānyam. kiṃ tu svatas sādhyatayā pratipannasya niyogasyaiva. na hy asmanmate phalasya bhāvyatvam. kiṃ tv apūrvasyaiva. phalaṃ tu niyojyaviśeṣaṇam. prakārāntareṇānvayāsambhavāt. na hi tasya bhāvyatayānvayaḥ. apūrvasyaiva bhāvyasya svato labdhatvāt.

C.10.3 10.3

C.10.3.1 10.3.1

tasmān niyogasya kāryatānirvāhārtham eva svaviṣayānuṣṭhānapravṛttaye svaniyojyasya phalaṃ sādhayati svāmivat. yathā svāmī svasaṃvidhānārtham eva garbhadāsasyopakaroti, tathā niyogo ’pīti na prādhānyapadacyutiḥ. tad uktam–

ātmasiddhyanukūlasya niyojyasya prasiddhaye |
kurvat svargādikam api pradhānaṃ kāryam eva naḥ || iti.

C.10.3.2 10.3.2

evaṃ cāpūrvaphalayoḥ pradhānopasarjanabhāvāt dvayor api sādhyatvenaikato vidhānāc ca na sādhyadvayam. ata eva na vākyabhedaś ca.

C.10.4 10.4

nanu phalasya kathaṃ prakārāntareṇānvayāsambhavaḥ. ucyate. tathā hi prathamam apūrvam eva mamedaṃ kāryam iti boddhṛtayā niyojyatvenānveti svargakāmaḥ puruṣaḥ. sa paścāt tatsiddhaye tatsādhane karmaṇi mayānuṣṭheyam idaṃ karmety adhikāritayā. karmaṇi mādarthyajñānam ad-

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8 niyogasya kāryatānirvāhārtham] So P, OP. M: niyogasvakāryatāvirvāhārtham

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276.9–277.2 nanu ...yuktam] (Ce’e) nanu niyogasya kāmyamānaphalasādhanatvābhyupagamāt, phalasyaiva prādhānyāt, tasyaiva vākyārthatvaṃ yuktam (VM II, ad 27, p. 47, Śā p. 443) .
5–7 phalam ...labdhatvāt] (Re) na hi phalaṃ phalatayānvīyate, kintv adhikāriviśeṣaṇatayā. labdhe tu jīvanādav adhikāriviśeṣaṇe kiṃ phalānveṣaṇena (VM II, ad 30, p. 48, Śā p. 445).
8–11 tasmān ...prādhānyapadacyutiḥ] (Ce’e) ātmasiddhyartham eva niyogaḥ kāmyamānaphalasiddhihetutvam avalambate svāmivat. yathātmana eva saṃvidadhānaḥ svāmī garbhadāsasyopakaroti, tathā niyogo ’pi niyojyasyeti na prādhānyapracyutiḥ (VM II, ad 28, p. 47, Śā p. 443).
11–12 ātmasiddhyanukūlasya ...naḥ] (Ce) VM II 28.

5–7 phalam ...labdhatvāt] kāryasya svasambandhitayā bodhyaḥ svargakāmādir niyojya iti vyutpāditam. svargakāmanā ca niyojyaviśeṣaṇam ity ekādaśādye vyutpāditam (VM II, ad 23, p. 44, Śā p. 440).

hikāraḥ. aiśvaryam iti yāvat. tadanutiṣṭhan kartṛtayā. ity ekasyaiva tisro 'vasthāḥ kramabhāvinyaḥ. tatra niyojyatvaṃ niyoge. itarad avasthādvayam karmaṇi.

C.10.5 10.5

1 na cāviśiṣṭo niyojyo bhavatīti svargo niyojyaviśeṣaṇatayānveti. yato nāviśiṣṭo niyojyaḥ ata evāśrutaniyojyake viśvajidādau niyojyākāṅkṣāvaśāt niyojyādhyāhāre tadviśeṣaṇatayā phalaparikalpanam. tathāhi "viśvajitā yajeta" ity atra liṅāpūrvaṃ kāryatayā pratīyate. tasya ca kāryatvaṃ svato 'nuṣṭhātum aśakyatayā viṣayānuṣṭhānam antareṇa na sambhavatīti tadanuṣṭhātā kartākṣipyate. kartṛtvaṃ cādhikāram antareṇa na sambhavati. yo hi madīyam idaṃ karmeti jānāti, sa eva tad anutiṣṭhati. sa cādhikāro na niyojyatvam antareṇa. yo hi niyogaṃ mamedaṃ kāryam iti jānāti, sa etatsādhanaṃ karma madīyakāryasādhanatayā madartham ity adhyavasyati. sa ca nāviśiṣṭo bhavitum arhatīti tadviśeṣaṇatayā paśuputrānnādyādinānāsukhasādhaneṣu anuvṛttas sukhasāmānyalakṣaṇaḥ sarvāpekṣitas svargaḥ parikalpyate. yady api śrutaniyojyasthale 'pi niyogasya niyojyākāṅkṣā kartradhikārapraṇālikayaiva tathāpi tatra niyojyasya sākṣāc

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3 na cāviśiṣṭo niyojyo] So M. P, OP: na cāviśiṣṭo niyojyaḥ | .
3–4 bhavatīti ...niyojyaḥ] So M. P, OP: om.
4–5 evāśrutaniyojyake ...phalaparikalpanam] So M. P: evāśrutaniyojye ākāṅkṣāvaśān niyojyādhyāhāratadviśeṣaṇatayā phalaparikalpanam. OP: evāśrutaniyojya kāṅkṣāvaśān [sic!] niyojyādhyāhāre tadviśeṣaṇatayā phalaparikalpanam.
12 sa ca nāviśiṣṭo] So M. P: na ca sāviśiṣṭā. OP: na ca sā viśiṣṭā.

16–19 mamedaṃ ...adhikāraḥ] (Pv) svargakāmasya yāgāvacchinnaṃ kāryaṃ bodhyam ity ukte tv anyapuruṣakāryasyāpi tadaniṣpādakenānyena bodhyatvasaṃbhavāt kṛtidvārakasaṃbandhālābhena mamedaṃ kāryam ity evaṃvidhaṃ niyojyatvaṃ na syād ity arthaḥ. [...] niyojyatvānvayo 'py adhikāradvārā karmaṇi pravṛttyarthaḥ (NR ad AN, III, ad 23-24, p. 251).
19 adhikāraḥ ...yāvat] (Re) īśvaravacano hy adhikṛtaśabdaḥ (Bṛ ad 6.1..1, **Brhati1934**).
19 adhikāraḥ ...yāvat] **īśvaravacano hy adhikṛtaśabdaḥ**. asmin grāme ayam adhikṛtaḥ īśvara iti gamyate. tenaiśvaryam evādhikāraḥ karmaṇi. yata eva ca kasyacit karmaṇy apy aiśvaryam asti **ata eva tulye 'pi kartṛtve svāmikarmakaravyapadeśaḥ** (Ṛju ad Bṛ 6.1.1, in **Brhati1934**
6–9 tasya ...sambhavati] (Ce'e) yat *tv apūrvaṃ kāryam, tasya niyojyānvayaṃ vinā kāryatvānupapatteḥ, anuṣṭhānaṃ vinā tadasambhavāt kartrā ca vinā tadanupapatteḥ, adhikāreṇa ca vinā karttur abhāvāt (VM II, ad 28, p. 47. Śā p. 443). *Śā has tad.

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19 adhikāraḥ ...yāvat] phalasvāmyabodhako vidhir adhikāravidhiḥ (MNP 225, p. 241).
3–6 na ...atra] (In a Bhāṭṭa perspective:) yatra phalaviśeṣasamarpakaṃ padāntaraṃ samānavākye nāsti tatra prakaraṇādinā phalaṃ kalpyaṃ bhavatīti [...] prakaraṇādīnām apy abhāve arthavādotthena phalena [...] tasyāpy abhāve 'dhyāhṛtena phalenānvaya iti viśvajidadhikaraṇe siddham (VN, ad 2, p. 46).
6–10 liṅāpūrvaṃ ...antareṇa] See yad apūrvaṃ kāryabhūtaṃ pratīyate tad viṣayatvena sambandhakaraṇībhūtayāgādyanuṣṭhānādhīnātmalābhaṃ, na ca vinā kartrā tadanuṣṭhānopapattiḥ. na cādhikaraṃ vinā kartṛtvalābhaḥ. na ca niyojyam antareṇādhikārasiddhiḥ. na vāviśiṣṭo niyojyo 'vakalpata iti (PrP Śāstramukha 1904, p. 6, Śā pp. 11-12).

chrutatvāt prathamaṃ tenānvayaḥ. tad api tatsiddhaye 'dhikārikartṛbhyām iti ākāṅkṣākramam anādṛtyaivānvayaḥ. aśrutasthale tu trayāṇāṃ apy aśrutatvāviśeṣād ākāṅkṣākrameṇaiva kartradhikāriniyojyānvaya iti sthitiḥ. yato niyojyānvayaḥ kartrādipraṇālikayā, ato yatrānyato 'nuṣṭhānalābhaḥ tatra na niyojyakalpanaṃ, yathādhyayanavidhau. sa hy adhyāpanavidhiprayuktasvaviṣayānuṣṭhāno na niyojyam apekṣate. adhyāpanavidhiś cādhyayanam antareṇādhyāpanāsambhavāt adhyayanam api prayuṅkte. yathā vā uttarakratuvidhiprayojyam ādhānam. yathā vā prayājādividhayaḥ. te hi pradhānavidhyanuṣṭhāpitasvaviṣayā na pṛthag adhikāriṇaṃ niyojyaṃ kalpayantīti.

C.10.6 10.6

nanu viśvajidādivan nityanimittikaniṣedhādhikāreṣv api phalaṃ kimiti na kalpyate. kiṃ ca kāmādhikāre niyojyasya svaviṣayānuṣṭhānasiddhyarthaṃ niyogaḥ phalaṃ tasya sādhayatīty uktam iti tannyāyenātrāpi phalaṃ syāt.

C.10.7 10.7

naivam. na hi kāmādhikāre niyogasya phalasādhanatvāt pravartakatvam. kiṃ tv kāryatvād eva. phalaṃ tu śrutatvād anumanyate. loke phalasādhanatvam api kāryatayāvagamārtham evopayujyate. na tu pravṛttaye. sā tu kāryatāvagamād eva. sākṣāt phalasyāpi kāryatayāvagamyamānasyaiva pravṛttihetutvam. nityeṣu ca nirapekṣāc chabdād apūrvaṃ kāryatayā pratīyate. .niyojyaś ca svavākyeṣv eva labdhaḥ. "yāvaj jīvam agnihotraṃ juhoti" ityādau jīvanavān,"putre jāte yad aṣṭākapālaḥ" ityādau putrajananavān, "na kalañjaṃ bhakṣayet" ityādau niṣedhyānuṣṭhāne pravṛttaḥ. jīvanādikaṃ ca niyojyaviśeṣaṇam aviśiṣṭasya niyojyatvāsambha-

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14–15 niyogasya ...kartradhikārapraṇālikayaiva] (Pr) adhikārikartṛpraṇālikayā hi niyojyo niyoganiṣpattyanukūlaḥ (NR ad AN V, xi adhyāya, ad 2, p. 300).

2–4 nanu ...syāt] (Re) nanv evaṃ bhavatu kāmyeṣv apūrvakāryābhidhānaṃ liṅādīnām, nityanaimittikaniṣedhādhikāreṣu katham? na hi teṣu phalodayaṃ prābhākarā anumanyante (VM II, ad 30, p. 48, Śā p. 445).

6–10 loke ...pratīyate] (Re) na ca phalam antareṇa pravṛttyasambhavaḥ, svasambandhikāryāvagamamātrāyattatvāt pravṛtteḥ. nirapekṣāc chabdāt phalam antareṇāpi *svasambandhakāryāvagamaḥ, tāvan mātrasya loke pravṛttihetutvāgamāt (VM II, ad 30, p. 48, Śā p. 445). *Śā has svasambandhikāryāvagamaḥ.

10–13 niyojyaś ...niyojyaviśeṣaṇam] (Pv) yāvaj jīvaṃ juhotītyādiṣu svavākyaśrutajīvanādiviśiṣṭa eva niyojyaḥ. na nihanyān na bhakṣayed ityādiṣu tu phalasyāśravaṇāt niyogasya svataḥ kāryatayā phalānapekṣatvāt niyojyaviśeṣaṇasyāpy atraiva lābhāt hananādipravṛtta eva sāmarthyān niyojyo labhyata ity arthaḥ (NR ad AN, III, ad 27, p. 252).

10–13 niyojyaś ...niyojyaviśeṣaṇam] (Re) labdhe tu jīvanādāv adhikāriviśeṣaṇe kiṃ phalānveśaṇena (VM II, ad 30, p. 48, Śā p. 445).

10–11 yāvaj ...juhoti] (Ce) MS 2.4.1, 6.2.23 and 31; 6.3.1, 6.5.38, 8.1.20, 9.1.34, 10.8.36, 11.1.11, 12.2.19. Source: Bāhvṛca Brāhmaṇa [Garge 1952: 125].

11 putre ...yadaṣṭākapālaḥ] (Ce) [...] putre jāte yad aṣṭākapālo [...] (ŚBh ad 4.3.38).

11 putre ...yadaṣṭākapālaḥ] Ce [...] putre jāte yad aṣṭākapālo [...] (TS 2.2.5.3)

5–6 na ...eva] avaśyaṃ ca kāminaḥ kriyāyām api kāryāvagatir eṣitavyā. katham anyathā svatantraḥ pravartate (VN, ad 2, p. 45).

vāt. atas tatra nirapekṣaṃ kāryam eva svavākyaśrutaṃ niyojyaṃ svaviṣayānuṣṭhānāya prayuṅkte. viśvajidādau tu niyojyasyāśravaṇād viśiṣṭasya tasya parikalpanam iti. nityanaimittikādhikāreṣu paraiḥ pratyavāyaparihārasya bhāvyatayānvayo 'py anupapannaḥ.

C.10.8 10.8

nanu śabdāt pratītāpi kāryatā niṣphalatvād anumānena bādhyatāṃ, vimatam akāryaṃ phalāsādhanatvāt" iti.

C.10.9 10.9

na. āgamavirodhe 'numānānudayāt. liṅādipratyayaś ca kāryatayāpūrvaṃ bodhayatīty uktam.

C.10.10 10.10

tarhi kāryatāvagatāv api niṣphalatvāt tatra na pravartata iti cet, kāmādhikāre phalasādhanatāvagatāv api tatra kaścin na pravartate kiṃ kartavyam. etāvān eva pramāṇavyāpāraḥ, yat svārthapradarśanamātram. nanu kāmādhikāre 'nuṣṭhāṇābhāve phalaṃ na sidhyet. tac cāniṣṭam. nityeṣu tu kiṃ syāt. vidhisiddhir na syāt. tataḥ kim aniṣṭam.

C.10.11 10.11

tad evāniṣṭam. tasyaiva puruṣārthatvāt. ata eva kāmādhikāre 'pi vidhisiddhiḥ prayojanam. phalasiddhis tu nāntarīyakī. nanu kathaṃ tadasiddhis aniṣṭam. tatsiddhau stuvantas tadasiddhau garhamāṇāḥ śiṣṭā evātrottarapradātāraḥ. tadasiddhāv akṛtārthaṃ manyamānaṃ svakīyam antaḥkaraṇaṃ vā. tasmāt kāryam eva pradhānam.

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13 pravṛttaḥ] So P, OP. M: pravṛtteḥ.
16 nityanaimittikādhikāreṣu] So P. OP, M and in parentheses in P: nanu nityanaimittikādhikāreṣu.
279.16–280.1 pratyavāyaparihārasya] So P, OP. M: pratyavāyaparihāro.

2–3 nanu ...iti] (Re) tathā niṣphalatvād anumānenākāryatā pratītir apīti, kathaṃ pravṛttyupapattiḥ? (VM II, ad 30, p. 48, Śā p. 445).
4 na ...'numānānudayāt] (Ce'e) na, āgamavirodhenānumānasyātmalābhābhāvāt (VM II, ad 30, p. 48, Śā p. 445).
6–8 tarhi ...yatsvārthapradarśanamātram] (Ce'e) etāvān eva pramāṇavyāpāraḥ, yat pravṛttiyogyārthopadarśanam. anyathā yadi kaścit kalpite phale na pravarttate tadā kiṃ kartavyam (VM II, ad 30, p. 48, Śā p. 445).

11–12 ata ...nāntarīyakī] na phalasambhavāyattā kriyāniṣpattiḥ, kriyāniṣpattyāyattaiva tu phalasiddhir iti loke pratītam. ata eva tasmin pakṣe niṣphale 'pi preraṇāsiddheḥ pravṛttiḥ syāt (VM II, ad 4, p. 32, Śā p. 422).
11–12 ata ...nāntarīyakī] niyoga evātrāpi pradhānaṃ sādhyam, anīpsitakarmatvāt agnīnām (VM II, ad 27, p. 45, Śā p. 442).
11–12 ata ...nāntarīyakī] nanu niyogasiddhināntarīyakī svargasiddhiḥ. ata eva sādhyavivṛddhir iyaṃ na tu svargo 'pi svatantratayā sādhyaḥ (Kāśikā ad ŚV codanā 15).

C.11 11.

tad eva vākyārthaḥ. liṅādayas sākṣāt tatparāḥ. itarāṇy api tattatprakaraṇapaṭhitāni vākyāni tattatkāryānvitasvārthaparāṇi. sarvapadāṇāṃ kāryānvite vyutpatteḥ.

C.11.1 11.1

tathā hi —tattatprakaraṇapaṭhitānāṃ padānāṃ nānāprakāreṇānvayaḥ. keṣāñcit karaṇatayā keṣāñcin niyojyatayā keṣāñcid itikartavyatayā keṣāñcin nāmadheyatayā keṣāñcid anuṣṭheyāvasthapadārthasmārakatayā keṣāñcit stāvakatayā. pragītānāṃ stotramantrāṇāṃ guṇiniṣṭhaguṇaprakāśakatayā apragītānāṃ śastramantrāṇām api tathānvayaḥ. praiṣamantrāṇāṃ tu parapratyāyakatayeti yathāyogam anvayo draṣṭavyaḥ. ataḥ kṛtsno vedaḥ kāryaparatayaiva pramāṇam.

C.11.2 11.2

idam eva kāryaṃ mānāntarāgocaratvād apūrvam iti svātmani puruṣaṃ niyuñjāno niyoga iti gīyate. tad eva svaprakaraṇapaṭhitapadārthajātaṃ svaśeṣatayā gṛhṇan grāhaka iti. gṛhītaṃ padārthavargaṃ śrutyādibhir vā svātantryeṇa vā dvāraśeṣatayā viniyuñjāno viniyojaka iti. tatra śrutyādiviniyogacintā tṛtīye. caturthe tad eva svaśeṣatayā gṛhītaṃ paścāt dvāraśeṣatayā ca viniyuktam itikartavyatākalāpaṃ kadācit karaṇaṃ cānuṣṭhāpayan prayojaka iti ca grāhakatvaviniyojakatvaprayojakatvāvasthāḥ kramabhāvinyaḥ. tās tv adhikārāpūrvasyaiva. na tv aṅgapradhānotpattyapūrvāṇām.

C.11.3 11.3

kvacit prayuktiśaktasyāpy aprayojakatvaṃ yathā –kāmyajyotiṣṭomāpūrvaprayuktyā svaviṣayānuṣṭhānasiddhau prāsaṅgikasya nityajyotiṣṭomāpūrva-

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6 tattatprakaraṇapaṭhitānāṃ] So P, OP. M: tattatprakaraṇapaditānāṃ.
6 nānāprakāreṇānvayaḥ] So P, OP. M: nānāprakaraṇānvayaḥ.
9 guṇiniṣṭha-] So P. OP: ṣuguṇinikāro. M: ṣuṇinikāro (i and ī are not distinguished in M). RITORNA
15 iti. gṛhītaṃ padārthavargaṃ] My punctuation. P, OP: iti gṛhītaṃ padārthavargaṃ [...]. M displays no punctuation.

13–14 mānāntarāgocaratvād ...gīyate] (Ce'e) tac ca pramāṇāntarāpūrvatayāpūrvam iti ca svātmani puruṣaṃ niyuñjānaṃ niyoga iti khyāyate (VN, ad 1, p. 40–1937: p. 63).

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3 tad eva vākyārthaḥ.] yat pradhānatayā pratipādyate tad vākyārthaḥ iti. kāryañ ca pradhānatayocyate iti tasyaiva vākyārthatvam (VM, II, ad 27, p. 45, Śā p. 441).
9–10 stāvakatayā ...śastramantrāṇām] apragītamantrasādhyā stutiḥ śastram, pragītamantrasādhyā stutiḥ stotram (Jaiminīya Nyāyamālāvistara, 2.1.5, ad v. 18, **Jaiminiyanyayamalavistara**).
13–14 mānāntarāgocaratvād ...gīyate] pramāṇāntarāgocaro liṅādiśabdamātrālambanaḥ kāryātmā yāgādibhāvārthagocaraḥ svargakāmādiniyojyam ātmānaṃ prerayan niyogo vidhir iti (VN, ad 1, p. 40).

sya. tac ca prayojakatvaṃ vyavasthayaiva. nityanaimittikādhikārāpūrvasya karaṇāṃśe itikartavyatāṃśe ca.

C.11.3.1 11.3.1

kāmādhikārāpūrvasya tv itikartavyatāṃśe. karaṇāṃśe tu phalarāgād eva pravṛtter na tatra prayojakatvam apravṛttapravartanasvabhāvatvād vidheḥ.

C.11.3.1.1

ata eva "śyenenābhicaran yajeta" ity atra abhicāraparaparyāyamaraṇasādhanahiṃsārūpasya śyenayāgasya karaṇasya rāgamūlapravṛttiviṣayasya vidhyanuṣṭhāpyatvābhāvena "na hiṃsyāt" iti pratiṣedhagocarasyānarthatvam. agnīṣomīyādihiṃsāyās tu yāgāṅgatvena vidhyanuṣṭhāpyatvān na tatra niṣedhaśāstrapravṛttir iti tato vaiṣamyam. paramate tv abhicārāparaparyāyasya hiṃsātmakasya māraṇarūpasya phalasyaiva niṣedhaśāstragocaratvād anarthatvam. na tu karaṇasya. tasya vidheyatvāt. na hi vidhispṛṣṭā pravṛttis anarthāya kalpate.

C.11.4 11.4

kvacid avāntarāpūrvasyāpi paramāpūrvādhīnaṃ prayojakatvam. yathā "mandraṃ dīkṣaṇīyāyām anubrūyāt" ity atra jyotiṣṭomāṅgasya

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13 māraṇarūpasya] So P. OP, M: maraṇarūpasya. SECOND CASE OF CONFUSION BETWEEN caus-simple root (patana/pātana).

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8 "śyenenābhicaran yajeta"] (Ce) MS 1.1.2; 2.1.1 (similar readings in MS 1.4.5; 8.1.16). Source –ĀpŚ 22.4.13 [Garge 1952: 135].

282.8–283.1 śyenenābhicaran ...kalpate] tīrthabahirbhūtaiva hiṃsā niṣiddhā. iyaṃ tu tīrthamadhyagatā vidhispṛṣṭaiveti nānarthaḥ. śyenaphalaṃ tu cirātipanne śyene tajjanyāpūrvavicchinnabhāgyeṣu śatruṣu vipadyamāneṣu jāyate. atas tīrthabahirbhāvād artho na bhavati. tena kratubahirbhūtā phalāṃśahiṃsāvaidikī niṣidhyate. nāntaḥkratv iti vivekaḥ iti. kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ sādhanopāyabhūtā na niṣidhyate. sāmānyena na hiṃsyād iti śāstraṃ pravṛttam. ato 'ṅgasādhanahiṃsayor api pratiṣedho bhavet, ata āha – aṃśadvaya iti (Kāśikā ad ŚV codanā 231-2).
282.8–283.1 śyenenābhicaran ...kalpate] nanu vidhispṛṣṭe pratiṣedho 'navakāśaḥ. saty api vā pratiṣedhe naivaṃvidhasyānarthatvam ity uktam. tad yadi codanālakṣaṇā hiṃsā, kathaṃ niṣiddhatvād anarthaḥ. codanālakṣaṇatve 'py avidheyatvam iti tu bhavadbhir eva nirākṛtam. ata eva kramo vidheya ity āśritam, ata āha – phalāṃśa iti vakṣyate'ntena. ayam abhiprāyaḥ – uktam idam asmābhiḥ kiñcid vidhātuṃ phalam uddiśyate ity etāvatī codanālakṣaṇatā. na tu phalam eva vidhīyate, bhāvanāyāḥ phalāṃśe pratyayāvidhāyakatvasya vakṣyamāṇatvāt. vakṣyati hi – jānāty evāsau mayaitat kartavyam iti upāyaṃ tu na vedeti. ataḥ svayam eva kartavyeṣu puruṣāṇāṃ pravṛtter na tadviṣayapravṛttijñāpanaṃ vidheḥ phalam. sādhanopāyayos tv apravṛttaḥ puruṣaḥ pravartyata iti tayor vidheyatvam (Kāśikā ad ŚV codanā 222).
10–11 pratiṣedhagocarasyānarthatvam] surāpānaṃ ca mahānarthasādhanatvena niṣedhena pratipāditaṃ dveṣagocaratayā nānuṣṭhātum arhati (VN, ad 2, p. 46).
12–14 paramate ...anarthatvam] nanu bhavanmate samīhitasādhanatā hananasya vidyata eveti kathaṃ niṣidhyate. ucyate pravartanā hi vidhyarthaḥ kartavyatā ca mahāntam anartham janayatsu hananādiṣu yad api svalpasukhasādhanatvaṃ tena pravartanā kartavyatā vā na hi tādṛśe prekṣāpūrvakāriṇāṃ kṛtiḥ pravartate (VN, ad 2, p. 54).
2–4 kvacid ...prati] See āntarālikabhāvye 'pūrve vāṅniyamavad avāntarāpūrve paryavasyatīti (AN IV, adhyāya vii-viii, p. 258).

dīkṣaṇīyādyapūrvasya vāṅniyamaṃ prati. yady api sarvatra paramāpūrvam eva prayojakaṃ svataḥ kāryatvāt tathāpi dīkṣaṇīyāṃ prati vāṅniyamasya śeṣatayā viniyogabalād avāntarāpūrvadvāraiva paramāpūrvasya prayojakatvam iti tasyāpi prayojakatvavyapadeśaḥ. āgneyādikaraṇotpattyapūrvāṇāṃ tu paramāpūrvaṃ prati karaṇatayaivānvayāt tasyaiva sākṣāt prayojakatve sambhavati dvāradvāritayā prayojakatvakalpanāyā ayuktatvān na svāṅgaṃ prati paramāpūrvāyattam api prayojakatvam. "vrīhīn avahanti" "taṇḍulān pinaṣṭi" iti vihitayor hantipinaṣṭyos tu "prokṣitābhyām ulūkhalamusalābhyāṃ avahanti", "prokṣitābhyāṃ dṛṣadupalābhyāṃ pinaṣṭi" iti vihitaṃ svāṅgabhūtaṃ prokṣaṇaṃ prati tayor laukikatayā nirjñātopāyasādhyatvān na paramāpūrvāyattam api prayojakatvam. dīkṣaṇīyāpūrvasya tv alaukikatayā na nirjñātopāyasādhyatvam iti vāṅniyamaprayojakatvam.

C.11.5 11.5

itthaṃ niyojyānvayavaśāl liṅādīnām apūrvaparatvam abhihitam. sa cānvayaḥ prayojakāpūrvasyaiva, kṛtyuddeśyatayā pratīteḥ.

C.11.5.1 11.5.1

adhyayanāṅgapradhānotpattyapūrvāṇāṃ tacchūnyānām evābhidhānam. tathā hi –adhyayanavidher adhyāpanavidhiprayuktyaivānuṣṭhānalābhān niyojyaśūnyābhidhānam. aṅgotpattiniyogā api grāhakagṛhītaprayājādiviṣayatvād adhikāraniyogata eva labdhasvaviṣayānuṣṭhānās sidhyantīti na teṣu niyojyānvitābhidhānam. tathā pradhānotpattiniyogā apy adhikāraniyogākṣiptaviṣayānuṣṭhānenaivāptasiddhaya iti na tatra niyojyāpekṣā.

C.11.6 11.6

yathā hy apūrvapratītau niyojyaḥ pratītyanubandhī, evaṃ viṣayo 'pi. na hy

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9 dvāradvāritayā] So P, OP. M: dvāradvārikayā.
11 hantipinaṣṭyos] So P, OP. M: hantipiṃṣyos.
14 prayojakatvam] So P, OP. M: prayojakam.

2–4 kvacid ...prati] (Pv) anenaiva nyāyena kvacit saṃnihitatvāt pradhānotpattyapūrvāṇām aṅgāpūrvāṇāṃ ca prayojakatvaṃ na paramāpūrvasyety āha –eteneti. ata eva taddharmāṇāṃ na parasparasāṃkaryaṃ vāṅniyamanādīnāṃ ca jyotiṣṭomāṅgabhūteṣṭyantareṣv aprasaktir iti bhāvaḥ (NR ad AN IV, vii-viii adhyāya, p. 162).
4 adhyayanāṅgapradhānotpattyapūrvāṇāṃ ...evābhidhānam] (Ce'e) ādhānādhyayanāṅgapradhānotpattiniyogānāṃ niyojyaśūnyānām abhidhānābhyupagamāt (VM, II, ad 27, p. 45, Śā p. 441).
5–9 tathā ...niyojyāpekṣā] (Ce'e) tathādhyayanavidhāv apy ācāryakaraṇavidhiprayuktyaivānuṣṭhānalābhān niyojyaśūnyābhidhānam iti sthitam. pradhānotpattiniyogā apy adhikāraniyogākṣiptasvaviṣayānuṣṭhānenaiva labdhasiddhaya iti na tatra niyojyānvitābhidhānānveṣaṇam. aṅgotpattiniyogā api viniyuktaprayājādiviṣayatvād adhikāraniyogāṅgatayaiva sidhyantīti kiṃ teṣu niyojyānvitābhidhānena (VM, II, ad 27, p. 46, Śā p. 442).

283.10–284.1 vrīhīn ...vāṅniyamaprayojakatvam] See, on a different position, etenājyauṣadhasānnāyyadharmāṇāṃ vāṅniyamādīnāṃ cāvāntarāpūrvaprayuktir vyākhyātā (AN IV, vii-viii adhyāya, p. 259).

aviṣayakam apūrvaṃ pratyetuṃ śakyam. kiṃ tu niyojyānvayaḥ prāyikaḥ. viṣayānvayas tu niyata eva. adhikārāpūrvapradhānāṅgotpattyapūrvāṇāṃ viṣayaniyatatvāt. “yajeta”, “juhuyāt”, “dadyāt”, ityādiṣu sarvāṇy api kāryāṇi yāgakāryaṃ homakāryaṃ dānakāryam iti yāgādibhāvārthāvacchinnam eva pratīyate. ataḥ prakṛtyarthabhūto bhāvārtha eva viṣayatvenānveti.

C.11.6.1 11.6.1

nanu “yajeta” ityādau liṅādipratyayena kevalaṃ kṛtis tatsādhyam apūrvaṃ ca parasparānvitaṃ yugapadam abhidhīyate. prakṛtyā tu kevalaṃ bhāvārthaḥ. tasya katham ubhayāvacchedakatvam.

C.11.6.2 11.6.2

ākāṅkṣādiparāmarśeneti brūmaḥ. tathā hi –kṛtisādhyaṃ kāryam. tac ca kṛter īpsitatamam kṛtiś ca prayatnarūpo vyāpāraḥ. sa ca pratyātmaṃ mānasapratyakṣavedyaḥ. sa ca bhavitari apūrve prayojakasya bhāvayitur ātmano vyāpāratvād bhāvanety ucyate. tad uktam –

bhavatyarthasya kartuḥ prayojakavyāpāro bhāvanā iti.

tasya ca tathāvidhasya nūnaṃ kenacid bhāvyena vastunāvacchedo vaktavyaḥ. na hy anavacchinnaḥ prayatnas sambhavati. apūrvasya ca nāvacchedakatvam. tasya sākṣāt tannirvartyatvābhāvāt. atas tatsādhyabhūtaḥ prakṛtyartho bhāvārtha eva kṛtim avacchindan kāryam apy avacchinatti. kṛtyavacchedadvārā kāryāvacchedakatvaṃ viṣayatvam iti viṣayavi-

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11 niyojyānvayaḥ] So P, OP. M:niyojyānvayas tu.
4 kṛter īpsitatamam] So in parentheses. P, OP, M: kṛtir īpsitatamam. In a similar passage Nay has kṛtīpsitātamam. See also, infra, my considerations referring to a similar expression in §C.11.7.

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11 kiṃ ...prāyikaḥ] (Ce'e) niyojyānvitābhidhānaṃ ca prāyikam (VM, II, ad 27, p. 45, Śā p. 441).
3 kṛtisādhyaṃ kāryam.] (Ce'e) kāryañ ca kṛtisādhyam (VM, II, ad 23, p. 44, Śā p. 440).
3–6 kṛter ...ucyate] (Ce'e) kāryaṃ ca kṛtīpsitam ucyate iti. kṛtir ātmavyāpāraḥ puruṣaprayatnaḥ ity anarthāntaram. [...] ity ātmano mānasapratyakṣasamadhigamanīyaḥ prayatnaḥ svavyāpāraḥ. atas tannirvartyam evāpūrvaṃ kāryam ātmā manyate. prayatna eva bhavitavye 'pūrve prayojakabhūtasya bhāvayitur ātmano vyāpāra iti bhāvanāśabdenocyate (VK, p. 197–Śā p. 452).
4–5 kṛtiś ...mānasapratyakṣavedyaḥ] (Ce'e) prayatnaś ca kṛtiḥ. sa ca mānasapratyakṣavedya iti (VM, II, ad 13, p. 39, Śā p. 431).
4–5 kṛtiś ...mānasapratyakṣavedyaḥ] (Ce'e) kṛtir hi puruṣaprayatnaḥ sa ca mānasapratyakṣavedyo (VN, ad 2, p. 41).
7 bhavatyarthasya ...bhāvanā] (Ce) VM II ad 4, p. 34, Śā p. 424.
8–14 tasya ...viṣayaśabdārthaḥ] (Ce'e) tasya tathāvidhasya kāryasya nūnaṃ kenacid bhāvārthenāvacchedakaḥ. na hi prayatno bhāvārtham antareṇāsti. sarvo hi puruṣaprayatnaḥ kaṃcid bhāvārtham avaśyam āśrayati. tena vinā tadabhāvāt. tena prayatnāvinābhāvī

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3 kṛtisādhyaṃ kāryam.] kṛtisādhyaṃ pradhānaṃ ca kāryam (VN, ad 2, p. 41–1937: p. 65).
4 kṛtiś ...vyāpāraḥ] kṛtisādhyaṃ hi kāryam ucyate kṛtiś ca puruṣaprayatnaḥ (VN, ad 2, p. 44).

daḥ. viṣiṇoty avacchinattīty avacchedakaparyāyo viṣayaśabdaḥ. ananyatrabhāvo vā viṣayaśabdārthaḥ. kṛtyapūrvayor madhya eva bhavati nānyatreti. "yad āgneyam aṣṭākapālam", "saumyaṃ carum", "sāvitraṃ dvādaśakapālaṃ bhavati" ityādau abhāvārthasyāpi dravyadevatāsambandhasya śabdabalād viṣayatvam iti vivaraṇakāraḥ.

C.11.7 11.7

itthaṃ viṣayāvacchinne 'pūrve pratipanne paścāt tasya karaṇetikartavyatākāṅkṣāyāṃ pūrvaṃ viṣayībhūto bhāvārtha evāpūrvabhāvanāyāṃ karaṇam. kāryasya hi karaṇākāṅkṣā svārasikī. anyārthapravṛttavyāpāravyāpyaṃ karaṇam iti karaṇalakṣaṇam. atrāpy apūrvārthapravṛttakṛtivyāpyatvād dhātvarthaḥ karaṇaṃ paraśuvat. yathā dvaidhībhāvapravṛttābhyām udyamananipātanābhyāṃ vyāpyamānaḥ paraśuḥ dvaidhībhāvalakṣaṇaphalāvacchedalabdhadvaidhīkaraṇavyapadeśayoś chididhātuvācyayos tayor evodyamananipātanayoḥ karaṇam.

C.11.7.1 11.7.1

nanu prayatnavyāpyo dhātvarthaḥ taṃ prati karmaiva syāt. na tu karaṇam. ucyate –na tāvat karmatvam anīpsitatvāt. kṛter īpsitaṃ tat. pūrvam

5–6 udyamananipātanābhyāṃ] My emendation. P, OP, M: evodyamananipatanābhyāṃ.
8 evodyamananipātanayoḥ] My emendation. P, OP, M: evodyamananipatanayoḥ.
10–11 kṛter īpsitaṃ ...eva] Punctuation as in P. OP: kṛtir īpsitaṃ tatpūrvam eva |. No

bhāvārthaḥ prayatnābhinirvarttyam apūrvam avacchinatti. avacchedakatayaiva viṣayabhāvam. yatraiva hi yo bhavati nānyatra sa tasya viṣaya iti viṣayavidaḥ, ananyatra bhāvo viṣayārthaḥ (PrP, VK ad 1, 1904 p. 198, Śā p. 453).

11–12 bhāvārtha ...avacchinatti] (Ce'e) sa ca bhāvārthaḥ [kṛtyā] sambadhyamānas tam (kāryam) avacchinattīti śabdāntarādhikaraṇe nirṇītam (VM, II, ad 23, p. 44, Śā p. 440). Words in brackets have been added by me for clarity's sake.

15 saumyaṃ carum] (Cee) saumyaś caruḥ (TS.7.5.21.1; MaiS.1.10.1 (quater): 140.8,11; 141.1,3; KS.9.4 (bis),5; KSA.5.18.

1–8 itthaṃ ...karaṇam] (Ce'e) sa ca viṣayībhūtabhāvārthāvacchinno vidhyarthaḥ kāryātmā pratītaḥ karaṇam itikarttavyatāṃ cāpekṣate. anyatrāpi sādhye *darśanāt. tatra sa eva bhāvārtho viṣayībhūtaḥ karaṇam ity avasīyate. kṛtivyāpyatvāt. yo hi yayā kṛtyānyārthapravṛttayā viṣayīkṛyate sa eva tatra karaṇam. yathā paraśur udyamananipātanābhyāṃ kāṣṭhagatadvaidhībhavanalakṣaṇakārye pravṛttābhyāṃ vyāpyamānas tayor eva dvidhābhavanalakṣaṇaphalāvacchedalabdhadvaidhīkaraṇavyapadeśyayoś chididhātuvācyayoḥ karaṇaṃ, tathehāpy apūrvārthapravṛttapuruṣaprayatnavyāpyamāno bhāvārthas tasminn eva prayatne apūrvabhāvanārūpe karaṇam (VK, pp. 198-9–Śā p.453). *Śā has tathādarśanāt.

9–19 nanu ...karmanāmadheyatvāt] (Ce'e) nanu kathaṃ prayatnalabdhātmā bhāvārtho bhāvanāyāṃ karaṇaṃ, bhāvyamānatayā hi karmaiva syāt. ucyate. *tatra na karma tāvad* apūrvārthakṛtiviṣayatvāt. **sarvany eva hi kārakāṇi kartṛvyatiriktāni tadvyāpāravyāpyāni na ***ca etāvatā tāni karmatāṃ bhajante, anīpsitatvāt. kvacic cānīpsite karmatā dṛśyata eva. yathāgnihotraṃ juhotīti. karaṇaṃ tu yady api svarūpanivṛttau na sambhavati. tathāpy apūrvabhāvanārūpatā tadadhīneti nānupapannam. yathā paraśor eva. na hi paraśuḥ karma. karaṇaṃ tu bhavati, anīpsitatvāt. udyamananipātanayor dvaidhīkaraṇabhavanarūpatāyās tadadhīnatvāt. paraśusambandhaprabhāvena hy udyamananipātane dvedhābhavanaphalaniṣpādakatayā dvedhābhavane kāraṇatāṃ bhajete. ata udb-

eva kartṛvyatiriktāni sarvāṇy api kārakāṇi kartṛvyāpāravyāpyāni. naitāvatā karmatā. tathāpi yad īpsitam tad eva karma. anyat tu karaṇādikam. atrāpi prayatnamātrāpekṣayā chidbhāvārthaḥ karmaiva, tannirvartyatvāt. anyārthapravṛttaprayatnāpekṣayā tu karaṇam eva paraśuvat. yathā paraśur udyamananipātanāpekṣayā karmaiva, paraśum udyacchati niyacchatīti. anyārthapravṛttatadapekṣayā tu karaṇam. ataḥ kṛtivyāpyasyāpi karaṇatā nānupapannā. dhātvarthasya karaṇatvād eva "udbhidā yajeta", "jyotiṣṭomena yajeta" ityādau tṛtīyānirdeśaḥ. udbhidādiśabdānāṃ karmanāmadheyatvāt. tasya ca karaṇatvāt. "agnihotraṃ juhoti, samidho yajati" ityādau dvitīyā tv anīpsitakarmatvāt. tatrāpi dvitīyā dṛśyate, grāmaṃ gacchan vṛkṣamūlāny upasarpatīti. evaṃ pratītiyanubandhitayā viṣayībhūtasya bhāvārthasya paścāt siddhyanubandhitayā karaṇatvaṃ nānupapannam.

C.11.7.2 11.7.2

kiṃ tu kāmyeṣu prathamaṃ phalaṃ prati karaṇībhūtasyāpūrvaṃ prati paścād viṣayatvam. tadanu karaṇatvam. nitye tu viṣayībhūtasya karaṇatvam. ata eva kāmye sakalāṅgopasaṃhāreṇa karaṇānuṣṭhānam. nitye tu śakyāṅgopasaṃhāreṇa. tatra prathamata evāpūrvapratīteś śakyāṅ-

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punctuation in M.
10 kṛter īpsitaṃ] So in parentheses. P, OP, M: kṛtir īpsitaṃ. But in a similar passage Nay has kṛtīpsitam. See also kāryañ ca kṛtīpsitam ucyate (PrP, VK Śā p. 452), testifying for the usage of this expression in a work R. thoroughly knew.
13 tannirvartyatvāt] So P, OP. M: tannivartyatvāt.
15 udyamananipātanāpekṣayā] My emendation. P, OP, M: udyamananipatanāpekṣayā.
17–18 jyotiṣṭomena yajeta" ityādau] So P, OP. M:jyotiṣṭomena ityādau.
21 pratītiyanubandhitayā] So in parentheses in P. P, OP, M: pratītyasambandhitayā. The editor's emendation is made more likely by the parallel VK text (see in the second apparatus) and by the first line in §C.11.6.

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hidā yajeteti *****tṛtīyānirdeśopapattiḥ. apūrvabhāvanāyāṃ karaṇātvād yāgasya tannāmatvāc codbhicchabdasya (VK, pp. 198-9–Śā pp.453-4). *...* Śā has: tatra dhātvartho na karma. **1904 has sarvasya. ***1904 has nv. ****1904 has dvaidhīkaraṇabhavanarūpatāyās. *****1904 has tṛtīyānirdeśopapattiḥ.
17–19 udbhidā ...karaṇatvāt] karaṇaṃ hi yāgaḥ, udbhidādy api tṛtīyānirdeśāś karaṇam. tatrodbhidā yāgeneti karmanāmadheyatvena sāmānādhikaraṇyasāmañjasyam (ŚBh ad MS 1.4.2).
17 udbhidā yajeta"] (Cee) MS 1.4.1 and 11.1.25. Source –PB 19.7.3 (°yajate) [Garge 1952: 123]. Tāṃ. Brā. 19.7.2.3 [Śā ad VK].
19 agnihotraṃ juhoti] Taittirīya Saṃhitā 1.5.9.
286.21–287.1 evaṃ ...nānupapannam] (Re) yad eva viṣayībhūtaṃ tad eva karaṇaṃ nānyad iti tasyārthaḥ. *pratītyanubandhitayā ca viṣayabhāvaḥ sa yathābhidhānam avakalpate pratipattyupāyatvād abhidhānasya. atas tantrābhidhānāt sahitānāṃ viṣayabhāvaḥ **karaṇaṃ siddhyanubandho niyogasya ***yathāsvabhāvaṃ veditavyam (VK, pp. 199-200–Śā p. 454). *Śā has pratītyanubandhatayā. **Śā has karaṇan tu. ***Śā has tac ca yathāsvabhāvaṃ.

19–20 agnihotraṃ ...anīpsitakarmatvāt] sa eva dvitīyāntaḥ saktūnāṃ homasya ca saṃbandhaṃ karoti [...] tenocyate tṛtiyāyāḥ sthāne dvitīyety avagamyate (ŚBh ad MS 2.1.12).

gopasaṃhāreṇa katipayāṅgatyāge ’pi pūrvapratītaviṣayavilayābhāvenāpūrvasiddhisambhavān na sakalāṅgopasaṃhāraniyamaḥ.

C.11.7.3 11.7.3

atra bhāvanāvākyārthavādinaḥ kathaṃ prakṛtyartho dhātvarthaḥ pratyayārthapradhānam apūrvam atilaṅghya viprakṛṣṭena phalena prathamaṃ karaṇatayānvetīti parihasanti. te praṣṭavyāḥ. tvanmate vā kathaṃ bhāvanā sannihitaṃ sākṣād bhāvyaṃ prakṛtyarthaṃ parityajya viprakṛṣṭaṃ phalam avalambate.

C.11.7.4 11.7.4

ākāṅkṣādivaśād iti cet, atrāpi samānam.

C.11.7.5 11.7.5

evaṃ cāpūrvaphalayor ekaiva bhāvanā ekatvāt puruṣaprayatnasya. saiva kṛtiḥ. paścāt karaṇagocarā tadanu bhāvyagocarā. iyaṃ ca sādhyavivṛddhir iti prābhākarāḥ. sarvasyāpy apūrvagocarakṛtisādhyatvāt. karaṇatvaṃ cāpūrvabhāvanāṃ phalabhāvanāṃ praty eva. na tv apūrvaṃ phalaṃ vā prati. sarvasyāpi karaṇasya vyāpārayogitāniyamāt. adhikārāpūrvaphalayoś cāvyāpārarūpatvād bhāvanāyāś ca tadrūpatvāt. paraśur api dvaidhīkaraṇarūpe vyāpāra eva karaṇam. na tu dvaidhībhāve tasya vyāpāraphalatvāt.

C.11.7.6 11.7.6

nanu viṣayībhūtasya karaṇatve “darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ yajeta” ity ekenaiva yajinā tantreṇopāttānāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ yāgānām ekaṃ viṣayatvam iti karaṇatvam apy ekam eva syāt. tataś ca bhedenetikartavyatān-

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4 kathaṃ] So P, OP. M: om.

7–8 saiva kṛtiḥ. paścāt karaṇagocarā] So OP. P: saiva kṛtiḥ.

8 paścāt karaṇagocarā] So OP. P: paścātkaraṇagocarā. M could be interpreted either as OP or as P. In parentheses in P: prākkaraṇagocarā.

8 tadanu bhāvyagocarā] My conjecture. P, OP, M: tadanugocarā. In parentheses in P: tadanuphalagocarā.

7–9 evaṃ ...prābhākarāḥ] (Ce’e) evaṃ cāpūrvaphalayor ekaiva bhāvanā, ekatvāt puruṣaprayatnasya, ekam eva ca *karaṇaṃ tadbhāvanāvyāpyatvād ekaiva bhāvyateti. ata eva ca sādhyavivṛddhir iti prābhākarāḥ (VK, p. 199–Śā p. 454). *1904 has kāraṇaṃ.

14–17 nanu ...syāt] (Ce’e) yadi viṣayībhūtasya karaṇatā, hanta tarhi darśapūrṇamāsābhyām ity atra tantrābhihitānāṃ tantreṇaiva pratipattyanubandhatvād viṣayabhāvasyaikatvād ekam eva *karaṇaṃ syāt. tataś ca bhedenetikarttavyatāsambandho na syāt. ucyate (VK, p. 199–Śā p. 454). *1904 has kāraṇaṃ.

4–7 ata ...sakalāṅgopasaṃhāraniyamaḥ] pradhānavākyavirodhe tu aṅgopasaṃhāraniyamo nāstīty āha –yatreti. tatra vā kathaṃ tadvirodha ity āśaṅkya tatra nimittaśrutibālenāvaśyānuṣṭheyatvapratītes tadvirodha iti prāg evopapāditam ity āha –tatreti (NR ad AN, III, ad 30, p. 256).

2 pratyayārthapradhānam apūrvam] See pratyayārthaparamāpūrvam (VN, ad 2, p. 44).

7–9 evaṃ ...prābhākarāḥ] naivam api yāgasvargayoḥ sādhyasādhanasambandhasiddhiḥ. niyogo hi tadā sādhyaḥ. na ca sādhyadvayam ekatra samavaiti, samatvād asambandhāt. nanu niyogasiddhināntarīyakī svargasiddhiḥ. ata eva sādhyavivṛddhir iyaṃ na tu svargo ’pi svatantratayā sādhyaḥ (Kāśikā ad ŚV codanā 15).

vayo na syāt. tathā cājyauṣadhasānnāyyadharmāṇāṃ vilāpanotpavanāvahananaprokṣaṇadohanātañcanādīnāṃ sāṅkaryeṇānvayaḥ syāt.

C.11.7.7 11.7.7

maivam –pratītyanubandhi viṣayatvam. tac ca yathābhidhānam eva syāt. pratītyupāyatvād abhidhānasya. tantrābhidhānāc ca sahitānāṃ viṣayatvam. karaṇatvaṃ tu siddhyanubandhi. tac ca yathāsvabhāvam eva syāt. svabhāvādhīnā sādhanānāṃ sādhanatā. utpattivākyeṣu ca ṣaḍ api yāgā dravyadevatābhedād bhinnasvabhāvāḥ pratipannā iti bhedenaiva karaṇatvam. ataḥ ṣaḍbhir api yāgais sāvāntaravyāpārair ekam evāpūrvaṃ janyate. karaṇabhedāc ca dharmavyavasthā. tenādhikārāpūrvaprayuktatve 'pi sāvāntarāpūrvāṇāṃ karaṇānāṃ bhinnatvād ājyauṣadhasānnāyyadharmāṇāṃ yathādvāram asāṅkaryeṇānuṣṭhānam. ekasyāpy anekakaraṇasādhyatvaṃ dṛṣṭam. yathā –devadatto 'śvena dīpikayā rathena yātīti. tatrāvāntaravyāpāro bhinnaḥ. atrāpy avāntarāpūrvāṇi bhinnāni. tathā "rājasūyena yajeta" ity atrāpi viṣayaikye 'pi karaṇabhedaḥ. iṣṭipaśusomasaṅghātātmako rājasūyaḥ. tasmād viṣayībhūtasya karaṇatvaṃ sustham. etat sarvaṃ viṣayakaraṇīyanāmni prakaraṇe prapañcitam.

C.12 12.

atretthaṃ gurumate śāstrārthānvayaprakārasaṅkṣepaḥ.

C.12.1 12.1

"darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajeta" ityāmnāyaḥ. tatsannidhau darśapūrṇamāsalakṣaṇakālayogyāgneyādiṣaṭkam āmnātam. tathā ārādupakāripadārthavargaś cāmnātaḥ. tatra darśapūrṇamāsavākyam eva vidhyuddeśavākyam. tatraiva viṣayaniyojyānvitāpūrvapratīteḥ. tad eva kṛtyuddeśyatayā pradhānam adhikārāpūrvaṃ ca. itareṣv api vākyeṣu prathamaṃ sādhikāravidher eva sannihitatvena pratyabhijñāyamānatvāt tad evāpūrvaṃ tattadvidhipratyayenānūdyate. prakṛtyarthasyeva pratyayārthasyāpi pūrvapratipannatvād anuvādo ghaṭata eva. tatrāgneyādiṣaṭkasyotpattāv eva

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16 karaṇatvam apy] So M. P, OP: karaṇatvapy.

1–4 pratītyanubandhi ...sādhanatā] pratītyanubandhatayā ca viṣayabhāvaḥ sa yathābhidhānam avakalpate pratipattyupāyatvād abhidhānasya. atas tantrābhidhānāt sahitānāṃ viṣayabhāvaḥ *karaṇan tu siddhyanubandho niyogasya **tac ca yathāsvabhāvaṃ** veditavyam. svabhāvādhīnā hi sādhakānāṃ sādhakateti svabhāvabhede ***bhinnā sādhanatā*** (VK, p. 199-200–Śā p.454). *1904 has: karaṇaṃ. **...** 1904 has: yathāsvabhāvaṃ. ***...***1904 has: hi bhinnā sādhakatā.

7–9 tenādhikārāpūrvaprayuktatve ...asāṅkaryeṇānuṣṭhānam] (Ce'e) ata eva tadbhedeta bhinnatvāt *karaṇabhāvasya paramāpūrvaprayuktatve 'py ājyauṣadhasānnāyyadharmāṇām asaṅkaraḥ (VK, p. 200–Śā p. 455). *1904 has kāraṇabhāvasya.

9–11 ekasyāpy ...bhinnāni] (Ce'e) anekakaraṇasampādyatāpi ekasya dṛṣṭā. yathā gamanasyāśvena śibikayā *rathena vā gacchatīti. bhinnas tatra **kāraṇāvantaravyāpāra iti yady ucyeta. atrāpy utpattyapūrvāṇy avāntaravyāpārabhūtāni bhinnāni saṅgirāmahe eva (VK, p. 200–Śā p.455.). *1904 om. **1904 has kāraṇavyāpāra.

kālayogād darśapūrṇamāsaśabdavācyatvam. dvivacane ca trikadvayāpannasya tasyaivopādānam. yajeteti yajinā ca tad eva tantreṇopāttam. itthaṃ viṣayaniyojyasaṅghāṭite svayam prayojanabhūte 'pūrve pratipanne sati tatsannidhipaṭhitasyārātsannipātipadārthavargasya svayam aprayojanatayā prayojanākāṅkṣāyāṃ prayojanībhūtenādhikārāpūrveṇānvayayogyatve saty adhikāravākyagato liṅpratyayo yugapat kṛtsnapadārthānvitaṃ svārtham abhidhatte.

C.12.1.1 12.1.1

sa cānvayaḥ padārthavargaṃ prati grāhakaidamarthyarūpaḥ. prayojanaprayojanibhāvenānvayaś ca loke vyutpattisiddhaḥ. idam eva grāhakagrahaṇam ity ucyate.

C.12.2 12.2

kiṃ tu tatra sannipātivākyeṣu vidhipratyayenādhikārāpūrve 'nūdite saty avahananaprokṣaṇādayaś ca tadanvitaṃ svārtham abhidadhatīty anyonyānvitābhidhānam. ārādupakārakavākyeṣu na tadanvitasvārthābhidhānam. tathā hi —sādhikāravidhisannidhau prayājādivākyāni śrutāni. tāni na tāvat svasvaviṣayaṃ niyogāntaraṃ abhidhātum īśate. avaghātādivad anuvādaśaṅkākuṇṭhitatvāt. kiṃ tu tattaddravyadevatāviśiṣṭaṃ yāgasvarūpam evopapādayanti. tathā cādhikāravākyagato liṅśabdaḥ tadanvitaṃ svārtham abhidhatte.

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16 ityāmnāyaḥ.] My emendation. P, OP, M: ityāmnāya [with no punctuation before the following tatsannidhau].

24 dvivacane ca] So P, OP. M: dvivacane. In parentheses in P: dvivacanena ca

4 sa] So P, OP. M: na.

1–3 prayojanākāṅkṣāyāṃ ...abhidhatte] (Ce'e) tac ca prayojanākāṅkṣitayā prayojanībhūtena sādhikāreṇa niyogenānvīyate iti, adhikāravākyagata eva liṅśabdaḥ tadanvitaṃ svārtham abhidhatte (VM II, ad 27, p. 46, Śā p. 442).

4–6 sa ...ucyate] (Ce'e) sa cānvayaḥ prayājādīnām aidamarthyamātreṇa grāhakagrahaṇam ity ucyate (VM, II, ad 27, p. 46, Śā p. 442, A p. 87).

10–13 tathā ...evopapādayanti] (Ce'e) sādhikāraniyogasannidhau prayājādivākyāni śrutāni na tāvat svaviṣayaṃ niyogāntaram avagamayitum īśate, avaghātādivad anuvādakatvasambhavāt. kintu svarūpamātram eva yogyasvapadārthaviśiṣṭam upasthāpayanti (VM, II, ad 27, p. 46, Śā p. 442, A p.87). Wicher (1987: 225) emends thus: adhikāraniyogasannidhau [...]. But the TR text makes this reading unlikely. Similar expressions are moreover also to be found in Pārthasārathi Miśra's Nyāyaratnamālā (e.g., sādhikāravākye, in NRM, nityakāmyaviveka ad 7; sādhikaravākyeṣu, NRM aṅganirṇaya, II, ad 8, sādhikārasya vidheḥ, NRM aṅganirṇaya, III, ad 2.)

13–14 tathā ...abhidhatte] (Ce') adhikāravākyagata eva liṅśabdaḥ tadanvitaṃ svārtham abhidhatte (VM II, ad 27, p. 46, Śā p. 442).

14–16 prayājādīnāṃ ...abhidhatte] (Ce'e) nāsti tarhi prayājādiṣu niyogāntaram? na nāsti, kṣaṇikānāṃ teṣāṃ sambhūya karaṇopakārakatvānupapatter niyogāntarasyāvaśyāśrayaṇīyatvāt. yo 'sau liṅādiḥ prāg anūdyamānārthakatayā śaṅkitaḥ sa idānīṃ niyogāntaram abhidhatte (VM, II, ad 27, p. 46, Śā p. 443, A p. 87).

C.12.2.1 12.2.1

prayājādīnāṃ ca kṣaṇikatayā sambhūyopakārakatvasiddhaye 'vāntarāpūrvāṇy āśriyante. tatra yo 'sau liṅādiḥ prāg anūdyamānārthatayā śaṅkitaḥ sa idānīṃ paramāpūrvāṅgatayaiva niyogāntaram abhidhatte. na svātantryeṇa. anyathā viṣayadvayaniyogavirodhāt. abhihite ca tasmin prayājādivākyāni tadanvitasvārthabodhakāni. na tu paramāpūrvānvitasvārthabodhakāni. kāryadvayasambandhānupapatteḥ. na hy ekaṃ vastu yugapat kāryadvayasambandhi śakyam avagantum. tathā vyutpattivirahāt.

C.12.2.2 12.2.2

ato nānyonyānvitābhidhānam. yady avaghātādivat, teṣām api paramāpūrvānvitasvārthābhidhānaṃ syāt. tathā cotpattāv evāsya tiraścīnatayā punar niyogāntaraviṣayatā na syāt. avāntarāpūrvapratītis tu dūre. tena grāhakagrahaṇāviśeṣe 'pi sannipātivākyeṣu anyonyānvitābhidhānam. ārādupakārivākyeṣu neti viśeṣaḥ.

C.12.2.3 12.2.3

idaṃ ca grāhakagrahaṇaṃ khale kapotavad anyonyānvitaiḥ kṛtsnapadārthaiḥ pratyayārthaiś ca saha yugapad eva bhavati. itthaṃ sakalapadārthaśeṣiṇi prayojanabhūte grāhake pratīte tasya svatas sādhyatayā karaṇākāṅkṣāyāṃ viṣayībhūtānām āgneyādīnām eva karaṇatayānvayaḥ. teṣām api sambhūyakāritvasiddhyarthaṃ pradhānotpattyapūrvāṇi prati karaṇatvam aṅgīkriyate. prāg anūdyamānārthatayā śaṅkitā liṅādayas tu paścāt tadvācakāḥ. itthaṃ karaṇānvito niyoga itikartavyatām ākāṅkṣamāṇaḥ svayam evobhayavidham api padārthavargaṃ svakaraṇaśeṣatayā viniyuṅkte. idam eva karaṇaidamarthyam. anena grāhakaidamarthyanirvāhaś ca bhavati.

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14 sambhūyopakārakatvasiddhaye] My emendation. P: sambhūyopakārakavasiddhaye. M. OP: sambhūyopakāratvasiddhaye.
17 viṣayadvayaniyogavirodhāt.] My emendation. P, OP, M: viṣayaniyogavirodhāt. My emendation is based on the parallel VM text, i.e. anyathā viṣayadvayaviniyogavirodhād (VM, II, ad 27, p. 46, Śā p. 443).
20–22 yady ...syāt] My punctuation. OP: yady avaghātādivat teṣām api paramāpūrvānvitasvārthābhidhānaṃ syāt. tathā cotpattāv evāsya tiraścīnatayā punar niyogāntaraviṣayatā na syāt. P: yady avaghātādivat teṣām api paramāpūrvānvitasvārthābhidhānaṃ syāt tathā cotpattāv evāsya tiraścīnatayā punar niyogāntaraviṣayatā na syāt. No punctuation in M.
23 anyonyānvitābhidhānam] So M. P, OP: anyonyābhidhānam.

19–20 kāryadvayasambandhānupapatteḥ ...avagantum] (Ce'e) kasmāt punar anyatiraścīnasya niyogāntarāviṣayatvam, kāryadvayasambandhāvagamānupapatteḥ na hy ekaṃ vastu yugapat kāryadvayasambandhi śakyam avagantum (VM, II, ad 27, p. 46, Śā p. 443, A p. 88).
20–22 yady ...syāt] (Ce'e) ata eva cāvaghātādivad eṣāṃ "yaji" ādi śabdānām evāṅgavākyagatānām adhikāraniyogānvitasvārthābhidhānaṃ nābhyupagamyate. tathā saty utpattāv evāṅgayāgasvarūpasyānyatiraścīnasya niyogāntarāviṣayatvāt, niyogāntaraviṣayatā na syāt (VM, II, ad 27, p. 46, Śā p. 443, A p. 87).

C.12.3 12.3

tadanu karaṇaidamarthyanirvāhāya karaṇopakāram ākāṅkṣamāṇo niyogaḥ prathamaṃ karaṇaśarīranirvartakaṃ sannipātipadārthavargaṃ śrutyādisahitas tattaddvāraśeṣatayā viniyuṅkte. viniyuñjāno 'pi tattatpradhānāpūrvabhedanibandhanatattatkaraṇabhedam āśritya tattatkaraṇaśeṣatayā vyavasthayaiva. anena sannipātināṃ karaṇaidamarthyanirvāhaś ca bhavati. tattatkārakagatātiśayādhānadvāreṇa karaṇaśarīranirvartakatvam eva sannipātitvam. tattatkārakagatātiśaya evāvā ntarakiñcitkāraḥ.

C.12.4 12.4

tathā prakaraṇamātrasahāyaḥ prayājādīn sākṣāt karaṇatayā viniyuṅkte dvārasaṃyogābhāvāt. viniyuñjāno 'pi viśeṣānavagamāt kṛtsnakaraṇaśeṣatayā. ata eva teṣāṃ samuccayenānvayaḥ tantrānuṣṭhānaṃ ca. avāntarāpūrvāṇy evātra karaṇopakāraḥ. sa eva tajjanyaḥ kiñcitkāraḥ. anena karaṇaidamarthyanirvāho grāhakaidamarthyanirvāhaś ca bhavati. avāntarāpūrvakaraṇopakārakatvam evārādupakārakatvam.

C.12.4.1 12.4.1

nanu prayājādīnāṃ kimiti samuccayenānvayaḥ. vikalpenānvayas tu kimiti na syāt. na syāt. aikārthyanairapekṣyayor abhāvāt. tathā hi –

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3 evāvā ntarakiñcitkāraḥ] So in parentheses in P. P, OP, M: evāntarakiñcitkāraḥ.

10–16 nanu ...vikalpaḥ] (Pv) naikārtyhamātraṃ vikalpe hetuḥ. anekaiḥ pratyekaṃ samarthaiḥ samuccityāpi ekaprayojanasādhanasaṃbhavāt. kin tu nairapekṣyayuktam aikārthyaṃ taddhetuḥ. tac ca nairapekṣyaṃ vrīhiyavādiṣu vāśabdādibhiḥ pratipannam nāṅgeṣu tādṛśaḥ śabdo 'sti, atas teṣāṃ samuccaya eva yujyate. na tu vikalpa iti bhāvaḥ. upakāraḥ prayojanam. aikārthyam apy aṅgānāṃ na sambhavatīty āha –na ceti. śabdāntarābhyāsādibhiḥ samidādyaṅgayāgajanyānā, apūrvāṇām api bhedāvagamāt nāṅgānām ekakāryahetutvam ity arthaḥ. aṅgānām aikārthyābhāve bhāṣyakārasya saṃmatim āha –yathāheti. darśapūrṇamāsayoḥ samidyāgasaṃbandhena ya upakāro jāyata nāsau tanūnapādyāgena. kin tu anya evety arthaḥ. nanu sarvair aṅgair akhaṇḍa eka upakāro jāyata iti hi tāntrikaprasiddhiḥ. tadviruddhas tv aṅgānāṃ bhinnopakārajanakatvāṅgīkāra iti śaṅkate –nanv iti. pariharati –satyam iti. satyam akhaṇḍa upakāra eka eva. sa tu kṣaṇavinaśvarair aṅgaiḥ sambhūya sākṣāt saṃpādayituṃ na śakyata iti dvārabhūtāvāntaropakārāḥ parair aṅgīkāryāḥ. teṣu tu aikārthyābhāvāt na vikalpaśaṅkāvakāśaḥ. akhaṇḍopakāre tu aikārthyasaṃbhave 'pi nairapekṣyāsaṃbhavāt na vikalpa ity arthaḥ. nairapekṣyābhāvam evopapādayati –yadi hīti. vidhīyerann iti. ekaikam evāṅgam upakāroddeśena pṛthak pṛthak yadi vidhīyata ity arthaḥ. na tv etad astīti. upakārapratipādakaśabdābhāvād ity arthaḥ. paścād iti. paścāt kalpanīyenopakāreṇa prathamam aṅgānām anvayo na yujyata ity arthaḥ. prāg eva tṛtīyādhyāye prakaraṇaviniyogapratipādanāvasare. upakārakalpanāt pūrvam eva pradhānenaivāṅgānām anvayaḥ tathāpi samuccayasiddhis tu kathaṃ tatrāha –teneti. [...] akhaṇḍopakāraṃ praty aikārthyam. tatra sāpekṣataiva. avāntaropakāraṃ prati tu nairapekṣyam asti. na tv aikārthyam. ubhayaṃ ca samuditaṃ vikalpahetuḥ. na tv ekaikam. ato nāṅgānāṃ vikalpa ity arthaḥ vrīhiyavayos tu ubhayam apy astīty āha –vrīhiyavayor iti (NR ad AN III, ad 30, p. 255).

2–3 tattatkārakagatātiśayādhānadvāreṇa ...sannipātitvam] yāny aṅgāni sākṣāt paramparayā vā pradhānayāgaśarīram niṣpādya [...] tāni sannipatyopakārakāṇi Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā, p. 8.

te khalu vrīhiyavayor vikalpaprayojake. ubhayor api puroḍāśanirvartakatvenaikārthyāt. anyatareṇāpi kāryasiddhir itaranairapekṣyāc ca. atra tu prayājādīnāṃ svasvopakāreṣu nairapekṣyasambhave ’pi naikārthyam. akhaṇḍopakāre parasparasāpekṣatvāt. atra tv aikārthyasambhave ’pi tasya sarvāṅganiṣpādyatvān na nairapekṣyam iti na vikalpaḥ.

C.12.4.2 12.4.2

kiṃ cāṣṭadoṣaduṣṭaś ca saḥ. tathā hi –vrīhiśāstrānuṣṭhānakāle yavaśāstrasya prāmāṇyaparityāgaḥ, aprāmāṇyasvīkāraś ceti doṣadvayam. tasyaiva yavaśāstrasya yavānuṣṭhānakāle tyaktaprāmāṇyasvīkāraḥ, svīkṛtāprāmāṇyatyāgaś ceti doṣadvayam iti yavaśāstrasya catvāro doṣāḥ. evaṃ vrīhiśāstrasyāpi yavaśāstrānuṣṭhānakāle doṣadvayam. vrīhyanuṣṭhānakāle ca doṣadvayam ity ekaikatra koṭau catvāro doṣāḥ.

C.12.5 12.5

prayājādīnāṃ tu na karaṇatayānvayaḥ. āgneyādikaraṇāntarāvarodhāt. akhaṇḍopakāras tūbhayavidhāṅganiṣpādyaḥ. paramate tu kṛtsnasyāpi padārthavargasya sākṣāt paramparayā ca dvārānvayapūrvakaḥ pradhānān-

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10–16 nanu ...saḥ] (Re) nanv ekārthatvād aṅgānāṃ vrīhiyavavad vikalpe sati yena kenacid aṅgenāpi yuktaṃ pradhānaṃ phalasādhanaṃ syāt. maivaṃ vocaḥ. na hy ekārthatvamātraṃ vikalpe hetuḥ. kiṃ tarhi. nirapekṣāṇām ekopakārasādhanatvam. na ca samidādīnām ekārthatvam. parasparanirapekṣais samidādividhibhiḥ pṛthag evāvāntarāpūrvākhyopakāraparikalpanāt. yathāha bhāṣyakāraḥ –“na ca yat samitsambandhena kriyate tat tanūnapātsambandhena” (ŚBh 2.2.2) iti. nanu ca sarvair aṃśair eka upakāraḥ kriyata iti darśanaṃ tatkatham upakārabhedābhyupagamaḥ. satyam eka upakāraḥ. na tu tatra nairapekṣyam. yadi hi pūrvaprasiddham upakāram uddiśya tatsādhanatvena samidādayo vidhīyeraṃs tatas sarveṣāṃ nairapekṣyeṇa tatsādhanatvāvagamād vikalpaḥ syāt. na tv etad asti. tādarthyamātreṇāṅgeṣu pradhānānviteṣu paścād upakārakalpanād iti prāg evāveditam. tenāṣṭadoṣaduṣṭavikalpaparihārārthaṃ samuditāṅgaviśiṣṭapradhānabhāvanāvidhānāt sahaiva sarveṣām ekopakārasādhanatvenāgneyādīnām iva phalasādhanatvaṃ samidādīnām avagamyate. tena yatraikārthyaṃ na tatra nairapekṣyaṃ yatra nairapekṣyaṃ na tatraikārthya, iti na vikalasambhava iti. vrīhiyavayos tu puroḍāśaprakṛtitvād ekakāryayor vākyadvayena nirapekṣayor avagamād yukto vikalpaḥ (AN, III, ad 30, p. 250).

16–21 tathā ...doṣāḥ] (Pv) aṣṭadoṣeti. vikalpe hy ekaikasya padārthasyānuṣṭhānavelāyām itarasya svīkṛtāprāmāṇyatyāgas tyaktaprāmāṇyasvīkāra iti doṣadvayam. tathā punar api itarapadārthānuṣṭhāne ’pi doṣadvayam. ananuṣṭhāne ’pi doṣadvayam iti aṣṭau doṣā ity arthaḥ (NR ad AN III, ad 30, p. 255).

16–21 tathā ...doṣāḥ] tathā hi –”vrīhibhir yajeta yavair vā” ity atra. tatra ca prathamaprayoge vrīhyanuṣṭhāne yavaśāstraprāmāṇyasya svārthānuṣṭhāpakatvarūpasya parityāgaḥ. svārthānanuṣṭhāpakatvarūpasyāprāmāṇyasya ca svīkāro bhavati. tato dvitīyaprayoge yavānuṣṭhāne tu pūrvaparityaktasya yavaśāstraprāmāṇyasya svīkāraḥ, svīkṛtasya ca tadaprāmāṇyasya parityāgaś ceti yavaśāstre catvāro doṣā bhavanti. tathā prathamaprayoge yavānuṣṭhāne vrīhiśāstraprāmāṇyasya svārthānuṣṭhāpakatvalakṣaṇasya parityāgaḥ, svārthānanuṣṭhāpakatvasvarūpasya cāprāmāṇyasya svīkāraḥ, tato dvitīyaprayoge vrīhyanuṣṭhāne tu vrīhiśāstraprāmāṇyasya pūrvaṃ parityaktasya svīkāraḥ, svīkṛtasya ca tadaprāmāṇyasya parityāgaś ceti vrīhiśāstre catvāro doṣā bhavantīty aṣṭadoṣaduṣṭo vikalpo yathā vrīhiyavavākye prasiddhas tathātrāpi syāt (Mīmāṃsārthasaṃgrahakaumudī ad AS, vākyabhedadoṣaparihāra, **AS1950**

vayaḥ. atra tu pradhānānvayapūrvaka iti vaiṣamyam. tattaddvārāṇām apūrvīyatvalakṣaṇā tu matadvayasādhāraṇīti. tatrāgneyāgnīṣomīyayor utpattiśiṣṭapuroḍāśāvarodhāt vrīhīṇāṃ na sākṣāt karaṇatvam. kiṃ tu tatprakṛtitvam eva. itthaṃ vrīhīṇāṃ tatprakṛtitayānvaye sati nirūḍhaṃ praty anirūḍhasya śeṣateti nyāyād avahananādīnāṃ dvāradvāribhāvenānvayaḥ. tathā sānnāyyadharmāṇām ājyadharmāṇāṃ ca tattatkārakaśeṣatayānvayo 'vagantavyaḥ.

C.13 13

itthaṃ yathāviniyogaṃ sakalapadārthānvitaṃ grāhakatvaviniyojakatvaprayojakatvāvastham adhikārāpūrvaṃ śāstraprameyaṃ vidhitattvam iti siddham.

iti śrīmadrāmānujācāryaviracite tantrarahasye
śāstraprameyaparicchedaś caturthaḥ ||

21 doṣāḥ] So OP (but the *ā* is hardly recognizable), M. P: doṣaḥ.
292.30–293.1 grāhakatvaviniyojakatvaprayojakatvāvastham] So M. P, OP: grāhakatvaviniyojakatvāvastham.
3 śrīmadrāmānujācāryaviracite] So OP, M. P: śrīrāmānujācāryaviracite

27–28 nirūḍhaṃ nyāyād] (Pv) nirūḍhaṃ praty anirūḍhasya śeṣatayā (NR ad AN, III, ad 29, p.254).

Appendix D

Glossary

Expert readers will probably find a lot to blame in the tentative translations given in this glossary. However, these are by no means meant to settle long-lasting debates, such as the one about the translation of pramāṇa. Rather, they are meant for the benefit of non-Sanskritists who may through this glossary easily find a remedy to the use of Sanskrit terms in the preceding pages.

abhivati (scil. ṛc) , as opposed to kavati ṛc, «the verses beginning with "abhi tvā śūra nonuma" (Ṛgveda 7.32.22) over which the Rathantara Sāman is normally sung», whereas the kavatī verses are «the verses beginning with "kayā naścitra ābhuva", Ṛgveda 4.31.1» (Gaṅgānātha Jhā, translation of ŚBh 7.2.2, **Jha1933**).

abhiyukta is found only once in TR (TR IV §C.9.4.4), where it is part of a system of three different (and possibly descending) levels of authority: the Sacred Texts, the Smṛti texts and the opinion of learned people (presumably Mīmāṃsakas). In Vedāntadeśika's Seśvaramīmāṃsā (ad 1.1.2) "uktaṃ [...] śāsanam abhiyuktaiḥ" introduces a quotation of a Viśiṣṭādvaitin author, Parāśarabhaṭṭa, thus confirming the view that abhiyukta identifies people of the same school as the author using such term. Kumārila often uses it, but also just in the sense of 'expert' (TV 219 16-21, quoted in Taber, forthcoming, fn.80, TV 144, 7-8 and 10-11, quoted ibi, fn.92 and 93).

ādhāna «die Erreichtung des Hausfeuers, das aus dem Haus eines reichen vaiśya oder eines erfahrenen Opferveranstalters geholt oder aber durch Reibung erzeugt wird» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

adhikāra differently translated as 'eligibility', 'responsability', 'right' etc., in Prabhākara's system it is the biunique link established between an obligation and the one who has been compelled to fulfil it

adhikaraṇa section (of a book etc.), each of the short sections in which the MS is articulated.

adhikārin Authority-subject; the person endowed with adhikāra, i.e. obliged through that specific prescription.

agnihotra «überaus häufiges und verbreitetes Opfer vom Typ haviryajña: eine am Morgen und Abend jedes Tages stattfindende Milchlibation in das Opferfeuer. Es galt als obligatorisch [...]» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

agniṣomīya one of the three animal sacrifices subsidiaries of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. «Opfer eines Ziegenbocks für Agni und Soma, jedoch nicht als selbständiges Tieropfer, sondern als Teil des Somakultes am dritten Tag der upasad» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

ājya clarified butter. «There are three words for the melted and clarified butter (ghee) used in sacrificing, viz. ājyam, ghṛtam and sarpis. The last one is sometimes explained as "common butter" [...], the others are said to be interchangeable, although the former is ritually prepared (consecrated) butter, the latter not» (Gonda 1980:176). On ājya in rituals, see Gonda 1980:176-178. For its preparation, see Gonda 1980:313. «Als Opfersubstanz gebrauchtes Butterschmalz, zerlassene (oder auch wieder verfestigte) Butter, eines der häufigsten und wichtigsten Opfermaterialien (dravya) überhaupt» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

ākāṅkṣā expectation (for another word), as in the case of "Door!," which expects either "Close" or "Open".

ākāśa ether, space.

ākhyāta verbal ending.

ākṛti configuration (that of cow, e.g., is believed by Prābhākaras to inhere in all individual cows, but not to exist separately).

alaukika non-relating to this world, ultra-mundane, transcendental (opposite to laukika, q.v.).

aṃśa part, component.

aṅga , auxiliary. Auxiliaries are actions, things or qualifications connected to the principal ritual through an application prescription (viniyogavidhi).

antaḥkaraṇa which kind of notion Rāmānujācārya held of a "subject" is controversial. Most of the TR presupposes an *ātman* which is able to initiate an action (including knowledge as an action) and, hence, to desire. manas is only mentioned as a sense faculty, buddhi only as 'notion'

and ahaṅkāra or citta are not mentioned at all. Hence, the term antaḥkaraṇa might sound out of place. In fact, the notion of antaḥkaraṇa is already found in Sāṅkhya and Yoga as being composed of buddhi, ahaṅkāra and manas, but not of the puruṣa (the motionless Self). It is therefore the abode of mental events such as thinking, imagining and remembering. Within a Mīmāṃsā perspective, Rāmānujācārya considers the ātman to be active (see §C.11.6.2) and think (see §C.3.12). Still, outside the sacrificial context (in §C.10.11) he might have used the term antaḥkaraṇa (instead of ātman or puruṣa), because of the common usage of not directly attributing to the self feelings or thoughts. Unfortunately, I could not find a suitable definition of antaḥkaraṇa in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā texts. The following is, hence, a definition of it according to the Uttara Mīmāṃsā. «The Advaita Vedanta assigns the tasks of perception, cognition, recollection, and others to an entity conceived as the "inner instrument"(antahkarana).[...] the inner instrument includes the mind (manas) manifesting attentivity, the intellect (buddhi) meaning the capacity for determination and ascertainment, and citta, a storehouse of past impressions and memories. The inner instrument is a crucial aspect of the embodied person that coordinates the functions of the senses and the body while in constant interaction with events within the body and its surroundings. The inner instrument is said to "reach out" to objects in the environment through the senses, and to become transformed into their shapes, so to speak. The inner instrument is constantly undergoing modifications, depending on the objects it reaches out to, and it tries to "know" them by itself being transformed into their shapes.» (**Paranjpe2002**).

anumāna inference; syllogism.

anurañjana means 'colouring', hence 'connotation'. The metaphor of "colouring" has been used by Kumārila in order to describe the relationship between the meaning of the verbal root and that of the verbal ending. The latter expresses a general activity, whereas the former "colours" it, that is, defines it as, in this case, a sacrificial activity. Here, *yajeta* conveys the meaning of a general activity (through the verbal ending), defined as a sacrificial one through the verbal root. Hence, its paraphrase is "an activity connoted as sacrifice" (on *anurañjana* see also **Frauwallner1938**). See also Vāsudeva Dīkṣita, introduction to his commentary on MS 2.2: *kim ekaiva bhāvanā nānādhātvarthānuraktā vidhīyate? uta tadtaddhātvarthānuraktā bhinnaiva? iti saṃśayaḥ. ekaiveti brūmaḥ* (Adhvaramīmāṃsākutūhalavṛtti 1968-9, p. 189). And: *yathā jñānaṃ jñeyaviṣayarūpānurañjakabhedād bhidyate evaṃ bhāvanāyā apy anurañjakadhātvarthādhīnanirūpaṇatayā dhātvarthabhedād bhedo nyāyyaḥ* (ibi, commentary on 2.2.1, p. 190).

anvaya means ‘relation’ (mainly of words in a sentence or of ritual items in a sacrifice). That such association always presupposes a prescription within which it occurs, is explicit in NR ad AN, where Rāmānujācārya adds *vidhi* in order to explain the AN’s mentions of an association. See, e.g.: *saṃgatiṃ vidhisaṃgatim. [...] tatpratipattyā vidhyanvayapratipattyā* (NR ad AN III pariccheda, p.243).

anvitābhidhānavāda Prabhākara’s theory of the expressiveness of the already related words

apūrva ‘non [existing] before’, novelty (Jaimini); an energy produced by the sacrifice and lasting from the time of sacrifice until its result is accomplished (Bhāṭṭas); duty, “newly” known through a prescription (Prābhākaras).

artha object; referent; meaning; meant-entity; purpose.

arthabhāvanā or ārthībhāvanā, objective performative capacity; it is the performative capacity directed towards a concrete aim, e.g. the effort to make a pot. The arthabhāvanā (or just bhāvanā) is the undertaking of an action (which is still not identical with the action itself, and can hence also be called ‘effort’ or ‘initiation of the action’), and it is expressed by any verbal suffix (included optative, etc., suffixes, which hence convey a double meaning –śabdabhāvanā and arthabhāvanā). An objective bhāvanā causes to be an objective result (such as the cooking of rice or a sacrifice being performed), whereas the linguistic bhāvanā causes to be the objective bhāvanā.

arthāpatti the instrument of knowledge (not reducible to inference, according to Mīmā sakas) through which one knows that ‘if Devadatta is alive and is not at home, he must be outside’. The gist of the reasoning is that an apparent inconsistency leads to the only other possible solution (anyathānupapatti). If out of several possibilities, a, b, c... all but one, say c, are rejected by evidence to the contrary, c is automatically established. E.g. ,“The fat Devadatta does not eat during the day. He eats at night”.

arthavāda (within the Veda) explanatory passage; eulogy.

atideśa : Whenever some elements are missing in the direct statements prescribing (upadeśa) a derived ritual (vikṛti) they can be indirectly known: one looks at the main ritual (prakṛti) that is the model of the derived one, and one does as it is prescribed in it. The mandate which prescribes to do in the derived ritual as in the model one is called atideśa.

bhāṣya ‘Comment’; within Mīmāṃsā, Śabara’s ŚBh.

bhāṣyakāra 'the author of the comment', Śabara.

Bhāṭṭa or Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsaka Relating to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (adj.); (thinker) who follows Kumārila's philosophical system. Hence Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, one of the two sub-divisions of Mīmāṃsā.

bhāva existence; any existing item (less concrete then "thing," vastu); verbal base.

bhāvanā from the causative verbal noun bhāvanā, which means indeed 'causing to be', it is a performative capacity, to be distinguished in arthabhāvanā and śabdabhāvanā.

bhāvya gerundive of the causative of bhū- ('to be'), meaning 'to be caused to be'.

Brāhmaṇa Prose texts often referred within Mīmāṃsā as "Veda" by antonomasia. They elucidate Vedic mantras, and include mostly sacrificial prescriptions and aetiologies of sacrifices.

caru «eine verbreitete Opferspeise, Brei oder Suppe aus Reiskörnern und Wasser mit Milch und Butter» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). «In Wasser oder Milch gekochte *taṇḍula*s. Der caru ist eigentlich ein eherner oder ein irdener Kochtopf. Das Wort wird aber denn auf das in ihm Gekochte übertragen, welches eigentlich *odana* heißt, und der Kochtopf für den caru in übertragener Bedeutung heißt *carusthālī*. In der Ritualliteratur scheint das Wort caru ausschließlich für die Opfergabe des Śrautarituals verwendet zu werden, während das Wort odana die alltägliche Speise bezeichnet.» (**Einoo1985**). For further details on the preparation of the c. and for many other cereal ritual substances, **Einoo1985** is an invaluable source.

codanā nomen actionis from the causative of the root cud- ('to impel'), meaning 'injunction', especially Vedic injunction.

dadhi is «coagulated (thick sour) milk» (**Gonda1980**). Such coagulated milk is not separated from whey. «Saure Milch, Molke, vielfach frischer, heißer Milch zugesetzt und damit als Opferspende dienend» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

dāna see yajña

darbha «m, Gras, Grasbüschel aus Poa cynosuroides; dem in den Brāhmaṇas üblichen Ausdruck entspricht der Begriff kuśa der Śrautasūtras. Aus d. bestehen das barhis und der prastara» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). See also Jan Gonda, *The ritual functions and significance of grasses in the religion of the Veda*, Amsterdam, Oxford, New York 1985.

darśana philosophical system.

darśapūrṇamāsa «m Du, wichtiges und grundlegendes Opfer vom Typ iṣṭi, ein Ritus anläßlich der Syzygien, wobei das Vollmondopfer für Agni-Soma, das Neumondopfer für Indra-Agni ist. Es verlangt vier Priester [...] und ist Grundlage aller iṣṭis» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

Dharmasūtra a class of texts containing ethical norms concerning human behaviours.

dravya «generelle Bezeichnung für eine Opfersubstanz; sie war vom yajamāna zu beschaffen» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

dṛṣadupalā «dṛṣad f, der untere, größere Preßstein (Gegensatz: upala [sic!]), genutzt zum Kornmahlen» and «upalā f, oberer (kleinerer) Preßstein, der u.a. beim Zerstampfen von Getreidekörnern auf der unten befindlichen dṛṣad im darśapūrṇamāsa als Stößel dient» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

dvāra (among other meanings) some items (such as qualities) cannot be connected directly to what must be done and need instead to be connected to a medium (dvāra). dvāra may indicate whatever is a medium in an act, be it a substance or the apūrva (as a medium to the result); see p. 60, §C.11.4; §C.12.5.

ghañ «kṛt affix a causing the substitution of vṛddhi for the preceding vowel applied in various senses [...]» (Abhyankar 1961, s.v.). Rāmānujācārya in TR IV §C.3.8 mentions it while referring to word-formations such as *pākaḥ* from the verbal root *pac-*. Such forms cannot be used as answers to the question "What does [she]?".

Gṛhyasūtra Class of ritual manuals concerning the performance details of domestic sacrifices.

havis «Opfersubstanz, -gegenstand (–» dravya), gewöhnlich vegetabilischer Natur: Reis, Gerste, gekocht oder als Kuchen oder Mus. Aber auch Milch und Butter, mitunter selbst die Gliedmaßen des Opfertiers, werden als h. bezeichnet» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

homa «Opferung, gewöhnlich von Butterschmalz, die mittels der juhū [ladle, see §C.4.2.9] in den āhavanīya [one of the three main fires in Indian sacrifice] vollzogen wird» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). See also yajña

iṣṭadevatā chosen deity.

iṣṭi «ein einfaches Opfer (havis) aus Butter oder Früchten im Unterschied zum feierlichen Tier- und vor allem Somaopfer, vom adhvaryu dargebracht. Das Grundmodell der I. ist das Neu- und Vollmondopfer» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

itikartavyatā lit. ‘the way something has to be done’, ritual procedure.

jīva individual soul (believed to be distinct and non-distinct from God by Śrī Vaiṣṇavas.

jñāna cognition (different from pramā, knowledge).

juhū «A large ladle, for performing burnt-offerings (homa)» (Gonda 1980:173). «der zungenförmige Opferlöffel aus dem Holz von palāśa (Butea frondosa); mit ihm wird die Butter (ājya) ins Feuer geschüttet. Dieser Löffel wird schon ṚV I, 145, 3 erwähnt. Im Opfer verkörpert die j. das kṣatra.» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

kāla «means the proper time, for example, the Agnihotra is to be performed in the morning and evening, the DPM on the morning of the two pratipad days, etc.» (**Smith1987**).

Kalpasūtra A class of texts written in aphorisms, aiming at systematising the sacrificial lore of the Brāhmaṇas (Śrautasūtra); at describing domestic sacrifices, such as marriage, initiation etc. (Gṛhyasūtra); or at describing one’s social duties (Dharmasūtra).

kāmya optional, [ritual] performed in order to achieve a certain purpose, such as rain, cattle ...

kapāla pan; «n, hufeissenförmige Tonschüssel zum Backen der Opferkuchen (puroḍāśa). Sieben solcher Schüsseln braucht man für die Maruts, acht für Agni, elf für Indra und zwölf für Savitṛ» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). «Entweder die [flasche] Wandscherbe eines Tongefäßes oder ein [flacher] Tonteller» (**Rau1972**). The same book of Rau (**Rau1972**) is useful for many other crockery terms related to the ritual.

kapotakhalanyāya Bhuvaneśa’s Laukikanyāyasāhasrī explains: uktaṃ ca “vṛddhā yuvānaḥ śiśavaḥ kapotāḥ khale yathāmī yugapat patanti | tathaiva sarve yugapat parasparenānvayino bhavanti ||” iti nyāyaḥ. atra vṛddhayuvaśiśubhiḥ kapotai´cirataracirasannihitakāloktānāṃ padārthānāṃ sāmyaṃ bodhyam. yatra padārthānāṃ yugapad anvayas tatrāsya pravṛttir iti (p. 183). The maxim is often used in later Mīmāṃsā (Mīmāṃsākoṣa, s.v., lists occurrences in Rāmeśvara’s Subodhinī (**Verpoorten1987** mid-19th c.), Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, Bhāṭṭadīpikā, Bhāṭṭakauṣṭubha, Nyāyamuktāvalī [the reference is not explicit in the MK, maybe: Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita of Tanjore’s Saṃkarṣanyāyamuktāvalī (**Verpoorten1987** 1580-1650)], but also in the ŚBh), in both linguistic and ritual contexts. As for the latter, see arthena pradhānopakāreṇa khalekapotavat yugapat saṃnipatanty aṅgāni. tatra na gṛhyate viśeṣaḥ idaṃ prāpyate idaṃ veti. ataḥ sarvāṇi prāpyante (ŚBh 11.1.3.16, quoted in Mīkośa). Smith translates the maxim as follows:

«Just like all pigeons (kapota), young, old, and chicks alike, fly onto the threshing floor (khalī) at once, all words in an example or description are to be construed simultaneously» (**Smith1987** referring the content of the commentary on TKM, III.138c-139b).

kāraka action-factor, the function of the syntactical complements contributing to the main action (agent, object, instrumen etc.).

karaṇa instrument.

kārikā strophe .

karman 'ritual action', 'action'. As 'action' it is a syn. of kriyā (TR IV, §C.9.4.9).

kārya gerundive of the root kṛ (to do), meaning 'what has to be done', duty.

kḷp- (among other meanings), the causative of the root kḷp- is a terminus technicus used to designate the activity of the prescription whenever it must postulate something not directly stated in the text. See, for instance: [vidhiḥ] puruṣārtharūpam eva bhāvyaṃ tasyāḥ [bhāvanāyāḥ] kalpayati (NR ad AN, III pariccheda ad 12) and, within TR IV, §C.3.16: [vidhiḥ] bhāvanayā iṣṭasādhanatvam api kalpayati.

lakṣaṇā secondary signification.

laukika relating to this world (loka), mundane, empirical; (as regards language) human, common language (opposed to Vedic language).

liṅādi The endings referred to herewith are optatve (liṅ), imperative (loṭ), Vedic subjunctive (leṭ) and gerundive (tavya), which can all convey a deontic meaning.

liṅga mark; inferential mark, probans. One of the instruments of knowledge for properly understanding what has to be related to an application prescription.

loka the common world, the one all our experiences are about; ordinary experience.

maṅgala the auspicious strophes at the beginning of a work, usually in praise of God.

mantra (within the Veda) formula which accompanies sacrifices.

Mīmāṃsā (lit.: 'desire of thinking', hence 'reflection') is one of the six traditionally recognised Indian philosophical systems. The bulk of the

system is based (as usual in India) on a collection of aphorisms, Jaimini's Mīmāṃsāsūtras which would be quite obscure without Śabara' Bhāṣya ('commentary'). Śabara quotes from a more ancient commentary, now lost, whose author he refers to as "vṛttikāra" ('gloss' author'). Later the two main Mīmāṃsakas ('followers of the Mīmāṃsā') thinkers, Kumārila and Prabhākara wrote philosophical engaged commentaries on the fiābarabhāṣya. Those commentaries have been commented by later Mīmāṃsakas; Pārthasārathi , e.g., wrote a line-to-line commentary of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika and Śālikanātha a similar gloss of Prabhākara's Bṛhatī.

Mīmāṃsaka 'relating to Mīmāṃsā' (adj.); '(thinker) who follows the Mīmāṃsā system'.

mleccha foreigner; barbarian.

mūla root; in fine compositi: 'based on' (e.g. veda-mūla, 'based on the Veda').

musala «m n, Stößel aus dem Holz des khadira (Acacia catechu) zum Zerstampfen von Korn im Mörser» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

na hiṃsayāt a Vedic prohibition saying that no act of violence should be carried out.

naimittika "Naimittika or "incidental" rites are to be performed at designated times only or following the occurrence of certain non-recurring events. Among these would be the Pitṛmedha (obsequies for a deceased Āhitāgni) and prāyaścitta. Also included are a large number of iṣṭis such as the Jāteṣṭi: following the birth of a son" (**Smith1987**).

Naiyāyika 'relating to Nyāya' (adj.); '(thinker) who follows the Nyāya system'.

Nāvya Nyāya lit. 'New Logic', it develops from the classic Nyāya school and accepts Vaiśeṣika solutions as far as physics and ontology are concerned. It influenced heavily all Indian philosophical systems with its highly developed abstract language, aiming at a logical representation of all linguistic instances.

nimitta condition. The author consistently uses (see, e.g., §§C.3.1, C.3.7, C.3.16, C.3.17, C.4.2.7, C.9.6, C.9.13) nimitta to designate the essential condition for something to occur. As suggested by Dr. Alessandro Graheli, he may prefer nimitta to kāraṇa because nimitta evokes a biunique relation between nimitta and naimittika, whereas kāraṇa implies various factors.

nirjñāta notorious, see §C.11.4, where it is used to refer to what is well-known already in ordinary experience and hence does not need to be conveyed through the Veda.

nirvapana «n, das Ausschütten, Darbringen der Opferspendem und zwar des Korns oder der Butter bei einer iṣṭi» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

niṣedha prohibition (opposite of vidhi).

nitya compulsive [ritual]; fixed; eternal.

niyoga injunction (this term is especially used by Prābhākaras).

nyāya rule; as a proper name, it is usually translated as "Logic", and designates one of the six traditionally recognised darśanas. Among them it is the most engaged in epistemological and dialectic problems.

pada word, morpheme.

padārtha (among other meanings), also ritual auxiliaries may be called 'padārtha', see passim, especially §C.11.1, §C.12.1 and §C.12.3.

paramparā unbroken transmission; tradition.

pariccheda chapter.

paryavasāna Lawrence McCrea explains how *paryavasāna* is the definitive meaning of a Vedic prescription: "The final stage of textual comprehension, in which the precise, hierarchical relations of all semantic components of a text, both within and between sentences, have been definitely ascertained, the Mīmāṃsakas call *paryavasāna* or *paryavasāya* ('completion' –as opposed to *avāntara-vākyārtha*, 'intermediate sentence meaning', a meaning understood from a part of a text which must ultimately be revised or restricted in the light of context). *Paryavasāna* is the end point of the hermeneutical process, the point at which all interpretive questions have been settled and the ultimate, functionally integrated meaning of the entire text becomes clear" (**McCrea2000**). I did not adopt this translation, since the arousal of a definitive meaning seems to me the consequence of the completion of the prescription, rather than the primary meaning of *paryavasāna*, and for the sake of uniformity with the verbal usage of *paryavaso-* in the same sense.

paśu cattle.

patnī The sacrificer's wife. On the implications of the term patnī, see **Jamison1996**

Pāvamānī See R̥V ix, AV xix, 71 etc. (MW). «Pāvamānī means the verses (r̥cas) in the ninth Maṇḍala of the R̥gveda "relating to Soma Pavamāna" ('purifying itself'). The name is found in the Atharvaveda and later, possibly even in one hymn of the R̥gveda itself». (**McDonell1912**).

phala lit. fruit; result.

Prābhākara Relating to Prabhākara (adj.); (thinker) who follows Prabhākara's philosophical system. Hence Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, one of the two sub-divisions of Mīmāṃsā.

pradhānavākya , the principal prescription in a Vedic period, identified through its performative character and mostly identical with the adhikāravidhi (see).

praiṣa a significant term in Vedic ritual: «Aufforderung, Einladung; speziell die Aufforderung des maitrāvaruṇa an den hotr̥ zur Rezitation der yājyā» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

praiṣa, scilicet mantra Smith (**Smith1987**) offers a more suitable meaning insofar as he translates praiṣa as "recited instruction", i.e., a set of instructions which have to be recited by one of the officiants and directed to another. Apart from TR IV §C.11.1, I could not find any other instance of the classification of mantras into stotra-, śastra- and praiṣa-mantras.

prakr̥ti «Rituelle Grundform, Muster; so ist das Neu- und Vollmondopfer die p. für alle iṣṭis; der agniṣṭoma ist p. für die Somaopfer.» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

pramāṇa instrument for knowing what has to be related to a presctiption; instrument of knowledge. In this latter sense, the most commonly quoted pramāṇas are: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), testimony (śābda), analogy (upamāna), cogent evidence (arthāpatti), absence (abhāva). Bhāṭṭas accept all six, whilst Prābhakaras accept only the first five.

prāmāṇya status of being a pramāṇa, the fact of being a means of valid cognition, reliability, validity.

prameya object of cognition, whatever can be the content of a cognition.

prāp-, prāpti , the root prāp- and the noun prāpti are termini technici used in Mīmāṃsā text to denote what is acquired to the sacrifice as it has been conveyed by a prescription. See the Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā and the Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi passages quoted in the fn XXX of

the Sanskrit text, and prāptiphalako vidhir iti lakṣaṇam (Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, tarkapāda vidhibhedanirūpaṇa, **Bhattacintamani**). See also athāprāptam api dvitvaṃ vidhīyate (TV ad 1.3.23); AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 17, **NR1937** ibid. v.18, and passim; NR ad AN IV, x adhyāya, ad 17, **NR1937** ad 18, **NR1937** and passim. And MNP 10: sa [vidhiḥ] cāprāptam arthaṃ vidhatte: yathā, agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ, iti vidhir aprāptaṃ prayojanavad dhomanaṃ vidhatte; agnihotrahomena svargaṃ bhāvayed iti. Similar is also the AS's definition of vidhi.

prāśastya praiseworthiness.

pratyakṣa sense perception, direct perception.

pravartanā nomen actionis from the causative of the root pra-vṛt (to act), hence 'the causing to act', 'incitement', synonym of preraṇā.

pravṛtti initiation of an action, undertaking of an action; activity.

prayāja «"Voropfer": fünf, neun oder elf mit Opfersprüchen versehene ājya-Spenden, die vor der eigentlichen iṣṭi stattfinden. Im Neu- und Vollmondopfer sind es fünf Spenden (für samidh, tanūnapāt, iḍā, barhis und svāhākāra)» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

prāyaścitta «Sühnzeremonie für beim Opfer begangene Fehler und andere Verstöße, meist vom brahman, manchmal auch vom adhvaryu ausgeführt» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

preraṇā nomen actionis from the causative of the root pra-īr, 'incitement', synonym of pravartanā.

prīti happiness (described in MS as the condition everyone longs for).

puroḍāśa «Opferkuchen, Fladen aus Reis- oder Gerstenmehl, gebacken auf dem gārhapatya [Feuer] und zwar auf kapālas von wachselnder Zahl» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). «puroḍāś, A mass of ground rice rounded into a kind of cake (usually divided into pieces, placed on receptacles; cf. kapāla) and offered as an oblation in fire, RV. Puroḍāśa AV, any oblation; the leavings of an offering, Soma juice; the prayer recited while offering oblations in fire, [...]» (MW). Gonda 1980 calls it "cake" (p. 421) and describes it only indirectly "The sthālīpāka is a mess of rice or barley cooked in milk in an earthen dish or cooking-vessel (sthālī) and used as sacrificial food. It is decidedly distinct from the puroḍāś(a) of the śrauta ritual which is baked on dishes (e.g. P[āraskara] G[ṛhyasūtra]. 3, 12, 5; Kauś[ika Sūtra]. 20, 10; 48, 39 etc.)". «Die taṇḍulas werden mit den Mühlsteinen gemahlen, das Mehl wird mit Wasser gemischt und geknetet, und der Teil wird auf den kapāla-Schüsseln ausgebreitet und mit brennenden Kohlen von unten sowie mit heißer Arsche von

oben gebacken. Die Herstellung des puroḍāśa-Kuchens wird weiter in folgenden Handlungen eingeteilt:

1. peṣaṇa: Die taṇḍulas werden mit dem unteren Mühlstein (dṛṣad) und dem oberen (upalā) gemahlen. [...]
2. kapālopadhāna: Die kapāla-Schüsseln werden auf den westlichen Teil des *gārhapatya-* oder *āhavanīya*-Feuers gesetzt.
3. *madantyaḥ* genanntes kochendes Wasser wird vorbereitet.
4. saṃyavana: das Mehl wird mit Wasser und kochendem Wasser gemischt, geknetet und zu Klößen geformt. [...]
5. 'prathayati': Er breitet den Teig auf die kapāla-Schüsseln aus.
6. śrapaṇa: Er bäckt den puroḍāśa-Kuchen in den Schüsseln auf dem Feuer und mit heißer Asche von oben. [...]
7. Wenn der puroḍāśa gebacken ist, wischt er die Asche mit dem veda-Wisch herunter. [...] (**Einoo1985**)».

puruṣa person (either human or divine); human being; man.

puruṣārtha human purpose; (said of ritual elements to be performed in order for the sacrificer to acquire something, as opposed to those elements which pertain only to the ritual itself) (see **Clooney1990**); for the sake of the person.

Pūrva Mīmāṃsā , the 'prior' Mīmāṃsā, as opposed to Vedānta (but the exact meaning of the two term may be debated, see Parpola 1981), see Mīmāṃsā.

pūrvapakṣa prima facie view, deemed to be defeated by the siddhānta view.

pūrvapakṣin upholder of the pūrvapakṣa.

rājasūya «ein Komplex von Opferhandlungen, in welchem sowohl Soma- als auch iṣṭi und paśu-Opfer vorkommen; dem Zweck nach die rituelle Weihe eines Königs. Dieses berühmte Ritual wird geschrieben in [...]» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

rathantara «n, Name eines berühmten und im Ritual viel gebrauchten sāman, das auf SV I,233 beruht und als mit Agni, der gāyatrī und dem Frühling verbunden gilt» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). See also *sāman*.

ṛc indicates a verse as opposed to its sung form: «der gesprochene, metrisch gebundene Vers aus der Ṛksa hitā, im Unterschied zum gesungenen sāman aus dem Sāmaveda und zur metrisch weniger oder gar nicht gebundenen Opferformel yajus aus dem Yajurveda [...]» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

śabda indicates language in all its possible extensions, from language in general to 'statement', 'word' and 'morpheme'. Hence, I have translated it according to the context and used 'linguistic element' whenever multiple meanings (mostly, 'word' or 'morpheme') of the term have to be taken into account. In epistemology, it means Verbal Communication as instrument of knowledge.

śabdabhāvanā , or śābdībhāvanā, the inner force of a prescriptive sentence according to the Bhāṭṭas. Prābhākaras deny it and speak instead of 'prescription' and 'prescriptive force'. The linguistic bhāvanā is a urge conveyed by the prescriptive suffixes of optative, imperative, optative particles and subjunctive and leading one to undertake an action (called bhāvanā, q.v.). The linguistic bhāvanā is an innovation of Kumārila, who built it symmetrically to Śabara's notion of (objective) bhāvanā.

sādhana substantive from the root sidh- ('to realise') meaning 'instrument to realise'.

sādhya gerundive of sidh- ('to realise'), meaning 'to be realised'.

saktu «Gemahlene dhānās [=roasted taṇḍulas], d.h. geröstete und gemahlene Körner» (**Einoo1985**).

sāman «n, die (fast nur im Somakult) für den Gesangvortrag vorgesehenen vedischen Verse (ṛc) und deren Melodie; sie haben fünf Teile (bhakti), die von den einzelnen Gesangspriestern gesungen werden; das Finale (nidhana) wird jedoch im Trio ausgeführt. Meist versteht man aber unter s. die Grundmelodie allein; ein und dieselbe Melodie kann also auch durchaus verschiedenen Versen zugeordnet werden» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). Only the last meaning is used in TR IV. In a Mīmāṃsā context, Garge explains: «The particular music or melody to which a *mantra* is set is called *sāman*. Under MS 7.2.1-21 Śabara says that the various *sāman* names –*Rathantara* etc. should be taken as denoting music. Each *sāman* (chant) is primarily connected with certain verses, e.g., when we speak of *Rathantara* without further qualifications the verses meant are RV 7.32.22-23 (=SV 2.10-11 *abhi tvā*) and when one refers to the *Vāmadevya sāman* without more qualifications the verses intended are RV 4.31.1-3 (=SV 2.87-89). These are called the 'own' verses of the respective *sāmans* [...]. But the verses that are the 'own' verses of a *sāman* can be sung to another 'melody'. So the word *sāman* as applied to *Rathantara*, *Bṛhat*, *Raivata* and others means simply a melody and not one or more *ṛk*-verses that are sung. The same conclusion is reiterated in 9.2.1-2. [...]. Sāman have been divided into several kinds: *Rathantara*, *Bṛhat*, *Vairūpa*, *Śakvara*, *Raivata*, etc. This

division is based upon the different methods of singing *e.g.* the *Bṛhat-sāman* is to be sung with force and very loudly, while the *Rathantara* is sung not loudly, nor with force (MS 9.2.46).

sambandha connection.

saṃdhyopāsana Vedic ritual. «On the saṃdhyopāsana see Ṣaḍviṃśa Brāhmaṇa [ed. Eelsingh, Brill, Leiden 1908] 4.5; Taittirīya Āraṇyaka [Bibliotheca Indica] 2.2 (but this sentence is not found there). It is properly not a śrauta but a gṛhya rite, cf. Hillebrandt, Ritualliteratur, p. 74[**Hillebrandt1901**]; but the Gṛhya-sūtras seem to contain nothing like the sentence here quoted» (Edgerton 1929: 180fn, referring to a quotation within MNP which is identical with the one in TR §C.3.2).

Saṃhitā each of the three (or four) collections of verses/prose passages known in the West as "Veda", i.e. Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda and, according to some schools, Atharvaveda.

Sāṃkhyā one of the six traditionally recognised philosophical systems, characterised by the doctrine of a radical difference between a material nature (prakṛti), pauselessly changing, and an immaterial soul (puruṣa), existing beyond time and space.

sam-ṛ- indicates the semantic element conveyed by verbal root, verbal ending etc., and to be connected as instrument, procedure, or "what must be done". In AN, III, ad 22, p. 240 it is opposed to prāpta in the sense that the former indicates something already well established while sam-ṛ indicates what new shade of meaning has been added by a certain morpheme: pūrvapakṣavādī tāvad evaṃ manyate –kriyāsāmarthyād eva tāvad guṇabhūtaḥ puruṣaḥ prāptaḥ. tatra svargakāmaśabdena na kaścit puruṣaviśeṣo rājaśabdeneva vrīhyādiśabdeneva vā dravyaviśeṣaḥ samarpyate.

saṃskāra «rituelle Handlung verschiedener Art» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). «Jhā, Śabara trans., e.g. 6.3.38, vol. II, p. 1069, translated saṃskāra as "embellishment". Saṃskāras are preparatory actions including e.g. cutting the yūpa in the prescribed way, sprinkling the utensils with water, or pounding the grain (takṣaṇaprokṣaṇapeṣaṇādi). All of these are ritual actions accompanied by mantras, and thus bring the respective materials into the sacred sphere of the sacrifice. In the same way the jātakarma and other childhood saṃskāras including Upanayana (and later ones as well including the marriage and funerary ceremonies) are preparatory rites, preparing the individual for the next stage in life (or afterlife).» (**Smith1987**).

sānnāyya "(from sam-nī-, "to put together") is a mixture of freshly boiled milk from the morning milking and curds (yogurt) made from milk of

the previous evening's milking. It is offered in the new moon sacrifice to Indra or Mahendra. It should be offered by one who has performed a Soma sacrifice and replaces the *puroḍāśa* offered to the same deity by a non-Soma sacrificer. (**Smith1987**). «Any substance mixed with clarified butter &c. and offered as a burnt offering or oblation, (esp.) a partic. offering of the Agni-hotṛis (said to consist of milk taken from a cow on the evening of the new moon, mixed on the next day with other milk and offered with clarified butter), TS.; Br.; KātyŚr.» (MW).

sannidhi contiguity, proximity.

śastra,scil. mantra «śastra n, die Rezitation (Litanei) des hotṛ und seiner Gehilfen, im Unterschied zum vorangegangenen stotra, das gesungen wird [...]». «Die Stotra's beruhen auf Gesang, die śastra's sind Recitationen: apragītamantrasādhyā stutiḥ śastram, pragītamantrasādhyā stutiḥ stotram» (Hillebrandt 1897:§58, p.100 and fn. 5 to the text quoted: «Jaim. N.M.Vistara p. 60 SV.[=Sāmaveda] I, S.50».

śāstra is used in Mīmāṃsā texts to identify the Veda as a distinct kind of instrument of knowledge, symmetrical to sense perception insofar as only these two do not derive their basic data from any other instrument of knowledge. Such use is found since the time of the vṛttikāra. See, e.g., śāstraṃ śabdavijñānād asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe vijñānam (ŚBh ad 1.1.5), quoted supra, §C.3.13.

siddha past passive participle of the root siddh, 'to realise, establish', meaning 'realised, established'.

siddhānta 'conclusion', final and accepted thesis.

siddhāntin the supporter of the siddhānta, the thesis that will turn out to be the demonstrated conclusion; the upholder of the final view, usually coincident with the author himself.

śliṣṭa a verse which can be read as conveying two different meanings.

smaraṇa memory, the act of recollection.

smṛti memory; (opposed to śruti) a group of texts whose authority derives from the Vedas, but that, unlike the Veda; have been transmitted and not directly heard by the ancient seers; each of those texts.

śrauta adj. referring to the śruti; (of a ritual) official ritual to be performed according to the rules of the Śrautasūtras (as opposed to domestic rituals, described in the Gṛhyasūtras).

Śrautasūtra Class of ritual manuals concerning the performance details of official sacrifices.

Śrī Vaiṣṇavism a theological school grounded by Śrī Rāmāṇuja in the xiii century. It maintains that the world is different and at the same time non different from God (called Viṣṇu).

śrotriya expert in ritual. "A yajñika is one who performs the sacrifices. He is distinguished from a śrotriya, one who is knowledgeable in ritualistic praxis, and a vaidika, one who has memorized the Veda (Renou 1971:54)" (**Smith1987**).

śruti (opposite of smṛti) Sacred Texts, believed to have been heard (root śru-) by the ancient seers (ṛṣis), Vedas.

sruva «der kleine, aus khadira-Holz (Acacia catechu) gefertigte Opferlöffel, der dazu dient, zerlassene Butter oder Milch in den großen Löffel (sruc) zu füllen, mit dem dann die eigentliche Opferung (tyāga) vollzogen wird.» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). «So verschiedenärtig wie die Gefäße sind auch die Opferlöffel. Der größe Löffel heißt dhruvā; er wird für Butterschmalzlibationen ājyabhāga gebraucht. Die juhū ist ein zungenförmiger Löffel, mir dem man gleichfalls Butter ins Feuer träufelt. dhruvā, juhū und upabhṛt bilden die Gruppe der sruc genannten Löffel. Sie dienen vorzugsweise zum Träufeln der zerlassenen Butter ins Opferfeuer, sind armlang, haben einen Schöpfer von der Größe einer Hand und sind mit einer schnabelförmigen Gießöffnung versehen. Dagegen ist sruva der kleine Opferlöffel. MIt diesem füllt man ājya aus der sthālī in den tatsächlichen Opferlöffel. [...] Ein Schöpflöffel ist ferner die darvī. Aus khadira (Acacia catechu) ist der sruva, aus parṇa (=palāśa; Butea frondosa) die juhū, aus aśvattha (FIcus religiosa) der upabhṛt [...]» (**Mylius1995**12-13).

stotra, scilicet mantra «n, der Trio-Gesang des udgātṛ und seiner Gehilfen, des prastotṛ und pratihartṛ; er folgt der Somaschöpfung und geht dem śastra und der Opferung voraus. Das s. besteht aus Versen (ṛc), die in eine bestimmte Melodie (sāman) gesetzt sind.» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). On different mantras, see MS 2.1.adhik.5. See also śastra.

sūtra 1. Aphorism (used in philosophical texts for the sake of briefty)). 2. Collection of such aphorisms.

svarga a state of enduring happiness; heaven.

svargakāma the one who desires heaven/happiness.

svargakāmo yajeta a prescription often quoted in Mīmāṃsā texts, but never found in exactly this form in any extant Vedic or Śrautasūtra text: "The one who desires heaven should sacrifice".

svataḥ prāmāṇya intrinsic validity.

śyena a malefic ritual aimed at damaging one's own enemy and prescribed in the Veda.

taṇḍula "Enthülste Reis- oder Gerstenkörner. Die Körner in den Hülsen werden im Mörser (ulūkhala) mit dem Stößel (muṣala/musala) geschlagen und die Hülsen werden mit der Getreideschwinge (śūrpa) durch den Wind entfernt. Diese Handlungen des Schlagens (avahanana) und Entfernens (*parāpavana*) von Hülsen heißen *phalīkaraṇa* oder Fruchtmachung, und die Körner heißen in diesem Zustand *taṇḍula*. Der *taṇḍula* ist also noch mit Randschicht und Keimling versehen" (**Einoo1985**). "Grain (after threshing and winnowing), esp. rice" (MW).

tarkapāda the first chapter of the MS (and of many other philosophical texts), dealing with speculative issues.

udbhid «Name eines Einestages=Someopfers (ekāha)» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

uddiś- (among other meanings) to directly enunciate, same as *śru-*. See §C.6.2 (p.53, l.1) and §C.10.1, p.57. **Yoshimizu1994** claims, on the contrary, that it means *aufgezeigt*, and is opposed to *vidheya*. Hence, it indicates what is already known in a prescription, as opposed to the new content conveyed. There cannot be, in fact, two *vidheya*s, if one wants to avoid a split in the sentence (*vākyabheda*). See **Yoshimizu1994** Cf. especially C.10, since the context is there the same as the one discussed by Yoshimizu, and it would be striking if the meaning of *uddiś-* were so different. CHECK! CHECK! CHECK!

ulūkhala «n, Aus Holz bestehender Mörser zum Zerstößen von Körnern» (**Mylius1995** s.v.).

upadeśa teaching; Vedic word.

upamāna analogy (as instrument of knowledge).

upāṃśuyāja «Darbringung einer Butterschmalzspende zu Beginn des Hauptritus im Neu- und Vollmondopfer» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). On the Upāṃśuyāja, see ŚBh 6.5.10.

Upaniṣad Class of texts included within Vedic texts and regarded by Advaita Vedānta as the culmination of the Veda.

utpatti origin; coming into being.

utpū- (among other meanings) to purify (clarified butter) by removing the fat part. For this use of ut-pū-, see Gobhila Gṛhyasūtra 1.7.24.

uttarapakṣa possible antithesis to the pūrvapakṣa, deemed to be defeated to the definitive siddhānta.

uttarapakṣin upholder of the uttarapakṣa.

vacana statement, utterance; in Grammar, grammatical number.

Vaiśeṣika Together with Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Yoga, one of the six philosophical systems traditionally recognised as "orthodox". It focuses mainly on physics and ontology. In a later stage, it constitutes with Nyāya a single system, called Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. This term may also denote every thinker following the school.

vākya sentence. Sentence is not used as antithetical to"prescription". On the contrary, according to the Mīmāṃsā school, only Vedic prescriptions have an independent epistemological value, whereas non-prescriptive sentences have to be understood as subsidiaries to prescriptions. Hence, *vākya* is just a synonym of *vidhi* (or *niyoga*).

vākyārtha sentence-meaning.

vākyavipariṇāma , see vipariṇāma.

varṇa phoneme.

Veda lit. 'knowledge', Indian sacred texts, orally transmitted and not accepted as such by Buddhist and Jaina schools.

Vedānta Together with Mīmāṃsā, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Yoga, one of the six philosophical systems traditionally recognised as "orthodox". It is also called Uttara Mīmāṃsā.

vedāpauruṣeyatva the condition of having no author of the Veda (Veda-apauruṣeyatva).

vedapramāṇa Veda as a means of valid cognition.

vedaprāmāṇya Veda's being an instrument of knowledge, Veda's reliability, Veda's authoritativeness.

vidhi prescription.

vipariṇāma , or vākyavipariṇāma, is a paraphrase to make the bhāvanā (which is the meaning of every Vedic sentence) explicit.

viṣaya object; content (of a cognition).

viśvajit «Name eines Eintages-Somaopfers (ekāha); es kann entweder als agniṣṭoma oder als atirātra vollzogen werden. Im Einjahres-sattra ist der vierte Tag nach dem viṣuvat ein v. Der v. konnte auch Teil eines sarvamedha sein. Er erforderte als Opferlohn 100 Pferde und 1000 Rinder oder die ganze Habe» (**Mylius1995** s.v.). To this sacrifice no

result is explicitly connected in the Sacred Texts. In this regard, Mīmāṃsaka debates end up with the formulation of the "All-conquering [sacrifice] rule" (viśvajinnyāya), prescribing paradise as result whenever no explicit result is present (MS 4.3.15).

vivakṣā Lit 'desire to say,' the desire to express something which is the primus movens of every utterance.

vivaraṇa For this technical term, see **Cardona1975** In the same article, Cardona quotes this definition: "Viśvanātha Pañcānana, *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī* 276, defines *vivaraṇa* as saying the same thing in other words having the same meaning: *vivaraṇaṃ tu tat-samānārthaka-padāntareṇa tad-artha-kathanam* (**Cardona1975**).

vṛtti Gloss.

vṛttikāra lit. 'author of the gloss,' the author of the –now lost– gloss on MS quoted by Śabara, especially in ŚBh ad MS 1.1.2-5.

vyavahāra mundane use; mundane behaviour; linguistic use (referring to common language). V. is considered as the instrument through which one learns a language.

vyutpatti proficient learning, denotativeness; the grasping the signifier-signified relation holding between word and meaning (vācyavācakasambandhagrahaṇam eva vyutpattir VM i, S p.3). **TR1956** iii).

yāga sacrifice.

yajña Sacrificing, offering (homa) and giving (dāna) are the three kinds of ritual acts according to Mīmāṃsakas.

yajñika ritual-performing-priest.

yajvan "One who performs sacrifices in accordance with Vedic precepts" (Apte). But MW and PW do not mention this connotation of the term.

yogyatā fitness; suitability.

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All references are to page numbers.

Bibliography

D.1 Abbreviations

D.1.1 Sources

1900, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series edition of VN
1904, Mukuṇḍa Śāstrī's edition of VM
A, Avasthi edition of VM
AN, Aṅganirṇaya, chapter of Nyāyaratnamālā, see Pārthasārathi Miśra
AS, Arthasaṃgraha of Laugākṣi Bhāskara
ĀŚ, Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra
Bṛ, Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra
KŚ, Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra
KS, Kāhaka Saṃhitā
KSA, Kāhaka Saṃhitā, Aśvamedhagrantha
MaiS, Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā
MK, Mīmāṃsākośa
MNP, Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa, see Āpadeva
MŚ, Mānava Śrauta Sūtra
MS, Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini, see Śabara Svāmin and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa
NKus, Nyāyakusumañjali of Udayana
PrP, Prakaraṇa Pañcikā, see Śālikanātha Miśra
Ṛju, Ṛjuvimalā of Śālikanātha Miśra, see Prabhākara Miśra
S, Sarma edition of VM
Śā, Śāstrī edition of PrP
ŚBr, Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Mādh. recension
ŚBh, Śābarabhāṣya, see Śabara Svāmin
ŚV, Ślokavārttika, see Kumārila Bhaṭṭa
TK Trikāṇḍamaṇḍana of Bhāskara Miśra, see **Smith1987**
TS, Taittirīya Saṃhitā
TV, Tantravārttika, see Kumārila Bhaṭṭa
VK, Viṣayakaraṇīya, chapter of PrP, see Śālikanātha Miśra
VN, Vidhinirṇaya, chapter of Nyāyaratnamālā, see Pārthasārathi Miśra
VM I, Vākyārthamātṛkā part one, chapter of PrP, see Śālikanātha Miśra
VM II, Vākyārthamātṛkā part two, chapter of PrP, see Śālikanātha Miśra

VV, Vidhiviveka, see Maṇḍana Miśra

D.1.2 Others

Ce, Citatum ex alio, quotation from another text in the text one is editing.
Ce', Ce usus secundarii, that is, a text incorporated in the text one is editing without declaring it.
Cee, Ce modo edendi, that is, with minor modifications
Ce'e, Ce' modo edendi
Ce", Ce usus tertiarii, that is, a text incorporated in a text, which is again incorporated in the text one is editing.
Ce"e, Ce" modo edendi
Re, Citatum ex alio modo referendi, where only the content of a certain text is reported in the text one is editing.

Pr, Textus Parallelus modo referendi, a text of the same author of the text one is editing, whose content only is repeated, often with some differences in meaning.
Pv, Textus Parallelus variatus, a text of the same author of the text one is editing, but with more or less strong variations.